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In	  this	  thesis	  I	  propose	  that	  emotions	  and	  rationality	  are	  integrated,	  and	  jointly	  
constitute	  our	  moral	  agency.	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  influential	  ‘sentimentalist’	  claim	  
that	  emotions	  are	  the	  only	  constituents	  of	  the	  moral	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  act,	  
by	  showing	  that	  emotions	  are	  inextricably	  bound	  up	  with	  our	  sensory	  and	  
conceptual	  capacities.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  propose	  we	  act	  for	  moral	  reasons	  when	  we	  
act	  in	  light	  of	  the	  narratives	  we	  create	  and	  understand.	  Narrative	  understanding	  
here	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  inhabit	  a	  chain	  of	  events.	  It	  is	  embodied	  and	  action-­‐


















5	   	  
Moral	  Agency	  
An	  Embodied	  Narrative	  Approach	  
Précis	  
	  
The	  aim	  of	  philosophy,	  abstractly	  formulated,	  is	  to	  understand	  how	  things	  in	  the	  broadest	  
possible	  sense	  of	  the	  term	  hang	  together	  in	  the	  broadest	  possible	  sense	  of	  the	  term.	  
Sellars,	  1963	  
	  
My	  thesis	  asks:	  what	  is	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  our	  capacity	  to	  work	  out,	  and	  act	  
on,	  our	  moral	  values?	  My	  answer	  is	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  our	  narrative	  
understanding,	  and	  it	  is	  through	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  that	  we	  work	  out,	  
and	  act	  on,	  what	  matters	  to	  us.	  Because	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  and	  action-­‐
orientated,	  so	  is	  our	  narrative	  understanding.	  However,	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  also	  constituted	  through	  our	  conceptual	  and	  sensory	  
capacities,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  integrated	  with	  emotions.	  	  
In	  putting	  forward	  this	  theory,	  I	  retain	  an	  insight	  of	  Prinz	  concerning	  
what	  emotions	  are	  and	  how	  they	  contribute	  to	  our	  moral	  judgements.	  However,	  
unlike	  Prinz,	  and	  many	  others,	  I	  reject	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  deliberative	  
reasoning	  and	  emotions,	  and	  claim	  that	  emotions,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  narrative	  
understanding,	  are	  constitutive	  of	  our	  moral	  deliberation.	  	  
	  
Chapter	  1	  
Emotions	  and	  Moral	  Judgement:	  A	  Critique	  of	  Prinz	  
My	  first	  chapter	  examines	  the	  theory	  put	  forward	  by	  Jesse	  Prinz	  (2006	  &	  2007)	  
that	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  By	  this	  he	  means	  that	  emotions,	  
when	  in	  a	  compound	  state	  with	  a	  representation	  of	  their	  object,	  are	  constitutive	  
of	  moral	  judgements.	  However	  emotions	  are	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  judgement	  
when,	  and	  only	  when,	  they	  are	  caused	  by	  a	  sentiment	  attributable	  to	  the	  agent.	  
For	  example,	  the	  conjunction	  of	  my	  anger	  with	  the	  representation	  of	  ISIS	  may	  be	  
constitutive	  of	  a	  moral	  judgement.	  It	  is	  a	  moral	  judgement	  if,	  for	  example,	  my	  
anger	  is	  caused	  by	  me	  having	  general	  sentiments	  against	  authoritarianism	  and	  
unjust	  violence.	  A	  sentiment,	  here,	  is	  a	  disposition	  to	  feel	  a	  certain	  way	  that	  is	  
stored	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory.	  	  	  
6	   	  
That	  my	  anger	  is	  caused	  by	  notions	  of	  injustice	  makes	  it,	  for	  Prinz,	  a	  
moral	  emotion.	  A	  moral	  emotion	  for	  Prinz,	  is	  an	  embodied	  appraisal	  triggered	  
by	  a	  ‘calibration	  file’	  pertaining	  to	  moral	  issues.	  	  An	  embodied	  appraisal	  is	  an	  
embodied	  representation	  of	  what	  a	  situations	  means	  for	  an	  organism.	  In	  the	  
case	  of	  anger	  the	  appraisal	  may	  be	  that	  something	  the	  organism	  cares	  about	  has	  
been	  harmed	  or	  insulted.	  An	  emotion	  is	  calibrated	  to	  an	  issue	  when	  a	  
representation	  of	  that	  issue	  is	  the	  eliciting	  condition	  for	  the	  emotion.	  In	  the	  
example	  above	  the	  calibration	  file	  that	  elicits	  the	  embodied	  appraisal	  is	  
injustice.	  
While,	  for	  Prinz,	  most	  emotions	  are	  not	  normally	  conceptual,	  Prinz	  states	  
that	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  concepts.	  For	  Prinz,	  a	  concept	  is	  a	  
representation	  that	  is	  intentionally	  controlled.	  As	  such,	  if	  moral	  emotions	  
constitute	  moral	  judgements,	  they	  should	  be	  under	  the	  control	  of	  an	  agent.	  A	  
tension	  in	  Prinz’s	  account	  is	  that	  moral	  emotions	  are	  not	  intentionally	  controlled	  
but	  caused	  by	  intentional	  processes,	  and	  thus,	  while	  he	  states	  that	  moral	  
emotions	  constitute	  concepts,	  they	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  play	  the	  same	  role	  that	  Prinz	  
gives	  to	  concepts.	  Concepts,	  for	  Prinz,	  participate	  in	  our	  rational	  deliberative	  
processes,	  whereas	  moral	  emotions	  are	  triggered	  by	  deliberative	  processes.	  His	  
claim	  about	  moral	  judgements	  therefore	  boils	  down	  to:	  embodied	  appraisals,	  
along	  with	  a	  representation	  of	  their	  object,	  and	  when	  elicited	  by	  rational	  
processes,	  constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  
I	  will	  be	  accepting	  some	  of	  Prinz’s	  premises:	  first	  that	  emotions	  are	  
embodied	  appraisals,	  although	  I	  will	  not	  be	  understanding	  them	  as	  
representations,	  and	  second	  that	  the	  processes	  underlying	  moral	  judgements	  
necessarily	  have	  some	  motivational	  force.	  That	  is,	  I’ll	  be	  accepting	  his	  moral	  
internalism.	  	  
However,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  my	  first	  chapter	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  some	  
ambiguities	  in	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  moral	  judgements	  that	  result	  from	  his	  
simultaneous	  commitments	  to	  sentimentalism,	  his	  belief	  that	  moral	  emotions	  
constitute	  moral	  concepts,	  and	  his	  theory	  that	  concepts	  are	  under	  intentional	  
control.	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  three	  commitments,	  I	  argue,	  is	  why	  Prinz	  
explicitly	  states	  that	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  concepts,	  while	  describing	  their	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role	  in	  our	  mental	  processes	  differently	  from	  the	  role	  he	  normally	  assigns	  
concepts.	  	  
My	  aim	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  to	  give	  an	  alternative	  account	  
of	  the	  processes	  underlying	  moral	  judgements	  that	  contests	  Prinz’s	  view	  that	  
moral	  judgements	  fall	  outside	  of	  our	  deliberative	  capacities.	  This	  framework	  
makes	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  constitutive	  of	  the	  moral	  sense	  through	  
which	  we	  make	  judgements.	  Such	  a	  framework	  is	  a	  shift	  in	  perspective	  in	  that	  
the	  meaning	  and	  relationship	  between	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘agency’	  ‘judgement’	  and	  
‘concept’	  are	  reconceived.	  And,	  on	  this	  framework,	  moral	  judgements	  are	  the	  




The	  Mystery	  of	  the	  Missing	  Agent	  
Apparently	  countering	  Prinz’s	  story	  is	  an	  observation	  made	  by	  Gerrans	  &	  
Kennett	  (2010)	  that	  a	  moral	  judgement	  exists	  for	  an	  agent	  that	  can	  act	  for	  
reasons.	  To	  act	  for	  reasons,	  they	  submit,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  a	  creature	  that	  can	  
understand	  itself.	  For,	  following	  Velleman	  (1992),	  to	  have	  reasons	  is	  to	  act	  in	  
light	  of	  your	  self-­‐understanding,	  that	  is,	  what	  is	  most	  coherent	  given	  your	  
values,	  attitudes	  and	  aims.	  Human	  self-­‐understanding,	  on	  Gerrans	  &	  Kennett’s	  
(G&K’s)	  picture,	  takes	  places	  in	  an	  autobiographical	  context,	  which	  involves	  
both	  explicit	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  existing	  through	  time	  
provided	  by	  mental	  time	  travel.	  Mental	  time	  travel	  (MTT)	  requires	  not	  only	  that	  
we	  know	  that,	  in	  fact,	  our	  past	  was	  like	  this,	  and	  our	  future	  might	  be	  like	  that,	  
but	  also	  that	  we	  subjectively	  inhabit	  our	  past	  and	  possible	  future.	  	  
	   In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  explore	  exactly	  where	  the	  point	  of	  contestation	  is	  
between	  G&K’s	  account	  and	  Prinz’s.	  It	  is	  not	  quite	  where	  G&K	  believe	  it	  to	  be.	  
G&K’s	  focus	  in	  on	  how	  other	  theories	  of	  moral	  judgement	  leave	  out	  the	  
diachronic	  capacities,	  such	  as	  an	  autobiographical	  knowledge	  and	  MTT,	  that	  are	  
constitutive	  of	  an	  agent.	  These	  capacities	  are	  therefore	  required	  to	  make	  moral	  
judgements,	  because	  it	  is	  agents	  that	  make	  judgements.	  For	  G&K,	  Prinz’s	  
sentimentalism	  fails	  because	  it	  leaves	  out	  these	  diachronic	  capacities.	  This	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emphasis,	  I	  argue,	  gives	  Prinz	  an	  easy	  route	  out.	  Prinz	  can	  accept	  that	  diachronic	  
capacities	  are	  important,	  but	  because	  he	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  
cause	  and	  constitution,	  he	  can	  simply	  argue	  that	  diachronic	  capacities	  are	  
important	  causes	  of	  the	  emotions	  that	  constitute	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  not	  
themselves	  constituents	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
	   However,	  lurking	  underneath	  these	  less	  decisive	  arguments	  lies,	  I	  argue,	  
a	  more	  fundamental	  disagreement	  about	  what	  conceptual	  framework	  best	  
allows	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  agency.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  if	  we	  return	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  
agency,	  as	  a	  creature	  that	  acts	  for	  reasons.	  Here,	  I	  apply	  an	  argument	  of	  
McDowell’s	  to	  Prinz’s	  schema.	  Both	  agree	  that	  a	  creature,	  to	  be	  an	  agent,	  must	  
act	  on	  processes	  related	  to	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  Further,	  Prinz,	  like	  
McDowell,	  agrees	  that	  it	  is	  concepts	  that	  participate	  in	  such	  reasoning.	  
However,	  McDowell	  argues	  that	  to	  call	  an	  attitude	  a	  judgement,	  it	  must	  itself	  be	  
conceptual,	  rather	  than	  just	  caused	  by	  concepts.	  As	  McDowell	  puts	  it,	  a	  
judgement	  must	  fall	  in	  ‘the	  space	  of	  reasons’.	  Yet,	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  
not	  involved	  in	  deliberation,	  and	  so	  I	  suggest	  that	  his	  account	  of	  moral	  
judgements,	  when	  we	  take	  up	  an	  alternative	  viewpoint,	  fails	  to	  be	  an	  account	  of	  
judgements.	  Seen	  through	  McDowell’s	  framework,	  for	  as	  long	  as	  Prinz	  is	  
committed	  to	  arguing	  that	  our	  deliberative	  capacities	  are	  only	  a	  cause	  of,	  rather	  
than	  constitutive	  of,	  our	  judgements,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  G&K	  are	  right	  to	  suggest	  
that	  Prinz	  does	  not	  give	  us	  an	  account	  of	  agency	  or	  judgements.	  
This	  argument	  throws	  into	  relief	  two	  very	  different	  frameworks	  for	  
understanding	  agency,	  concepts,	  and	  judging.	  While	  for	  Prinz,	  judging	  can	  be	  
caused	  by	  an	  agent’s	  deliberative	  capacities,	  for	  McDowell,	  judging	  is	  constituted	  
by	  an	  agent’s	  deliberative	  capacities.	  While	  I	  will	  not	  be	  proving	  that	  McDowell’s	  
theory	  is	  preferable,	  this	  discussion	  does	  enable	  us	  to	  recognise	  that	  Prinz’s	  
argument	  only	  works	  because	  of	  fundamental,	  and	  debatable,	  commitments	  
concerning	  how	  best	  to	  understand	  these	  notions	  and	  their	  relationship.	  	  
	   Having	  laid	  out	  the	  contributions	  of	  G&K	  on	  the	  moral	  judgement	  debate,	  
I	  move	  on	  to	  the	  aims	  and	  methodology	  that	  will	  characterise	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  
thesis.	  I	  aim,	  like	  G&K	  and	  Prinz,	  to	  not	  only	  build	  on	  particular	  philosophical	  
frameworks	  about	  what	  characterises	  moral	  agency	  and	  moral	  judgements,	  but	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also	  to	  contribute	  to	  a	  naturalistic	  framework	  concerning	  what	  psychological	  
and	  neurological	  processes	  enable	  agency	  and	  judgements.	  Like	  G&K	  and	  
Velleman,	  this	  view	  of	  agency	  and	  judgement	  will	  focus	  on	  our	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐
understanding,	  but	  like	  Prinz,	  emotions	  will	  be	  central	  to	  this	  account.	  	  
My	  methodology	  is	  to	  co-­‐ordinate,	  and	  show	  the	  convergence	  between,	  
various	  lines	  of	  enquiry:	  conceptual,	  phenomenological	  and	  empirical.	  Prinz	  is	  
not	  proven	  to	  be	  wrong,	  instead,	  what	  I	  construct	  is	  a	  plausible	  alternative	  that	  
makes	  sense	  of	  various	  lines	  of	  thought	  and	  types	  of	  evidence,	  some	  of	  which	  is	  
also	  a	  problem	  for	  Prinz’s	  account.	  The	  unification	  of	  seemingly	  diverse	  existing	  
theories	  under	  the	  theory	  of	  narrative	  moral	  agency,	  the	  philosophically	  
informative	  novel	  contributions	  to	  it,	  and	  the	  accounting	  of	  various	  empirical	  
results	  using	  this	  theory,	  are	  proposed	  as	  reasons	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  
narrative	  moral	  agency.	  	  	  
	  
Chapter	  3	  
Emotion	  in	  Narrative	  Understanding	  and	  Mental	  Time	  Travel	  
We	  leave	  Prinz	  for	  the	  next	  two	  chapters	  to	  start	  developing	  a	  positive	  proposal	  
of	  agency.	  Prinz	  will	  be	  returned	  to	  when	  some	  new	  theoretic	  tools	  are	  in	  place.	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  pick	  up	  on	  G&K’s	  claim	  that	  MTT	  is	  crucial	  for	  being	  able	  to	  
make	  and	  act	  on	  responsible	  decisions.	  I	  bracket	  agency	  temporarily,	  given	  its	  
philosophical	  weight.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  can	  give	  an	  alternative,	  but	  
related,	  explanation	  for	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  G&K	  use	  to	  support	  their	  claim	  
about	  the	  importance	  of	  MTT	  to	  making	  and	  acting	  on	  decisions.	  I	  develop	  the	  
view	  that	  it	  is	  narrative	  understanding,	  rather	  than	  MTT,	  that	  is	  central	  to	  these	  
capacities,	  and	  which	  can	  explain	  the	  problems	  people	  with	  ventromedial	  
prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC)	  damage	  have	  with	  acting	  responsibly.	  	  
Narrative	  understanding	  is	  proposed	  as	  a	  broader	  category,	  of	  which	  
MTT	  is	  a	  specific	  type.	  MTT	  is	  telling	  and	  understanding	  stories	  explicitly	  about	  
oneself.	  Crucially,	  not	  all	  the	  narratives	  we	  understand	  are	  explicitly	  about	  
ourselves.	  Particularly,	  unlike	  G&K,	  my	  account	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  does	  
not	  give	  particular	  importance	  to	  our	  capacity	  to	  represent	  ourselves	  as	  
psychological	  beings,	  a	  capacity	  known	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis	  as	  
10	   	  
metarepresentation.	  Narrative	  understanding	  may	  only	  implicitly	  involve	  the	  
self,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  a	  perspectival	  and	  embodied	  
activity.	  Watching	  the	  news,	  I	  may	  understand	  events	  narratively,	  as	  the	  
newsreader	  takes	  me	  through	  an	  emotional	  sequence	  of	  events.	  	  
	   To	  develop	  a	  theory	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  I	  draw	  on	  the	  work	  of	  
Velleman	  and	  Goldie.	  Narrative	  understanding,	  for	  Velleman,	  consists	  of	  
understanding	  events	  emotionally.	  Since	  emotions	  are	  an	  embodied	  sense	  of	  
situations,	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  
viscerally	  and	  kinaesthetically.	  We	  understand	  narratives	  because	  the	  sequence	  
of	  emotions	  in	  them	  has	  cadence.	  Narrative	  follows	  patterns	  that	  are	  familiar	  to	  
us,	  because	  these	  patterns	  mimic	  patterns	  that	  are	  common	  in	  everyday	  life,	  and	  
because	  there	  is	  a	  sort	  of	  logic	  to	  what	  emotions	  are	  likely	  to	  follow	  from	  other	  
emotions.	  For	  example,	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  grief,	  as	  the	  feeling	  that	  something	  we	  
have	  love	  has	  been	  lost,	  to	  follow	  from	  love.	  	  
	   Using	  Goldie’s	  insight	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  characterised	  by	  a	  
perspective	  on	  events,	  but	  might	  also	  contain	  perspectives	  internal	  to	  events,	  I	  
relate	  narrative	  understanding	  back	  to	  MTT.	  Narrative	  understanding	  is	  the	  
general	  capacity	  to	  have	  an	  emotional	  and	  diachronic	  understanding	  of	  events	  
that	  are	  not	  currently	  before	  us,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  are	  about	  ourselves	  
or	  not.	  As	  a	  perspective	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  emotion,	  all	  narrative	  understanding	  
elicits	  an	  emotional	  cadence	  in	  us	  as	  onlookers	  to	  the	  event.	  We	  can	  also	  
understand	  ourselves	  as	  characters	  in	  a	  story	  when	  the	  emotional	  cadence	  we	  
experience	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  character	  in	  the	  narrative.	  In	  
cases	  of	  MTT,	  this	  character	  is	  us.	  To	  have	  an	  embodied	  perspective	  on	  events,	  
means	  to	  have	  an	  embodied	  sense	  of	  what	  those	  events	  mean	  to	  us,	  including	  a	  
sense	  of	  what	  actions	  a	  situation	  affords.	  	  
I	  argue	  that	  we	  also	  have	  scientific	  reasons	  for	  believing	  that	  emotions	  
are	  important	  for	  our	  sense	  of	  perspective.	  Work	  in	  neuroscience	  indicates	  that	  
regions	  of	  the	  brain	  associated	  with	  emotion	  are	  also	  associated	  with	  our	  sense	  
of	  self.	  In	  particular,	  engaging	  in	  narrative	  and	  autobiographic	  memories	  
increases	  the	  activity	  in	  emotion-­‐associated	  brain	  regions.	  This	  is	  what	  we	  
would	  expect,	  given	  the	  theory	  above.	  If	  emotions	  are	  perspectival,	  in	  the	  sense	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that	  they	  are	  an	  embodied	  sense	  of	  our	  selves	  engaging	  in	  a	  certain	  situation,	  
then	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  evidence:	  brain	  regions	  associated	  with	  emotion	  
are	  involved	  in	  narrative	  activity	  and	  autobiographical	  memory	  because	  
emotions	  co-­‐emerge	  with	  an	  embodied	  sense	  of	  being	  engaged	  in	  a	  situation.	   	  	  
	   Returning	  to	  G&K’s	  claim	  that	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  involved	  in	  acting	  
responsibly	  through	  its	  contribution	  to	  MTT,	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  preliminary	  
empirical	  support	  for	  accepting	  that	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  involved	  in	  a	  broader	  function	  
than	  that	  of	  enabling	  MTT.	  It	  appears	  to	  be	  activated	  in	  tasks	  that	  involve	  taking	  
a	  perspective,	  whether	  one’s	  own	  or	  another’s,	  on	  a	  complex	  temporal	  sequence	  
or	  spatial	  situation.	  This	  appears	  more	  akin	  to	  an	  involvement	  in	  enabling	  a	  
general	  process	  such	  as	  narrative	  understanding	  rather	  than	  MTT.	  	  That	  the	  
vmPFC	  contributes	  to	  our	  ability	  to	  act	  responsibly	  through	  its	  contribution	  to	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  therefore	  a	  plausible	  alternative	  to	  G&K’s	  theory	  that	  
the	  vmPFC	  contributes	  to	  acting	  responsibly	  through	  its	  contribution	  to	  




Chapter	  4	  looks	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  narrative	  understanding,	  mental	  
time	  travel,	  metarepresentation	  and	  agency.	  I	  first	  argue	  that,	  contrary	  to	  
Velleman,	  our	  metarepresentational	  self-­‐understanding	  –	  what	  he	  calls	  causal-­‐
psychological	  understanding	  –	  depends	  on,	  and	  is	  continuous	  with,	  non-­‐
metarepresentational	  narrative	  understanding.	  I	  argue	  further	  that	  minimal	  (i.e.	  
non-­‐metarepresentational)	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  type	  of	  
unified	  self-­‐understanding	  that	  is	  constitutive	  of	  agency.	  Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  a	  
minimal	  narrative	  understanding	  account	  of	  agency	  can	  account	  for	  Strawson’s	  
critique	  of	  narrative	  views	  of	  self,	  and	  is	  better	  at	  accounting	  for	  anthropological	  
data	  than	  metarepresentational	  accounts.	  	  	  	  
	   	  Both	  G&K	  and	  Velleman	  make	  metarepresentation	  central	  to	  agency,	  but	  
it	  is	  unclear	  how	  this	  relates	  to	  narrative	  understanding.	  Velleman	  (2007)	  
claims	  that	  these	  capacities	  are	  distinct.	  I	  argue	  that	  they	  are	  interconnected.	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The	  diachronic	  perspective	  that	  emerges	  with	  narrative	  understanding	  explains	  
how	  we	  are	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  causal-­‐psychological	  explanation.	  	  
	   Then	  I	  propose	  that	  minimal	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  sufficient	  for	  
fulfilling	  the	  functional	  role	  needed	  for	  agency	  that	  is	  normally	  attributed	  to	  
causal-­‐psychological	  understanding.	  When	  we	  understand	  something	  
narratively,	  we	  engage	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  coherent	  world-­‐view	  that	  is	  always	  
also	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  coherent	  self-­‐understanding.	  This	  is	  because	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  inherently	  perspectival	  and	  embodied	  –	  that	  is,	  it	  contains	  a	  
prereflective	  sense	  of	  self	  –	  and	  because	  it	  involves	  conceptual	  capacities	  that	  
enable	  us	  to	  draw	  coherent	  inference.	  Thus,	  even	  while	  we	  are	  directed	  towards	  
the	  world,	  rather	  than	  our	  own	  psychologies,	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  
contains	  a	  sense	  of	  who	  we	  are	  and	  what	  we	  care	  about.	  Like	  causal-­‐
psychological	  accounts	  of	  agency,	  narrative	  self-­‐understanding	  enables	  agency	  
by	  unifying	  us.	  When	  we	  have	  a	  relatively	  unified	  self-­‐understanding,	  it	  is	  then	  
possible	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  who	  we	  are.	  This	  counts	  as	  a	  
reason	  for	  action.	  	  
	   Once	  we	  understand	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  sufficient	  for	  
playing	  this	  role	  in	  agency,	  we	  can	  acknowledge	  Strawson’s	  criticisms	  of	  
narrative	  theories	  of	  the	  self.	  We	  can	  agree	  with	  him	  that	  metarepresentation	  is	  
not	  something	  that	  all	  people	  engage	  in,	  but	  we	  can	  also	  see	  why	  this	  is	  not	  a	  
problem	  for	  narrative	  theories	  of	  agency.	  Narrative	  theories	  of	  agency	  do	  not	  
require	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  metarepresentational	  understanding.	  
Furthermore,	  if	  we	  want	  narrative	  theories	  of	  agency	  to	  count	  in	  the	  right	  
people	  as	  agents,	  they	  better	  not	  require	  that	  agency	  requires	  
metarepresentational	  understanding,	  since	  there	  are	  some	  groups	  of	  people	  
who	  don’t	  generally	  metarepresent,	  and	  yet	  it	  seems	  wrong	  to	  suggest	  that	  this	  
compromises	  their	  agency.	  
	   	  
Chapter	  5	  
Narrative	  Moral	  Agency	  
The	  account	  of	  agency	  I	  develop	  in	  chapter	  4	  feeds	  into	  my	  account	  of	  moral	  
agency	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Here,	  I	  return	  to	  issues	  encountered	  in	  the	  first	  and	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second	  chapter:	  the	  relationship	  between	  emotion	  and	  deliberation.	  And	  in	  
doing	  this	  I	  return	  to	  my	  debate	  with	  Prinz.	  I	  develop	  an	  alternative	  model	  of	  
moral	  judgements	  that	  relies	  on	  McDowell’s	  framework.	  This	  model	  develops	  
the	  view	  of	  narrative	  agency	  I	  have	  already	  begun,	  incorporates	  theoretical	  and	  
phenomenological	  insights	  from	  Taylor,	  and	  fits	  with	  empirical	  evidence	  
concerning	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  concepts.	  Throughout	  this	  chapter,	  an	  
alternative	  account	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  which	  makes	  Prinz’s	  distinction	  
between	  deliberation	  and	  emotion	  incomprehensible,	  will	  come	  into	  greater	  
focus.	  The	  theoretic	  considerations	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  this	  account	  
makes	  sense	  of,	  act	  as	  reasons	  to	  take	  it	  seriously	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  Prinz’s	  
theory.	  In	  all,	  while	  we	  have	  seen	  Prinz	  equivocate	  on	  whether	  emotions	  are	  
conceptual,	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  them	  as	  
conceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  our	  capacity	  to	  stand	  back	  and	  
reflect	  on	  what	  we	  believe	  and	  why.	  	  
	   Taylor’s	  explanation	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘strong	  evaluations’,	  which	  is	  our	  
sense	  of	  what	  is	  moral,	  situates	  them	  as	  both	  emotional	  and	  constituted	  through	  
our	  capacity	  for	  deliberation.	  In	  particular,	  strong	  evaluations	  are	  our	  sense	  of	  
what	  is	  of	  qualitatively	  higher	  and	  lower	  worth.	  They	  are	  constituted	  by	  a	  
narrative	  network	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  encompass	  an	  interconnected,	  and	  
embodied,	  conceptual	  network	  that	  emerges	  with	  a	  particular	  moral	  
perspective.	  	  
While	  strong	  evaluations	  are	  affective	  and	  embodied	  they	  can	  also	  be	  
articulated,	  clarified	  and	  called	  into	  question.	  Further,	  they	  are	  conceptual	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  they	  incorporate	  the	  moral	  language	  we	  have	  available.	  Because	  we	  
can	  be	  asked	  to	  justify	  our	  strong	  evaluations,	  and	  because	  they	  incorporate	  our	  
moral	  language,	  Taylor’s	  strong	  evaluations	  are	  both	  emotional	  and	  placed	  in	  
the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  As	  such	  they	  fall	  within	  the	  same	  framework	  as	  that	  
explained	  by	  McDowell.	  	  
This	  contrasts	  with	  Prinz’s	  framework,	  where	  emotions	  are	  caused	  by	  
deliberative	  capacities	  but	  are	  not	  themselves	  involved	  in	  deliberation.	  Instead,	  
on	  a	  narrative	  view,	  emotions	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  deliberation,	  
and	  in	  this	  sense	  they	  are	  fully	  conceptual.	  Emotions	  are	  a	  conceptual	  capacity	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in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  participate	  in	  what	  I	  call	  a	  ‘recombinant	  system’.	  That	  is,	  
our	  emotions	  participate	  in	  sequences	  that	  can	  be	  combined	  in	  various	  ways.	  
Further,	  our	  emotions	  also	  take	  part	  in	  the	  type	  of	  recombinant	  system	  that	  we	  
can	  use	  to	  deliberate.	  We	  can	  articulate	  our	  emotions	  to	  justify	  our	  beliefs	  and	  
actions.	  This	  type	  of	  recombinant	  system	  I	  call	  ‘language’.	  	  
As	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  3,	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  our	  perspective	  
emerge	  together,	  and	  in	  this	  chapter	  I	  argue	  that,	  when	  our	  narrative	  
understanding	  engages	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  higher	  and	  lower	  worth,	  it	  co-­‐emerges	  
with	  a	  relatively	  unified	  moral	  perspective.	  Since	  it	  is	  through	  our	  moral	  
perspective	  that	  we	  make	  moral	  judgements,	  and	  our	  moral	  perspective	  is	  
conceptual	  in	  that	  it	  exists	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons,	  moral	  judgement	  are	  not	  only	  
emotional,	  but	  also	  conceptual.	  Specifically	  emotions	  are	  conceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  involved	  in	  deliberation.	  	  	  
The	  result	  of	  this	  difference	  between	  Prinz’s	  and	  my	  theory	  is	  two	  very	  
different	  stories	  about	  how	  we	  experience	  moral	  reasoning	  in	  life.	  On	  Prinz’s	  
framework	  we	  engage	  in	  thinking	  that	  culminates	  in	  an	  emotion.	  On	  mine,	  we	  
engage	  in	  understanding	  narratives,	  which	  is	  jointly	  affective	  and	  conceptual	  
throughout	  the	  process.	  	  
Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  empirical	  support	  for	  a	  narrative	  account	  of	  
moral	  agency.	  First	  there	  is	  support	  from	  neuroimagining	  studies	  on	  moral	  
judgements	  and	  narrative	  comprehension	  that	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  
between	  understanding	  stories	  and	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  medial	  prefrontal	  
cortex	  (mPFC),	  of	  which	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  a	  part.	  This	  study	  also	  shows	  a	  correlation	  
between	  activation	  of	  the	  mPFC	  and	  moral	  judgements.	  This	  fits	  with	  my	  
empirical	  proposal	  that	  the	  neurological	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  moral	  
judgements	  involves	  the	  mPFC,	  and	  that	  this	  region	  enables	  narrative	  
understanding.	  Second,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  abstract	  concepts	  –	  which	  I	  
suggest	  is	  what	  moral	  concepts	  are	  –	  are	  affective.	  Since	  such	  abstract	  concepts	  
are	  abstract	  words,	  and	  therefore	  concepts	  we	  use	  to	  deliberate,	  we	  ought	  not	  
make	  the	  distinction	  between	  deliberation	  and	  emotion	  that	  Prinz	  makes.	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Chapter	  6	  
The	  Interdependence	  of	  Sensory	  and	  Emotional	  Experience	  
In	  my	  final	  chapter	  I	  return	  to	  developing	  an	  account	  of	  how	  narrative	  
understanding,	  and	  therefore	  agency,	  is	  essentially	  embodied.	  To	  do	  this,	  I	  
address	  the	  topic	  of	  sensory	  experience,	  something	  that	  G&K	  make	  central	  to	  
their	  account	  of	  moral	  agency	  by	  their	  inclusion	  of	  MTT.	  Remembering	  and	  
imagining	  events	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  sensory	  activity.	  We	  visualise	  a	  scene,	  or	  
imagine	  a	  tune,	  for	  example.	  So	  far,	  in	  my	  account	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  I	  
have	  focused	  on	  its	  emotional	  character.	  So	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  clear	  that	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  importantly	  sensory.	  In	  this	  sense	  it	  appears	  that	  I	  am	  at	  odds	  
with	  both	  Prinz	  and	  G&K	  but	  for	  different	  reasons:	  Prinz	  because	  he	  thinks	  that	  
moral	  judgements	  are	  a	  compound	  state	  that	  includes	  an	  emotion	  and	  a	  
representation	  of	  the	  emotion’s	  object,	  and	  G&K	  because	  MTT	  is	  sensory.	  
However,	  this	  difference	  is	  only	  apparent.	  While	  I	  agree	  sensory	  experience	  is	  
part	  of	  agency,	  I	  argue	  that	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  
interdependent	  rather	  than	  independent,	  as	  Prinz	  claims.	  I	  argue	  that	  my	  theory	  
is	  preferable	  to	  Prinz’s	  because	  it	  accurately	  describes	  the	  phenomenology,	  it	  
enables	  us	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  phenomenology	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  are	  
consistent,	  and	  it	  gives	  us	  novel	  insight	  into	  cases	  in	  clinical	  psychology.	  	  The	  
phenomenological	  observation	  that	  our	  sense	  of	  perspective	  is	  constituted	  
through	  the	  interdependence	  of	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  experience	  helps	  us	  to	  
explain	  the	  experience	  of	  people	  with	  depression	  and	  psychosis.	  And	  it	  is	  this	  
observation	  that	  also	  explains	  the	  perspectival	  nature	  of	  narrative	  
understanding.	  	  
I	  argue	  for	  the	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  
first	  by	  examining	  the	  transcendental	  argument	  put	  forward	  by	  Merleau-­‐Ponty.	  
This	  argument,	  if	  it	  works,	  means	  that	  the	  interdependence	  of	  our	  experience	  of	  
body	  and	  world	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  us	  to	  have	  any	  experience	  at	  all.	  
Using	  this	  as	  a	  starting	  point,	  I	  characterise	  the	  way	  that	  the	  entanglement	  of	  
sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  are	  evident	  in	  everyday	  life.	  This	  poses	  some	  
issues	  for	  Prinz’s	  arguments	  for	  the	  independence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  
experience	  based	  on	  phenomenological	  observations.	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   Prinz	  may	  claim	  that	  the	  phenomenology	  can	  come	  apart	  from	  a	  
neurological	  theory	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  
experience.	  However,	  the	  current	  neuroscience	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  
phenomenology,	  and	  this	  fit	  is	  offered	  as	  support	  for	  my	  theory	  over	  Prinz’s.	  	  
	   Finally,	  while	  it	  may	  seem	  that	  we	  can	  have	  emotional	  disturbances	  that	  
are	  isolated	  from	  sensory	  disturbances,	  I	  argue	  that	  evidence	  from	  clinical	  
psychology	  shows	  this	  isn’t	  the	  case	  when	  these	  disturbances	  are	  global	  rather	  
than	  localised.	  I	  focus	  on	  depression	  and	  psychosis	  and	  argue	  that	  both	  involve	  
a	  global	  disturbance	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience.	  Psychosis,	  in	  
particular,	  as	  an	  extreme	  condition,	  also	  comes	  with	  extreme	  changes	  in	  a	  sense	  
of	  self	  and	  world,	  supporting	  the	  theory	  that	  the	  integration	  of	  sensory	  and	  
emotional	  experience	  is	  involved	  in	  our	  sense	  of	  perspective.	  Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  cannot	  explain	  this	  
phenomenon.	  	  
	   Moreover,	  this	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  
explains	  why	  MTT	  does	  not	  have	  a	  special	  characteristic	  that	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  lacking.	  Having	  explained	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  connection	  
between	  sensing,	  emoting	  and	  acting,	  I	  flesh	  out	  the	  sense	  that	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  involved	  in	  acting.	  Our	  virtual	  narrative	  adventures	  involve	  a	  
virtual	  embodied	  prereflective	  self	  because	  of	  the	  sensori-­‐affective	  nature	  of	  
narrative.	  In	  turn	  this	  means	  that	  our	  virtual	  actions	  and	  their	  consequences	  
belong	  to	  ourselves	  in	  the	  present	  because	  there	  is	  an	  embodied,	  experiential	  
identity	  between	  the	  self	  in	  past,	  present	  and	  future.	  This	  makes	  future	  and	  past	  
actions	  available	  to	  us.	  That	  is,	  the	  emotional	  cadence	  of	  our	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  a	  sensori-­‐affective	  cadence.	  This	  cadence	  emerges	  with	  a	  sense	  
of	  a	  diachronic	  perspective,	  situating	  our	  current	  perspective	  within	  a	  chain	  of	  
events.	  Hence	  our	  narrative	  understanding,	  while	  it	  involves	  understanding	  of	  
counterfactuals,	  presents	  us	  with	  possibilities	  for	  action	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now.	  
Thus,	  while	  I	  agree	  with	  Prinz	  that	  sensory	  experience	  is	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  
judgements,	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  not	  ones	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  the	  relationship	  
between	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  can	  account	  for.	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Conclusion	  
	  
We	  therefore	  end	  up	  with	  an	  alternative	  to	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  moral	  judgement,	  
that	  presents	  judgements	  as	  the	  activity	  of	  a	  robustly	  embodied,	  narrative,	  
moral	  agent.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  account	  incorporates	  some	  aspects	  of	  Prinz’s	  
theory	  of	  emotions,	  and	  maintains,	  like	  Prinz,	  that	  these	  are	  necessary	  for	  moral	  
judgements.	  Moral	  judgements,	  on	  this	  alternative	  view,	  are	  formed	  through	  
articulating	  the	  moral	  sense	  that	  is	  constituted	  by	  our	  narrative	  understanding.	  
Our	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  also	  a	  prereflective	  self-­‐understanding	  insofar	  
as	  its	  sensori-­‐affective	  character	  arises	  with	  an	  awareness	  of	  how	  we	  are	  related	  
to	  the	  world.	  And	  because	  of	  its	  self-­‐involving	  embodied	  nature,	  the	  possibilities	  
for	  action	  that	  arise	  through	  imaginative	  immersion	  in	  a	  counterfactual	  
situation	  are	  available	  to	  us	  in	  the	  present.	  Hence,	  moral	  narrative	  
understanding	  enables	  us	  to	  act	  on	  our	  moral	  sense.
18	   	  
19	   	  
Emotions	  and	  Moral	  Judgements:	  A	  Critique	  of	  Prinz	  
	  
There	  is	  more	  wisdom	  in	  your	  body	  than	  in	  your	  deepest	  philosophy	  




1.1.	  	  Introducing	  Prinz	  
It	  is	  reason,	  rather	  than	  emotion,	  that	  is	  typically	  associated	  with	  our	  personhood	  
and	  our	  sense	  of	  morality.	  And	  emotion	  is	  often	  understood	  as	  being	  counter	  to	  
reason.	  So	  it	  is	  surprising,	  that,	  in	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  ‘what	  is	  the	  role	  of	  
emotion	  in	  moral	  judgement?’,	  Prinz	  (2006,	  2007)	  answers,	  ‘everything:	  emotional	  
dispositions	  constitute	  our	  moral	  judgements’.	  	  
Specifically,	  Prinz	  offers	  what	  we	  call	  a	  sentimentalist	  account	  of	  moral	  
judgements.	  A	  sentiment,	  here,	  “is	  a	  disposition	  whose	  occurrent	  manifestations…	  
are	  emotions”	  (2007,	  p.	  84)1.	  Sentimentalists	  claim	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  
constituted	  through	  sentiments.	  Praise	  and	  blame,	  or	  judging	  right	  from	  wrong,	  are	  
sentiments	  of	  approbation	  or	  disapprobation	  towards	  actions,	  events,	  people,	  or	  
other	  features	  of	  the	  world.	  An	  articulated	  “judgement	  will	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  
underlying	  emotional	  disposition”	  (2006,	  p.	  34).	  However,	  Prinz	  thinks	  moral	  
judgements	  can	  exist	  unarticulated.	  Moral	  judgements,	  for	  Prinz,	  are	  constituted	  
by	  a	  compound	  state	  of	  an	  emotion	  and	  the	  object	  to	  which	  it	  is	  directed	  (2007,	  p.	  
96	  &	  99).	  So,	  the	  moral	  judgement	  “pickpocketing	  is	  wrong”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  96)	  is	  
constituted	  by	  anger	  and	  a	  representation	  of	  pickpocketing.	  While	  Prinz’s	  theory	  is	  
focused	  on	  being	  sentimentalist	  about	  our	  ability	  to	  judge	  something	  as	  morally	  
good	  or	  bad,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  next,	  this	  doesn’t	  come	  apart	  
from	  a	  theory	  about	  how	  we	  can	  be	  responsible	  for	  our	  actions.	  That	  is,	  for	  Prinz,	  
our	  emotions	  count	  as	  judgements	  partly	  because	  we	  are	  responsible	  for	  them.	  	  
Prinz’s	  sentimentalist	  theory	  is	  originally	  composed	  of	  two	  major	  theses	  
about	  the	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  moral	  judgement:	  they	  are	  necessary	  and	  they	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  theory	  therefore	  relies	  on	  a	  form	  of	  compatibilism	  first	  developed	  by	  Strawson	  
(1963)	  where	  our	  ability	  to	  judge	  someone’s	  actions	  as	  right	  or	  wrong	  depends	  on	  what	  he	  
calls	  ‘reactive	  feelings	  and	  attitudes’,	  such	  as	  moral	  indignation.	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sufficient	  for	  moral	  judgements	  (see	  his	  2006	  paper).	  This	  chapter	  will	  spell	  out	  
exactly	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  this	  theory.	  The	  necessity	  thesis	  will	  not	  be	  rejected	  in	  
this	  chapter	  or	  beyond,	  for	  what	  is	  striking	  about	  Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  moral	  
judgements	  is	  not	  that	  emotion	  has	  a	  role	  in	  them,	  but	  that	  Prinz	  initially	  sees	  
emotion	  as	  their	  only	  constituent,	  and	  later	  he	  continues	  to	  prioritise	  them.	  	  
However,	  he	  does	  accept	  that	  psychological	  processes	  other	  than	  emotions	  are	  
crucial	  for	  moral	  judgements,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  other	  psychological	  processes	  play	  
an	  important	  causal	  role	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  For	  Prinz,	  moral	  
emotions	  are	  merited:	  they	  are	  generally	  reached	  through	  reasoning	  and,	  because	  
reasoning	  is	  a	  thing	  that	  agents	  do,	  moral	  judgements	  are	  attributable	  to	  the	  agent	  
having	  that	  emotion.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  moral	  emotions	  that	  are	  sufficient	  for	  
moral	  judgements,	  where	  for	  an	  emotion	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  emotion	  it	  must	  be	  
triggered	  by,	  what	  Prinz	  calls,	  a	  calibration	  file.	  	  
However,	  by	  the	  time	  Prinz	  has	  written	  his	  2007	  book,	  The	  Emotional	  
Construction	  of	  Morals,	  Prinz	  no	  longer	  mentions	  the	  sufficiency	  thesis.	  While	  he	  
continues	  to	  maintain	  that	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  concepts,	  and	  therefore	  cognition,	  and	  moral	  judgements,	  
appears	  inconsistent.	  While	  Prinz	  continues	  to	  be	  noncognitivist	  about	  emotion	  in	  
general,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  his	  attitude	  towards	  moral	  emotions	  is	  ambiguous.	  He	  
wants	  to	  argue	  that	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  concepts,	  yet	  does	  not	  give	  them	  the	  
same	  functional	  profile	  that	  he	  uses	  to	  characterise	  concepts.	  Such	  an	  ambiguous	  
claim	  about	  the	  conceptual	  nature	  of	  moral	  emotions	  amounts	  to,	  under	  Prinz’s	  
own	  definition,	  an	  ambiguity	  about	  the	  cognitive	  status	  of	  moral	  emotions.	  This	  is	  a	  
precarious	  balance,	  one	  that	  I	  avoid	  in	  my	  own	  positive	  thesis	  of	  emotions	  and	  
their	  relation	  to	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
Prinz,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  emotion	  and	  concepts,	  will	  be	  the	  
major	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter	  and	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  my	  thesis.	  This	  chapter	  will	  
explain	  his	  overall	  argument	  for	  his	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  In	  particular,	  I	  
will	  be	  describing	  the	  features	  of	  his	  theory	  that	  I	  will	  be	  accepting,	  exploring	  or	  
contesting	  throughout	  this	  thesis.	  The	  role	  of	  his	  theory	  is	  to	  act	  as	  a	  backdrop	  
through	  which	  my	  own	  positive	  account	  of	  moral	  judgements	  can	  be	  defined,	  
developed	  and	  contrasted.	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Prinz’s	  theory	  opens	  the	  door	  for	  an	  embodied	  account	  of	  moral	  judgement:	  
one	  that	  escapes	  the	  assumption	  that	  moral	  agency	  and	  moral	  judgement	  can	  
occur	  through	  purely	  abstract	  thought.	  That	  is,	  thought	  that	  consists	  of	  
disembodied	  symbol	  manipulation,	  where	  judgement	  is	  an	  amodal	  process	  that	  is	  
contrasted	  to	  our	  acting,	  sensing	  and	  feeling	  capacities.	  Instead,	  the	  body	  takes	  a	  
central	  role	  in	  moral	  judgement	  on	  Prinz’s	  account	  because	  he	  classes	  emotions	  as	  
embodied	  appraisals	  that	  involve	  readiness	  for	  action.	  Additionally,	  he	  thinks	  we	  
may	  be	  able	  to	  usefully	  understand	  emotions	  in	  terms	  of	  involving	  action	  
affordances	  (2004,	  p.	  228).	  That	  is,	  emotions	  are	  experienced	  as	  making	  certain	  
actions	  available	  to	  us.	  I	  will	  be	  taking	  his	  theory	  of	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  
appraisals	  on	  board.	  Similarly,	  my	  positive	  project	  will	  propose	  a	  theory	  of	  moral	  
judgements	  that	  supports	  moral	  internalism,	  a	  thesis	  that	  Prinz	  also	  adopts.	  I	  
depart	  from	  Prinz	  by	  arguing	  we	  should	  break	  down	  the	  distinction	  between	  
rationality	  and	  emotions	  further	  than	  he	  does,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  see	  emotions	  as	  
involved	  in	  judgement.	  	  
	  
1.2. Setting	  up	  the	  wider	  dialectic	  
Before	  proceeding	  it	  is	  worth	  understanding	  how	  this	  chapter	  relates	  to	  the	  wider	  
dialectic	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
Since	  Prinz	  leaves	  it	  unsettled	  how	  we	  should	  think	  about	  emotions	  and	  
rationality	  I	  will	  develop	  a	  multifaceted	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  ‘what	  is	  the	  role	  of	  
emotion	  in	  moral	  judgement?’.	  This	  positive	  account	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  
forthcoming	  chapters.	  It	  will	  incorporate	  Prinz’s	  core	  claims	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  
emotions	  and	  develop	  their	  implications.	  A	  theory	  of	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  
appraisals	  will	  be	  put	  in	  the	  context	  of	  our	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  understanding.	  
On	  this	  account	  emotions	  are	  important	  for	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  not	  through	  
excluding	  deliberative	  capacities.	  	  	  
Narrative	  understanding	  –	  as	  a	  type	  of	  sense-­‐making2	  that	  only	  exists	  
through	  the	  interdependence	  of	  our	  conceptual	  capacities,	  emotion	  and	  sensory	  
experience	  –	  is	  a	  crucial	  way	  that	  emotion	  is	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  agency.	  Similar	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  By	  ‘sense-­‐making’	  I	  mean	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  creature	  to	  make	  meaning	  out	  of	  its	  
interactions	  with	  the	  world.	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to	  Prinz’s	  proposal,	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  not	  detached,	  abstract	  sense-­‐
making,	  but	  intrinsically	  depends	  on	  us	  as	  sensing,	  feeling,	  embodied	  creatures.	  
Therefore,	  my	  positive	  proposal	  for	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  moral	  
judgements	  is:	  they	  form	  part	  of	  a	  web	  of	  interwoven	  processes	  that	  jointly	  
constitute	  our	  capacity	  for	  expressing,	  determining	  and	  acting	  on	  what	  matters	  for	  
us	  via	  their	  role	  in	  narrative	  understanding.	  Such	  understanding	  is	  essentially	  
body	  involving.	  But	  this	  positive	  proposal	  will	  not	  work	  within	  the	  same	  
intellectual	  tradition	  that	  Prinz	  works	  within.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  
my	  background	  understanding	  of	  how	  we	  should	  understand	  agency	  is	  one	  
expressed	  by	  McDowell:	  agents	  and	  their	  judgements	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  
falling	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons,	  which	  means	  that	  judgements	  involve	  concepts.	  
Particularly,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Prinz,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  emotions	  are	  just	  
triggered	  in	  ways	  that	  we	  can	  control.	  Instead,	  they	  enable	  us	  to	  engage	  in	  rational	  
activity	  itself.	  So	  what	  I	  will	  present	  is	  an	  alternative	  that	  involves	  reshaping	  the	  
conceptual	  landscape,	  and	  therefore	  highlights	  that	  Prinz	  needs	  his	  own	  set	  of	  
fundamental	  commitments	  to	  make	  his	  argument	  work.	  Further,	  this	  thesis	  sets	  
out	  an	  account	  of	  moral	  judgements	  that	  overcomes	  the	  tensions	  and	  problems	  in	  
Prinz’s	  account,	  as	  well	  as	  uniting	  various	  philosophical	  theories	  and	  empirical	  
data,	  and	  developing	  our	  understanding	  of	  cognition	  and	  action.	  	  
In	  regards	  to	  the	  present	  chapter	  there	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  things	  to	  note.	  I	  will	  
not	  be	  attempting	  to	  disprove	  Prinz’s	  claims.	  However,	  I	  will	  be	  setting	  out	  where	  I	  
think	  he	  is	  confused.	  In	  future	  chapters,	  I	  will	  explicate	  a	  convincing	  theory	  of	  
moral	  agency	  in	  which	  moral	  judgements	  are	  understood	  through	  the	  way	  our	  
conceptual	  capacities	  are	  integrated	  with	  our	  emotional	  capacities.	  This	  theory	  of	  
moral	  judgement	  brings	  developments	  in	  embodied	  theories	  of	  cognition	  to	  the	  
debates	  in	  moral	  philosophy	  about	  agency	  and	  moral	  judgements.	  It	  also	  develops,	  
clarifies	  and	  expands	  those	  theories	  of	  cognition,	  by	  examining	  the	  relationship	  
between	  affect,	  action	  and	  language.	  When	  cognition	  is	  actively	  engaged	  in,	  I	  take	  it	  
to	  involve	  explicit,	  deliberative,	  reasoning.	  	  
	   So,	  we	  have	  in	  this	  thesis	  two	  competing	  accounts,	  both	  that	  make	  emotions	  
central,	  of	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  creature	  to	  experience	  the	  world	  morally.	  One	  is	  
Prinz’s	  sentimentalism,	  where	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements,	  when	  they	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are	  caused	  by	  the	  right	  rational	  processes,	  and	  the	  other	  is	  a	  narrative	  account,	  
which	  argues	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  our	  rationality.	  	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter,	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  Prinz’s	  sentimentalism	  is	  
not	  always	  consistent	  concerning	  what	  type	  of	  control	  we	  have	  over	  moral	  
emotions,	  and	  therefore	  how	  we	  should	  see	  them	  as	  related	  to	  cognition.	  Further,	  I	  
hope	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  his	  sentimentalism	  succeeds	  only	  through	  equivocating	  
over	  the	  conceptual	  status	  of	  moral	  emotions.	  However,	  the	  ultimate	  destination	  in	  
this	  thesis	  gives	  us	  reasons	  to	  take	  a	  more	  decisive	  stand,	  through	  an	  alternative	  
positive	  account	  where	  emotions	  and	  cognition	  are	  integrated.	  	  
	  
	  
2.	  Prinz’s	  Sentimentalism	  
	  
Before	  the	  debate	  begins,	  we	  first	  need	  to	  understand	  some	  of	  Prinz’s	  main	  
commitments,	  including	  his	  sentimentalist	  theory	  and	  his	  moral	  internalism.	  Both	  
are	  intimately	  bound	  up	  with	  his	  position	  on	  emotions	  and	  moral	  judgements,	  and	  
his	  internalism	  is	  a	  commitment	  that	  I	  will	  share.	  First,	  I	  explain	  Prinz’s	  
sentimentalism.	  
	  
According	  to	  Prinz	  (2006),	  “to	  judge	  that	  something	  is	  wrong	  is	  to	  have	  a	  
sentiment	  of	  disapprobation	  towards	  it”	  (p.	  29).	  For	  him,	  a	  sentiment	  is	  the	  stance	  
a	  subject	  has	  towards	  some	  issue.	  It	  is	  constituted	  by	  our	  disposition	  to	  have	  
certain	  emotions.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  ‘sentiment’	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  single	  emotion	  
and	  a	  particular	  sentiment	  towards	  something	  can	  result	  in	  many	  types	  of	  
occurrent	  emotion.	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  have	  a	  sentiment	  of	  disapprobation	  towards	  
dinosaurs,	  my	  stance	  towards	  them	  is	  one	  of	  dislike.	  I	  express	  happiness	  when	  I	  
hear	  dinosaurs	  are	  extinct,	  and	  feel	  angry	  when	  they	  are	  brought	  back	  to	  life.	  	  
	  Moral	  judgements,	  on	  this	  account,	  are	  constituted	  by	  emotions,	  which	  in	  
turn	  are	  occurrent	  manifestations	  of	  moral	  sentiments	  (Prinz,	  2007).	  Specifically,	  
moral	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  Moral	  emotions	  are	  emotions	  that	  
are	  triggered	  by,	  what	  Prinz	  calls,	  a	  calibration	  file.	  So,	  for	  example,	  indignation	  is	  a	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moral	  emotion	  because	  it	  is	  the	  emotion	  ‘anger’	  triggered	  by	  the	  calibration	  file	  
‘injustice’.	  	  
	  	  Such	  moral	  emotions	  are	  occurrent	  manifestations	  of	  sentiments.	  Prinz	  
explains	  that,	  	  
	  We	  can	  think	  of	  the	  sentiment	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory	  as	  a	  standing	  belief,	  
and	  the	  emotion	  in	  working	  memory	  as	  an	  occurrent	  belief.	  Or,	  to	  
introduce	  a	  useful	  piece	  of	  terminology,	  we	  can	  call	  the	  sentiment	  a	  moral	  
rule,	  and	  we	  can	  call	  a	  particular	  emotional	  manifestation	  of	  that	  
sentiment	  a	  moral	  judgement.	  (2007,	  p.	  96,	  original	  emphasis.)	  	  
	  
So,	  the	  judgement	  ‘that	  is	  wrong!’	  in	  response	  to	  thinking	  about	  a	  friend	  being	  
dishonest	  with	  you,	  is	  activated	  when	  the	  memory	  of	  the	  event	  triggers	  a	  
sentiment	  of	  disapprobation	  towards	  dishonesty.	  This	  sentiment	  of	  disapprobation	  
towards	  dishonesty	  constitutes	  a	  moral	  rule	  that	  ‘dishonesty	  is	  wrong’.	  A	  
particular	  emotion	  occurs	  –	  perhaps	  anger	  at	  perceived	  injustice	  –	  when	  the	  
sentiment	  is	  activated.	  When	  this	  anger	  is	  attached	  to	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  
moment	  of	  dishonesty,	  and	  caused	  by	  the	  concept	  ‘injustice’,	  this	  compound	  state	  
constitutes	  the	  moral	  judgement	  ‘that	  friend	  has	  treated	  me	  unjustly’.	  	  	  
	  
Prinz	  initially	  states	  that	  emotions	  are	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  moral	  
judgements.	  So	  let	  us	  turn	  to	  Prinz’s	  reasons	  for	  stating	  this.	  Prinz’s	  (2006)	  
defends	  his	  necessity	  thesis	  through	  the	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  a	  good	  explanation	  of	  
empirical	  observations.	  First,	  it	  seems	  that	  parents	  teach	  their	  children	  moral	  rules	  
by	  the	  use	  of	  emotion.	  For	  example,	  by	  using	  punishment	  to	  cause	  fear	  in	  the	  child,	  
or	  causing	  distress	  by	  encouraging	  the	  child	  to	  empathise	  with	  a	  person	  they	  have	  
harmed.	  Second,	  in	  psychopathy,	  a	  deficit	  in	  negative	  emotions	  correlates	  with	  
anti-­‐social	  behaviour	  and	  a	  non-­‐typical	  way	  of	  understanding	  moral	  concepts.	  
Psychopaths	  have	  trouble	  differentiating	  moral	  wrongs	  from	  conventions.	  These	  
examples,	  Prinz	  claims,	  support	  the	  thesis	  that	  emotions	  are	  “necessary	  for	  
acquiring	  the	  capacity	  to	  make	  moral	  judgements”	  (2006,	  p.	  32).	  	  
Prinz	  (2006)	  also	  thinks	  there	  are	  some	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  a	  creature’s	  
current	  capacity	  for	  emotion	  is	  necessary	  for	  moral	  judgements.	  For	  one,	  it	  is	  hard	  
to	  conceive	  of	  someone	  believing	  that	  something	  is	  wrong	  without	  them	  being	  
disposed	  to	  feel	  negatively	  towards	  it.	  Someone	  may	  have	  all	  the	  non-­‐emotional	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facts	  about	  killing,	  such	  as	  all	  the	  deontological	  and	  utilitarian	  reasons	  not	  to	  kill,	  
but	  not	  feel	  negatively	  towards	  killing.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  it	  seems	  we	  would	  not	  say	  
that	  such	  a	  person	  believes	  killing	  is	  morally	  wrong.	  	  
Prinz	  also	  argues	  that,	  if	  moral	  judgements	  depended	  on	  another	  
psychological	  process,	  such	  as	  rationality	  or	  observation,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  
more	  similarity	  between	  the	  moral	  codes	  of	  different	  cultures.	  However,	  
considering	  that	  moral	  outlooks	  vary	  widely	  between	  cultures,	  geographical	  
regions	  and	  political	  groups,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  moral	  judgement	  relies	  on	  these	  
processes.	  The	  assumption	  making	  this	  argument	  work	  is	  that	  rationality	  and	  
observation	  are	  not	  prone	  to	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  cultural	  inculcation	  as	  emotions.	  
Like	  Prinz,	  I	  think	  emotions	  are	  crucial	  for	  moral	  judgements.	  My	  argument	  
in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis	  will	  give	  us	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  emotion	  is	  necessary	  for	  
moral	  judgements,	  through	  explaining	  how	  it	  is	  constitutive	  of	  our	  narrative	  
understanding	  and	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  contributes	  to	  moral	  judgements.	  
That	  is,	  I	  hope	  to	  give	  alternative	  reasons	  for	  why	  we	  should	  think	  that	  emotions	  
are	  necessary	  for	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
However,	  one	  thing	  to	  briefly	  remark	  on	  now,	  is	  that	  the	  necessity	  claim	  is	  
bound	  up	  with	  Prinz’s	  argument	  that	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  moral	  judgement	  as	  
intrinsically	  motivational.	  As	  emotions	  are	  usefully	  understood	  by	  many	  emotion	  
theorists	  as	  involving	  action	  tendencies	  (e.g.	  Frijda,	  2004),	  and	  some	  think	  that	  
other	  types	  of	  cognition	  are	  motivationally	  inert	  (e.g.	  Roskies,	  2003),	  emotions	  
look,	  to	  some,	  like	  good	  candidate	  for	  being	  one	  of	  the	  constituents	  in	  our	  capacity	  
for	  making	  moral	  judgements.	  
	  	   In	  his	  original	  defence	  of	  the	  sufficiency	  thesis,	  Prinz	  (2006)	  uses	  a	  study	  
where	  participants	  are	  hypnotised	  to	  feel	  disgust	  when	  they	  hear	  the	  word	  ‘often’,	  
a	  word	  picked	  because	  it	  is	  an	  emotionally	  neutral	  word.	  When	  participants	  later	  
read	  vignettes,	  those	  that	  were	  hypnotised	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  judge	  vignettes	  that	  
include	  the	  word	  ‘often’	  as	  morally	  wrong	  compared	  to	  participants	  who	  had	  not	  
been	  hypnotised.	  This	  apparently	  shows	  the	  feeling	  of	  disgust	  is	  sufficient	  for	  
judging	  that	  something	  is	  wrong,	  since	  manipulating	  the	  emotional	  response	  is	  
enough	  to	  produce	  a	  corresponding	  change	  in	  moral	  judgement.	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Prinz	  (2007)	  later	  rejects	  this	  argument	  since,	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  the	  emotion	  of	  
disgust	  is	  not	  caused	  by	  a	  sentiment.	  Sentiments	  are	  stored	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory	  
and	  constitute	  what	  an	  agent	  takes	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  rule.	  In	  the	  hypnosis	  experiment,	  
the	  causal	  chain	  is	  bypassed	  such	  that	  the	  emotion	  is	  triggered	  without	  the	  
retrieval	  of	  a	  moral	  rule.	  Because	  of	  this,	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  the	  hypnotically-­‐
produced	  moral	  condemnations	  “do	  not	  qualify	  as	  legitimate	  expressions	  of	  the	  
subjects’	  moral	  attitudes”	  (2007,	  p.	  96).	  	  
	   The	  other	  piece	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  Prinz	  (2006,	  2007)	  uses	  to	  support	  
his	  argument	  that	  only	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements	  are	  studies	  that	  
apparently	  show	  that	  people	  –	  when	  asked	  to	  make	  moral	  judgments	  in	  certain	  
circumstances	  –	  cannot	  give	  reasons.	  In	  one	  study,	  participants	  were	  given	  a	  
number	  of	  vignettes,	  two	  of	  which	  were	  designed	  to	  test	  moral	  intuitions:	  a	  story	  
about	  incest	  and	  a	  story	  about	  cannibalism	  (Haidt,	  Bjorklund	  &	  Murphy,	  2000).	  
Both	  stories	  were	  designed	  so	  that	  the	  normal	  reasons	  people	  use	  to	  make	  moral	  
judgements	  did	  not	  apply.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  incest	  case,	  there	  were	  two	  siblings,	  
who	  had	  consensual	  sex	  once,	  suffered	  no	  psychological	  damage,	  kept	  it	  a	  secret	  so	  
that	  they	  suffered	  no	  social	  stigma,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  pregnancy	  as	  a	  result.	  
Participants	  were	  ‘dumbfounded’	  because	  the	  reasons	  they	  gave	  for	  their	  
judgements	  could	  be	  debunked,	  and	  yet	  they	  would	  continue	  to	  claim	  the	  events	  
were	  wrong.	  However,	  what	  remained	  was	  the	  participants’	  emotional	  reaction	  of	  
disgust.	  So,	  the	  only	  process	  that	  appears	  needed	  for	  moral	  judgements	  in	  the	  
dumbfounding	  cases	  appears	  to	  be	  emotions.	  	  
	   Prinz	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  these	  cases	  show	  that	  emotions	  express	  basic	  
values.	  The	  question	  ‘why?’	  no	  longer	  applies:	  “When	  we	  get	  down	  to	  basic	  values,	  
passions	  rule.	  People	  say	  incest	  and	  cannibalism	  are	  disgusting.	  Murder	  is	  
abhorrent.	  Stealing	  is	  unconscionable”	  (2007,	  p.	  32).	  	  
	  
However,	  a	  switch	  occurs	  in	  Prinz’s	  thinking	  between	  2006	  to	  2007,	  which	  has	  
ramifications	  for	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  understand	  his	  theory	  as	  sentimentalist.	  
While	  in	  2006,	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  sufficient	  for	  moral	  judgements,	  in	  
2007	  this	  claim	  changes	  subtly.	  Here	  he	  drops	  the	  sufficiency	  claim,	  and	  instead	  
argues	  that	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  This	  may	  not	  sound	  like	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a	  huge	  change.	  But	  it	  matters	  for	  whether	  we	  think	  of	  Prinz	  as	  a	  cognitivist	  about	  
moral	  judgements	  or	  not.	  Because,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  moral	  emotions,	  for	  Prinz,	  are	  
conceptual,	  while	  emotions,	  in	  general,	  are	  not.	  This	  makes	  emotions	  look	  like	  they	  
should	  be	  counted	  as	  not	  just	  reasons	  for	  beliefs,	  but	  rational	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  
can	  be	  part	  of	  our	  deliberative	  processes.	  	  
This	  raises	  questions	  for	  how	  we	  ought	  to	  think	  of	  Prinz	  in	  relation	  to	  
sentimentalism.	  If	  emotions	  are	  part	  of	  rational,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  deliberative,	  
thinking	  processes,	  then	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  as	  much	  a	  rationalist	  about	  moral	  
judgements	  as	  a	  sentimentalist.	  Furthermore,	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  emotions	  are	  
conceptual	  is	  ambiguous	  in	  Prinz.	  Normally,	  for	  Prinz,	  concepts	  are	  capable	  of	  
being	  under	  intentional	  control.	  However,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  Prinz’s	  moral	  emotions	  
don’t	  always	  seem	  to	  play	  the	  role	  that	  other	  concepts	  do	  in	  our	  cognitive	  
activities.	  What	  I	  turn	  to	  next,	  before	  getting	  stuck	  into	  this	  debate,	  is	  another	  
component	  of	  Prinz’s	  theory:	  his	  moral	  internalism.	  Moral	  internalism	  is	  a	  
commitment	  that	  many	  of	  the	  theorists	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  share,	  so	  it	  will	  be	  
taken	  as	  a	  ground	  to	  build	  on,	  rather	  than	  one	  of	  the	  premises	  to	  debate.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  Moral	  Internalism	  
	  
Moral	  internalism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  moral	  judgements	  provide	  motivation	  to	  act.	  It	  
is	  a	  conceptual	  claim:	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  moral	  judgement	  that	  it	  can	  
motivate	  action	  (Döring,	  2007).	  Moral	  externalists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  state	  that	  
moral	  judgements	  are	  rational	  judgements,	  and	  whether	  they	  motivate	  or	  not	  
depends	  on	  processes	  that	  are	  contingently	  related	  to	  moral	  judgements.	  For	  
example,	  an	  externalist	  might	  hold	  that	  we	  act	  on	  the	  judgement	  that	  “hitting	  
children	  is	  wrong”	  not	  because	  of	  that	  judgement,	  but	  because	  we	  have	  a	  
motivation	  external	  to	  that	  judgement	  not	  to	  hit	  children,	  such	  as	  empathising	  with	  
children.	  	  
	   Prinz	  (2006)	  argues	  that	  we	  have	  pre-­‐theoretical	  intuitions	  that	  moral	  
judgements	  motivate	  and	  that	  empirical	  evidence	  supports	  his	  sentimentalist	  
theory,	  and	  therefore	  internalism.	  That	  is,	  to	  support	  internalism	  he	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“intermingle[s]	  empirical	  and	  philosophical	  results”	  (p.	  30).	  Because	  empirical	  
results	  show,	  he	  argues,	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgement,	  and	  emotions	  
are	  action	  guiding,	  then	  moral	  judgements	  are	  too.	  We	  will	  see	  this	  evidence	  in	  
detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
Additionally,	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  if	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements	  and	  
motivate	  action,	  then	  we	  can	  explain	  why	  psychopaths	  have	  difficulty	  acting	  
morally.	  If	  emotions	  are	  necessary	  constituents	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  then	  people	  
who	  have	  a	  more	  limited	  emotional	  repertoire	  will	  have	  a	  corresponding	  deficit	  in	  
moral	  competence.	  	  
This	  appears	  similar	  to	  Smith’s	  (1996)	  argument,	  that	  we	  do	  not	  recognise	  
amoral	  people	  as	  making	  moral	  judgements.	  Psychopaths	  are	  (relatively)	  amoral.	  
They	  don’t	  appear	  to	  be	  making	  moral	  judgements,	  because	  we	  understand	  
judgements	  as	  intrinsically	  motivating.	  As	  Prinz	  puts	  it,	  
In	  the	  real	  world,	  psychopaths	  are	  as	  close	  as	  we	  can	  find	  to	  amoralists:	  
when	  they	  say	  that	  killing	  is	  wrong,	  they	  have	  no	  inclination	  to	  refrain	  
from	  killing.	  But	  I	  think	  psychopaths	  are	  like	  anthropologists.	  They	  report	  
on	  morality	  without	  making	  moral	  judgments.	  (2006,	  p.	  38.)	  
	  
This	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  externalist	  picture,	  where	  we	  can	  make	  a	  moral	  judgement,	  
but	  it	  motivates	  only	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  desire.	  Instead	  we	  understand	  the	  
psychopath	  as	  being	  (more)	  amoral	  because	  they	  have	  (less)	  moral	  understanding,	  
not	  because	  they	  understand	  things	  morally	  but	  don’t	  have	  an	  additional	  desire	  to	  
act	  on	  what	  is	  moral.	  	  
	   In	  keeping	  with	  this	  line	  of	  thought,	  Prinz	  notes	  that	  our	  moral	  judgements	  
tend	  to	  reliably	  co-­‐occur	  with	  what	  we	  feel	  impelled	  to	  do:	  
Can	  one	  sincerely	  attest	  that	  killing	  is	  morally	  wrong	  without	  being	  
disposed	  to	  have	  negative	  emotions	  towards	  killing?	  My	  intuition	  here	  is	  
that	  such	  a	  person	  would	  be	  confused	  or	  insincere.	  (2006,	  p.	  32)	  
	  
We	  can	  further	  note	  that	  behaviour	  reliably	  changes	  as	  our	  judgements	  change	  
(Smith,	  1994).	  If	  someone	  changes	  their	  mind	  on	  a	  moral	  issue,	  for	  example	  from	  
believing	  that	  homeless	  people	  are	  bad	  people	  that	  deserve	  punishment,	  to	  
believing	  that	  homeless	  people	  are	  victims	  of	  circumstance,	  then	  their	  behaviour	  
tends	  to	  change;	  for	  example,	  they	  might	  stop	  spitting	  on	  homeless	  people	  and	  
start	  getting	  angry	  at	  people	  who	  do.	  In	  these	  cases,	  it	  seems	  we	  are	  motivated	  by	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our	  judgements.	  We	  would	  question	  whether	  someone	  had	  made	  a	  judgement	  if	  it	  
provided	  no	  motivation	  for	  action.	  	  	  
	   For	  Prinz	  (2006)	  sentimentalism	  provides	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  moral	  
judgements	  motivate	  us	  to	  act.	  For	  example,	  a	  moral	  judgement	  that	  eating	  meat	  is	  
wrong	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  disapprobation.	  Negative	  emotions	  inhibit	  the	  
occurrence	  of	  eating	  meat,	  typically	  by	  “promot[ing]	  avoidance,	  ceasing,	  
intervention,	  withdrawal,	  and,	  when	  anticipated,	  preventative	  measures”	  (p.	  36).	  
So	  sentimentalism	  explains	  the	  conjunct	  between	  beliefs	  about	  wrongness	  and	  
feeling	  motivated	  to	  act	  in	  certain	  ways,	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  both	  
manifestations	  of	  our	  emotional	  dispositions.	  	  	  
While	  it	  may	  be	  noted	  that	  not	  all	  moral	  judgements	  do	  result	  in	  action,	  
Prinz	  argues	  that	  all	  one	  needs	  to	  say	  here	  is	  that	  we	  can	  have	  a	  motive	  to	  act	  
without	  acting.	  The	  feeling	  of	  a	  hot	  dinner	  plate	  may	  motivate	  me	  to	  drop	  it,	  but	  if	  
I’m	  being	  a	  waitress	  at	  a	  formal	  dinner	  I	  might	  be	  able	  to	  override	  this	  impulse.	  
Prinz	  suggests	  that,	  	  
A	  motive	  provides	  a	  reason	  for	  action,	  and	  a	  motivation	  impels	  us	  to	  act.	  I	  
think	  all	  emotions	  are	  motives…	  But	  emotions	  are	  not	  always	  motivations.	  
They	  do	  not	  always	  succeed	  in	  impelling	  us.	  (2004,	  p.	  193)	  	  
	  
Nonetheless	  “the	  somatic	  component	  of	  an	  emotion	  prepares	  us	  for	  action”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  
194,	  emphasis	  added).	  In	  this	  way,	  he	  is	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  internalist,	  one	  who	  
does	  not	  believe	  judgements	  necessarily	  motivate,	  but,	  because	  they	  are	  
constituted	  through	  emotion,	  they	  do	  provide	  a	  motive.	  	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  Prinz	  puts	  forward	  good	  reasons	  for	  why	  only	  
internalism	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “moral	  judgements”.	  If	  he	  is	  right,	  
we	  cannot	  understand	  someone	  as	  making	  a	  moral	  judgement	  if	  they	  are	  not	  
motivated	  by	  that	  judgement3.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Even	  in	  cases	  where	  it	  looks	  like	  moral	  judgements	  come	  away	  from	  how	  we	  are	  
disposed	  to	  act,	  on	  closer	  inspection,	  this	  doesn’t	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  Consider	  when	  
someone’s	  implicit	  biases	  are	  contrary	  to	  their	  explicit	  judgements	  of	  what	  is	  good.	  
Implicit	  biases	  are	  attitudes	  we	  have	  that	  are	  evident	  in	  our	  automatic	  and	  pre-­‐reflective	  
behaviour.	  They	  may	  contrast	  with	  our	  explicit	  assertions.	  For	  example,	  Jasmine	  thinks	  
racism	  is	  wrong,	  but	  has	  an	  implicit	  bias	  that	  associates	  black	  people	  with	  violence.	  Some	  
of	  Jasmine’s	  behaviour	  may	  be	  motivated	  by	  her	  implicit	  bias	  and	  not	  her	  explicit	  
assertions.	  However,	  if	  we	  take	  her	  assertions	  to	  express	  a	  moral	  judgement,	  then	  we	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However,	  like	  Prinz,	  I	  have	  another	  reason	  for	  adopting	  internalism:	  
internalism	  is	  an	  outcome	  of	  the	  theory	  I	  am	  proposing,	  not	  (just)	  a	  motivation	  for	  
it.	  On	  the	  proposal	  I	  will	  offer	  in	  the	  following	  chapters,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  best	  
way	  of	  explaining	  our	  moral	  sense	  is	  as	  an	  embodied	  orientation	  to	  the	  world	  that	  
is	  constituted	  through	  narrative	  understanding.	  When	  we	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  how	  
we	  understand	  the	  world	  morally,	  it	  is	  an	  embodied,	  affective	  process	  that	  happens	  
to	  also	  makes	  certain	  actions	  available	  to	  us.	  So	  our	  moral	  sense,	  through	  which	  we	  
make	  judgements,	  prepares	  us	  for	  action.	  This	  approach	  incorporates	  
phenomenological	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  about	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
Moral	  externalism	  therefore	  appears	  to	  add	  a	  superfluous	  component	  to	  
our	  understanding	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  Moral	  externalism	  states	  that	  we	  can	  
make	  a	  moral	  judgement,	  but	  for	  that	  judgement	  to	  motivate,	  we	  also	  require	  a	  
desire	  to	  act	  on	  what	  is	  good.	  But	  no	  such	  additional	  desire	  is	  required	  for	  an	  
explanation	  of	  how	  we	  act	  on	  what	  is	  good	  if	  we	  have	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  
view	  of	  moral	  agency.	  On	  this	  view,	  our	  judgements	  do	  motivate.	  So	  one	  reason	  for	  
adopting	  internalism	  is	  that	  our	  best	  explanation	  for	  how	  we	  make	  moral	  
judgements	  is	  internalist,	  because	  moral	  judgements	  requires	  emotions,	  and	  it	  
turns	  out	  that	  emotions	  motivate	  us.	  	  
This	  may	  look	  like	  I’m	  begging	  the	  question	  in	  that	  I	  am	  both	  assuming	  and	  
proving	  moral	  internalism.	  However,	  this	  is	  to	  misconstrue	  the	  argument.	  There	  is	  
more	  than	  one	  reason	  to	  endorse	  moral	  internalism:	  one	  approach	  is	  trying	  to	  
work	  out	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  “moral	  judgement”,	  and	  the	  other	  is	  the	  result	  of	  
building	  a	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  phenomenological	  
and	  empirical	  evidence.	  My	  suggestion	  is	  both	  of	  these	  approaches	  lead	  to	  the	  
same	  conclusion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
expect	  at	  least	  some	  of	  her	  behaviour	  to	  be	  motivated	  by	  an	  understanding	  of	  racism	  as	  
wrong.	  Perhaps	  Jasmine	  tries	  to	  change	  her	  implicit	  biases	  by	  attending	  more	  to	  narratives	  
that	  undercut	  the	  typical	  narratives	  about	  blackness.	  At	  the	  least,	  she	  might	  get	  defensive	  
at	  the	  assertion	  that	  she	  might	  sometimes	  behave	  in	  racist	  ways.	  We	  cannot	  understand	  
Jasmine’s	  assertion	  that	  racism	  is	  wrong	  as	  a	  moral	  judgement	  if	  she	  has	  never	  has	  any	  
motivation	  to	  avoid	  being	  racist.	  Some	  defensiveness	  on	  her	  part,	  charitably	  interpreted,	  is	  
evidence	  that	  she	  is	  motivated	  to	  not	  be	  racist	  and	  is	  therefore	  frustrated	  at	  the	  
implications	  that	  she	  does	  sometimes	  act	  in	  racist	  ways.	  If	  someone	  claims	  they	  believe	  
‘racism	  is	  wrong’	  and	  displays	  no	  evidence	  that	  they	  are	  motivated	  to	  be	  non-­‐racist,	  then	  
we	  would	  doubt	  that	  they	  do	  judge	  racism	  to	  be	  wrong.	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Internalism,	  however,	  comes	  in	  different	  colours.	  One	  can	  believe	  that	  moral	  
judgements	  are	  motivating,	  but	  do	  not	  involve	  reasons	  to	  act,	  or	  one	  can	  believe	  
that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  both	  rational	  and	  motivating	  (Döring,	  2007;	  Gerrans	  &	  
Kennett	  2010).	  The	  later	  we	  might	  call	  a	  rationalist	  internalist	  (Gerrans	  &	  Kennett,	  
2010).	  “Rationalism	  states	  that	  if	  it	  is	  right	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  choose	  a	  certain	  action	  
in	  a	  given	  situation,	  there	  is	  necessarily	  a	  reason	  for	  him	  to	  choose	  that	  action	  in	  
the	  given	  situation”	  (Döring,	  2007,	  p.	  364).	  	  
However,	  there	  is	  some	  ambiguity	  about	  the	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  what	  
counts	  as	  a	  reason.	  Many	  think	  of	  ‘reason’	  as	  something	  explicit	  and	  conscious,	  like	  
what	  we	  express	  in	  inner	  speech	  or	  to	  others.	  However,	  others	  think	  ‘a	  reason’	  may	  
be	  based	  on	  unconscious,	  automatic	  or	  non-­‐inferential	  processes	  (see	  Gigerenzer,	  
2004,	  and	  Vargas,	  2013).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Prinz,	  we	  might	  understand	  emotions	  as	  
providing	  reasons	  because,	  as	  we	  saw	  above,	  	  
A	  motive	  provides	  a	  reason	  for	  action,	  and	  a	  motivation	  is	  that	  which	  
impels	  us	  to	  act.	  I	  [Prinz]	  think	  that	  all	  emotions	  are	  motives.	  Being	  angry	  
provides	  a	  reason,	  ceteris	  paribus,	  to	  act…	  but	  emotions	  are	  not	  always	  
motivations.	  They	  do	  not	  always	  succeed	  in	  impelling	  us4.	  (2004,	  p.	  193,)	  	  
	  
So,	  being	  angry,	  as	  the	  appraisal	  than	  you	  are	  being	  insulted	  or	  demeaned,	  gives	  
you	  reason	  to	  defend	  yourself.	  And	  since	  emotions,	  on	  this	  theory,	  also	  involve	  
action	  tendencies,	  this	  appraisal	  prepares	  one	  to	  act,	  even	  while	  it	  may	  be	  the	  case	  
that	  we	  restrain	  ourselves.	  	  	  
However,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘rational’	  I	  will	  be	  using,	  Prinz	  is	  not	  a	  rationalist	  
internalist.	  As	  I	  will	  argue	  below,	  Prinz	  does	  not	  think	  that	  emotions	  are	  involved	  
in	  our	  deliberative	  capacities.	  Instead	  of	  being	  involved	  in	  these	  activities,	  
emotions	  are	  caused	  by	  them.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  We	  may	  disagree	  with	  Prinz’s	  terminology	  here.	  In	  everyday	  language,	  we	  may	  often	  talk	  
of	  something	  being	  a	  motivation	  even	  if	  it	  may	  not	  succeed	  in	  impelling	  us	  to	  act.	  The	  
threat	  of	  early	  death	  due	  to	  cancer	  may	  be	  one	  motivation	  for	  me	  to	  give	  up	  smoking,	  but	  
this	  motivation	  may	  not	  be	  strong	  enough	  for	  me	  to	  give	  up,	  or	  the	  competing	  motivation	  
might	  override	  it,	  perhaps	  the	  motivation	  of	  being	  coherent	  with	  my	  self-­‐understanding	  
that	  I’m	  happy	  to	  live	  fast	  and	  die	  young.	  While	  disagreeing	  with	  Prinz’s	  terminology,	  I	  
think	  his	  point	  stands	  that	  not	  all	  motives	  end	  up	  motivating	  us	  to	  act	  in	  line	  with	  them.	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In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  however,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  have	  to	  be	  rational	  
internalists:	  if	  we	  are	  to	  explain	  moral	  judgements	  they	  must	  open	  to	  justification	  
and	  clarification.	  In	  this	  way,	  moral	  judgements	  are	  affective	  but	  they	  are	  also	  




4.	  Emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisal	  	  
	  
Now	  I	  want	  to	  explain	  what	  Prinz	  means	  by	  ‘emotion’.	  Like	  my	  discussion	  of	  moral	  
internalism,	  this	  will	  introduce	  some	  commitments	  that	  Prinz	  has	  that	  I	  will	  build	  
on.	  However,	  it	  will	  also	  be	  used	  to	  explain	  why	  I	  think	  there	  are	  shifts	  and	  
inconsistencies	  in	  his	  account.	  	  	  
Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  appraisals.	  An	  appraisal,	  here,	  is	  a	  
“representation	  of	  an	  organism/environment	  relation	  with	  respect	  to	  well-­‐being”	  
(2004,	  p.	  52).	  So,	  fear	  is	  the	  appraisal	  that	  you	  are	  in	  danger.	  And	  sadness	  is	  the	  
appraisal	  that	  something	  valuable	  has	  been	  lost.	  Crucially,	  Prinz	  argues,	  these	  
appraisals	  are	  embodied.	  Emotions	  are	  mental	  representations	  of	  a	  set	  of	  
physiological	  changes	  in	  your	  body	  that	  simultaneously	  signal	  how	  the	  world	  bears	  
on	  you,	  and	  prepare	  you	  for	  action.	  For	  example,	  fear	  is	  a	  mental	  representation	  of	  
an	  increasing	  heart	  rate	  and	  a	  surge	  of	  adrenaline,	  and	  represents	  that	  you	  are	  in	  a	  
harmful	  situation.	  It	  prepares	  you	  to	  flee,	  fight	  or	  freeze.	  Roughly	  speaking,	  this	  
idea	  of	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisals	  is	  going	  to	  continue	  throughout	  this	  
thesis.	  However,	  it	  will	  undergo	  some	  tweaks.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  That	  I	  have	  endorsed	  moral	  internalism	  may	  make	  it	  puzzling	  that	  I	  argue	  against	  the	  
sufficiency	  hypothesis.	  The	  worry	  is	  that	  emotions	  motivate,	  and	  concepts	  are	  
motivationally	  inert.	  So,	  if	  one	  is	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  internalist,	  then	  it	  better	  be	  that	  the	  process	  
involved	  in	  moral	  judgements	  are	  processes	  that	  can	  motivate.	  	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  emotions	  seem	  to	  fit	  the	  job	  description	  of	  ‘a	  psychological	  process	  
that	  can	  motivate’.	  However,	  at	  the	  most,	  this	  implies	  that	  emotions	  are	  necessary	  for	  
moral	  judgements,	  not	  that	  they	  are	  sufficient.	  Considering	  that	  I	  agree	  that	  moral	  
judgements	  are	  affective,	  I	  retain	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  they	  can	  motivate.	  Prinz	  himself	  
takes	  the	  necessity	  thesis,	  rather	  than	  the	  sufficiency	  thesis,	  to	  be	  crucial	  for	  a	  moral	  
internalist	  stance.	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   In	  forming	  this	  theory,	  Prinz	  seeks	  to	  overcome	  the	  opposition	  between	  
appraisal	  theories	  of	  emotion	  and	  theories	  of	  emotions	  as	  bodily	  feelings.	  As	  he	  
sees	  it,	  appraisal	  theories,	  where	  emotions	  represent	  how	  the	  situation	  is	  for	  the	  
organism,	  are	  typically	  cognitivist	  theories.	  Cognitivist	  theories	  depend	  on	  some	  
account	  of	  cognition	  that	  differentiates	  it	  from	  bodily	  responses,	  and	  hold	  that	  
emotions	  are	  characterised	  by	  cognitive	  processes.	  Cognitivists	  about	  emotions	  
generally	  argue	  that	  emotions	  are	  appraisals	  or	  judgements	  of	  some	  sort	  and	  are	  
therefore	  not	  characterised	  best	  by	  our	  physiological	  state.	  The	  assumption,	  here,	  
is	  that	  (representations	  of)	  physiological	  states	  are	  not	  the	  types	  of	  things	  that	  
make	  appraisals.	  	  
However,	  while	  Prinz	  accepts	  that	  emotions	  are	  appraisals,	  he	  does	  not	  
accept	  that	  they	  are	  cognitive.	  Which	  is	  to	  say,	  that,	  in	  2004,	  Prinz	  sees	  his	  theory	  
of	  emotions	  as	  a	  non-­‐cognitivist	  theory	  of	  emotion.	  Act	  of	  cognition,	  for	  Prinz,	  
involves	  the	  intentional	  use	  of	  representation,	  such	  as	  when	  we	  explicitly	  reason.	  
Emotions	  appear	  to	  arise	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  reasoning,	  so	  cognition	  is	  not	  
necessary	  for	  an	  occurrence	  of	  an	  emotion.	  We	  often	  feel	  fear	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  
what	  we	  see,	  without	  any	  intervening,	  explicit,	  thought.	  For	  example,	  someone	  can	  
see	  a	  mouse	  in	  their	  house,	  immediately	  feel	  scared,	  shriek	  and	  gather	  their	  whole	  
body	  onto	  a	  higher	  surface	  than	  the	  mouse	  without	  first	  thinking	  “a	  mouse!	  How	  
dangerous!”.	  Quite	  the	  opposite:	  if	  there	  is	  any	  conscious	  thought,	  it	  comes	  after	  
the	  fact,	  in	  the	  form	  of,	  “a	  mouse!	  That	  shouldn’t	  be	  scary”.	  	  
Most	  emotions,	  for	  Prinz	  (2004),	  are	  like	  this.	  They	  are	  passive	  reactions	  to	  
the	  world	  rather	  than	  something	  we	  are	  able	  to	  wilfully	  control.	  He	  admits	  that	  
emotions	  may	  sometimes	  be	  conceptual,	  “as	  when	  we	  plan	  for	  the	  future.	  One	  
might	  wilfully	  imagine	  being	  afraid	  and	  elated	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  emotional	  
costs	  of	  a	  roller-­‐coaster	  ride	  will	  outweigh	  the	  benefits”	  (2004,	  p.	  50).	  But	  “our	  
ability	  to	  wilfully	  generate	  emotions	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  every	  episode	  of	  emotion	  
is	  conceptual”	  because	  “emotions	  that	  are	  caused	  in	  us	  by	  events	  in	  our	  everyday	  
life	  are	  not	  concepts.	  They	  are	  more	  like	  percepts.	  They	  are	  under	  exogenous	  
control”	  (ibid.).	  	  	  
Furthermore,	  Prinz	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  there	  are	  neurological	  reasons	  for	  
thinking	  that	  emotions	  are	  not	  (normally)	  conceptual	  and	  are	  embodied.	  LeDoux	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(1996)	  and	  Morris	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  present	  evidence	  that	  (some)	  emotional	  responses	  
are	  primarily	  the	  result	  of	  the	  amygdala	  and	  thalamus,	  which	  are	  argued	  to	  be	  
involved	  only	  in	  bodily	  changes	  and	  not	  conceptual	  activity.	  This	  appears	  to	  the	  
case	  when	  we	  respond	  to	  pictures	  of	  a	  coiled	  snake	  (LeDoux,	  1996)	  and	  if	  we	  
respond	  to	  the	  rapid	  presentation	  of	  facial	  expressions	  (Morris,	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  So,	  
Prinz	  concludes	  that	  “emotions	  can	  arise	  without	  judgments,	  thoughts,	  or	  other	  
cognitive	  mediators”	  (2007,	  p.	  57).	  	  
Prinz	  (2007)	  also	  thinks	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  bodily	  changes	  are	  
sufficient	  for	  emotion.	  First,	  he	  uses	  evidence	  from	  a	  study	  by	  Levenson	  et	  al.	  
(1990)	  that	  shows	  that	  pulling	  facial	  expressions	  associated	  with	  a	  certain	  emotion	  
causes	  both	  a	  particular	  pattern	  of	  bodily	  changes	  and	  induces	  a	  particular	  
emotional	  state.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  a	  conscious	  judgement	  occurring,	  our	  
embodied	  state	  here	  appears	  to	  be	  sufficient	  for	  an	  emotion.	  Prinz	  invites	  us	  to	  
experience	  this	  too,	  in	  the	  wild.	  We	  can	  smile	  and	  notice	  the	  feeling	  of	  happiness,	  
scowl,	  and	  experience	  the	  feeling	  of	  anger;	  so	  the	  emotion	  occurs	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
thought	  and	  the	  bodily	  pattern	  appears	  sufficient	  for	  the	  feeling.	  Additionally,	  
Prinz	  questions	  the	  claim	  that	  there	  are	  ever	  cases	  where	  an	  emotion	  is	  felt	  in	  the	  
absence	  of	  bodily	  sensations.	  When	  we	  experience	  an	  emotion,	  it	  appears	  that	  
some	  bodily	  sensations	  are	  always	  present.	  	  
Prinz	  takes	  himself	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  felt	  bodily	  changes	  and	  the	  
experience	  an	  emotion	  normally	  co-­‐occur,	  by	  the	  examples	  above.	  So	  now	  he	  turns	  
to	  particular	  cases	  where	  it	  might	  seem	  like	  there	  is	  an	  emotion	  without	  an	  
embodied	  component.	  We	  shall	  see	  that	  he	  argues	  that	  both	  these	  possible	  
exceptions	  are	  unconvincing,	  so	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  cognitivist	  has	  failed	  to	  provide	  
examples	  of	  where	  emotions	  are	  experienced	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  particular	  
embodied	  state.	  Therefore,	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  embodied	  states	  are	  necessary	  for	  
emotions	  remains	  plausible.	  	  
The	  first	  counter-­‐example	  cognitivists	  present	  are	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  a	  
sentiment,	  but	  not	  an	  occurrent	  emotion.	  For	  example,	  one	  can	  have	  a	  spider	  
phobia	  without	  being	  in	  constant	  fear	  of	  spiders.	  Nonetheless,	  Prinz	  responds	  that	  
one	  cannot	  have	  a	  spider	  phobia	  without	  the	  disposition	  to	  have,	  say,	  butterflies	  in	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the	  stomach	  and	  the	  rushing,	  tingling,	  feeling	  of	  adrenaline	  to	  the	  limbs	  when	  in	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	  spider.	  	  
The	  second	  counter-­‐example	  the	  cognitivist	  presents	  is	  the	  apparently	  
more	  cognitive	  emotions	  such	  as	  aesthetic	  appreciation.	  For	  Prinz	  (2007),	  even	  
what	  we	  think	  of	  as	  more	  soulful	  sentiments,	  such	  as	  aesthetic	  appreciation,	  do	  not	  
occur	  without	  bodily	  changes	  such	  as	  shivers	  down	  the	  spine,	  or	  an	  expansive	  
feeling	  in	  our	  chest.	  Evidence	  from	  neuroimaging	  studies	  appears	  to	  support	  this:	  
they	  show	  that	  brain	  areas	  involved	  with	  bodily	  regulation	  are	  active	  when	  people	  
view	  art	  (Kawabata	  &	  Zeki,	  2004;	  Vartanian	  &	  Goel,	  2004).	  So	  far,	  there	  are	  no	  
good	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  that	  bodily	  changes	  aren’t	  necessary	  for	  emotions.	  	  
However,	  convincing	  someone	  that	  bodily	  changes	  are	  necessary	  and	  
sufficient	  for	  emotions	  does	  not	  show	  that	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  appraisals.	  So	  
why	  does	  Prinz	  hold	  that	  they	  are	  and	  how	  can	  an	  appraisal	  theory	  be	  consistent	  
with	  his	  theory	  that	  emotions	  are	  a	  pattern	  of	  bodily	  change?	  
Prinz	  holds	  there	  can	  be	  a	  difference	  between	  what	  a	  mental	  state	  registers,	  
and	  what	  it	  represents.	  It	  is	  true,	  for	  him,	  that	  emotions	  occur	  when	  bodily	  changes	  
are	  registered.	  Yet	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  for	  a	  mental	  state,	  like	  emotion,	  to	  represent	  
something,	  it	  must	  have	  the	  function	  of	  detecting	  that	  thing.	  If	  emotions	  
represented	  bodily	  changes	  then	  they	  would	  have	  the	  function	  of	  detecting	  bodily	  
changes.	  Furthermore,	  he	  thinks	  that	  we	  should	  also	  assume	  that	  the	  function	  of	  a	  
mental	  state	  will	  have	  come	  into	  being	  via	  natural	  selection,	  and	  will	  therefore	  
tend	  to	  enhance	  the	  survival	  of	  a	  creature.	  For	  Prinz,	  this	  creates	  a	  problem	  if	  we	  
believe	  that	  emotions	  represent	  bodily	  changes,	  as	  the	  survival	  advantage	  of	  
emotions	  seems	  to	  come	  from	  their	  integration	  with	  our	  decision-­‐making	  
capacities	  and	  our	  behaviour	  responses.	  ‘Representation	  of	  a	  bodily	  state’	  doesn’t	  
seem	  to	  fit	  with	  this	  criterion.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  why	  “we	  should	  flee	  when	  our	  heart	  
races”	  (2004,	  p.	  59).	  And,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  decision-­‐making	  would	  be	  helped	  
through	  anticipating	  non-­‐evaluative	  bodily	  changes:	  	  
Suppose	  I	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  a	  certain	  course	  of	  action	  will	  make	  my	  
blood	  vessels	  dilate	  or	  constrict.	  Does	  my	  ignorance	  lead	  me	  to	  
recklessness?	  If	  so,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  why.	  (ibid.)	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Since	  bodily	  changes,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  have	  no	  evaluative	  character,	  do	  not	  
seem	  to	  be	  adaptive,	  it	  doesn’t	  seem	  right	  to	  Prinz	  that	  they	  are	  what	  
emotions	  represent.	  	  
	   Emotions	  also	  seem	  to	  be	  triggered	  by	  our	  perception	  of	  our	  situation.	  We	  
feel	  scared	  when	  it	  seems	  to	  us	  our	  situation	  is	  dangerous,	  sad	  when	  we	  feel	  we	  
have	  lost	  something	  valuable.	  We	  may,	  as	  Prinz	  points	  out,	  understand	  different	  
things	  as	  dangerous	  or	  valuable.	  But	  our	  emotions	  are	  reliably	  “elicited	  by	  things	  
as	  they	  relate	  to	  us.	  This	  suggests	  that	  emotions	  represent	  relations	  between	  
external	  states	  and	  our	  selves.	  The	  represent	  organism-­‐environment	  relations.”	  
(2004,	  p.	  60).	  Note	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  see	  how	  the	  understanding	  of	  something	  
as	  dangerous	  to	  oneself	  is	  involved	  in	  prompting	  one	  to	  get	  away	  from	  it	  now,	  and	  
make	  decisions	  about	  how	  best	  to	  avoid	  it	  in	  the	  long-­‐term.	  So,	  as	  Prinz	  
understands	  it,	  the	  theory	  that	  emotions	  represent	  appraisals	  of	  organism-­‐
environment	  relations	  fulfils	  both	  criteria	  of	  what	  it	  counts	  for	  a	  mental	  state	  to	  
represent:	  it	  has	  the	  function	  of	  detecting	  something	  (an	  organism-­‐environment	  
relation),	  and	  we	  can	  understand	  how	  that	  function	  is	  adaptive	  (it	  helpfully	  
informs	  our	  current	  and	  long-­‐term	  behaviour).	  Prinz	  concludes	  that,	  “emotions	  
represent	  changes	  in	  organism-­‐environment	  relations	  by	  tracking	  changes	  in	  the	  
body”	  (2004,	  p.	  78).	  	  
I	  find	  the	  direction	  of	  this	  argument	  broadly	  convincing.	  While	  I	  have	  
doubts	  about	  understanding	  emotions	  as	  representations6,	  the	  observation	  that	  
emotions	  systematically	  co-­‐vary	  with	  our	  situation,	  and	  our,	  often	  implicit,	  
understanding	  of	  it,	  still	  holds.	  So	  does	  the	  observation	  that	  their	  role	  in	  our	  
intentions	  and	  decisions	  remains	  opaque	  if	  they	  do	  not	  have	  content	  or	  express	  
meaning.	  Similarly,	  the	  evidence	  that	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  seems	  empirically	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  will	  be	  expanded	  on	  in	  chapter	  5.	  Briefly,	  however,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  word	  
‘representation’	  suggests	  that,	  for	  there	  to	  be	  meaning	  involved	  in	  a	  mental	  activity,	  we	  
must	  make	  an	  inference	  between	  it	  and	  what	  it	  is	  about.	  For	  example,	  a	  thermometer	  
represents	  the	  temperature	  by	  us	  making	  an	  inference	  from	  the	  number	  on	  it,	  to	  what	  the	  
number	  is	  about	  (Taylor,	  1983).	  While	  Prinz	  could	  respond	  that	  we	  needn’t,	  and	  he	  
doesn’t,	  mean	  that	  by	  ‘represent’,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  debate	  about	  whether	  more	  minimal	  uses	  
of	  these	  term	  is	  misleading.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  jury	  is	  still	  out	  on	  this	  long-­‐standing	  debate,	  
and	  it	  cannot	  be	  settled	  in	  this	  thesis.	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and	  phenomenologically	  convincing7.	  And,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  chapters	  3,	  4,	  5	  and	  6,	  
if	  we	  use	  this	  model	  of	  emotions	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  whole	  host	  of	  
observations	  about	  agency.	  
	  
However,	  while	  I	  will	  be	  accepting	  that	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  appraisal,	  I	  will	  not	  
be	  accepting	  that	  emotions,	  in	  general,	  are	  non-­‐conceptual.	  So,	  before	  moving	  on,	  I	  
want	  to	  challenge	  the	  way	  Prinz’s	  uses	  the	  neurological	  literature	  to	  argue	  that	  
emotions	  are	  generally	  non-­‐conceptual.	  	  
While	  it	  may	  be	  that	  some	  studies	  have	  shown	  a	  small	  and	  select	  neural	  
underpinning	  for	  some	  emotional	  responses,	  recent	  meta-­‐analyses	  of	  the	  literature	  
provide	  a	  different	  picture.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  enabling	  mechanisms	  of	  emotion	  
are	  widespread	  and	  involve	  areas	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  enable	  cognition.	  
Many	  of	  these	  areas	  associated	  with	  cognition	  overlap	  with	  Prinz’s	  
understanding	  of	  cognition.	  For	  example,	  the	  studies	  include	  the	  activation	  of	  brain	  
areas	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  cognitive	  control	  (Pessoa,	  2008)	  and	  language	  (Lindquist	  
et	  al.,	  2012).	  Both	  of	  these	  capacities	  seem	  to	  be	  included	  in	  Prinz’s	  understanding	  
of	  cognition,	  given	  that	  cognition	  is	  understood	  to	  depend	  on	  our	  capacity	  to	  
control	  representation.	  Since	  language-­‐use	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  manipulating	  
representations,	  it	  fits	  Prinz’s	  definition	  quite	  well.	  Nonetheless,	  I	  note	  that	  it	  is	  
tricky	  to	  compare	  the	  capacities	  that	  some	  neuropsychologist	  distinguish	  to	  Prinz’s	  
definition,	  given	  how	  the	  former	  are	  often	  orthogonal	  to	  Prinz’s	  categories.	  	  
Pessoa	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  neuroscientific	  
literature	  is	  that	  “complex	  cognitive-­‐emotional	  behaviours	  have	  their	  basis	  in	  
dynamic	  coalitions	  of	  networks	  of	  brain	  areas,	  none	  of	  which	  should	  be	  
conceptualised	  as	  specifically	  affective	  or	  cognitive”	  (p.	  148).	  His	  broad	  argument	  
is	  that	  areas	  of	  the	  brain	  generally	  thought	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  cognition	  tend	  to	  also	  
be	  involved	  in	  emotion	  and	  vice	  versa.	  In	  contrast	  to	  Prinz’s	  assertion,	  the	  
amygdala,	  along	  brain	  regions	  associated	  with	  emotion,	  “might	  function	  as	  
important	  connectivity	  hubs”	  (p.	  152).	  Specifically,	  the	  amygdala	  is	  highly	  
connected	  to	  areas	  of	  the	  brain	  typically	  thought	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  cognition.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  For	  more	  evidence,	  see	  Colombetti	  (2014).	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Whether	  we	  should	  see	  it	  as	  enabling	  processes	  that	  are	  completely	  distinct	  from	  
cognition,	  when	  it	  appears	  to	  generally	  be	  involved	  in	  cognition,	  therefore	  is	  
debatable.	  	  
Similarly,	  Lindquist	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  found	  that	  discrete	  emotions8	  were	  
associated	  with	  widespread	  activation	  in	  brain,	  including	  areas	  associated	  with	  
conceptualisation,	  language,	  and	  executive	  attention.	  All	  of	  these	  are	  cortical	  areas,	  
rather	  than	  the	  thalamus	  and	  amygdala.	  	  
We	  will	  see	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis	  a	  more	  detailed	  account	  of	  why	  we	  
should	  see	  emotion	  and	  cognition	  as	  integrated.	  For	  now,	  all	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  is	  
that	  Prinz’s	  use	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  support	  his	  claim	  that	  emotions	  are	  not	  
normally	  conceptual	  is	  highly	  contestable.	  Furthermore,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	  
Prinz’s	  interest	  in	  arguing	  that	  emotions	  are	  generally	  not	  conceptual	  is	  not	  clearly	  
carried	  over	  to	  his	  idea	  of	  moral	  emotions.	  	  	  
	  
Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisals	  should	  be	  viewed	  in	  a	  general	  
context	  where	  the	  conceptual	  dichotomy	  between	  sense-­‐making	  and	  embodied	  
activity	  is	  being	  broken	  down.	  Various	  emotion	  theorists	  have	  also	  moved	  in	  this	  
direction	  in	  recent	  (and	  not	  so	  recent9)	  years.	  Notably,	  within	  the	  field	  of	  the	  
philosophy	  of	  cognitive	  science,	  Colombetti	  (2007	  &	  2014),	  Hutto	  (2012),	  Ratcliffe	  
(2005),	  and	  Slaby	  &	  Stephan	  (2008),	  among	  others,	  have	  put	  forward	  a	  similar	  
view.	  	  Colombetti	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  “that	  the	  experience	  of	  evaluating	  one’s	  
environment	  is	  already	  affective	  and	  corporeal”	  (p.	  544).	  	  In	  her	  2014	  book,	  
Colombetti	  expands	  on	  this	  theory.	  For	  her,	  all	  affective	  processes	  are	  embodied,	  
enacted	  appraisals,	  which	  are	  fundamental	  to	  life	  and	  cognition.	  That	  is,	  affective	  
capacities	  are	  a	  necessary	  and	  fundamental	  characteristic	  of	  the	  way	  that	  that	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Discrete	  emotions	  are	  those	  emotions	  that	  we	  can	  name,	  such	  as	  anger	  or	  joy,	  and	  that	  
occur	  for	  a	  fixed	  period	  of	  time.	  	  	  
9	  See	  Ahmed	  (2004)	  in	  the	  afterword	  of	  ‘The	  Cultural	  Politics	  of	  Emotion’	  where	  she	  
discusses	  how	  feminist	  theorists,	  for	  decades,	  have	  been	  the	  initiators	  of	  ‘the	  affective	  
turn’.	  From	  the	  80s	  onward,	  feminists	  have	  been	  challenging	  the	  dualism	  between	  
capacities	  associated	  with	  mindedness,	  and	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  body,	  through	  their	  
discussion	  of	  affect	  and	  emotion.	  Similarly,	  Taylor	  has	  been	  expressing	  a	  view	  along	  these	  
lines	  from	  the	  late	  50s.	  The	  beginnings	  of	  these	  views	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  stretch	  further	  back.	  
Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  Phenomenology	  of	  Perception	  was	  originally	  published	  in	  1945,	  and	  as	  we	  
will	  see	  in	  chapter	  6,	  implies	  a	  similar	  attitude	  to	  emotion.	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organism,	  in	  its	  interaction	  with	  the	  world,	  makes	  meaning.	  Hutto	  (2012),	  while	  
against	  the	  use	  of	  representation	  language	  in	  emotion	  theories,	  similarly	  
understands	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  attitudes.	  	  In	  his	  exposition	  of	  emotions,	  
Ratcliffe	  (2005)	  argues	  that	  bodily	  feelings	  are	  part	  of	  the	  structure	  of	  
intentionality.	  Slaby	  &	  Stephan	  (2008)	  take	  emotions	  to	  reveal	  “how	  things	  stand	  
with	  regard	  to	  our	  personal	  well	  being	  or	  our	  faring	  in	  the	  world	  in	  general”	  (p.	  
507)	  through	  our	  felt	  body.	  Again,	  emotional	  experience	  ‘discloses’	  or	  ‘makes	  
manifest’,	  rather	  than	  ‘represents’,	  our	  relation	  to	  our	  world.	  Many	  years	  before,	  
the	  philosopher	  Taylor	  (1985),	  also	  conveys	  a	  theory	  of	  emotions	  where	  they	  are	  
simultaneously	  expressions	  of	  the	  ‘import’	  of	  a	  situation	  (i.e.	  how	  a	  situation	  
matters	  to	  us)	  and	  embodied	  senses.	  Like	  Hutto,	  Slaby	  and	  Stephan,	  Taylor	  wants	  
to	  move	  away	  from	  representation	  language,	  for	  reasons	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  
later	  in	  the	  thesis.	  Further	  afield,	  feminist,	  queer	  theorist	  and	  critical	  race	  theorist,	  
Ahmed	  (2004)	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  bodily	  orientations	  to	  the	  world.	  	  
All	  of	  which	  is	  to	  say	  that	  Prinz,	  while	  apparently	  making	  a	  very	  bold	  and	  
(to	  some)	  counter-­‐intuitive	  statement,	  finds	  himself	  within	  a	  movement	  of	  
thinkers	  who	  want	  to	  overcome	  the	  dichotomy	  between	  how	  a	  creature	  
apprehends	  the	  world	  and	  its	  existence	  as	  an	  embodied	  thing.	  Unlike	  Prinz,	  and	  
more	  like	  the	  thinkers	  just	  overviewed,	  I	  will	  be	  going	  further	  than	  his	  proposal	  
however.	  I	  will	  be	  suggesting	  not	  only	  that	  we	  should	  overturn	  the	  dichotomy	  
between	  our	  embodied	  activity	  and	  our	  appraisals,	  but	  also	  we	  should	  overturn	  
the	  dichotomy	  between	  embodied	  activity	  and	  cognition.	  	  
	   I	  will	  be	  accepting	  what	  I	  understand	  to	  be	  the	  essence	  of	  Prinz’s	  proposal	  
on	  emotion,	  which	  is	  captured	  by	  all	  of	  the	  theorists	  above10.	  Like	  a	  few	  of	  those	  
theorists,	  I	  will	  move	  away	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  emotions	  as	  representations	  in	  chapter	  
5.	  While	  I	  will	  continue	  to	  agree	  with	  Prinz	  that	  emotions	  are	  embodied,	  in	  chapter	  
2,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  deep	  ambiguity	  that	  Prinz	  has	  in	  regards	  to	  cognition	  and	  
emotion	  generates,	  from	  one	  perspective,	  a	  dilemma.	  In	  chapter	  5,	  I	  will	  present	  
my	  proposal,	  in	  response	  to	  this	  dilemma.	  In	  chapter	  6	  I	  will	  dispute	  another	  
aspect	  of	  Prinz’s	  (2004)	  theory	  of	  emotions,	  which	  is	  that	  emotions	  do	  not	  include,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  I	  do	  not	  think	  this	  essence	  relies	  on	  other	  facets	  of	  Prinz’s	  theory.	  For	  instance,	  I	  do	  not	  
share	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  basic	  emotions.	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as	  a	  constituent,	  the	  particular	  events	  or	  objects	  to	  which	  they	  are	  directed.	  So,	  for	  
example,	  he	  argues	  that	  if	  someone	  feels	  sadness	  at	  the	  death	  of	  a	  pet,	  they	  are	  in	  a	  
compound	  state	  which	  includes	  both	  sadness,	  as	  a	  representation	  of	  something	  
valuable	  being	  lost,	  and	  (independently	  of	  the	  emotional	  state)	  a	  representation	  of	  
the	  dead	  pet.	  In	  contrast,	  I	  will	  argue	  later	  that	  exteroception	  –	  sensory	  
information	  related	  to	  the	  external	  world	  –	  is	  integral	  to	  embodied	  appraisals.	  That	  
is,	  the	  things	  emotions	  are	  directed	  at	  are	  constituents	  of	  the	  emotion.	  	  
Yet	  I	  will	  be	  affirming	  Prinz’s	  insight	  that	  understanding	  emotions	  as	  
embodied	  appraisals	  is	  pivotal	  to	  understanding	  their	  role	  in	  moral	  judgements.	  
Like	  Prinz,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  emotions	  can	  play	  this	  role	  through	  the	  inextricable	  tie	  
between	  their	  evaluative	  and	  embodied	  character.	  For	  me,	  this	  character	  is	  
necessary	  for	  us	  to	  imaginatively	  grasp	  the	  meaning	  of	  causes	  and	  consequence	  
that	  aren’t	  currently	  before	  us.	  Unlike	  Prinz,	  my	  theory	  is	  not	  (only)	  sentimentalist,	  
in	  the	  sense	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  constituted	  through	  affective	  deliberation	  
in	  the	  form	  of	  making	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  explicit.	  	  
One	  final	  thing	  to	  note	  is	  that	  there	  are	  various	  distinctions	  we	  can	  make,	  
for	  example,	  between	  ‘emotion’	  ‘affect’	  ‘sentiment’	  and	  ‘mood’	  (e.g.	  Prinz,	  2004).	  
For	  example,	  one	  can	  think	  of	  a	  mood	  as	  having	  a	  general	  object,	  and	  emotion	  as	  
having	  a	  particular	  one.	  However,	  none	  of	  these	  distinctions	  are	  relevant	  to	  this	  
thesis	  and	  I	  will	  be	  using	  the	  terms	  ‘affect’	  and	  ‘emotion’	  interchangeably.	  By	  both,	  
I	  mean	  an	  embodied	  appraisal.	  	  
	  
	  
5.	  Moral	  emotions	  &	  their	  relationship	  to	  concepts	  	  
	  
5.1	  Moral	  emotions	  
While	  in	  2006	  Prinz	  states	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judegments,	  in	  his	  book,	  
‘The	  Emotional	  Construction	  of	  Morals’	  Prinz	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  ‘moral	  
emotions’	  that	  are	  crucial	  for	  moral	  judgements.	  This	  brings	  in	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  
ambiguity	  to	  the	  mechanism	  involved	  in	  moral	  judgement.	  In	  particular,	  this	  
indicates	  a	  switch	  where	  moral	  judgements	  are	  no	  longer	  just	  emotional,	  they	  are	  
also	  conceptual.	  However,	  as	  I	  wish	  to	  demonstrate,	  Prinz	  appears	  to	  only	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understand	  emotions	  as	  conceptual	  in	  some	  respects,	  and	  does	  not	  think	  they	  
participate	  in	  our	  cognitive	  activity	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  other	  types	  of	  concepts	  do.	  
Specifically,	  emotions	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  participate	  in	  deliberation	  for	  Prinz.	  	  	  
Here	  are	  what	  Prinz	  sees	  as	  the	  main	  moral	  emotions	  (2007,	  chapter	  2,	  
section	  2.2.),	  where	  the	  equation	  involves	  a	  calibration	  file	  and	  the	  physiological	  
state	  associated	  with	  a	  non-­‐moral	  emotion:	  	  
• Indignation	  =	  injustice	  +	  anger	  
• Righteous	  anger	  =	  harm	  against	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  person	  +	  anger	  
• Moral	  disgust	  =	  violations	  of	  what	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  natural/pure	  +	  disgust	  
• Guilt	  =	  being	  responsible	  for	  harming	  someone	  one	  cares	  about	  +	  sadness	  
• Shame	  =	  being	  responsible	  for	  violating	  rules	  concerning	  the	  natural	  order	  
+	  embarrassment	  
In	  these	  cases	  the	  moral	  emotion	  represents	  a	  different	  relation	  between	  creature	  
and	  world	  than	  the	  non-­‐moral	  emotion	  it	  is	  based	  on,	  and	  yet	  the	  calibration	  file	  is	  
the	  cause	  of	  this	  change	  in	  the	  representation,	  and	  not	  a	  proper	  part	  of	  the	  
emotion.	  The	  calibration	  file	  is	  a	  cause,	  rather	  than	  a	  constituent	  of	  an	  emotion,	  
like	  the	  sun	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  sunburn	  and	  not	  a	  constituent	  of	  it	  (p.68).	  	  
It	  is	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  calibration	  file	  to	  an	  emotion	  that	  transforms	  it	  into	  a	  
moral	  emotion,	  and	  a	  sentiment	  into	  a	  moral	  sentiment.	  But,	  what	  is	  a	  ‘calibration	  
file’?	  Calibration	  files	  are	  a	  set	  of	  “impressions	  and	  ideas”	  (2007,	  p.	  66)	  that	  
represent	  a	  particular	  concern	  and	  trigger	  a	  certain	  emotion.	  An	  emotion	  is	  
calibrated	  to	  a	  set	  of	  impressions	  and	  ideas	  when	  it	  is	  triggered	  by	  something	  
pertaining	  to	  that	  set.	  And	  “moral	  emotions	  promote	  or	  detect	  conduct	  that	  
violates	  or	  conforms	  to	  a	  moral	  rule”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  68).	  For	  example,	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  
the	  moral	  emotion	  of	  indignation	  occurs	  when	  the	  emotion	  of	  anger	  is	  calibrated	  to	  
impressions	  and	  ideas	  of	  injustice.	  The	  calibration	  file	  ‘injustice’	  could	  be	  set	  off	  by	  
thoughts	  about	  injustice,	  or	  a	  perception	  of	  injustice,	  say,	  watching	  a	  police	  person	  
hit	  a	  protestor.	  Such	  calibration	  files	  change	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  emotion,	  despite	  
the	  somatic	  pattern	  staying	  the	  same.	  So,	  while	  anger	  represents	  that	  something	  
you	  care	  about,	  including	  oneself,	  has	  been	  insulted	  or	  threatened,	  indignation	  
represents	  that	  an	  injustice	  has	  occurred.	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   When	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  morally-­‐relevant	  calibration	  files	  is	  added	  to	  Prinz’s	  
theory	  of	  sentiments,	  sentiments	  of	  dis/approbation	  now	  refer	  not	  to	  the	  
disposition	  towards	  any	  types	  of	  emotion,	  but	  emotions	  that	  are	  moral	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  they	  represent	  self-­‐blame	  or	  praise,	  or	  other-­‐blame	  or	  praise.	  A	  sentiment	  of	  
disapprobation	  towards	  police	  brutality,	  for	  example,	  results	  in	  indignation	  when	  
such	  instances	  are	  perceived.	  	  
	   Ostensibly,	  Prinz	  introduces	  calibration	  files	  to	  get	  round	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  
‘somatic	  similarity	  problem’.	  The	  somatic	  similarity	  problem	  is	  that	  there	  are	  
presumably	  fewer	  distinct	  patterns	  bodily	  patterns	  of	  change	  than	  there	  are	  
distinct	  emotions11.	  That	  is,	  what	  we	  think	  of	  as	  distinct	  emotions	  may	  share	  the	  
same	  pattern	  of	  bodily	  changes.	  Since,	  for	  him,	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  appraisals	  
because	  they	  are	  somatic	  patterns	  that	  represent	  a	  creature-­‐world	  relationship,	  
and	  emotions	  are	  only	  somatic	  patterns,	  Prinz	  needs	  to	  explain	  how	  there	  can	  be	  a	  
greater	  number	  of	  creature-­‐world	  relationships	  represented	  than	  there	  are	  
somatic	  patterns.	  One	  answer	  he	  gives	  is	  that	  emotions	  can	  be	  the	  result	  of	  blends	  
of	  two	  or	  more	  embodied	  appraisals	  (2007,	  p.	  67).	  Prinz’s	  other	  proposal	  is	  that	  
representing	  creature-­‐world	  relations	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  the	  somatic	  patterns,	  
but	  also	  on	  what	  caused	  that	  pattern	  i.e.	  the	  calibration	  file	  (ibid.).	  	  
	   To	  illustrate	  why	  this	  works,	  Prinz	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  a	  machine	  that	  
detects	  smoke,	  and	  one	  that	  detects	  carbon.	  Both	  are	  wired	  to	  the	  same	  alarm.	  He	  
thinks	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  say	  that	  the	  sounding	  of	  the	  alarm	  represents	  a	  
disjunct,	  that	  is,	  that	  it	  represents	  the	  presence	  of	  “either-­‐fire-­‐or-­‐carbon”.	  Instead,	  
what	  the	  alarm	  represents	  depends	  on	  what	  has	  caused	  it.	  Similarly,	  what	  the	  
word	  ‘bat’	  represents	  depends	  on	  the	  context	  it	  appears	  in.	  If	  we	  are	  talking	  of	  a	  
baseball	  game,	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  wooden	  thing	  you	  swing,	  if	  the	  word	  appears	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  a	  full	  moon	  and	  witches,	  it	  represents	  a	  flying	  rodent.	  Similarly,	  what	  a	  
somatic	  pattern	  represents	  is	  determined	  not	  just	  by	  the	  pattern,	  but	  by	  what	  
caused	  this	  pattern.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  I	  think	  this	  might	  vastly	  underestimate	  the	  complexity	  of	  bodily	  reactions.	  See	  James	  
(1884)	  who	  understands	  the	  body	  as	  a	  complex	  “sounding	  board”	  (p.	  191	  &	  p.	  202),	  and	  
Colombetti	  (2014).	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An	  aspect	  of	  Prinz’s	  argument	  to	  attend	  to,	  given	  the	  argument	  I	  will	  make	  
concerning	  control	  and	  emotion,	  is	  that	  his	  example	  in	  no	  way	  settles	  what	  aspects	  
of	  the	  chain	  of	  events	  we	  should	  see	  as	  constituents	  of	  the	  representation.	  Is	  it	  only	  
the	  alarm	  that	  represents	  something	  or	  is	  it	  the	  machine	  wired	  to	  the	  alarm	  plus	  
the	  alarm?	  Is	  it	  just	  the	  word	  ‘bat’	  or	  the	  word	  ‘bat’	  plus	  its	  context?	  Is	  it	  just	  the	  
somatic	  pattern,	  or	  the	  somatic	  pattern	  plus	  the	  calibration	  file?	  	  
Prinz	  doesn’t	  explain	  why	  he	  takes	  a	  causal	  rather	  than	  constitutive	  
approach	  here.	  Presumably	  it	  is	  because	  he	  has	  other	  arguments	  for	  thinking	  that	  
embodied	  appraisals,	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  other	  capacities,	  are	  sufficient	  for	  emotions.	  
For	  example,	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  appear	  to	  be	  triggered	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
the	  cognitive	  areas	  of	  the	  brain	  being	  activiated,	  and	  argues	  our	  experience	  of	  
emotion	  is	  an	  experience	  of	  our	  bodies.	  So,	  Prinz’s	  commitment	  to	  embodied	  
appraisals	  being	  sufficient	  for	  emotion,	  combined	  with	  his	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
somatic	  similarity	  problem,	  guide	  him	  to	  his	  position	  on	  calibration	  files	  being	  
causes,	  rather	  than	  constituents,	  of	  emotions.	  	  
Yet,	  it	  is	  not	  obvious	  from	  Prinz’s	  fire	  alarm	  thought	  experiment	  that	  we	  
must	  take	  this	  route.	  I	  am	  not	  currently	  suggesting	  that	  we	  have	  good	  reason	  to	  
include	  more	  into	  what	  counts	  as	  constituting	  an	  embodied	  appraisal	  than	  Prinz	  
does,	  just	  that	  the	  only	  criteria	  we	  currently	  have	  for	  assessing	  the	  fire	  alarm	  case	  
are	  not	  decisive.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  from	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  content	  of	  what	  
Prinz	  calls	  ‘calibration	  files’	  and	  the	  affective	  quality	  of	  our	  embodied	  experience,	  
are	  causally	  rather	  than	  constitutively	  related.	  Particularly	  considering	  the	  
empirical	  evidence	  that	  shows	  cognition	  and	  affect	  as	  being	  enabled	  by	  
overlapping	  neural	  architecture.	  	  
What	  is	  striking,	  however,	  is	  that	  calibration	  files	  appear	  to	  be	  conceptual	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  the	  type	  of	  representations	  that	  we	  can	  manipulate.	  
‘Injustice’	  and	  ‘human	  rights’,	  for	  example,	  are	  what	  we	  typically	  take	  to	  be	  the	  
concepts	  that	  we	  use	  when	  thinking	  about	  morally	  pertinent	  situations.	  So	  what	  I	  
want	  to	  suggest,	  and	  what	  I	  want	  to	  give	  more	  evidence	  of	  later,	  is	  that	  Prinz	  has	  an	  
interest	  in	  keeping	  calibrations	  files	  as	  causal	  processes,	  rather	  than	  constitutive,	  
because	  he	  wants,	  to	  some	  extent,	  to	  reserve	  a	  clear	  difference	  in	  kind	  between	  
deliberative	  thought	  and	  emotions.	  On	  this	  story,	  calibration	  files	  can	  be	  part	  of	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cognition,	  in	  Prinz’s	  sense,	  but	  emotions	  are	  not.	  This	  is	  despite	  thinking	  that	  moral	  
emotions	  are,	  in	  some	  sense,	  conceptual.	  After	  explaining	  Prinz’s	  argument	  that	  
moral	  emotions	  are	  concepts,	  I	  explain	  why	  he	  does	  not	  consistently	  hold	  this.	  	  
	   	  
	   5.2.	  Moral	  emotions	  as	  concepts	  
Moral	  emotions	  seem	  to	  have	  quite	  different	  properties	  to	  emotions,	  in	  Prinz’s	  
view.	  As	  we	  saw	  above,	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  most	  emotions	  are	  not	  concepts,	  because	  
we	  are	  not	  generally	  able	  to	  intentionally	  control	  our	  emotions,	  like	  we	  do	  
concepts.	  However,	  his	  view	  on	  moral	  emotions	  is	  different,	  and,	  I	  argue,	  rather	  
ambiguous.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  explain	  why	  he	  thinks	  moral	  emotions	  are	  
conceptual.	  In	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  look	  at	  reasons	  why	  this	  claim	  is	  more	  
ambiguous	  than	  it	  initially	  seems.	  	  
	   First,	  what	  is	  Prinz’s	  motivation	  for	  claiming	  that	  moral	  sentiments	  
constitute	  concepts?	  The	  basic	  idea	  is	  that	  an	  account	  of	  judging	  must	  involve	  
concepts,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  through	  concepts	  that	  we	  can	  make	  judgements.	  
The	  best	  evidence	  of	  this	  is	  in	  his	  account	  of	  moral	  Mary,	  a	  woman	  who	  has	  no	  
emotions,	  but	  who	  tries	  to	  learn	  everything	  she	  can	  about	  morality	  through	  
reading	  about	  it.	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  despites	  Mary’s	  keen	  intellectual	  pursuit	  of	  
morality,	  she	  wouldn’t	  ever	  acquire	  the	  concepts	  of	  right	  and	  wrong,	  and	  therefore	  
would	  never	  be	  able	  to	  make	  a	  moral	  judgement	  (p.	  38-­‐	  42,	  2007).	  Through	  
thinking	  about	  what	  Mary	  is	  capable	  of,	  Prinz	  concludes	  that	  while	  Mary,	  	  
Can	  mouth	  the	  words	  “right”	  and	  “wrong”…	  she	  cannot	  understand	  them.	  
This	  strongly	  suggests	  that	  the	  concepts	  right	  and	  wrong…	  are	  not	  
explicable	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  concepts	  introduced	  by	  Kant,	  Mill,	  and	  other	  
normative	  ethicists.	  (ibid.,	  p.	  39.)	  
	  
Furthermore,	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  if	  Mary	  suddenly	  acquires	  emotional	  capacities,	  she	  
would	  then	  posses	  the	  concepts	  right	  and	  wrong:	  
The	  intuitions	  behind	  the	  thought	  experiment	  suggest	  that	  Mary	  does	  not	  
have	  standard	  moral	  concepts	  until	  she	  develops	  moral	  emotions.	  Without	  
moral	  emotions,	  she	  cannot	  form	  moral	  judgements	  in	  the	  ordinary	  sense.	  
(ibid.,	  p.42.)	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So,	  for	  Prinz,	  an	  account	  of	  moral	  judgements	  means	  an	  account	  of	  moral	  concepts.	  
And	  he	  thinks	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  those	  concepts,	  and	  that	  is	  how	  moral	  
emotions	  constitute	  judgements.	  	  	  
	   Prinz	  states	  that,	  “we	  can	  capture	  the	  idea	  that	  moral	  concepts	  are	  
perceptually	  based	  detectors	  of	  moral	  properties	  by	  postulating	  that	  moral	  
concepts	  are	  constituted	  by	  sentiments”	  (2007,	  p.	  94,).	  Concepts,	  for	  Prinz,	  are	  
perceptually	  based	  rather	  than	  amodal,	  so	  our	  concept	  of	  ‘dog’	  involves	  “an	  
assembly	  of	  perceptual	  features	  garnered	  from	  our	  various	  encounters	  with	  dogs”	  
(ibid.,	  p.	  93,).	  Since	  emotions,	  for	  Prinz,	  are	  perceptions	  of	  our	  bodily	  state	  that	  
represent	  our	  relation	  of	  the	  world,	  like	  other	  types	  of	  perceptions,	  they	  can	  
constitute	  concepts.	  	  
Moral	  emotions	  constitute	  concepts	  when	  they	  are	  representation	  that	  
reside	  in	  “memory	  or	  one	  that	  has	  been	  activated	  by	  memory”	  (2004,	  p.	  46,).	  This	  
is	  what	  sentiments	  are:	  they	  are	  dispositions,	  stored	  in	  memory,	  and,	  when	  a	  
situation	  or	  thought	  triggers	  a	  moral	  emotion,	  it	  is	  because	  the	  situation	  or	  thought	  
is	  triggering	  a	  manifestation	  of	  this	  disposition.	  This	  is	  why	  Prinz	  argues	  that,	  “the	  
standard	  concepts	  WRONG	  is	  a	  detector	  for	  the	  property	  of	  wrongness	  that	  
comprises	  a	  sentiment	  that	  disposes	  its	  possessor	  to	  experience	  emotion	  in	  the	  
disapprobation	  range”	  (2007,	  p.	  94).	  So,	  moral	  emotions	  involved	  in	  feeling	  
disapprobation	  constitute,	  when	  they	  are	  stored	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory	  as	  a	  moral	  
sentiment,	  the	  concept	  ‘wrong’.	  	  
To	  be	  clear,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  an	  objection	  to	  Prinz	  to	  argue	  that	  we	  do	  not	  
always	  control	  our	  moral	  emotions,	  so	  they	  cannot	  be	  conceptual.	  Even	  if	  moral	  
emotions	  are	  not	  always	  controlled	  voluntarily,	  this	  in	  itself	  would	  not	  be	  a	  
problem	  for	  Prinz,	  who	  distinguishes	  between	  cognition	  and	  acts	  of	  cognition	  
(2004,	  p.	  46).	  	  For	  something	  to	  be	  a	  concept,	  it	  can	  often	  be	  triggered	  by	  the	  
environment.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  it	  is	  possible,	  at	  other	  times,	  to	  voluntarily	  
use	  that	  concept:	  	  
Consider	  the	  case	  of	  thoughts	  that	  are	  triggered	  by	  perceptual	  experience.	  
You	  see	  a	  dog	  and	  you	  automatically	  form	  the	  thought	  that	  there	  is	  a	  dog	  
in	  front	  of	  you.	  The	  thought,	  and	  its	  constituent	  concepts,	  does	  not	  occur	  as	  
a	  result	  of	  organismic	  control.	  It	  is	  a	  reflex	  like	  response	  to	  your	  
experience.	  It	  qualifies	  as	  a	  thought	  because	  the	  representations	  it	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contains	  are	  under	  organismic	  control	  in	  a	  dispositional	  sense.	  You	  can	  
wilfully	  form	  thoughts	  using	  your	  dog	  concept.	  (2004,	  p.	  46,	  original	  
emphasis.)	  
	   	  
	  
	   5.3.	  Are	  moral	  emotions	  concepts?	  
	   5.3.1.	  Merited	  emotions	  
This	  result,	  as	  a	  reader	  of	  Prinz,	  is	  somewhat	  surprising.	  It	  seems	  that,	  when	  
describing	  emotions,	  he	  has	  put	  a	  lot	  of	  effort	  into	  arguing	  that	  they	  may	  be	  
triggered	  by	  cognition,	  but	  are	  not	  themselves,	  generally,	  cognitive.	  Since,	  for	  
Prinz,	  cognition	  involves	  concepts,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  involves	  representations	  
that	  we	  could,	  if	  we	  want	  to,	  voluntarily	  manipulate,	  it	  is	  now	  unclear	  what	  the	  
relationship	  is	  between	  moral	  emotions	  and	  cognition.	  There	  are	  several	  reasons	  
why	  I	  think	  this.	  First,	  because	  he	  often	  talks	  of	  moral	  emotions	  as	  though	  they	  are	  
not	  part	  of	  cognition	  as	  we	  normally	  understand	  it.	  This	  is	  evident	  both	  in	  his	  
argument	  about	  emotions	  being	  merited,	  and	  in	  his	  use	  of	  moral	  dumbfounding.	  
Second,	  because	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  theory	  as	  a	  sentimentalist	  
theory	  if	  he	  did	  think	  of	  emotions	  as	  cognitive	  in	  the	  fullest	  sense.	  And,	  if	  we	  take	  
his	  commitment	  to	  sentimentalism	  seriously,	  then	  we	  can	  understand	  why	  he	  
phrases	  things	  as	  he	  does	  in	  relations	  to	  merited	  emotions	  and	  dumbfounding.	  I	  
will	  expand	  on	  all	  these	  problems	  in	  turn.	  	  
	   	  
For	  Prinz,	  emotions	  can	  be	  merited.	  For	  him,	  “moral	  emotions	  are	  not	  merely	  
caused,	  they	  are	  merited	  by	  their	  causes”	  (2007,	  p.	  115).	  Emotions	  are	  merited	  
when	  what	  they	  represent	  applies	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  emotion,	  and	  the	  agent	  who	  
has	  the	  emotion	  is	  deemed	  responsible	  because	  they	  have	  some	  control	  of	  that	  
emotion.	  For	  example,	  the	  emotion	  of	  ‘fear’	  correctly	  represents	  its	  cause	  if	  one	  
really	  is	  in	  danger.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  feeling	  of	  fear	  fulfils	  the	  first	  criterion	  needed	  
for	  a	  psychological	  process	  to	  be	  merited.	  In	  this	  sense,	  emotions	  are	  analogous	  to	  
secondary	  qualities	  like	  colour	  –	  our	  colour	  perception	  is	  working	  accurately	  if	  the	  
experience	  of	  blueness	  is	  caused	  by	  light-­‐waves	  of	  a	  certain	  frequency	  or	  suitable	  
reflectance	  properties.	  However,	  meeting	  the	  first	  criterion	  isn’t	  sufficient	  for	  a	  
process	  to	  be	  merited.	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   It	  is	  the	  second	  criterion	  for	  a	  process	  being	  merited	  where	  Prinz	  takes	  the	  
analogy	  between	  moral	  judgements	  and	  colour	  perception	  to	  break	  down.	  We	  have	  
control	  over	  our	  emotions	  in	  a	  way	  that	  we	  don’t	  have	  control	  over	  what	  we	  see:	  
“in	  some	  cases,	  emotions	  require	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  deliberation	  before	  they	  arise”	  
(2007,	  p.	  114).	  For	  example,	  one	  gets	  indignant	  at	  capitalism	  if	  one	  takes	  time	  and	  
effort	  to	  understand	  (and	  then	  comes	  to	  believe)	  the	  theory	  that	  it	  is	  intrinsically	  
exploitative	  and	  results	  in	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  proletariat.	  While	  both	  emotions	  
and	  colour	  perception	  depend	  on	  the	  physical	  attributes	  and	  abilities	  of	  the	  
creature,	  our	  conscious	  deliberations	  are	  not	  able	  to	  affect	  our	  colour	  perception	  in	  
the	  way	  that	  they	  affect	  our	  emotions.	  Even	  spontaneous	  emotions	  can	  be	  under	  
control	  through	  habituation	  argues	  Prinz,	  for	  example,	  we	  can	  train	  ourselves	  not	  
to	  be	  scared	  when	  we	  skydive.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  for	  Prinz	  to	  have	  this	  distinction	  because	  we	  seem	  
responsible	  for	  our	  moral	  judgements	  in	  a	  way	  that	  we	  are	  not	  responsible	  for	  the	  
colours	  we	  see.	  And	  if	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements,	  this	  means	  
there	  must	  be	  a	  way	  that	  we	  are	  responsible	  for	  our	  emotions,	  because	  “when	  we	  
say	  that	  something	  merits	  an	  emotion,	  we	  imply	  that	  the	  person	  who	  failed	  to	  have	  
the	  emotion	  could	  be	  held	  accountable”	  (2007,	  p.	  114).	  For	  Prinz,	  having	  some	  
control	  over	  our	  emotions	  via	  our	  rational	  capacities	  explains	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  
that	  emotions,	  and	  thus	  moral	  judgements,	  can	  be	  merited.	  We	  have	  control	  of	  our	  
sentiments	  insofar	  as	  “we	  can	  deliberate	  more,	  acquire	  more	  facts,	  expose	  
ourselves	  to	  more	  experiences,	  and	  undergo	  more	  training”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  115).	  Because	  
of	  this,	  emotions	  are	  capacities	  of	  an	  agent,	  a	  creature	  that	  we	  hold	  accountable	  for	  
making	  the	  wrong	  moral	  judgement,	  or	  not	  making	  a	  moral	  judgement	  that	  they	  
should	  have.	  As	  he	  puts	  it,	  “we	  cannot	  hold	  a	  colour-­‐blind	  person	  accountable	  for	  
failing	  to	  distinguish	  red	  from	  green,	  but	  we	  can	  hold	  an	  emotionally	  healthy	  
person	  responsible	  for	  being	  afraid	  of	  foreigners	  or	  for	  failing	  to	  fear	  the	  effects	  of	  
cigarette	  smoke”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  114).	  	  
Prinz	  doesn’t	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  we	  can	  change	  our	  emotional	  
reactions	  through	  deliberation,	  he	  just	  states	  that	  we	  can	  and	  do.	  One	  possibility	  is	  
that	  he	  thinks	  that	  deliberation	  opens	  our	  eyes	  to	  how	  properties	  of	  a	  situation	  
that	  we	  have	  recently	  recognised	  are	  related	  to	  old	  sentiments.	  If,	  through	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deliberation,	  one	  changes	  from	  a	  neoliberal	  position	  where	  capitalism	  promotes	  
human	  freedom	  to	  a	  position	  where	  it	  exploits	  humans	  and	  reduces	  their	  freedom,	  
then	  capitalism	  comes	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  inhumane	  and	  oppressive	  system.	  If	  one	  
already	  had	  a	  sentiment	  of	  disapprobation	  towards	  inhuman	  and	  oppressive	  
treatment,	  then,	  through	  deliberation,	  one	  comes	  to	  feel	  disapprobation	  towards	  
capitalist	  systems.	  	  
	   What	  I	  think	  is	  important,	  for	  our	  current	  purposes,	  about	  the	  way	  that	  
Prinz	  describes	  the	  roles	  of	  emotions	  here,	  is	  that	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  separated	  from	  
other	  types	  of	  cognition,	  and	  they	  seem	  to	  be	  caused	  by	  other	  cognitive	  faculties	  
rather	  than	  being	  voluntarily	  controlled	  and	  integrated	  with	  other	  thoughts.	  We	  
can	  see	  this	  first	  in	  the	  way	  that	  emotions	  are	  said	  to	  ‘arise’	  through	  deliberation.	  
Our	  understanding	  of	  deliberation	  is	  voluntary,	  explicit,	  rational	  thought	  where	  we	  
apply	  the	  rules	  of	  logic.	  The	  idea	  here,	  it	  seems,	  is	  that	  emotions	  are	  triggered	  by	  
our	  deliberation	  rather	  than	  part	  of	  that	  deliberation,	  there	  is	  some	  non-­‐emotional	  
deliberation	  and	  this	  causes	  an	  emotion.	  But	  then,	  if	  emotions	  are	  not	  integral	  to	  
deliberation,	  but	  caused	  by	  it,	  then	  they	  don’t	  seem	  to	  have	  the	  same	  properties	  
that	  Prinz	  normally	  associates	  with	  concepts.	  They	  do	  not	  take	  part	  in	  cognitive	  
acts;	  instead	  they	  are	  a	  result	  of	  it.	  	  	  	  
	   When	  combined	  with	  some	  other	  characteristics	  of	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  
emotions,	  I	  think	  this	  point	  becomes	  clearer.	  So	  I	  move	  on	  now	  to	  moral	  
dumbfounding,	  and	  Prinz’s	  understanding	  of	  it.	  	  
	  
5.3.2.	  Dumbfounding	  
Prinz	  uses	  dumbfounding	  experiments	  to	  support	  his	  argument	  that	  emotions	  
constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  I	  want	  to	  point	  out	  that,	  if	  he	  thinks	  we	  can	  control	  
our	  moral	  emotions	  like	  we	  control	  out	  other	  conceptual	  capacities,	  he	  falls	  in	  to	  
trouble	  in	  relation	  to	  his	  explanation	  of	  dumbfounding.	  However,	  if	  he	  doesn’t	  
think	  we	  can	  control	  our	  moral	  emotions,	  his	  explanation	  of	  dumbfounding	  
experiments	  is	  consistent	  with	  his	  understanding	  of	  moral	  emotions.	  
Dumbfounding	  experiments	  present	  people	  with	  vignettes,	  often	  about	  
taboos	  but	  where	  no	  harm	  occurs.	  For	  instance,	  about	  sibling	  incest.	  In	  the	  
vignettes,	  the	  siblings	  suffer	  no	  ill	  affects,	  psychological	  or	  physical;	  there	  is	  no	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pregnancy;	  and	  they	  suffer	  no	  stigma	  because	  no-­‐one	  ever	  finds	  out.	  In	  many	  cases,	  
participants	  consider	  the	  siblings	  to	  have	  acted	  immorally.	  	  
The	  dumbfounding	  claim	  for	  the	  thesis	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  
judgements	  works	  like	  this:	  people	  make	  some	  moral	  judgement	  about	  a	  particular	  
event;	  the	  reasons	  they	  provide	  for	  their	  judgement	  are	  contradictory	  to	  the	  details	  
of	  the	  event;	  when	  reminded	  of	  this,	  they	  fail	  to	  change	  their	  judgement;	  therefore	  
it	  is	  not	  explicit	  reasons	  that	  are	  components	  of	  moral	  judgement.	  However,	  their	  
emotional	  reactions	  stay	  the	  same,	  therefore	  it	  is	  the	  emotion,	  and	  only	  the	  
emotion,	  that	  explains	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
Or,	  more	  precisely,	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  our	  emotions	  are	  basic	  values	  that	  
provide	  reasons	  but	  are	  not	  based	  on	  reason	  (2007,	  p.	  31-­‐2).	  If	  we	  repeat	  ‘why’	  to	  
questions	  about	  something	  being	  wrong,	  eventually	  we’ll	  get	  to	  ‘because	  it’s	  
harmful’.	  Asked	  why	  ‘harm’	  is	  wrong,	  and	  the	  question	  seems	  odd.	  Suppose	  we	  ask,	  
‘why	  is	  it	  wrong	  to	  kill	  people	  below	  5’3”	  for	  fun?’12.	  The	  answer,	  it	  seems,	  is	  this	  is	  
harmful	  and	  malicious.	  But	  ask	  what	  is	  wrong	  about	  harm	  and	  malice,	  and	  the	  
question	  is	  baffling.	  It	  makes	  us	  angry,	  maybe	  disgusted,	  and	  there	  is	  nothing	  
beyond	  that.	  This	  supports,	  for	  Prinz,	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  basic	  values	  provide,	  but	  
cannot	  be	  changed	  by,	  reasons,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  constituted	  through	  affect.	  	  
Here,	  Prinz	  relies	  on	  an	  observation	  first	  made	  by	  Hume.	  Hume	  (2006)	  
argues	  that	  it	  is	  only	  emotion	  that	  teaches	  us	  of	  right	  and	  wrong.	  When	  we	  reason	  
about	  moral	  matters,	  	  
All	  the	  circumstances	  and	  relations	  must	  be	  previously	  known;	  and	  the	  
mind,	  from	  the	  contemplation	  of	  the	  whole,	  feels	  some	  new	  impression	  of	  
affection	  or	  disgust,	  esteem	  or	  contempt,	  approbation	  or	  blame.	  (p.	  271.)	  
	  
Sentiments	  of	  dis/approbation	  are	  reached	  after	  considering	  a	  system	  of	  relations	  
and	  consequences,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  affective	  sentiment	  we	  reach	  through	  this	  that	  tells	  
us	  something	  uniquely	  moral	  about	  the	  situation.	  It	  is	  emotion	  and	  sentiment	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  I	  use	  this	  example	  as	  a	  replacement	  for	  Prinz’s	  example.	  Prinz	  gives	  the	  example	  of	  the	  
rape	  of	  a	  toddler	  who	  will	  not	  remember	  the	  incident:	  “Consider	  the	  question	  “why	  is	  it	  
wrong	  to	  rape	  a	  toddler	  who	  will	  never	  remember	  the	  incident?”	  This	  is	  an	  odd	  question.	  
It	  is	  difficult	  to	  answer.	  It’s	  just	  wrong	  to	  do	  that.”	  (2007,	  p.	  31).	  However,	  this	  example	  has	  
difficulties,	  because	  a	  lack	  of	  memory	  does	  not	  necessarily	  co-­‐occur	  with	  lack	  of	  trauma.	  
Lack	  of	  harm,	  I	  imagine,	  is	  what	  Prinz	  thinks	  this	  example	  indicates,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  
it	  does.	  	  
50	   	  
lie	  at	  the	  root	  of	  morality,	  just	  as	  it	  lies	  at	  the	  root	  of	  other	  decisions	  about	  how	  to	  
live	  our	  lives13:	  
Ask	  a	  man	  ‘why	  he	  uses	  exercise’;	  he	  will	  answer,	  ‘because	  he	  desires	  to	  
keep	  his	  health’.	  If	  you	  then	  enquire,	  why	  he	  desires	  health,	  he	  will	  readily	  
reply	  ‘because	  sickness	  is	  painful’.	  If	  you	  push	  your	  enquiries	  farther,	  and	  
desire	  a	  reason	  why	  he	  hates	  pain,	  it	  is	  impossible	  he	  ever	  give	  any.	  This	  is	  
perhaps	  the	  ultimate	  end,	  and	  is	  never	  referred	  to	  any	  other	  object.	  (p.	  
273.)	  
	  
	   So,	  one	  could	  ask,	  with	  the	  case	  above,	  ‘why	  would	  causing	  harm	  be	  wrong?’	  
And,	  perhaps	  the	  right	  response	  is,	  ‘well	  it	  just	  is!’.	  We	  feel	  angry	  and	  there	  is	  
nothing	  beyond	  that.	  Similarly,	  the	  emotions	  elicited	  in	  the	  dumbfounding	  
experiments	  show	  that	  taboos	  are	  basic	  values	  constituted	  by	  emotions.	  We	  just	  
find	  incest	  disgusting,	  there	  is	  no	  further	  reason	  we	  can	  give.	  Hence	  we	  can	  see	  
Prinz	  as	  making	  a	  Humean	  point:	  our	  ultimate	  reasons	  are	  constituted	  by	  our	  
sentiments14.	  	  
	   	  Prinz’s	  argument	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  basic	  values	  appears	  to	  be	  
validated	  by	  the	  dumbfounding	  cases.	  In	  these	  cases,	  emotions	  and	  moral	  
judgements	  continue	  to	  co-­‐vary	  in	  cases	  when	  deliberative	  reasons	  appear	  to	  
contradict	  moral	  judgements.	  This	  fits	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  emotions	  provide	  
reasons	  rather	  than	  are	  part	  of	  explicit	  reasoning	  practices.	  	  
However,	  there	  is	  a	  puzzle	  here.	  In	  one	  sense	  this	  argument	  appears	  to	  
conflict	  with	  the	  account	  of	  control	  over	  our	  moral	  judgements	  that	  Prinz	  gives	  
above,	  because	  deliberation	  seems	  to	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  moral	  judgements.	  That	  is,	  
Prinz	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  no	  matter	  what	  we	  explicitly	  recognise,	  it	  seems	  our	  
judgements	  stay	  the	  same.	  So,	  while	  he	  appears	  to	  argue	  above	  that	  we	  do	  have	  
control	  of	  our	  moral	  judgements,	  now	  he	  seems	  to	  say	  the	  opposite.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  I	  wish	  to	  leave	  it	  open	  at	  this	  stage	  that	  morality	  and	  decisions	  about	  how	  we	  live	  our	  
lives	  are	  separate,	  although	  this	  presupposition	  will	  be	  contested	  later.	  	  
14	  Although	  I	  want	  to	  look	  at	  how	  this	  argument	  fits	  together	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  Prinz’s	  
theory,	  we	  can	  also	  question	  the	  argument	  itself.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  just	  that	  killing	  people	  
under	  5’3”	  for	  fun	  is	  harmful,	  it	  seems	  a	  particularly	  unjust	  harm.	  And	  there	  is	  a	  tradition,	  
in	  philosophy,	  of	  trying	  to	  explain	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  harm,	  when	  and	  why	  harm	  is	  bad,	  
what	  is	  injustice,	  what	  is	  so	  disturbing	  about	  malice	  etc.	  That	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  explicate	  why	  we	  
have	  certain	  intuitions	  does	  not	  make	  it	  impossible,	  or	  else	  moral	  philosophy	  would	  not	  be	  
such	  a	  rich	  domain.	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  This	  conflict,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  is	  only	  an	  appearance.	  When	  we	  see	  why	  this	  
is	  an	  appearance,	  another	  issue	  in	  Prinz	  account	  becomes	  more	  visible,	  one	  that	  
I’ve	  already	  discussed	  above.	  And	  that	  is	  that	  emotions,	  in	  this	  account	  of	  providing	  
basic	  values,	  are	  not	  conceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Prinz	  normally	  takes	  a	  mental	  
process	  to	  be	  conceptual.	  	  
	  First,	  why	  would	  I	  say	  that	  it	  is	  an	  appearance	  that	  this	  account	  of	  basic	  
values	  conflicts	  with	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  control	  over	  our	  moral	  judgements?	  Well,	  
as	  seen	  above,	  this	  is	  because	  Prinz	  does	  not	  think	  we	  have	  control	  over	  our	  moral	  
judgements	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  we	  have	  control	  over	  the	  application	  of	  logical	  
processes	  typical	  in	  everyday	  deliberation.	  While	  we	  can	  understand	  deliberation,	  
in	  Prinz’s	  theory,	  as	  the	  intentional	  manipulation	  of	  concepts,	  Prinz	  does	  not	  think	  
our	  moral	  judgements	  are	  part	  of	  this	  deliberation,	  instead	  they	  are	  “elicited”	  by	  
this	  deliberation.	  	  
	   We	  can	  slot	  this	  idea	  back	  into	  the	  context	  of	  dumbfounding	  and	  basic	  
values	  if	  we	  understand	  the	  argument	  about	  merit	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  
We	  saw	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  deliberation	  playing	  a	  part	  in	  an	  emotion	  
being	  merited	  by	  an	  emotion	  being	  elicited	  by	  deliberation	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  a	  
circumstance	  as	  fitting	  a	  certain	  category.	  For	  instance,	  if	  I	  deliberate	  about	  
capitalism,	  I	  might	  come	  to	  see	  it	  as	  unjust.	  A	  sense	  of	  injustice,	  like	  our	  category	  of	  
‘incest’,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  basic	  value.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  if	  we	  remind	  ourselves	  that,	  
for	  Prinz,	  moral	  emotions	  are	  formed	  through	  particular	  types	  of	  calibration	  file	  
triggering	  basic	  emotions.	  Moral	  emotions,	  therefore,	  are	  basic	  values,	  which	  are	  
constrained	  by	  what	  calibration	  files	  we	  have	  available,	  and	  the	  basic	  emotions.	  
What	  our	  deliberation	  enables	  is	  for	  us	  to	  see	  some	  situation	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  
incest	  or	  injustice,	  for	  example.	  I	  might	  deliberate	  some	  more,	  and	  realise	  that	  
capitalism	  isn’t	  unjust.	  In	  this	  case,	  my	  moral	  judgement	  would	  change	  in	  regard	  to	  
that	  situation,	  but	  the	  types	  of	  moral	  judgements	  I	  have	  available	  wouldn’t.	  	  
Similarly,	  for	  Prinz,	  ‘incest’	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  calibration	  file	  that	  triggers	  an	  
emotion.	  Once	  we	  understand	  a	  situation	  as	  incest,	  Prinz	  is	  arguing,	  then	  we	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automatically	  feel	  an	  emotion	  (presumably	  disgust	  and/or	  anger),	  and	  that	  
emotion	  constitutes	  the	  judgement	  of	  disapprobation15.	  	  
So,	  either	  way,	  moral	  judgement	  is	  inflexible,	  on	  Prinz’s	  theory,	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  once	  one	  understands,	  through	  deliberation	  or	  perceptions,	  a	  situation	  to	  be	  
of	  a	  certain	  kind,	  then	  the	  judgement	  is	  triggered.	  Moral	  judgements	  are	  flexible,	  or	  
controlled,	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  may	  not	  think,	  or	  perceive,	  a	  situation	  as	  
being	  of	  that	  kind.	  	  	  
If	  this	  is	  the	  right	  way	  to	  understand	  Prinz,	  then	  what	  Prinz	  says	  about	  
dumbfounding	  experiments	  and	  emotions	  being	  merited	  are	  congruent:	  in	  both	  
cases,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  inflexible,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  
automatically	  triggered	  by	  particular	  perceptions	  of	  chains	  of	  deliberation.	  Prinz’s	  
analysis	  of	  the	  dumbfounding	  cases	  make	  this	  clear,	  because	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  
moral	  judgement,	  which	  is	  emotional,	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  deliberative	  reasoning	  
that	  leads	  up	  to	  it.	  	  
But,	  if	  we	  understand	  Prinz	  to	  be	  making	  this	  claim,	  then	  it	  looks	  like	  moral	  
emotions	  are	  not	  conceptual	  in	  the	  way	  that	  our	  deliberative	  processes	  are.	  They	  
are	  triggered	  by	  a	  calibration	  file	  rather	  than	  being	  available	  for	  manipulation	  
themselves.	  However,	  if	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  concepts,	  then	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  
this	  should	  be	  the	  case.	  Instead,	  if	  Prinz	  does	  think	  that	  moral	  sentiments	  
constitute	  concepts,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  under	  intentional	  control,	  then	  they	  
should	  be	  the	  types	  of	  things	  that	  participate	  in	  deliberation,	  rather	  than	  being	  
triggered	  by	  it.	  	  
One	  response	  to	  this	  might	  be	  that	  calibration	  files	  are	  under	  intentional	  
control,	  and	  therefore	  so	  are	  moral	  emotions.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is	  that	  
calibration	  files	  are,	  for	  Prinz,	  not	  a	  constituent	  of	  the	  emotion,	  but	  only	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  We	  might	  argue	  with	  the	  details	  of	  this.	  Perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  say	  that	  
categorising	  a	  situation	  as	  incest	  seems	  to	  automatically	  trigger	  a	  calibration	  file	  of	  
“injustice”	  and/or	  “harms	  against	  the	  rights	  of	  a	  person”	  and/or	  “violations	  of	  what	  is	  seen	  
to	  be	  natural/pure”,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  triggers	  the	  emotion.	  Yet	  this	  observation	  would	  do	  
little	  to	  change	  Prinz’s	  schema	  concerning	  how	  moral	  emotions	  work,	  instead	  it	  would	  be	  
an	  argument	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  include	  incest	  as	  a	  basic	  value	  itself,	  or	  as	  triggering	  
other	  basic	  values.	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necessary	  cause.	  So,	  even	  if	  calibration	  files	  were	  part	  of	  our	  deliberation,	  
emotions	  would	  remain	  what	  were	  triggered	  by	  our	  deliberation.	  
It	  appears	  that	  Prinz’s	  moral	  sentiments	  are	  both	  concepts	  and	  not	  concepts	  
under	  his	  theory.	  But	  why	  would	  Prinz	  create	  a	  hybrid	  of	  this	  kind?	  The	  answer,	  I	  
think,	  is	  his	  commitment	  to	  sentimentalism,	  which	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  now.	  	  
	  	  
5.3.3.	  Sentimentalism	  and	  deliberation	  
There	  is	  a	  relatively	  simple	  way	  to	  explain	  this	  ambiguity	  in	  Prinz’s	  account	  as	  to	  
whether	  emotions	  count	  as	  concepts	  or	  not.	  The	  first	  is	  Prinz’s	  commitment	  to	  
concepts	  being	  those	  things	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  bring	  under	  intentional	  control.	  
The	  second	  is	  his	  commitment	  to	  sentimentalism:	  the	  view	  that	  sentiments	  
constitute	  our	  moral	  judgements.	  The	  final	  one	  is	  his	  commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  
moral	  sentiments	  constitute	  concepts.	  These	  three	  commitments	  create	  a	  problem.	  
Because	  if	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  concepts	  and	  moral	  judgements,	  and	  
concepts	  are	  the	  types	  of	  things	  we	  can	  intentionally	  control,	  then	  it	  isn’t	  clear	  that	  
one	  is	  still	  a	  sentimentalist.	  If	  emotions	  are	  part	  of	  rational	  deliberation,	  then	  one	  
is	  as	  much	  a	  rationalist	  about	  moral	  judgements	  than	  a	  sentimentalist.	  After	  all,	  if	  
rational	  deliberation	  is	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  then	  it	  looks	  like	  one	  is	  a	  
rationalist	  about	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
	   It	  is	  because	  Prinz	  sees	  himself	  as	  a	  sentimentalist,	  and	  not	  a	  rationalist,	  I	  
want	  to	  suggest,	  that	  he	  resists	  giving	  emotions	  the	  full	  functional	  role	  that	  he	  
normally	  associates	  with	  concepts.	  By	  making	  emotions	  causally	  related	  to,	  rather	  
than	  participants	  in,	  our	  deliberations,	  Prinz	  can	  maintain	  that	  he	  is	  a	  
sentimentalist.	  So,	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  in	  his	  account	  because	  he	  has	  a	  commitment	  
to	  sentimentalism,	  to	  moral	  emotions	  constituting	  concepts,	  and	  to	  a	  certain	  notion	  
of	  ‘concept’.	  But	  these	  three	  commitments,	  taken	  together,	  create	  a	  problem	  that	  
he	  tries	  to	  resolve	  by	  not	  giving	  sentiments	  the	  role	  that	  he	  normally	  gives	  
concepts,	  while	  simultaneously	  claiming	  that	  they	  do	  constitute	  concepts.	  This	  is	  
an	  unstable	  position	  where	  Prinz	  simultaneously	  denies	  and	  affirms	  that	  emotions	  
take	  part	  in	  our	  cognitive	  capacities.	  	  
	   If	  Prinz,	  to	  make	  his	  argument	  coherent,	  opts	  to	  accept	  rationalism	  as	  much	  
as	  sentimentalism,	  then	  that,	  too	  would	  resolve	  the	  issue.	  However,	  he	  could	  not	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do	  that	  by	  just	  claiming	  that	  both	  the	  deliberative	  reasoning	  and	  the	  emotion	  
jointly	  constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  If	  he	  does	  this,	  he	  would	  open	  up	  a	  new	  
worry:	  it	  appears	  on	  this	  account	  that	  the	  mental	  process	  that	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  
reason	  for	  action	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  the	  process	  that	  motivates	  action.	  	  
	   For	  if	  Prinz	  proposes	  the	  above,	  rational	  deliberation	  is	  the	  conceptual	  part	  
of	  moral	  judgements	  that	  enables	  our	  moral	  judgements	  to	  be	  merited,	  and	  
emotion	  is	  a	  non-­‐conceptual	  process	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  act.	  Here	  Prinz’s	  loses	  his	  
moral	  internalism:	  what	  provides	  us	  with	  reasons	  is	  not	  what	  motivates	  our	  
actions.	  While	  moral	  judgements	  would	  be	  rational	  and	  motivate,	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
judgement	  that	  is	  rational	  would	  not	  be	  the	  same	  part	  that	  motivates	  the	  action.	  
Further,	  it	  would	  be	  unclear	  why	  emotions,	  as	  the	  part	  that	  motivates	  but	  is	  
not	  part	  of	  rationality,	  could	  be	  said	  to	  help	  constitute	  a	  judgement.	  We	  will	  see	  in	  
the	  next	  chapter	  why	  it	  is	  important	  that	  if	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  judgements	  
they	  themselves	  are	  rational,	  in	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  be	  part	  of	  deliberation.	  	  
Finally,	  another	  route	  for	  Prinz	  out	  of	  this	  problem	  would	  be	  to	  give	  up	  
sentimentalism	  and	  claim	  that	  rational	  deliberation	  can	  motivate	  actions.	  This	  
would	  be	  a	  huge	  departure	  from	  his	  current	  position.	  It	  would	  also	  be	  
controversial,	  and	  would	  need	  arguing	  for.	  	  
So,	  Prinz	  falls	  into	  additional	  problems	  if	  he	  responds	  to	  my	  worry	  about	  his	  
position	  being	  unstable	  by	  arguing	  that	  rational	  deliberation	  and	  emotions	  jointly,	  
but	  separately,	  co-­‐constitute	  moral	  judgement.	  	  
A	  large	  part	  of	  what	  I	  will	  be	  doing	  in	  future	  chapters	  is	  building	  a	  positive	  
account	  of	  moral	  judgements	  that	  resists	  this	  precarious	  position	  by	  giving	  up	  any	  
strong	  claim	  to	  sentimentalism,	  while	  retaining	  a	  central	  role	  for	  emotions.	  This	  is	  
a	  form	  of	  sentimentalist	  rationalism	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  emotions	  and	  rationality	  are	  
tightly	  integrated,	  and	  therefore	  co-­‐constitute	  judgement.	  In	  offering	  this	  proposal,	  
I	  sidestep	  the	  worries	  that	  would	  arise	  if	  Prinz	  were	  to	  claim	  that	  rational	  
deliberation	  and	  emotion	  are	  separate	  co-­‐constituents	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  That	  
is,	  I	  explain	  how	  we	  could	  hold	  that	  emotions	  and	  rationality	  are	  integrated.	  	  
As	  we	  will	  see	  in	  future	  chapters,	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  view	  of	  moral	  
judgements	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  moral	  judgements	  as	  constituted	  through	  chains	  of	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affective	  concepts	  that	  exist	  within	  a	  narrative	  frame.	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  present	  a	  
coherent	  form	  of	  rational	  internalism.	  	  
	  
	   	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  
	  
I	  have	  outlined	  Prinz’s	  sentimentalism	  and	  some	  of	  the	  themes	  connected	  to	  it	  that	  
will	  be	  important	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis.	  I	  have	  accepted,	  to	  some	  degree,	  his	  
theory	  of	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisals	  and	  his	  moral	  internalism.	  The	  main	  
point	  of	  contention	  has	  been	  his	  equivocal	  attitude	  towards	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  
our	  deliberative	  capacities.	  I	  have	  shown	  that	  his	  position	  is	  somewhat	  unstable.	  
An	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  this	  instability	  by	  making	  moral	  judgements	  comprised	  of	  
separate	  parts	  –	  deliberation	  and	  emotions	  –	  leads	  to	  additional	  problems.	  We	  will	  
return	  to	  this	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  
	  	   One	  might	  think	  that	  committing	  to	  a	  more	  rationalist	  line	  to	  resolve	  this	  
instability	  might	  be	  contrary	  to	  moral	  internalism,	  emotions	  being	  the	  best	  
candidate	  for	  a	  psychological	  state	  that	  motivates.	  However,	  moral	  internalism	  
seems	  to	  more	  clearly	  rest	  on	  the	  thesis	  that	  emotions	  are	  necessary	  for	  moral	  
judgements.	  If	  one	  believes	  that	  emotions	  are	  integrated	  with	  our	  deliberative	  
capacities,	  then	  rationalism	  and	  moral	  internalism	  are	  not	  clearly	  at	  odds.	  Further,	  
as	  shown	  in	  chapters	  2	  &	  5,	  I	  think	  we	  find	  we	  have	  good	  reasons	  for	  adopting,	  
rather	  than	  rejecting,	  rationalism.	  	  
	   Resolving	  Prinz’s	  unstable	  position	  on	  concepts	  and	  emotions	  by	  taking	  a	  
stronger	  and	  more	  coherent	  stance	  –	  and	  considering	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  
proposed	  by	  Gerrans	  &	  Kennett,	  Velleman,	  and	  Taylor	  –	  I	  propose	  an	  account	  of	  
moral	  agency	  which	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  through	  the	  thorough	  integration	  of	  
our	  conceptual	  and	  emotional	  capacities.	  Moral	  judgements,	  on	  this	  story,	  are	  the	  
outcome	  of	  a	  multifaceted	  process	  that	  gives	  a	  creature	  reasons	  to	  act.	  
So,	  while	  I	  take	  on	  Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisals,	  I	  
argue	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  more	  tightly	  interlinked	  with	  both	  our	  
deliberative	  capacities	  and	  sensory	  capacities	  than	  he	  anticipates.	  What	  is	  
particularly	  relevant	  for	  this	  current	  chapter	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  necessarily	  right	  that	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we	  see	  the	  relation	  between	  concept	  and	  emotion	  as	  a	  sequential	  process	  where	  
the	  former	  triggers	  the	  latter.	  Rather,	  our	  reasoning	  is	  infused	  with	  affect,	  and	  so	  
the	  two	  cannot	  be	  separated.	  	  
This	  creates	  a	  path	  out	  of	  the	  unstable	  situation	  Prinz	  finds	  himself	  in	  
without	  running	  into	  a	  new	  worry:	  how	  to	  avoid	  being	  a	  rationalist	  that	  can’t	  
explain	  how	  judgements	  motivate,	  and	  how	  to	  avoid	  being	  an	  internalist	  that	  fails	  
to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  judgements.	  It	  is	  this	  pair	  of	  dangers	  that	  Gerrans	  &	  Kennett	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The	  Mystery	  of	  the	  Missing	  Agent	  
	  
I’ve	  always	  claimed	  that	  the	  ability	  to	  fantasize	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  survive,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  
fantasize	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  grow.	  Boys	  and	  girls	  of	  11,	  12,	  13,	  the	  most	  important	  time	  of	  their	  
day	  is	  especially	  at	  night	  right	  before	  they	  go	  to	  sleep,	  is	  dreaming	  themselves	  into	  becoming	  
something,	  into	  being	  something.	  So	  when	  you	  are	  a	  child	  you	  begin	  to	  dream	  yourself	  into	  a	  
shape,	  and	  then	  you	  run	  into	  the	  future	  and	  try	  to	  become	  that	  shape.	  	  




Prinz	  (2006)	  has	  claimed	  that	  moral	  judgements	  consist	  of	  one	  type	  of	  
psychological	  process,	  an	  emotional	  process.	  On	  his	  view,	  too,	  moral	  judgements	  
motivate.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  debate	  are	  theories	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  
constituted	  through	  rational	  deliberative	  processes	  that	  are	  not	  intrinsically	  
motivational	  (e.g.	  Roskies,	  2003).	  Gerrans	  &	  Kennett	  (2010)	  take	  up	  the	  task	  of	  
synthesising	  these	  opposing	  views,	  by	  keeping	  the	  assumption	  that	  moral	  
judgements	  motivate	  (i.e.	  internalism)	  but	  finding	  a	  way	  for	  such	  motivation	  to	  be	  
rational.	  First,	  they	  want	  to	  undercut	  a	  common	  assumption,	  which	  is	  that	  it	  makes	  
sense	  to	  talk	  of	  judgements	  as	  isolated	  events.	  Instead,	  they	  propose	  that	  
judgements	  are	  always	  the	  activity	  of	  the	  agent	  that	  issues	  them,	  and	  thus	  the	  task	  
of	  working	  out	  how	  we	  can	  act	  for	  moral	  reasons	  involves	  the	  task	  of	  explaining	  
agency	  in	  general,	  rather	  than	  judgements	  in	  particular.	  Second,	  they	  want	  to	  
account	  for	  agency	  by	  arguing	  that	  it	  requires	  mental	  time	  travel	  (MTT),	  
deliberative	  reasoning,	  and	  emotion,	  where	  MTT	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  an	  
experience	  of	  subjectively	  inhabiting	  one’s	  past	  and	  possible	  future.	  	  
	   However,	  to	  understand	  Gerrans	  &	  Kennett’s	  (G&K’s)	  account	  fully,	  and	  to	  
understand	  how	  they	  provide	  a	  response	  to	  Prinz,	  we	  have	  to	  understand	  some	  of	  
the	  theoretical	  backdrop	  to	  their	  argument.	  To	  this	  end,	  I	  give	  an	  explanation	  of	  
why	  the	  moral	  psychology	  and	  philosophy	  of	  J.	  David	  Velleman	  is	  relevant	  to	  their	  
account,	  something	  G&K	  do	  not	  expand	  on	  themselves.	  I	  explain	  how	  his	  theory	  
challenges	  rival	  theories	  of	  moral	  judgement	  by	  requiring	  theories	  of	  judging	  and	  
acting	  to	  give	  a	  role	  to	  the	  agent	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  Velleman	  (2000)	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argues	  that	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  the	  part	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  that	  
plays	  the	  functional	  role	  of	  the	  agent.	  	  
Returning	  to	  Prinz,	  I	  ask	  what	  it	  is	  about	  G&K’s	  alternative	  account	  that	  is	  
meant	  to	  persuade	  us	  he	  has	  made	  a	  mistake.	  That	  answer	  is	  that	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  
the	  act	  of	  making	  a	  moral	  judgement	  is	  constituted	  through	  being	  an	  agent	  that	  can	  
act	  for	  reasons.	  While	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  an	  emotion	  can	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  action,	  his	  
idea	  falls	  far	  short	  of	  what	  it	  would	  really	  take	  to	  act	  for	  reasons,	  because	  he	  
doesn’t	  recognise	  that	  MTT	  and	  other	  diachronic	  processes	  are	  necessary	  to	  have	  
reasons	  for	  actions.	  	  
However,	  I	  argue	  that	  G&K	  have	  to	  say	  more	  than	  this.	  We	  also	  have	  to	  ask	  
why	  this	  has	  any	  bearing	  on	  Prinz’s	  claim	  that	  psychological	  processes	  other	  than	  
emotion	  make	  an	  important	  causal	  contribution	  to	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  are	  not	  
constituents	  of	  it.	  	  Prinz	  can	  claim	  that	  MTT	  and	  deliberation	  may	  be	  important	  
causes	  of	  an	  emotion,	  and	  therefore	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  
they	  are	  constitutive	  of	  them.	  	  
What	  is	  pivotal	  here,	  though,	  is	  that	  some	  of	  the	  commitments	  Prinz	  has	  are	  
up	  for	  debate.	  Particularly,	  we	  can	  debate	  those	  commitments	  that	  enable	  him	  to	  
assume	  that	  intentional	  and	  epistemological	  characteristics	  such	  as	  a	  state	  being	  
merited	  can	  be	  fully	  captured	  using	  only	  causal	  language.	  If,	  instead,	  we	  think	  that	  
explaining	  what	  constitutes	  merit	  uses	  a	  different	  explanatory	  framework	  from	  
causal	  explanations,	  then	  Prinz	  falls	  into	  a	  dilemma	  when	  he	  tries	  to	  integrate	  
causal	  modes	  of	  thinking	  with	  his	  idea	  that	  emotions	  are	  merited.	  	  	  
On	  an	  alternative	  picture,	  either	  Prinz	  should	  say	  that	  emotions	  are	  not	  
merited,	  because	  we	  understand	  them	  only	  through	  causal	  discourse,	  in	  which	  
case	  he	  does	  lose	  sight	  of	  the	  agent.	  Or	  else,	  he	  has	  to	  stay	  true	  to	  the	  task	  of	  
explaining	  how	  it	  is	  that	  we	  act	  for	  reasons,	  and	  lose	  his	  causal	  thinking	  when	  
understanding	  what	  constitutes	  moral	  judgements.	  If	  he	  does	  the	  latter,	  then	  his	  
emotions	  must	  be	  conceptual,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  must	  be	  the	  type	  of	  state	  that	  
can	  participate	  in	  inferential	  thinking.	  They	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  justified	  and	  
of	  justifying,	  rather	  than	  merely	  being	  caused	  and	  causing.	  	  
Unlike	  the	  position	  we	  saw	  Prinz	  take	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  emotions	  are	  not	  
ambiguously	  conceptual,	  but	  fully	  conceptual.	  Because,	  if	  we	  recognise	  that	  we	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cannot	  understand	  what	  constitutes	  agency	  through	  causal	  vocabulary,	  then	  we	  
recognise	  that	  it	  is	  a	  confusion	  to	  think	  of	  emotions,	  only	  mechanistically	  
understood,	  as	  being	  a	  reason	  for	  action.	  This	  does	  not	  make	  agency	  a	  non-­‐natural,	  
mysterious,	  phenomenon,	  for	  reasons	  we	  will	  see	  later.	  	  
Essentially,	  this	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  the	  same	  crack	  in	  Prinz’s	  argument	  as	  
the	  last	  one,	  but	  explains	  how	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  an	  inconsistency	  in	  his	  theory,	  but	  
betrays	  other	  commitments	  which	  we	  can	  reject.	  	  
The	  best	  (perhaps,	  only)	  way	  of	  understanding	  G&K’s	  argument	  as	  a	  
response	  to	  Prinz	  is	  that	  many	  philosophers	  take	  it	  as	  central	  that	  agency	  is	  
understood	  through	  our	  participation	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons	  (McDowell,	  1994).	  If	  
we	  take	  this	  as	  fundamental,	  then	  the	  quest	  is	  to	  find	  a	  description	  of	  our	  
psychological	  capacities	  that	  meets	  this	  criterion,	  and	  Prinz	  fails	  to	  do	  this.	  	  This	  
reasoning	  requires	  us	  to	  depart	  from	  Prinz’s	  conceptual	  framework	  into	  novel	  
territory.	  In	  chapter	  5	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  also	  phenomenological	  and	  
empirical	  reasons	  that	  support	  this	  argument16.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  explanation	  of	  McDowell’s	  framework	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  out	  of	  
the	  precarious	  situation	  Prinz	  has	  found	  himself	  in	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  last	  chapter.	  
One	  possibility	  that	  comes	  to	  the	  fore	  with	  McDowell	  is	  that	  emotions	  could	  
constitute	  deliberative	  reasoning,	  something	  I	  will	  explain	  further	  in	  chapter	  5.	  	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  this	  discussion,	  we	  will	  have	  examined	  and	  explained	  much	  of	  
the	  basic	  content	  of	  my	  thesis.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  in	  the	  last	  part	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  
explain	  my	  aims	  and	  the	  basic	  shape	  of	  my	  methodology	  in	  the	  upcoming	  chapters.	  	  
We	  will	  then	  have	  all	  the	  pieces	  in	  place	  to	  begin	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  
what	  best	  explains	  agency,	  and	  how	  we	  can	  depart	  from	  Prinz’s	  sentimentalism,	  
while	  maintaining	  the	  importance	  of	  emotions	  to	  agency.	  First,	  I	  want	  to	  explain	  
where	  G&K	  understand	  the	  problem	  to	  lie	  in	  contemporary	  debates	  about	  moral	  
judgements.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  When	  discussing	  my	  methodology	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  explain	  why	  empirical	  
reasons	  are	  still	  relevant	  once	  we	  question	  whether	  causal	  explanation	  exhaust	  all	  
explanatory	  needs	  in	  regards	  to	  agency.	  Empirical	  data,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  provides	  enabling	  
explanations:	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  a	  thing	  like	  an	  agent	  to	  exist,	  given	  that	  agents	  are	  
particular	  type	  of	  things.	  But	  this	  last	  point,	  explaining	  what	  characteristics	  constitute	  
agency,	  is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  the	  empirical	  data.	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2.	  Agency	  
	  
G&K	  (2010)	  want	  to	  reframe	  the	  debate	  over	  how	  we	  make	  moral	  judgements.	  
Many	  of	  their	  peers	  are	  misguided,	  they	  claim,	  because	  they	  assume	  that	  moral	  
judgements	  are	  the	  types	  of	  things	  that	  depend	  only	  on	  information	  available	  in	  
the	  here	  and	  now.	  One	  can	  be	  a	  neurosentimentalist,	  such	  as	  Prinz,	  and	  take	  this	  
position,	  a	  ‘neurosentimentalist’	  being	  one	  who	  uses	  neurological	  and	  
psychological	  evidence	  to	  argue	  that	  intuitive	  and/or	  tacit	  emotional	  processes	  are	  
necessary	  and	  sufficient	  for	  making	  moral	  judgements.	  Or	  one	  can	  be	  a	  rationalist	  
externalist	  	  (‘externalist’	  from	  now	  on):	  one	  who	  believes	  that	  being	  able	  to	  apply	  a	  
rule	  to	  a	  particular	  situation	  is	  sufficient	  for	  making	  moral	  judgements.	  While	  the	  
sentimentalist	  is	  an	  internalist,	  and	  can	  explain	  how	  judgments	  motivates,	  the	  
externalist	  does	  not	  believe	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  intrinsically	  motivational.	  	  
	   What	  we	  have	  here	  is	  a	  restating	  of	  the	  two	  poles	  that	  Prinz	  is	  caught	  
between	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  last	  chapter	  if	  he	  chooses	  to	  argue	  that	  emotions	  and	  
deliberative	  reasoning	  jointly,	  but	  separately,	  constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  Both	  
sentimentalists	  and	  externalists	  believe	  emotions	  motivate17,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  
separate	  from	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  If	  we	  have	  both	  these	  commitments,	  then	  an	  
internalist	  appears	  wedded	  to	  sentimentalism,	  and	  a	  rationalist	  appears	  wedded	  to	  
externalism.	  An	  additional	  problem	  for	  the	  sentimentalist,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  
section	  3.4.,	  is	  that	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  arguing	  that	  emotions	  are	  constitutive	  
of	  judgements	  if	  one	  also	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  separate	  from	  our	  capacity	  to	  
participate	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  	  
G&K	  take	  a	  different	  approach	  from	  the	  one	  I	  will	  present	  to	  show	  that	  
neurosentimentalism	  and	  externalism	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  moral	  judgements	  
(although	  I	  will	  also	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  something	  important	  about	  their	  claims).	  
They	  argue	  that	  both	  tacit	  processes	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  apply	  rules	  are	  synchronic	  
capacities.	  They	  claim	  this	  because	  people	  with	  amnesia,	  who	  are	  less	  able	  to	  
understand	  themselves	  as	  agents	  extended	  though	  time,	  have	  the	  former	  capacity,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  In	  chapter	  6,	  I	  will	  explain	  why	  I	  agree	  that	  emotions	  motivate:	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  our	  
capacities	  to	  act,	  to	  sense	  the	  world,	  and	  to	  make	  embodied	  appraisals	  are	  all	  caught	  up	  
with	  one	  another.	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and	  some	  also	  have	  the	  latter	  capacity.	  Because	  people	  with	  amnesia	  are	  able	  to	  
have	  an	  emotion	  or	  engage	  in	  logical	  reasoning,	  while	  simultaneously	  being	  
unaware	  of	  themselves	  as	  an	  agent	  through	  time,	  G&K	  argue	  that	  these	  activities	  
are	  ‘synchronic’.	  	  
G&K	  propose	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  moral	  judgements	  as	  an	  exercise	  
of	  the	  capacities	  of	  a	  moral	  agent	  and,	  crucially,	  such	  capacities	  depend	  on	  the	  
diachronic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  moral	  agent.	  A	  diachronic	  agent,	  on	  their	  account,	  
has	  two	  interrelated	  abilities:	  they	  can	  re-­‐experience	  their	  past	  and	  imagine	  their	  
future	  (which	  they	  take	  to	  be	  one	  capacity,	  and	  I	  will	  argue	  the	  same	  in	  chapter	  3),	  
and	  they	  can	  think	  about	  themselves	  as	  an	  agent	  through	  time18.	  	  
Planning	  requires	  a	  capacity	  to	  imaginatively	  project	  oneself	  into	  the	  future;	  
this	  in	  turn	  requires	  both	  a	  sense	  of	  oneself	  as	  the	  very	  same	  individual	  who	  
will	  inhabit	  that	  future	  (autonoetic	  awareness),	  and	  also	  the	  kind	  of	  detailed	  
self-­‐knowledge	  that	  is	  supported	  by	  autobiographical	  memory.	  (p.	  601.)	  
	  
Autonoetic	  awareness	  and	  self-­‐knowledge	  are	  important	  because	  we	  become	  
agents	  through	  these	  capacities.	  They	  do	  this,	  as	  stated	  above,	  by	  enabling	  us	  to	  
make	  and	  act	  on	  plans	  and	  projects.	  	  	  
	   But	  why	  think	  any	  of	  this	  has	  something	  to	  do	  with	  agency?	  To	  answer	  this	  
question,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  explore	  the	  thoughts	  of	  some	  of	  those	  they	  cite,	  
particularly	  Velleman.	  	  	  
In	  his	  1992	  paper,	  What	  Happens	  when	  Someone	  Acts?,	  Velleman	  argues	  that	  
any	  description	  of	  psychological	  processes	  involved	  in	  acting	  must	  have	  at	  least	  
one	  functional	  part	  that	  corresponds	  to	  what	  we	  take	  to	  be	  an	  agentive	  process.	  
There	  must	  be	  some	  functional	  component	  that	  intervenes	  by	  assessing	  beliefs,	  
desires,	  in	  light	  of	  some	  standard,	  which	  he	  initially	  argues	  is	  our	  desire	  to	  act	  in	  
accordance	  with	  reasons.	  The	  desire	  to	  act	  on	  reasons,	  is	  “the	  agent’s	  contribution	  
to	  the	  causal	  order”	  (p.	  479).	  Having	  such	  a	  functional	  role	  in	  our	  descriptions	  of	  
the	  causal	  sequence	  involved	  in	  acting	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  the	  output	  of	  the	  
sequence	  as	  acting,	  that	  is,	  as	  the	  result	  of	  agency.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  This	  distinction	  between	  experience	  of	  oneself	  through	  time,	  and	  knowledge	  of	  oneself	  
through	  time,	  will	  form	  the	  basis	  on	  much	  of	  my	  discussion	  in	  the	  next	  two	  chapters.	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Because	  of	  this,	  Velleman	  argues	  against	  the	  ‘belief-­‐desire’	  explanation	  for	  
action,	  arguing	  that	  no	  part	  of	  this	  process	  has	  a	  functional	  part	  that	  is	  
recognisably	  agentive.	  Instead,	  we	  can	  understand	  how	  the	  combination	  of	  
desiring	  x,	  and	  believing	  that	  we	  can	  have	  x	  if	  we	  do	  y,	  would	  lead	  to	  behaviour	  y	  
without	  being	  able	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  is	  an	  act	  of	  an	  agent,	  rather	  than	  
behaviour	  of	  an	  automaton.	  In	  descriptions	  concerning	  how	  the	  decision-­‐making	  
process	  of	  an	  agent	  causes	  agentive	  acts	  we	  want	  to	  understand	  why	  it	  is	  a	  
description	  of	  an	  agent	  acting,	  something	  that	  is	  done.	  Instead,	  standard	  
belief/desire	  accounts	  of	  decision-­‐making	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  automatic	  
processes	  resulting	  in	  behaviour,	  something	  that	  happens.	  	  
In	  his	  2000	  paper,	  From	  Self	  Psychology	  to	  Moral	  Philosophy,	  Velleman	  
posits	  that	  it	  is	  our	  understanding	  of	  our	  self	  that	  we	  use	  to	  assess	  what	  we	  have	  
reason	  to	  do.	  We	  do	  not	  just	  act	  indiscriminately	  on	  our	  beliefs	  and	  desires	  since	  
actions	  are	  events	  that	  are	  chosen	  according	  to	  what	  makes	  sense	  given	  what	  type	  
of	  person	  we	  understand	  ourselves	  to	  be,	  the	  current	  situation	  we	  are	  in,	  and	  what	  
we	  understand	  ourselves	  to	  be	  feeling.	  We	  are	  agents	  because	  there	  is	  a	  process	  
that	  plays	  the	  functional	  role	  of	  assessing	  what	  we	  have	  reasons	  to	  do,	  and	  we	  
assess	  what	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  do	  by	  the	  above	  criteria19.	  Importantly,	  this	  
assessment	  is	  driven	  by	  a	  fundamental	  feature:	  the	  desire	  to	  be	  intelligible	  to	  
ourselves.	  We	  can	  achieve	  this	  goal	  of	  becoming	  intelligible	  to	  ourselves	  when	  we	  
act	  in	  ways	  that	  make	  sense,	  given	  our	  characteristics.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  broad	  ways	  that	  Velleman	  thinks	  we	  can	  act	  on	  our	  self-­‐
understanding	  (2007).	  First,	  we	  can	  build	  narratives	  about	  the	  events	  we	  are	  
engaged	  with,	  and	  decide	  how	  to	  act	  based	  on	  what	  would	  make	  sense,	  given	  the	  
line	  of	  the	  narrative.	  For	  instance,	  if	  Shauntelle	  has	  spent	  the	  last	  five-­‐years	  
creating	  and	  maintaining	  a	  new	  company,	  then	  it	  makes	  sense	  that,	  even	  if	  sales	  
are	  bad	  for	  few	  months,	  she	  will	  figure	  out	  whether	  there	  are	  any	  particular	  
reasons	  and	  try	  to	  resolve	  them,	  rather	  than	  give	  up	  straight	  away.	  If	  her	  company	  
is	  in	  a	  very	  bad	  way	  however,	  we	  may	  wonder	  why	  she	  doesn’t	  give	  up	  and	  start	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This	  ties	  in	  with	  the	  analysis	  of	  another	  philosophy	  G&K	  cite:	  Bratman	  (2000),	  who	  
argues	  that	  our	  reflectiveness	  functions	  to	  organise	  us	  as	  a	  singular	  agent	  that	  can	  act	  
consistently	  through	  time.	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better	  company	  from	  scratch	  –	  it	  may	  take	  less	  energy	  to	  do	  that,	  then	  try	  and	  
rescue	  what	  she	  has.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  this	  is	  because	  
understanding	  a	  narrative	  involves	  a	  particular	  emotional	  cadence,	  and	  such	  
emotional	  cadence	  consists	  in	  us	  making	  sense	  of	  events	  through	  what	  precedes	  
and	  follows	  an	  event.	  A	  project	  we	  are	  invested	  in	  is	  understood	  through	  its	  value	  
to	  us,	  which	  becomes	  apparent	  only	  through	  situating	  it	  in	  a	  narrative,	  where	  what	  
matters	  is	  worth	  pursuing,	  and	  so	  we	  continue	  to	  invest	  in	  it	  despite	  problems.	  
This	  brief	  summary	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  will	  be	  revisited	  and	  developed	  on	  
in	  chapter	  3	  and	  beyond,	  becoming	  my	  main	  thesis	  about	  what	  makes	  moral	  
agency	  possible.	  	  
Such	  narrative	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  largely	  implicit,	  we	  may	  be	  aware	  of	  
what	  we	  want	  and	  act	  on	  it,	  but	  we	  may	  not	  think	  of	  ourselves	  as	  wanting	  it.	  
Shauntelle	  might	  search	  for	  reasons	  she	  can	  remedy	  to	  keep	  her	  company	  going,	  
but	  she	  may	  not	  think	  herself	  “I	  really	  love	  this	  company	  and	  I’m	  heavily	  invested	  
in	  it.	  Because	  of	  this	  I	  want	  to	  find	  a	  solution”.	  This	  would	  count	  as	  the	  second	  way	  
we	  can	  find	  a	  rational	  way	  to	  act:	  we	  can	  understand	  ourselves	  in	  causal-­‐
psychological	  terms,	  which	  means	  explicitly	  understanding	  ourselves	  in	  terms	  of	  
our	  psychologies,	  who	  we	  think	  we	  are,	  and	  finding	  an	  action	  that	  makes	  sense,	  
given	  what	  type	  of	  person	  we	  believe	  ourselves	  to	  be.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  
distinction	  in	  the	  next	  chapters,	  for	  now	  what	  is	  important	  is	  that	  they	  are	  both	  
ways	  of	  acting	  rationally	  through	  enabling	  us	  to	  act	  on	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  
So,	  to	  sum	  up	  Velleman’s	  thoughts,	  he	  asks:	  how	  do	  actions	  differ	  from	  
behaviour?	  His	  answer:	  only	  the	  former	  is	  caused	  by	  an	  agent.	  What	  makes	  
something	  an	  agent?	  That	  it	  acts	  for	  reasons.	  What	  motivates	  this?	  That	  a	  creature	  
wants	  to	  be	  fully	  rational	  and	  coherent	  in	  the	  form	  of	  being	  intelligible	  to	  
themselves.	  How	  do	  people,	  as	  agents,	  fulfil	  this	  aim?	  They	  act	  in	  light	  of	  their	  self-­‐
understanding,	  which	  is	  built	  either	  through	  their	  narrative	  abilities	  or	  their	  
causal-­‐psychological	  reasoning,	  to	  decide	  what	  would	  make	  sense	  for	  them	  to	  do.	  	  
Velleman’s	  account	  of	  agency	  is	  undoubtedly	  contestable	  and	  partial.	  For	  
instance,	  he	  says	  little	  about	  what	  enables	  this	  drive	  to	  be	  self-­‐consistent.	  It	  is	  
unclear,	  for	  instance,	  if	  this	  is	  explicitly	  formulated	  or	  implicit	  in	  our	  practices,	  
whether	  it	  is	  innate	  or	  learned,	  individually	  achieved	  or	  socially	  extended,	  or	  some	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mixture	  of	  these	  features20.	  However,	  his	  basic	  point	  about	  the	  need	  for	  self-­‐
understanding	  and	  consistency	  in	  acting	  for	  reasons	  is	  widely	  held	  (see	  e.g.	  
Korsgaard,	  1989,	  Bratman,	  2000	  &	  Levy,	  2014),	  and	  we	  will	  see	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  
thesis	  that	  it	  is	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  fits	  well	  with	  phenomenology	  and	  
empirical	  evidence.	  It	  also	  forms	  a	  coherent	  network	  with	  other	  theories	  of	  agency	  
that	  elucidate	  what	  type	  of	  creatures	  we	  need	  to	  be	  to	  be	  moral	  creatures	  (see	  
chapter	  5).	  Finally,	  to	  limit	  my	  scope,	  I	  will	  unfortunately	  be	  circumventing	  some	  
deep	  debates	  in	  moral	  philosophy.	  My	  perspective,	  while	  venturing	  into	  the	  realm	  
of	  moral	  philosophy,	  comes	  from	  the	  philosophy	  of	  cognitive	  science.	  From	  now	  
on,	  I	  broadly	  take	  Velleman’s	  view	  forming	  the	  background	  of	  how	  we	  should	  
understand	  agency21.	  	  
	   This	  discussion	  serves	  to	  expand	  on	  what	  seems	  special	  about	  agency,	  
which	  underlies	  much	  of	  G&K’s	  discussion.	  It	  shows	  why	  it	  is	  important	  that	  acting	  
in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  one	  way	  of	  
understanding	  ‘acting	  rationally’	  and	  also	  a	  way	  that	  is	  often	  tied	  to	  our	  diachronic	  
capacities,	  as	  G&K	  want	  to	  claim.	  Fundamentally,	  if	  we	  are	  to	  act	  in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  
take	  people	  to	  act,	  that	  is	  by	  pursuing	  goals	  and	  projects	  through	  time,	  then	  we	  
need	  a	  consistent	  set	  of	  attitudes	  that	  justify	  picking	  some	  goals	  among	  many.	  
Importantly	  for	  my	  project,	  while	  diachronic	  agency	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  
able	  to	  act	  on	  long-­‐term	  plans	  seems	  to	  be	  important	  for	  a	  lot	  of	  human	  agency,	  I	  
think	  acting	  on	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  prior	  to	  this,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  chapter	  5.	  If	  
self-­‐understanding	  is	  what	  is	  necessary	  for	  acting	  on	  reasons,	  then	  this	  is	  what	  is	  
fundamental	  to	  agency.	  Briefly,	  this	  is	  because	  our	  self-­‐understanding	  is	  often	  
implicit,	  and	  emerges	  with	  our	  narrative	  understanding.	  This	  narrative	  
understanding	  constitutes	  the	  perspective	  through	  which	  we	  understand	  our	  
current	  context	  and	  through	  which	  we	  decide	  how	  to	  currently	  act.	  G&K’s	  proposal	  
goes	  beyond	  this	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  minimal	  condition	  of	  agency	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  act	  
in	  the	  future	  on	  plans	  that	  we	  currently	  make.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  For	  an	  indicator	  that	  our	  drive	  for	  consistency	  is	  socially	  learned	  and	  implicitly	  (and	  
socially)	  practiced	  see	  McDowell	  on	  second-­‐nature	  (1994)	  and	  Taylor	  on	  how	  we	  follow	  
rules	  (1993).	  	  
21	  	  However	  see,	  for	  example	  Franklin	  (2015)	  and	  Dunn	  (1998)	  where	  different	  aspects	  of	  
Velleman’s	  theory	  are	  critically	  discussed	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The	  idea	  that	  narrative	  self-­‐understanding	  allows	  us	  to	  act	  for	  reasons	  prior	  
to	  our	  ability	  to	  act	  on	  long-­‐term	  plans	  is	  more	  consistent	  with	  some	  of	  Velleman’s	  
and	  Korsgaard’s	  thinking	  than	  the	  line	  that	  G&K	  take.	  An	  account	  of	  agents	  as	  
creatures	  that	  pursue	  plans	  and	  are	  consistent	  through	  time	  faces	  an	  objection.	  It	  
appears,	  on	  this	  account,	  that	  people	  who	  undergo	  radical	  changes,	  which	  
therefore	  interfere	  with	  pursuing	  such	  plans	  and	  goals,	  have	  their	  agency	  
undermined.	  A	  response	  to	  this	  is	  given	  by	  Korsgaard	  (1989)	  who	  argues	  that	  
while	  people	  may	  change,	  if	  the	  change	  is	  down	  to	  their	  own	  initiative,	  rather	  than	  
imposed	  on	  them,	  this	  change	  itself	  is	  an	  act	  of	  agency.	  She	  writes,	  “you	  are	  not	  a	  
different	  person	  just	  because	  you	  are	  very	  different.	  Authorial	  psychological	  
connectedness	  is	  consistent	  with	  drastic	  changes,	  provided	  those	  changes	  are	  the	  
result	  of	  actions	  by	  the	  person	  herself…”(p.	  123).	  To	  fit	  this	  into	  my	  narrative	  
account	  of	  agency,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  if	  it	  is	  some	  part	  of	  our	  own	  narrative	  
understanding	  that	  drives	  reformulations	  in	  our	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  
hence	  our	  point	  of	  view,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  are	  the	  author	  of	  the	  
changes	  in	  our	  personality.	  I	  will	  give	  an	  example	  of	  this	  in	  chapter	  5.	  Similarly,	  for	  
Velleman,	  agency	  emerges	  with	  the	  desire	  to	  be	  consistent.	  So,	  if	  it	  is	  such	  a	  desire	  
that	  is	  the	  driving	  force	  in	  a	  change	  in	  perspective,	  which	  may	  undercut	  
diachronicity,	  then	  our	  agency	  is	  what	  defines	  this	  change	  rather	  than	  being	  
challenged	  by	  it.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  Prinz	  &	  the	  missing	  agent	  
	  
3.1.	  Criteria	  for	  a	  response	  to	  Prinz	  
Before	  explaining	  G&K’s	  objections	  to	  Prinz,	  let	  us	  recap	  briefly	  on	  what	  is	  at	  stake	  
in	  this	  debate	  with	  Prinz.	  It	  is	  the	  particular	  line	  he	  draws	  between	  causation	  and	  
constitution	  that	  is	  important	  for	  his	  argument.	  To	  counter	  his	  argument	  about	  
emotions	  being	  sufficient	  for	  moral	  judgements,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  a	  
reason	  is	  given	  for	  another	  process	  being	  constitutive	  of,	  and	  not	  just	  causally	  
important	  for,	  moral	  judgement.	  However,	  the	  causal-­‐constitution	  distinction	  is	  
not	  something	  that	  G&K	  explicitly	  respond	  to.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  after	  explaining	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G&K’s	  objection,	  is	  draw	  out	  why,	  read	  one	  way,	  it	  poses	  no	  problem	  for	  Prinz,	  but,	  
if	  we	  dig	  deeper,	  we	  can	  unearth	  a	  set	  of	  commitments	  underlying	  their	  arguments	  
that	  would	  pose	  a	  real	  problem	  for	  Prinz’s	  framework.	  	  
In	  the	  last	  chapter	  we	  saw	  that	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  emotions	  are	  the	  sole	  
constituents	  of	  moral	  judgements	  but,	  nonetheless,	  there	  are	  important	  causal	  
contributions	  from	  other	  psychological	  processes.	  By	  this	  he	  means	  that	  emotion	  is	  
the	  only	  proper	  part	  of	  a	  moral	  judgement,	  but	  other	  processes	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
producing	  that	  emotion.	  Specifically,	  deliberative	  processes	  are	  necessary	  causal	  
components	  for	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  he	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  think	  that	  emotions	  are	  
part	  of	  our	  deliberative	  processes,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  	  
So,	  in	  the	  debate	  between	  Prinz	  and	  G&K,	  both	  sides	  agree	  that	  explicit	  
rational	  processes	  are	  necessary	  for	  making	  moral	  judgements.	  Further,	  I	  want	  to	  
highlight	  that	  Prinz’s	  position	  allows	  that	  any	  processes,	  including	  MTT,	  could	  be	  
necessary	  for	  moral	  judgements,	  while	  keeping	  his	  thesis	  that	  only	  emotions	  
constitute	  emotions.	  Precisely	  because	  he	  utilises	  the	  causal-­‐constitution	  
distinction,	  he	  can	  respond	  that	  some	  process	  X	  is	  a	  necessary	  cause,	  but	  not	  a	  
constituent,	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  G&K,	  in	  response	  are	  claiming	  that	  moral	  
judgements	  are	  an	  exercise	  of	  our	  capacity	  for	  agency.	  If	  G&K	  are	  to	  have	  a	  
substantial	  disagreement	  with	  Prinz,	  in	  addition	  to	  showing	  that,	  
i) Processes	  other	  than	  emotion	  are	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  agency;	  
They’d	  better	  also	  be	  showing	  that,	  
ii) There	  are	  substantial	  differences	  between	  their	  description	  of	  the	  
processes	  that	  constitute	  agency	  and	  the	  description	  of	  various	  
psychological	  processes	  causing	  an	  emotion.	  
Now	  we	  know	  what	  criteria	  we	  must	  use	  to	  assess	  G&K’s	  response,	  lets	  look	  at	  the	  
content	  of	  their	  response.	  	  
	  
3.2.	  A	  problem	  for	  Prinz	  
It	  seems	  that	  G&K	  are	  making	  a	  similar	  claim	  about	  the	  neurosentimentalist	  (i.e.	  
Prinz)	  and	  externalist	  account	  of	  moral	  judgement	  that	  Velleman	  makes	  about	  
belief/desire	  descriptions	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  That	  is,	  neither	  the	  
neurosentimentalist	  nor	  the	  externalist	  have	  accounted	  for	  our	  ability	  to	  act	  for	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reasons.	  Moral	  judgments	  are	  activities	  of	  an	  agent.	  It	  is	  virtue	  of	  being	  an	  agent	  
that	  one	  engages	  in	  decisions	  about	  what	  one	  ought	  to	  do,	  and	  to	  take	  part	  in	  this	  
practice	  requires	  the	  desire	  to	  be	  consistent,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  have	  reasons	  for	  
acting.	  Both	  neurosentimentalism	  and	  externalism	  fail,	  G&K	  argue,	  because	  for	  
reasons	  to	  exist	  for	  an	  agent	  a	  person	  must	  understand	  themselves	  as	  diachronic,	  
and	  both	  tacit	  affective	  processes	  and	  rational	  rule	  application	  rely	  solely	  on	  
synchronic	  processes.	  Diachronicity	  is	  needed,	  it	  is	  argued,	  because	  the	  ability	  to	  
make	  decisions,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  act	  on	  the	  decisions	  we	  have	  made,	  both	  depend	  
on	  our	  capacity	  to	  understand	  ourselves	  as	  agents	  with	  pasts	  and	  futures.	  	  
In	  particular,	  G&K	  argue	  that	  a	  necessary	  component	  for	  being	  a	  moral	  
agent	  is	  having	  the	  capacity	  for	  mental	  time	  travel	  (MTT).	  This	  includes	  episodic	  
memory,	  which	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  subjectively	  experience	  past	  events	  (backwards	  
time	  travel),	  and	  in	  turn	  seems	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  imaginatively	  project	  ourselves	  
into	  possible	  futures	  (forward	  time	  travel).	  So	  MTT	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  re-­‐experience	  
one’s	  past	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  inhabit	  imagined	  futures.	  MTT	  is	  important,	  on	  their	  
account,	  because	  our	  experience	  of	  existing	  through	  time	  enables	  decisions	  to	  
mean	  something	  to	  us,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  act	  on	  them:	  	  
Agency	  requires	  the	  capacity	  for	  episodic	  memory	  (of	  events	  in	  subjective	  
autobiography)	  and	  imaginative	  projection	  into	  the	  future	  in	  order	  for	  the	  
subject	  to	  have	  the	  requisite	  inter-­‐temporal	  perspective	  on	  her	  actions	  (p.	  
588.)	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  such	  an	  agent	  has	  “detailed	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  is	  supported	  by	  
autobiographical	  memory”	  (p.	  601).	  A	  diachronic	  agent	  can	  act	  through	  time	  
because	  they	  can	  experience	  their	  past	  and	  future	  and	  because	  they	  can	  reflect	  on	  
who	  they	  are	  through	  using	  information	  in	  autobiographical	  memory.	  	  
	   G&K	  argue	  that	  both	  affective	  processing	  and	  procedural	  reasoning	  are	  by	  
themselves	  insufficient	  for	  moral	  judgement,	  because,	  alone,	  do	  not	  enable	  us	  to	  
have	  a	  personal	  perspective.	  	  A	  person	  with	  amnesia,	  who	  has	  only	  synchronic	  
processes,	  cannot	  “represent	  the	  results	  of	  these	  processes	  to	  herself,	  because	  she	  
is	  not	  a	  diachronic	  self	  but	  a	  bundle	  of	  habits	  linked	  to	  a	  synchronic	  reasoning	  
system”	  (p.	  596).	  We	  might	  wonder	  what	  this	  means.	  Here	  we	  refer	  back	  to	  
Velleman.	  What	  it	  means	  for	  person	  to	  represent	  a	  decision	  to	  themselves,	  because	  
68	   	  
they	  are	  not	  just	  a	  bundle	  of	  habits,	  is	  that	  decision-­‐making	  involves	  an	  agential	  
perspective,	  which	  is	  the	  desire	  to	  be	  coherent	  and	  rational.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  desire	  
to	  be	  coherent,	  along	  with	  an	  awareness	  of	  our	  selves	  that	  makes	  some	  actions	  
coherent,	  that	  one	  gains	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  G&K’s	  claim	  is	  that	  such	  a	  sense-­‐making	  
capacity	  is	  not	  present	  in	  either	  neurosentimentalism	  or	  externalism.	  So	  neither	  
gives	  a	  place	  to	  the	  agent.	  	  While	  G&K	  fail	  to	  capture	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  for	  
reasons	  I	  outline	  shortly,	  I	  think	  this	  does	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  true	  of	  Prinz’s	  
neurosentimentalism.	  Externalism,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  chapter	  1,	  has	  been	  bracketed	  for	  
the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis.	  So	  I	  will	  not	  be	  discussing	  their	  claims	  in	  regards	  to	  
externalism.	  
G&K	  claim	  that	  neither	  neurosentimentalism	  nor	  externalism	  make	  room	  
for	  the	  agent,	  since	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  moral	  judgements	  they	  propose	  are	  
synchronic	  and	  therefore	  exclude	  the	  capacities	  necessary	  for	  moral	  agency.	  G&K	  
diagnose	  the	  root	  of	  this	  problem	  to	  be	  that	  both	  neurosentimentalism	  and	  
externalism	  rely	  on	  dual	  processing	  theories,	  but	  that	  this	  theory	  gives	  us	  
inadequate	  tools	  for	  understanding	  moral	  judgements22.	  Both	  theories	  assume	  our	  
cognitive	  capacities	  fall	  either	  in	  the	  ‘tacit,	  associative,	  automatic	  and	  motivatory’	  
camp	  (system	  1	  of	  dual	  systems	  theory),	  or	  the	  ‘explicit,	  syntactical,	  effortful,	  and	  
motivationally-­‐inert’	  camp	  (system	  2	  of	  dual	  systems	  theory)23.	  Both	  theories	  
assume	  that	  these	  processes	  cannot	  influence	  each	  other.	  The	  problem	  with	  both	  
theories	  is	  that	  they	  only	  involve	  synchronic	  capacities,	  and	  so	  cannot	  make	  sense	  
of	  how	  we	  can	  act	  for	  reasons24.	  	  That	  is,	  both	  theories	  ignore	  our	  capacity	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  We	  might	  question	  whether	  it	  really	  is	  dual	  processing	  theories	  that	  are	  the	  root	  of	  the	  
problem,	  since	  sentimentalism	  and	  rationalist	  externalism	  predate	  these	  theories,	  and	  
modern	  moral	  philosophers	  may	  not	  be	  that	  aware	  of	  contemporary	  cognitive	  science.	  
G&K	  argue,	  however,	  that	  neurosentimentalists	  explicitly	  rely	  on	  dual	  processing	  theories,	  
and	  externalists	  implicitly	  do	  (p.	  606).	  Perhaps,	  we	  might	  think	  it	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  
to	  claim	  that	  an	  older	  dichotomy	  between	  reason	  and	  intuition/emotion	  is	  a	  common	  
cause	  of	  both	  dual	  processing	  theory	  and	  externalism.	  	  	  
23	  For	  examples	  of	  discussion	  and	  engagement	  with	  dual	  systems	  theory	  see	  Carruthers	  
(2009)	  and	  Apperly	  &	  Butterfill	  (2009).	  	  
24	  We	  might	  wonder	  why	  diachronicity	  implies	  an	  experiential	  capacity.	  Maybe	  this	  is	  not	  
a	  necessary	  connection.	  However,	  G&K	  think	  that	  it	  is	  this	  experiential	  quality	  that	  makes	  
our	  diachronic	  reasons	  available	  for	  action.	  They	  talk	  of	  MTT	  as	  “an	  essentially	  indexical	  
way	  of	  representing	  that	  information”	  (p.	  601).	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  why	  we	  should	  see	  it	  this	  
way	  in	  chapters	  3,	  5	  &	  6.	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semantic	  autobiography	  and	  MTT.	  	  	  
	  	  	   G&K	  suggest	  that	  their,	  	  
Wider	  interpretation	  makes	  room	  for	  diachronic	  sentimentalists	  and	  
rationalists	  who	  wish	  to	  incorporate	  a	  role	  for	  reflection	  and	  deliberation	  
linked	  to	  a	  personal,	  intertemporal,	  perspective	  on	  action.	  The	  key	  is	  
understanding	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  in	  
helping	  to	  create	  a	  moral	  agent	  constituted	  by	  the	  connection	  between	  
deliberation,	  emotion,	  and	  diachronic	  self.	  (p.	  590,	  original	  emphasis.)	  
	  
And	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  “dismiss	  the	  evidence	  about	  the	  role	  of	  tacit	  emotional	  
and	  cognitive	  processes	  in	  moral	  judgement	  but	  rather	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  their	  role	  in	  
constituting	  the	  moral	  agent”	  (p.	  586).	  I	  pick	  up	  on	  this	  point	  here	  because	  I	  later	  
want	  to	  suggest	  that	  G&K	  fail	  to	  give	  a	  determinate	  role	  to	  emotion.	  	   	  
	   So,	  similar	  to	  Velleman,	  G&K	  are	  claiming	  that	  we	  act	  for	  reasons	  when	  we	  
act	  on	  our	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  diachronic	  self-­‐experience.	  We	  can	  act	  for	  reasons	  
when	  we	  understand,	  reflectively	  and	  experientially,	  who	  we	  are.	  It	  is	  through	  
these	  processes	  that	  we	  can	  work	  out,	  and	  act	  on,	  what	  would	  make	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  
do.	  Moral	  judgements	  are	  an	  activity	  of	  the	  agent,	  and	  agency	  is	  enabled	  by	  
diachronic	  processes.	  
	  
Because	  of	  the	  inadequacies	  of	  their	  theories,	  G&K	  argue	  that	  the	  
neurosentimentalist	  and	  the	  externalist	  are	  forced	  to	  take	  implausible	  stances	  on	  
whether	  to	  attribute	  agency	  to	  people	  who	  do	  not	  (or	  are	  impaired	  in	  their	  ability	  
to)	  experience	  themselves	  as	  agents	  through	  time.	  For	  synchronic	  theories,	  people	  
with	  this	  impairment	  qualify	  as	  making	  moral	  judgements.	  Such	  cases	  include	  
people	  with	  amnesia	  who	  lack	  the	  autobiographical	  database	  (i.e.	  awareness	  and	  
knowledge	  of	  their	  past),	  and	  people	  with	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC)	  
damage	  who	  cannot	  make	  use	  of	  it.	  	  
A	  case	  study	  of	  a	  patient,	  called	  M.L.	  –	  who	  had	  memories	  but	  didn’t	  feel	  a	  
personal	  sense	  of	  connection	  to	  them	  –	  described	  him	  as	  irresponsible	  and	  a	  poor	  
decision-­‐maker.	  M.L.	  knew	  about	  his	  past	  but	  he	  could	  no	  longer	  mentally	  time	  
travel,	  he	  didn’t	  re-­‐experience	  his	  past.	  It	  was	  observed	  that	  M.L.	  had	  difficulties	  
acting	  as	  a	  responsible	  parent	  for	  his	  children,	  and	  that	  he	  needed	  supervision.	  
Another	  vmPFC	  patient,	  called	  EVR,	  took	  a	  long	  time	  to	  make	  decisions,	  for	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example	  what	  restaurant	  to	  eat	  in,	  and	  reported	  that	  even	  when	  he	  made	  a	  
decision,	  he	  found	  it	  hard	  knowing	  what	  they	  meant	  for	  action25.	  G&K	  note	  that	  the	  
characteristics	  associated	  with	  vmPFC	  patients	  include	  impulsivity,	  inability	  to	  
plan,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  motivation	  to	  act	  on	  any	  decisions	  they	  do	  make.	  It	  seems	  to	  
G&K	  that	  we	  should	  not	  deem	  people	  who	  are	  impaired	  in	  this	  way	  moral	  agents	  
because	  they	  lack	  reasons	  for	  acting	  that	  guide	  their	  future	  actions.	  Similarly,	  if	  
someone	  has	  amnesia	  and	  has	  no	  ability	  to	  locate	  themselves	  in	  a	  personal	  history,	  
they	  both	  appear	  to	  lack	  the	  information	  needed	  to	  make	  a	  decision,	  and	  also	  to	  
carry	  out	  those	  plans.	  
Both	  people	  with	  amnesia	  and	  people	  with	  vmPFC	  damage	  seem	  to	  have	  
impaired	  agency	  insofar	  as	  they	  have	  problems	  deciding	  what	  to	  do,	  and	  acting	  on	  
their	  decisions:	  	  
Patients	  with	  ventromedial	  damage	  and	  amnesia	  either	  fail	  to	  make	  
[moral]	  judgements	  or	  are	  impaired	  as	  agents	  in	  their	  inability	  to	  choose	  
and	  act	  in	  accordance	  with	  reasons	  they	  accept…	  But	  this	  rationalist	  
position	  cannot	  be	  mapped	  onto	  a	  dual	  process	  model	  which	  sees	  action	  as	  
either	  driven	  from	  below	  by	  automatic	  affective	  processes	  or	  from	  above	  by	  
procedural	  reasoning	  detached	  from	  affect	  and	  personal	  motivation…(p.	  
596,	  original	  emphasis.)	  
	  
So,	  for	  a	  synchronic	  theorist	  to	  account	  for	  the	  data	  they	  seem	  committed	  to	  saying	  
either	  that	  people	  with	  these	  problems	  are	  agents,	  despite	  their	  problems,	  or	  that	  
they	  make	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  are	  not	  agents26.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  diachronic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Craver	  (2014)	  argues	  that	  people	  who	  lack	  MTT	  do	  not	  have	  impairments	  in	  their	  
diachronic	  understanding.	  Further,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  one	  person,	  K.C.,	  who	  lacks	  
episodic	  memory	  but	  not	  semantic	  memory,	  retains	  good	  decision-­‐making	  abilities	  (Kwan	  
et	  al.,	  2012).	  This	  may	  seem	  like	  a	  problem	  to	  G&K.	  For	  they	  tie	  our	  capacity	  to	  MTT	  to	  our	  
ability	  to	  make	  decisions.	  However,	  I	  think	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  be	  suspicious	  of	  what	  
K.C.’s	  results	  mean	  for	  agency.	  The	  experiments	  showing	  this	  involved	  a	  gambling	  
paradigm,	  which	  involves	  a	  relatively	  simple	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis,	  compared	  to	  the	  
contextually	  rich,	  ethically	  nuanced,	  everyday	  decision-­‐making.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  
these	  experiments	  are	  ecologically	  valid.	  Additionally,	  these	  experiments	  ask	  participants	  
to	  make	  a	  choice	  among	  hypothetical	  scenarios,	  so	  they	  are	  not	  required	  to	  act	  on	  their	  
decision	  in	  the	  distal	  future.	  So,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  how	  these	  experiments	  relate	  to	  agency	  as	  
G&K	  are	  understanding	  it	  here,	  where	  agency	  involves	  the	  ability	  to	  act	  on	  judgements	  we	  
have	  made	  in	  the	  past.	  	  	  
26	  There	  may	  be	  reasons	  other	  than	  those	  that	  G&K	  suggest	  that	  mean	  we	  do	  not	  see	  these	  
people	  as	  agents.	  However,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  shortly,	  I	  think	  there	  alternative	  reasons	  for	  
arguing	  that	  neurosentimentalism	  fails	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  agency.	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theory	  can	  account	  for	  this	  phenomenon	  by	  claiming	  that	  these	  people	  cannot	  
make	  moral	  judgements	  because	  their	  agency	  is	  impaired.	  	  
These	  cases	  indicate	  to	  G&K	  that	  our	  capacity	  to	  mentally	  time	  travel	  in	  
particular	  is	  necessary	  for	  being	  an	  agent,	  for	  being	  a	  creature	  that	  can	  act	  
responsibly.	  They	  say	  that,	  “it	  is	  not	  just	  loss	  of	  information	  about	  future	  
consequences	  but	  of	  an	  essentially	  indexical	  way	  of	  representing	  that	  information	  
which	  impairs	  deliberation”	  (p.	  601).	  MTT	  enables	  us	  to	  experience	  ourselves	  as	  
existing	  as	  diachronic	  creatures,	  and	  therefore	  to	  experience	  our	  projects,	  
commitments	  and	  values	  as	  ours.	   
	  But	  synchronic	  theories,	  it	  seems,	  cannot	  account	  for	  this	  data	  because	  they	  
don’t	  take	  into	  account	  that	  moral	  judgements	  require	  the	  diachronic	  capacities	  
that	  enable	  agency.	  So	  the	  synchronic	  theorists	  could	  stipulate	  that	  people	  with	  
these	  problems	  have	  no	  impairment	  in	  agency,	  which	  doesn’t	  seem	  true,	  given	  the	  
problems	  people	  with	  vmPFC	  damage	  or	  amnesia	  have	  with	  acting	  responsibly.	  
Alternatively,	  synchronic	  theorists	  can	  claim	  that	  people	  with	  vmPFC	  lesions	  or	  
amnesia	  can	  make	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  that	  such	  judgements	  do	  not	  require	  
agency.	  There	  are	  two	  problems	  with	  this.	  First,	  at	  least	  some	  people	  with	  vmPFC	  
lesions	  seem	  to	  be	  impaired	  in	  making	  judgements,	  and	  second	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  a	  
moral	  judgement	  is	  if	  it	  is	  not	  an	  exercise	  of	  agency,	  i.e.	  if	  it	  is	  not	  something	  that	  
we	  can	  act	  on.	   
So,	  this	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  Prinz.	  Presented	  from	  the	  angle	  that	  
G&K	  stress,	  it	  is	  related	  to	  the	  dual	  systems	  account	  of	  cognition.	  The	  dual	  systems	  
account,	  which	  splits	  cognition	  into	  immediate	  affective	  and	  intuitive	  processes	  on	  
one	  side,	  and	  explicit	  deductive	  reasoning	  on	  the	  other,	  leaves	  out	  a	  place	  for	  
experiential	  memory	  and	  our	  self-­‐knowledge	  gained	  through	  autiobiographical	  
memory.	  On	  this	  story,	  once	  we	  reject	  dual	  systems,	  and	  give	  a	  place	  for	  diachronic	  
capacities,	  we	  rehabilitate	  the	  agent,	  and	  we	  reject	  neurosentimentalism.	  Emotion	  
(alone)	  cannot	  be	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  because	  moral	  judgements	  are	  
an	  activity	  of	  an	  agent,	  and	  an	  agent	  is	  constituted	  by	  their	  diachronic	  and	  
deliberative	  capacities.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  when	  we	  look	  at	  the	  behaviour	  of	  people	  
who	  lack	  the	  experience,	  and	  knowledge,	  of	  themselves	  as	  creatures	  that	  exist	  
through	  time.	  But	  this	  isn’t	  going	  to	  work	  or,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  it	  will	  only	  work	  with	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a	  few	  more	  ideas	  made	  explicit.	  The	  real	  problem	  for	  Prinz	  is	  something	  else	  that	  
G&K	  have	  expressed	  but	  not	  explained,	  and	  that	  concerns	  the	  confusion	  between	  
two	  modes	  of	  explanation.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  dual	  systems	  account	  obscures	  rather	  
than	  facilitates	  our	  grasp	  of	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  Prinz’s	  account.	  
	  
3.3.	  Not	  actually	  a	  problem	  for	  Prinz?	  
To	  see	  that	  Prinz	  can	  accommodate	  G&K’s	  objection	  we	  need	  to	  remember	  a	  
signature	  move:	  making	  a	  distinction	  between	  a	  cause	  of	  a	  moral	  judgement	  and	  a	  
constituent	  of	  it.	  Importantly,	  Prinz	  has	  already	  conceded	  that	  deliberative	  reason	  
is	  a	  necessary	  cause	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  he	  thinks	  that	  our	  
moral	  judgements	  are	  merited.	  We	  need	  to	  take	  a	  look	  at	  how	  and	  why	  he	  deals	  
with	  this	  issue	  to	  1)	  see	  how	  he	  can	  deal	  with	  G&K’s	  objection	  and	  2)	  show	  how	  
there	  is	  room	  to	  suggest	  that	  he	  could	  be	  confused	  in	  this	  style	  of	  thinking.	  	  
Prinz	  believes	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  merited,	  not	  merely	  caused,	  
because	  we	  have	  a	  type	  of	  control	  over	  our	  emotions	  that	  we	  do	  not	  have	  over	  all	  
psychological	  processes,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  seeing	  a	  colour.	  Prinz	  (2007)	  asks,	  	  
Where	  does	  this	  intuition	  of	  meriting	  come	  from?	  It	  may	  have	  something	  
to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  link	  between	  emotions	  and	  their	  causes	  is	  less	  
direct	  than	  the	  link	  between	  colour	  and	  their	  causes.	  In	  the	  colour	  case,	  
the	  causal	  connection	  is	  fixed	  by	  our	  biology…In	  the	  case	  of	  emotions,	  we	  
can	  exercise	  more	  control…(p.114.)	  
	  
It	  is	  because	  we	  have	  control	  of	  our	  emotions,	  that,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  moral	  
judgements,	  we	  think	  someone	  can	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  getting	  them	  wrong:	  
We	  cannot	  hold	  a	  colour-­‐blind	  person	  accountable	  for	  failing	  to	  
distinguish	  red	  from	  green,	  but	  we	  can	  hold	  an	  emotionally	  healthy	  person	  
accountable	  for	  being	  afraid	  of	  foreigners.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
So	  “moral	  emotions	  are	  not	  merely	  caused;	  they	  are	  merited	  by	  their	  
causes”	  (p.115).	  Prinz’s	  criteria	  for	  a	  psychological	  response	  being	  merited	  
concerns	  whether	  “a)	  it	  applies	  to	  its	  cause,	  and	  b)…	  the	  agent	  can	  be	  held	  
responsible	  to	  some	  degree	  for	  failing	  to	  have	  that	  response”	  (p.	  114).	  
Despite	  all	  this,	  Prinz	  continues	  to	  argue	  that	  emotions	  are	  the	  only	  
constituent	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  And	  he	  does	  so	  by	  arguing	  that	  rational	  
deliberation	  is	  an	  important	  cause	  of	  a	  moral	  judgement,	  but	  not	  a	  constituent	  of	  it.	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As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  his	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so	  appear	  to	  be	  mainly	  
motivated	  by	  a	  commitment	  to	  sentimentalism,	  combined	  with	  evidence	  from	  
dumbfounding	  experiments.	  In	  dumbfounding	  experiments,	  deliberation	  doesn’t	  
alter	  one’s	  moral	  judgements,	  and	  emotions	  and	  moral	  judgements	  appear	  to	  co-­‐
vary.	  Therefore	  deliberation	  doesn’t	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  constituent	  of	  moral	  
judgements,	  but	  emotions	  do.	  	  
Similarly,	  Prinz	  can	  respond	  that	  MTT	  may	  be	  an	  important	  cause	  of	  the	  
emotions	  that	  constitute	  moral	  judgements	  but	  that	  we	  needn’t	  see	  MTT	  as	  a	  
constituent.	  Just	  like	  deliberative	  reasoning	  can	  feed	  into	  our	  judgements,	  so	  can	  
other	  psychological	  processes.	  This	  way	  of	  putting	  it	  may	  appear	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  
role	  G&K	  give	  to	  MTT.	  For	  example,	  they	  claim	  that	  the	  problem	  with	  amnesia	  is	  
that	  it	  impairs	  someone’s	  ability	  to	  “assemble	  and	  inhabit	  the	  episodes	  necessary	  
to	  support	  adequate	  deliberations”	  and	  so,	  “impairs	  [a	  person’s]	  capacity	  for	  
agency”	  (p.	  589).	  One	  could	  read	  this	  as	  MTT	  being	  an	  input	  to	  our	  deliberative	  
processes,	  it	  is	  food	  for	  thought.	  Put	  this	  way,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  some	  convergence	  
between	  G&K’s	  account	  and	  Prinz’s,	  where	  one	  can	  understand	  moral	  judgements	  
as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  causal	  chain	  constituted	  by	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  And,	  whatever	  
mental	  process	  one	  puts	  forward	  as	  being	  important	  for	  moral	  agency,	  it	  seems	  
that	  Prinz	  can	  make	  the	  same	  move.	  Because	  it	  remains	  true	  that	  if	  we	  see	  a	  
judgement	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  merely	  causal	  process,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  a	  single	  
emotion	  constitutes	  that	  judgement,	  while	  other	  psychological	  processes	  are	  
crucial	  causal	  inputs	  that	  help	  shape	  that	  emotion.	  	  
Prinz	  takes	  it	  that	  he	  has	  shown	  that	  emotion	  constitutes	  moral	  judgement,	  
and	  that	  all	  deliberative	  rational	  processes	  are	  causes.	  What	  we	  are	  looking	  for,	  in	  
G&K’s	  account,	  is	  a	  reason	  why	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  deliberative	  processes	  are	  
only	  causally	  important	  (as	  suggested	  in	  criterion	  ii.).	  However,	  they	  don’t	  appear	  
to	  provide	  us	  with	  this.	  What	  they	  do	  give	  us	  is	  a	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  certain	  
diachronic	  processes	  are	  necessary	  for	  moral	  judgements.	  But,	  like	  the	  sun	  is	  a	  
necessary	  cause	  of	  sunburn,	  but	  not	  a	  constituent	  of	  it,	  showing	  that	  a	  process	  is	  
necessary	  for	  a	  mental	  state	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  showing	  that	  it	  is	  a	  constituent	  of	  
that	  mental	  state.	  If	  G&K	  want	  to	  go	  further,	  and	  claim	  that	  diachronic	  processes	  
constitute	  moral	  judgements,	  they	  have	  to	  say	  something	  more.	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And,	  without	  explaining	  why,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  for	  G&K	  to	  say	  that	  because	  
diachronic	  processes	  are	  constitutive	  of	  agency,	  and	  it	  is	  an	  agent	  that	  makes	  a	  
judgement,	  therefore	  diachronic	  processes	  are	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  
Remember	  that	  what	  G&K	  are	  focused	  on	  is	  how	  to	  characterise	  agency,	  and	  they	  
understand	  judgements	  as	  activities	  of	  an	  agent.	  But	  Prinz	  has	  argued	  that	  agents	  
are	  rational	  creatures,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  deliberate	  and	  can	  justify,	  or	  fail	  
to	  justify,	  their	  beliefs.	  Nonetheless,	  he	  thinks	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  saying	  that	  the	  
processes	  that	  make	  us	  an	  agent	  are	  only	  important	  causes	  of	  our	  moral	  
judgements,	  not	  constituents	  of	  them.	  So	  he	  could	  make	  an	  analogous	  response	  to	  
the	  addition	  of	  diachronic	  processes:	  sure,	  they	  constitute	  us	  as	  agents,	  but	  our	  
agency	  is	  a	  cause	  of	  our	  moral	  judgements27.	  	  
Furthermore,	  if	  emotions	  are	  merited	  because	  they	  are	  under	  an	  agent’s	  
rational	  control,	  then	  Prinz	  can	  reply	  that	  he	  hasn’t	  made	  the	  mistake	  that	  G&K	  
accuse	  him	  of.	  On	  his	  account,	  it	  looks	  like	  we	  do	  act	  for	  the	  reasons,	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  emotions	  represent	  values	  that	  are	  under	  rational	  control.	  Now	  he	  can	  add	  
that	  he	  missed	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  what	  matters	  for	  an	  emotion	  to	  be	  under	  
rational	  control,	  and	  that	  is	  that	  our	  emotions	  are	  also	  shaped	  by	  MTT.	  Our	  reasons	  
for	  acting	  are	  constituted	  through	  emotions,	  but	  are	  shaped	  by	  our	  self-­‐knowledge	  
and	  MTT,	  and	  controlled	  by	  our	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  If	  agency	  is	  constituted	  by	  
our	  self-­‐understanding	  –	  born	  through	  deliberation,	  our	  self-­‐concept	  and	  
experience	  of	  our	  self	  through	  time	  –	  then,	  on	  one	  reading,	  Prinz	  can	  reinstate	  the	  
agent,	  but	  remain,	  fundamentally,	  a	  sentimentalist.	  Many	  processes	  are	  required	  
for	  a	  moral	  judgement,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  cause	  an	  emotion,	  which	  is	  
what	  constitutes	  the	  moral	  judgement.	  
We	  can	  understand	  Prinz’s	  concern	  here	  in	  light	  of	  G&K’s	  commentary	  on	  
the	  moral	  judgement	  debate.	  Part	  of	  what	  drives	  Prinz	  to	  note	  that	  emotions	  are	  
merited	  is	  some	  concern	  for	  understanding	  moral	  judgements	  as	  an	  activity	  of	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Of	  course,	  G&K	  could	  accept	  a	  state	  of	  stalemate,	  and	  argue	  that	  none	  of	  Prinz’s	  reasons	  
for	  seeing	  emotions	  as	  sufficient	  for	  constituting	  moral	  judgements	  are	  decisive.	  
Therefore,	  since	  they	  find	  it	  more	  compelling	  to	  see	  diachronic	  capacities	  as	  constitutive	  of	  
moral	  judgements,	  they	  are	  going	  to	  continue	  in	  that	  vein.	  However,	  I	  find	  this	  
unsatisfying.	  Such	  a	  position	  fails	  to	  articulate	  what	  commitments	  one	  would	  have	  for	  
making	  a	  process	  constitutive	  rather	  than	  causal.	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agent.	  We	  can	  see	  this,	  because	  in	  his	  discussion,	  Prinz	  refers	  to	  the	  need	  for	  his	  
theory	  to	  account	  for	  agency,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  he	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  under	  
rational	  control.	  By	  describing	  emotions	  as	  under	  rational	  control,	  Prinz	  provides	  a	  
way	  to	  understand	  moral	  judgements	  as	  the	  result	  of	  agency.	  It	  is	  our	  rational	  
control	  that	  allows	  a	  judgement	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  ours,	  rather	  than	  something	  that	  
happens	  to	  us.	  And	  it	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  our	  moral	  
judgements	  as	  something	  we	  are	  responsible	  for,	  as	  Prinz	  does:	  we	  are	  responsible	  
for	  them	  because	  they	  are	  an	  act	  of	  agency.	  	  
Prinz	  does	  not	  have	  to	  accept	  that	  diachronic	  capacities	  are	  important	  for	  a	  
judgement	  being	  merited.	  It	  is	  open	  to	  him	  to	  show	  that	  G&K	  (and	  Velleman	  &	  co.)	  
are	  mistaken	  in	  this.	  However,	  on	  first	  glance,	  it	  appears	  that	  Prinz	  does	  not	  need	  
to	  go	  as	  far	  as	  rejecting	  G&K’s	  insights	  for	  him	  to	  defend	  his	  sentimentalist	  theory.	  
He	  can	  accept	  that	  MTT	  and	  autobiographical	  memory	  contribute	  to	  our	  
judgements	  being	  merited	  while	  still	  denying	  they	  are	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  
judgements.	  	  
But	  put	  this	  way,	  it	  doesn’t	  look	  like	  G&K	  have	  met	  criterion	  ii)	  for	  
responding	  to	  Prinz.	  We	  have	  yet	  to	  see	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  not	  recasting	  their	  claim	  
in	  terms	  of	  a	  causal	  process	  that	  leads	  to	  an	  emotion,	  where	  that	  emotion	  is	  the	  
only	  constituent	  of	  a	  moral	  judgement.	  
	  
	   3.4.	  Prinz	  and	  losing	  the	  agent	  (again)	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  now	  is	  explain	  what	  I	  think	  needs	  to	  be	  made	  explicit	  for	  
criterion	  ii)	  to	  be	  met.	  This	  involves	  explaining	  a	  potential	  confusion	  that	  Prinz	  has	  
made	  in	  his	  reasoning,	  and	  explaining	  how	  this	  leads	  to	  a	  dilemma	  where	  he	  either	  
loses	  the	  agent,	  or	  has	  to	  reconsider	  his	  sentimentalism.	  For	  this	  confusion	  to	  
become	  evident,	  however,	  requires	  explaining	  a	  competing	  conceptual	  framework	  
to	  the	  one	  Prinz	  uses,	  which	  has	  been	  proposed	  by	  McDowell.	  	  
The	  first	  thing	  to	  note	  is	  that	  it	  looks	  like	  our	  intentional	  and	  epistemic	  
behaviour	  is	  normative,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  our	  causal	  explanations	  are	  not.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  
see	  how	  one	  atom	  affecting	  another,	  or	  one	  neuron	  stimulating	  another,	  can	  result	  
in	  something	  being	  justified	  or	  unjustified.	  No	  matter	  how	  complicated	  the	  causal	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chain	  is,	  it	  still	  looks	  like	  we’ve	  explained	  how	  things	  happen,	  rather	  than	  what	  is	  
justified.	  	  
Justification	  has	  normative	  force.	  It	  tells	  us	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  do	  or	  believe	  
given	  some	  state	  of	  affairs.	  But	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  understand	  the	  relevance	  of	  a	  
description	  of	  mechanism	  to	  questions	  of	  ‘ought’.	  It	  appears	  that	  there	  is	  no	  clear	  
way	  to	  get	  from	  causal	  explanations	  to	  epistemic	  explanations.	  
While	  Prinz	  wants	  to	  retain	  emotions	  as	  epistemic	  processes,	  by	  arguing	  
they	  are	  conceptual,	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  that	  he	  does	  not	  think	  they	  are	  
participants	  in	  our	  deliberative	  processes.	  Emotions	  can	  only	  be	  caused	  by	  
deliberation.	  Because	  Prinz	  implies	  that	  emotions	  are	  not	  participants	  in	  
deliberation	  but	  caused	  by	  it,	  he	  implies	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  emotions	  in	  
causal	  terms.	  In	  chapter	  1	  we	  saw	  that,	  on	  his	  own	  definition	  of	  concepts,	  Prinz	  has	  
a	  tension	  where	  he	  both	  sees	  emotions	  as	  conceptual	  and	  not	  conceptual.	  
Moreover,	  there	  is	  another	  switch,	  on	  Prinz’s	  account,	  from	  the	  space	  of	  reasons,	  to	  
causal	  explanations.	  We	  reason,	  and	  that	  triggers	  an	  emotion.	  All	  the	  while,	  he	  
maintains	  that	  the	  caused	  state	  is	  a	  judgement.	  	  What	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  now	  is	  that	  if	  
we	  apply	  McDowell’s	  framework	  to	  Prinz’s	  theory	  that	  moral	  emotions	  are	  
concepts,	  but	  not	  part	  of	  deliberative	  reasoning,	  new	  issues	  arise.	  	  
On	  McDowell’s	  framework,	  we	  are	  led	  into	  confusion	  if	  we	  understand	  an	  
emotional	  response	  to	  reasoning	  as	  simultaneously	  a	  judgement	  and	  a	  reaction	  to	  
reasoning,	  rather	  than	  itself	  part	  of	  our	  abilities	  to	  justify,	  infer	  and	  clarify.	  We	  are	  
led	  into	  confusion	  because	  our	  agency,	  and	  with	  it	  our	  ability	  to	  judge,	  is	  
characterised	  by	  our	  capacity	  to	  engage	  in	  what	  McDowell	  calls	  the	  “space	  of	  
reasons”.	  The	  space	  of	  reasons,	  in	  turn,	  is	  characterised	  by	  relationships	  of	  
justification	  and	  their	  lack,	  not	  by	  causal	  and	  mechanical	  processes	  (see,	  for	  
example,	  Lecture	  IV,	  1994).	  According	  to	  McDowell,	  then,	  if	  emotions	  are	  
judgements,	  they	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  our	  deliberative	  capacities.	  	  
	  	  	  	   However,	  because	  emotions	  are	  caused,	  but	  not	  participants	  in	  reasoning,	  
on	  Prinz’s	  account,	  when	  he	  understands	  them	  as	  judgements,	  it	  looks	  like	  he	  has	  
mixed	  together	  two	  types	  of	  explanation.	  For	  McDowell,	  when	  we	  mix	  together	  talk	  
of	  merely	  causal	  processes	  with	  talk	  of	  intentional	  and	  epistemic	  behaviour,	  we	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have	  mixed	  together	  two	  distinct	  modes	  of	  understanding,	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  have	  
applied	  one	  type	  of	  rule	  to	  domain	  where	  that	  rule	  doesn’t	  apply.	  	  
This	  observation	  is	  similar	  to	  Sellars’	  (1956)	  argument	  against	  the	  way	  that	  
sense-­‐datum	  psychology	  is	  used	  in	  epistemology.	  To	  explain	  “sensory	  perception	  
in	  scientific	  style”	  (p.	  132-­‐3)	  and	  simultaneously	  hold	  that	  it	  has	  an	  epistemic	  
character,	  endowing	  us	  with	  awareness	  of	  how	  the	  world	  is,	  creates	  a	  “mongrel	  
resulting	  from	  the	  crossbreeding	  of	  two	  ideas”	  (p.	  132).	  Emotions,	  as	  endowing	  us	  
with	  an	  awareness	  of	  moral	  properties,	  on	  Prinz’s	  picture,	  are	  simultaneously	  held	  
to	  be	  mere	  causal	  processes	  and	  have	  an	  epistemic	  character.	  That	  is	  they	  are,	  on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  epistemic	  and	  intentional,	  and	  other	  hand,	  merely	  causal.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  causal	  processes	  do	  not	  enable	  us	  to	  think	  
inferentially,	  just	  that	  when	  we	  understand	  some	  creature	  as	  an	  agent,	  we	  are	  
taking	  a	  particular	  explanatory	  stance	  towards	  them,	  one	  where	  we	  understand	  
them	  as	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  logical	  inference	  and	  
justification.	  	  This	  is	  another	  distinction	  that	  McDowell	  (1994)	  makes,	  where	  a	  
constitutive	  condition	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  characterise	  what	  makes	  a	  thing	  a	  thing	  of	  
a	  particular	  sort,	  and	  an	  enabling	  condition	  is	  the	  mechanism	  by	  which	  a	  thing	  of	  
that	  sort	  can	  exist.	  So	  what	  constitutes	  agency	  is	  being	  a	  creature	  capable	  of	  
standing	  back	  and	  asking	  things	  such	  as,	  ‘given	  I	  believe	  x,	  am	  I	  justified	  in	  
believing	  y?’,	  or	  	  ‘given	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is/I	  am,	  what	  action	  is	  justified?’28.	  But	  
what	  enables	  this	  is	  a	  particular	  physical	  substrate,	  which	  involves	  (in	  the	  human	  
case)	  neural	  machinery,	  and	  perhaps	  the	  non-­‐neural	  body	  and	  the	  world.	  	  
To	  see	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  an	  agent	  as	  operating	  in	  a	  space	  
of	  reasons	  as	  legitimate,	  we	  must	  abandon	  what	  McDowell	  calls	  “bald	  naturalism”.	  
Bald	  naturalism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  for	  something	  to	  be	  explained	  naturalistically,	  it	  
has	  to	  be	  explained	  through	  the	  laws,	  and	  patterns	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  that	  the	  
natural	  sciences	  study	  and	  explain.	  If	  we	  take	  bald	  naturalism	  to	  be	  the	  only	  mode	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Note	  that	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  what	  is	  crucial	  is	  our	  capacity	  to	  stand	  back	  and	  reflect,	  
not	  that	  we	  always	  engage	  this	  capacity	  before	  acting.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  in	  chapter	  5.	  
Briefly,	  however,	  I	  mean	  that	  it	  may	  be	  that	  we	  often	  act	  without	  reflecting,	  for	  example	  I	  
cross	  the	  road	  when	  the	  green	  person	  lights	  up	  without	  thinking,	  ‘the	  green	  person	  is	  a	  
sign	  I	  can	  cross	  the	  road,	  they	  have	  lit	  up,	  so	  I	  can	  cross	  the	  road’.	  However,	  if	  you	  asked	  
me	  why	  I	  crossed	  the	  road	  when	  I	  did,	  my	  reasons	  would	  be	  available	  to	  me.	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of	  explanation	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  naturalise	  a	  subject,	  then	  talking	  of	  teleological	  
creatures,	  for	  which	  there	  are	  a	  set	  of	  inferentially	  justified	  reasons,	  should	  simply	  
reduce	  to	  causal	  explanations	  without	  any	  loss	  of	  understanding	  of	  the	  subject	  we	  
are	  trying	  to	  explain.	  Bald	  naturalists29	  think	  that	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  
normative	  terms	  like	  ‘justify’	  through	  purely	  causal	  mechanisms.	  	  
However,	  those	  that	  want	  to	  break	  with	  bald	  naturalism,	  like	  McDowell,	  
have	  reservations	  about	  these	  claims.	  First,	  we	  don’t	  have	  a	  story	  about	  how	  causal	  
processes	  explain	  normative	  practices	  yet,	  and	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  we	  ever	  will	  
do.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  there	  just	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  conceptual	  leap	  when	  going	  from	  
a	  causal	  explanation	  to	  normative	  explanations.	  	  
Additionally,	  there	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  need	  to	  reduce	  explanations	  that	  
use	  the	  space	  of	  reasons	  to	  causal	  explanations	  unless	  we	  are	  bald	  naturalists.	  And	  
it	  isn’t	  evident	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  bald	  naturalists	  to	  be	  naturalists.	  	  
McDowell	  defends	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  a	  non-­‐bald	  naturalist	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  
practices	  and	  patterns	  that	  govern	  how	  we	  live	  in	  daily	  life	  (1994,	  p.	  78-­‐79).	  These	  
practices	  are	  practices	  of	  justifying	  our	  behaviour	  and	  beliefs,	  and	  asking	  others	  to	  
justify	  theirs.	  And	  this	  behaviour,	  of	  giving	  and	  asking	  for	  reasons,	  is	  characteristic	  
of	  the	  kind	  of	  animals	  we	  are,	  for	  McDowell.	  Because	  it	  is	  a	  type	  of	  animal	  
behaviour,	  it	  is	  a	  part	  of	  the	  natural	  world:	  	  
On	  this	  view,	  our	  lives	  are	  animal	  lives	  through	  and	  through;	  it	  is	  just	  that	  
we	  are	  animals	  of	  a	  rather	  special	  kind.	  The	  capacity	  to	  engage	  in	  rational	  
reflection	  about	  how	  we	  should	  live	  belongs	  to	  our	  nature,	  as	  the	  kind	  of	  
animals	  we	  are,	  no	  less	  than,	  say,	  the	  capacity	  to	  walk	  on	  two	  legs.	  (2008,	  
p.	  215.)	  
	  
Explanations	  that	  refer	  to	  this	  behaviour,	  therefore,	  are	  naturalistic	  explanations:	  
By	  dint	  of	  exploiting,	  in	  an	  utterly	  intuitive	  way,	  ideas	  like	  that	  of	  the	  
patterns	  characteristic	  of	  the	  life	  of	  animals	  of	  a	  certain	  kind,	  we	  can	  insist	  
that	  such	  phenomena,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  natural-­‐
scientific	  explanation,	  are	  perfectly	  real,	  without	  thereby	  relegating	  them	  
to	  the	  sphere	  of	  the	  occult	  or	  the	  supernatural.	  (ibid.,	  p.	  217.)	  
	  
If	  explaining	  the	  patterns	  of	  human	  behaviour	  is	  a	  naturalistic	  explanation,	  and	  we	  
think	  that	  understanding	  humans	  to	  engage	  in	  ‘a	  space	  of	  reasons’	  is	  a	  good	  way	  of	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characterising	  such	  behaviour,	  then	  explanation	  that	  refer	  to	  the	  space	  of	  reasons	  
count	  as	  a	  naturalistic,	  rather	  than	  supernatural,	  explanations.	  	  
McDowell	  also	  has	  a	  general	  idea	  of	  how	  it	  is	  that	  we	  become	  able	  to	  reason.	  
We,	  as	  social	  animals,	  come	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  reasoning,	  for	  McDowell,	  because	  of	  
the	  cultural	  practices	  we	  are	  taught	  as	  we	  grow	  up.	  So,	  for	  McDowell,	  the	  ability	  to	  
take	  part	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons	  is	  part	  of	  our	  ‘second	  nature’.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  a	  part	  of	  
the	  natural	  world	  that	  depends	  on	  our	  cultural	  practices.	  	  
The	  outcome,	  for	  McDowell,	  is	  that	  we	  can	  have	  a	  type	  of	  naturalism	  that	  
encompasses	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  But	  note	  that	  this	  comes	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  
space	  of	  reasons	  is	  of	  its	  own	  kind	  (sui	  generis),	  it	  is	  governed	  by	  normative	  
relations,	  which	  are	  not	  found	  in	  the	  causal	  mode	  of	  explanation.	  The	  type	  of	  
naturalism	  that	  McDowell	  is	  proposing	  includes	  the	  type	  of	  explanations	  where	  
one	  can	  be	  right	  or	  wrong,	  justified	  or	  unjustified,	  and	  where	  we	  take	  creatures	  to	  
be	  free	  and	  not	  merely	  caused30.	  	  
So,	  another	  reason	  why	  we	  might	  adopt	  McDowell’s	  naturalism,	  as	  opposed	  
to	  bald	  naturalism	  is	  that	  we	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  have	  a	  story	  about	  how	  our	  mental	  
activity	  is	  constituted	  through	  causal	  processes.	  It’s	  true	  that	  we	  no	  longer	  have	  
this	  story,	  but	  that’s	  because	  we	  have	  no	  need	  for	  such	  a	  story.	  Because	  on	  
McDowell’s	  account	  we	  can	  still	  give	  a	  causal	  story	  about	  what	  enables	  the	  space	  of	  
reasons	  to	  exist.	  That	  this	  enabling	  story	  cannot	  explain	  how	  causal	  processes	  
could	  have	  a	  normative	  character	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  problem	  because	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  
causal	  processes	  enable,	  but	  are	  not	  characterised	  by,	  normative	  relations.	  	  	  
	   What	  I	  want	  to	  remind	  us	  of	  now	  is	  that	  Prinz	  has	  some	  commitment	  to	  
explaining	  how	  moral	  judgements	  could	  exist	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  This	  is	  what	  
is	  implied	  when	  he	  expresses	  the	  view	  that	  the	  emotions	  that	  constitute	  moral	  
judgements	  can	  be	  merited,	  and	  his	  commitment	  to	  seeing	  moral	  emotions	  as	  
constituting	  moral	  concepts.	  ‘Merit’	  acts	  like	  ‘justification’	  in	  this	  argument,	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  Prinz	  is	  arguing	  that	  emotions	  can	  constitute	  judgements	  in	  the	  sense	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  This	  ought	  not	  imply	  being	  a	  libertarian.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  causal-­‐mechanical	  
enabling	  explanation	  of	  how	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  free,	  but	  that	  when	  explaining	  what	  
constitutes	  us,	  we	  use	  a	  different	  type	  of	  explanation.	  Because	  what	  constitutes	  us	  as	  
agents	  are	  our	  intentional,	  and	  epistemic,	  practices.	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that	  we	  ought	  to	  have	  those	  emotions,	  because	  they	  are	  caused	  by	  our	  deliberative	  
processes.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  Prinz’s	  concern	  with	  making	  emotions	  a	  result	  of	  agency	  that	  
underlies	  his	  concern	  with	  control:	  emotions	  are	  under	  our	  rational	  control,	  and	  
this	  is	  what	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  moral	  judgements	  as	  a	  result	  of	  our	  agency,	  as	  
something	  we	  do	  rather	  than	  something	  that	  happens	  to	  us.	  Such	  an	  activity	  is	  
what	  makes	  moral	  judgements	  the	  result	  of	  a	  creature	  that	  is	  free	  (or	  what	  
McDowell	  would	  call	  “spontaneous”),	  and	  therefore	  responsible	  for	  its	  actions.	  And	  
to	  be	  clear,	  Prinz	  can	  hold	  that	  we	  act	  for	  reasons	  while	  also	  holding	  that	  some	  
causal	  psychological	  process	  enables	  us	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasoning.	  In	  
this	  way,	  it	  is	  consistent	  for	  Prinz	  to	  claim	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  merited	  as	  
well	  as	  caused.	  Moral	  judgements	  are	  merited,	  by	  reasons,	  and	  they	  are	  enabled	  by	  
some	  causal	  process.	  	  	  
	   According	  to	  McDowell’s	  view,	  it	  is	  a	  confused	  line	  of	  reasoning	  to	  suggest	  
that	  the	  right	  type	  of	  cause	  can	  merit	  some	  judgement	  X.	  The	  right	  type	  of	  
justification	  can	  merit	  some	  judgement	  X,	  but	  a	  process	  understood	  in	  purely	  
causal	  language	  cannot.	  Our	  reasoning	  can	  merit	  an	  emotion	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  the	  
relation	  between	  the	  reason	  and	  the	  emotion	  is	  one	  of	  justification.	  Only	  if	  we	  
ought	  to	  have	  that	  emotion	  given	  that	  reason.	  But	  this	  then	  brings	  emotion,	  or	  at	  
least	  those	  that	  are	  justified	  by	  reason,	  into	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  Emotions,	  on	  this	  
account,	  would	  (have	  the	  potential	  to)	  participate	  in	  deliberation,	  and	  not	  just	  be	  
elicited	  by	  it.	  Because,	  for	  McDowell,	  it	  is	  conceptual	  processes	  that	  participate	  in	  
reasoning,	  emotions	  would	  have	  to	  be	  unambiguously	  conceptual	  to	  participate	  in	  
reasoning.	  This	  presents	  a	  problem	  for	  Prinz.	  For	  he	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  think	  that	  
emotions	  participate	  in	  reasoning.	  	  
	   It	  might	  be	  suggested	  that	  I	  am	  no	  longer	  paying	  heed	  to	  Prinz’s	  definition	  
of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  for	  an	  emotion	  to	  be	  merited.	  For	  him,	  an	  emotion	  is	  merited	  if	  it	  is	  
caused	  by	  good	  reasoning,	  not	  if	  it	  can	  participate	  in	  deliberation.	  However,	  as	  
argued	  above,	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	  understanding	  ‘merited’	  this	  way.	  If	  we	  look	  
at	  what	  Prinz	  means	  by	  ‘judgement’,	  it	  is	  the	  type	  of	  mongrel	  understanding	  where	  
moral	  emotions	  are	  simultaneously	  understood	  to	  play	  the	  epistemic	  role	  of	  
representing	  what	  is	  good	  (for	  us)	  and	  to	  be	  triggered,	  rather	  than	  part	  of,	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deliberative	  processes.	  One	  way	  to	  put	  this	  is	  that	  Prinz	  wants	  to	  hold	  that	  we	  
should	  understand	  what	  constitutes	  emotions	  as	  simultaneously	  a	  type	  of	  causal	  
reaction	  and	  an	  instance	  of	  moral	  knowledge.	  What	  is	  being	  contested	  above	  is	  
whether	  this	  is	  clearly	  the	  case.	  As	  has	  been	  suggested,	  it	  is	  not	  yet	  clear	  how	  moral	  
knowledge	  can	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  type	  of	  causal	  process,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  not	  
yet	  clear	  how	  moral	  knowledge	  is	  constituted	  through	  a	  causal	  process.	  Further,	  it	  
looks	  like	  there	  might	  be	  a	  schism	  between	  causal	  explanations	  and	  epistemic	  
explanations,	  making	  it	  unclear	  how	  we	  could	  ever	  hold	  this.	  Finally,	  if	  we	  drop	  
bald	  naturalism	  and	  use	  McDowell’s	  framework	  we	  have	  no	  need	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  
hold	  that	  we	  could	  characterise	  moral	  knowledge	  this	  way.	  	  
	   This	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  why	  Prinz	  cannot	  simply	  adopt	  the	  position	  that	  
emotion	  and	  deliberative	  reason	  independently,	  but	  jointly,	  constitute	  moral	  
judgements.	  If	  we	  cannot	  characterise	  emotions	  as	  conceptual,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
they	  are	  capable	  of	  participating	  in	  deliberation,	  then,	  on	  McDowell’s	  account,	  they	  
cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  participating	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  judging.	  On	  this	  solution	  to	  
Prinz’s	  problem,	  it	  now	  looks	  like	  only	  the	  rational	  deliberative	  part	  of	  a	  judgement	  
is	  constitutive	  of	  judging.	  This	  requires	  Prinz	  to	  abandon	  sentimentalism,	  which	  is	  
a	  reversal	  of	  his	  position.	  	  	  
	   Because	  emotions,	  for	  Prinz,	  motivate	  action,	  this	  would	  also	  require	  that	  
he	  abandon	  his	  moral	  internalism.	  This	  presents	  a	  different	  problem	  for	  our	  
characterisation	  of	  a	  process	  as	  a	  judgement:	  how	  do	  we	  understand	  something	  as	  
a	  moral	  judgement	  if	  it	  not	  something	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  act	  on?	  
A	  question	  arises	  here	  about	  how	  moral	  internalism	  can	  escape	  mixing	  
causal	  explanations	  with	  epistemic	  ones,	  given	  that	  its	  claims	  that	  judgements	  
motivate	  actions	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  judgements	  can	  cause	  actions.	  My	  
internalism,	  however,	  is	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  our	  characterisation	  of	  
moral	  judgements	  and	  agency	  ought	  to	  allow	  for	  an	  enabling	  explanation	  of	  how	  
agents	  can	  act	  on	  reasons.	  	  
	  
If	  emotions	  are	  judgements	  in	  McDowell’s	  sense,	  then	  we	  have	  to	  understand	  them	  
as	  the	  type	  of	  things	  that	  can	  participate	  in	  being	  justified	  by	  a	  reason	  and	  
justifying	  an	  action,	  rather	  than	  being	  merely	  caused	  and	  be	  a	  cause.	  For	  both	  Prinz	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and	  McDowell,	  an	  activity	  that	  can	  be	  justified	  and	  justifying	  is	  conceptual.	  So,	  if	  we	  
are	  to	  say	  that	  emotions	  are	  justified	  (or	  ‘merited’	  as	  Prinz	  puts	  it)	  and	  justifying,	  
then,	  according	  to	  McDowell,	  emotions	  must	  be	  conceptual.	  In	  some	  ways,	  this	  is	  
the	  case	  for	  Prinz	  too,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  concepts,	  for	  Prinz,	  that	  participate	  in	  rational	  
activity,	  rather	  than	  being	  merely	  caused	  by	  it.	  	  
However,	  if	  we	  adopt	  McDowell’s	  reasoning,	  then	  Prinz’s	  description	  of	  
events	  is	  muddled	  –	  he	  is	  moving	  between	  the	  space	  of	  reasons	  and	  a	  causal	  
description.	  He	  is	  marrying	  two	  inconsistent	  types	  of	  description,	  and	  applying	  the	  
concept	  of	  ‘merit’,	  which	  is	  an	  epistemic	  and	  normative	  concept,	  where	  it	  does	  not	  
apply.	  	  
Within	  this	  way	  of	  understanding	  ‘judgement’	  Prinz	  is	  presented	  with	  a	  
dilemma.	  If	  he	  wants	  to	  maintain	  that	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  moral	  
judgements,	  he	  can	  either	  change	  his	  basic	  understanding	  of	  moral	  emotions,	  so	  
that	  they	  become	  fully	  conceptual	  (i.e.	  involved	  in	  deliberation),	  and	  keep	  the	  
agent,	  or	  he	  can	  keep	  his	  basic	  understanding	  of	  moral	  emotions,	  and	  lose	  the	  
agent.	  	  
The	  first	  move	  is	  the	  one	  I	  am	  going	  to	  make.	  In	  chapter	  5,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  
emotions	  do	  constitute	  concepts,	  and	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  hold	  this.	  Prinz	  
can	  also	  make	  this	  move	  if	  he	  wishes,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  a	  claim	  that	  can	  be	  made	  without	  
further	  substantiation,	  because	  it	  flies	  in	  the	  face	  of	  an	  everyday	  assumption.	  
Namely	  that	  emotions	  and	  rationality	  are	  opposed	  to	  each	  other.	  	  
The	  second	  move	  would	  mean	  that	  G&K’s	  argument	  continues	  to	  have	  a	  
hold	  on	  him.	  If	  Prinz	  is	  committed	  to	  bald	  naturalism,	  then	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  clear	  that	  
we	  should	  take	  moral	  emotions	  as	  moral	  judgements	  any	  more,	  because	  they	  
cannot	  be	  part	  of	  deliberation,	  so	  they	  cannot	  be	  the	  types	  of	  things	  that	  are	  
justified.	  They	  can	  be	  causes	  of	  behaviour,	  but	  they	  no	  longer	  look	  like	  the	  right	  
type	  of	  thing	  to	  understand	  how	  it	  is	  that	  we	  can	  act.	  	  
On	  McDowell’s	  framework,	  as	  long	  as	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  explaining	  how	  
it	  is	  that	  we	  can	  act	  for	  reasons,	  something	  more	  like	  the	  first	  move	  is	  required.	  
That	  is,	  we	  have	  to	  understand	  emotions	  as	  being	  in	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  	  
Seen	  this	  way,	  Prinz’s	  switch	  between	  modes	  of	  explanation	  means	  that	  his	  
causal-­‐constitution	  argument	  is	  either	  opaque	  or	  wrong.	  Both	  possibilities	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undermine	  his	  argument	  that	  emotions,	  as	  opposed	  to	  our	  deliberative	  capacities,	  
are	  constituents	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  First,	  it	  doesn’t	  seem	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  
his	  argument	  any	  more.	  The	  space	  of	  reasons	  is	  characterised	  by	  relations	  of	  
justification,	  not	  causes.	  Second,	  if	  we	  are	  more	  careful	  about	  how	  we	  use	  modes	  of	  
explanation,	  then	  it	  looks	  like	  his	  claim	  that	  emotions,	  rather	  than	  deliberation,	  
constitute	  judgements	  is	  false:	  either	  our	  emotional	  capacities	  are	  conceptual,	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  participate	  in	  deliberation,	  or	  we	  have	  no	  understanding	  of	  
how	  we	  make	  moral	  judgements	  at	  all.	  	  	  	  
We	  can	  recharacterise	  Velleman’s	  account	  using	  this	  framework	  too.	  Self-­‐
understanding	  should	  not	  be	  characterised	  as	  a	  particular	  part	  of	  the	  causal	  order	  
that	  allows	  us	  to	  act	  for	  reasons.	  Instead,	  there	  is	  some	  causal	  process	  that	  enables	  
self-­‐understanding.	  Self-­‐understanding	  is	  part	  of	  what	  constitutes	  the	  space	  of	  
reasons.	  It	  provides	  a	  reason	  for	  acting	  because,	  since	  we	  want	  to	  be	  consistent,	  it	  
justifies	  some	  courses	  of	  action	  over	  others.	  	  
In	  chapter	  5	  I	  will	  present	  my	  solution	  to	  the	  dilemma	  Prinz	  faces.	  I	  will	  
argue	  that	  moral	  concepts,	  which	  participate	  in	  deliberation,	  are	  constituted	  
through	  emotions,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  the	  interrelation	  of	  moral	  concepts	  that	  acts	  as	  a	  
justification	  for	  action.	  Moral	  concepts	  justify	  only	  as	  part	  of	  broad	  narrative	  
networks	  that	  constitute	  our	  values.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  situate	  the	  argument	  above	  
within	  a	  more	  detailed	  theoretic	  framework	  of	  how	  we	  make	  moral	  judgements,	  
and	  include	  phenomenological	  and	  empirical	  support	  for	  this	  picture.	  In	  doing	  so	  I	  
will	  commit,	  unlike	  Prinz,	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  moral	  concepts	  are	  part	  of	  deliberation,	  
and	  depart	  from	  sentimentalism.	  Or,	  maybe	  more	  precisely,	  my	  theory	  is	  one	  
where	  rationalism	  and	  sentimentalism	  converge.	  	  
	  In	  chapter	  5,	  I	  will	  also	  respond	  to	  potential	  criticisms	  of	  the	  argument	  I	  
have	  presented	  here:	  that	  it	  is	  hyper-­‐rational	  because	  it	  means	  that	  we	  only	  act	  
when	  we	  have	  reflected	  prior	  to	  the	  action;	  and	  that	  it	  gives	  us	  too	  much	  power,	  
because	  it	  implies	  that	  it	  would	  be	  simple	  to	  articulate,	  understand	  and	  change	  our	  
reasons.	  Briefly,	  I	  don’t	  think	  either	  of	  these	  characteristics	  are	  necessarily	  implied	  
by	  the	  picture	  I	  have	  presented	  here.	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4.	  Aims	  and	  methods	  
	  
4.1.	  Naturalising	  agency	  
So	  we	  have	  seen	  how,	  although	  G&K’s	  response	  to	  neurosentimentalism	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  Prinz,	  their	  emphasis	  on	  agency	  can	  lead	  us	  in	  a	  
direction	  where	  a	  response	  is	  provided.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  ideas	  of	  agency	  can	  be	  
understood	  as	  belonging	  to	  a	  type	  of	  explanation	  that	  is	  not	  congruent	  with	  Prinz’s	  
explanation	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
However,	  another	  question	  then	  arises	  of	  what	  contribution	  G&K	  take	  
themselves	  to	  be	  making	  to	  a	  positive	  account	  of	  agency.	  In	  this,	  I	  think	  they	  share	  
similar	  commitments	  and	  aims	  to	  Prinz,	  ones	  that	  are	  adopted	  in	  this	  thesis.	  One	  of	  
these	  shared	  commitments	  is	  a	  sensitivity	  to	  empirical	  literature,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  
considerations	  in	  play	  when	  deciding	  what	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements	  makes	  
most	  sense.	  Before	  returning	  to	  an	  outline	  of	  my	  general	  methodology,	  I	  want	  to	  
explain	  a	  couple	  of	  projects	  I	  will	  be	  adopting	  from	  G&K.	  	  
	   The	  first	  is	  G&K’s	  concern	  with	  providing	  psychological	  and	  neurological	  
processes	  that	  they	  take	  to	  enable	  the	  type	  of	  self-­‐understanding	  required	  for	  
agency.	  This	  is	  a	  task	  that	  I	  will	  be	  taking	  up	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis.	  We	  can	  see	  
evidence	  of	  this	  approach,	  when,	  in	  their	  explanation	  of	  acting	  for	  reasons,	  they	  
state	  that,	  	  
	  In	  so	  committing	  ourselves,	  as	  Velleman	  (1991	  and	  1997)	  points	  out,	  we	  
provide	  reasons	  for	  ourselves	  in	  the	  future,	  reasons	  which	  will	  be	  ours,	  but	  
which	  we	  would	  otherwise	  not	  have	  had.	  In	  this	  way	  we	  construct	  ourselves	  
as	  particular,	  temporally	  extended,	  agents.	  Our	  diachronic	  reasons,	  made	  
salient	  to	  us	  via	  our	  capacity	  for	  mental	  time	  travel,	  are	  thus	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
compete	  with	  synchronically	  occurring	  wants.	  In	  effect	  they	  become	  
normative	  for	  us.	  (2010,	  p.	  602.)	  	  
	  
Part	  of	  G&K’s	  project	  is	  to	  use	  the	  psychologically	  informed	  theory	  of	  MTT,	  
and	  the	  neurological	  evidence	  about	  the	  circuitry	  involved	  in	  it,	  to	  explain	  what	  
enables	  us	  to	  have	  self-­‐understanding,	  and	  therefore	  have	  reasons	  for	  acting.	  Their	  
argument	  is	  that	  MTT	  and	  autobiographical	  memory	  are	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  have	  
the	  self-­‐understanding	  required	  to	  create	  and	  commit	  to	  projects	  across	  time.	  And	  
it	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  people	  with	  amnesia	  and	  ventromedial	  damage	  are	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impaired	  in	  this	  activity.	  The	  (neuro)psychological	  literature	  on	  MTT	  then	  allows	  
us	  to	  provide	  the	  enabling	  conditions	  for	  Velleman’s	  theory	  of	  agency.	  	  
Part	  of	  what	  I	  will	  do	  in	  the	  proceeding	  chapters	  is	  challenge	  the	  way	  that	  
G&K	  interpret	  this	  evidence.	  I	  will	  claim	  that	  the	  vmPFC	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  
enabling	  the	  more	  general	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  understanding,	  where	  MTT	  is	  a	  
particular	  type	  of	  narrative	  understanding.	  It	  is	  through	  narrative	  understanding	  
that	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  our	  selves	  and	  the	  world,	  what	  we	  value,	  and	  through	  
which	  we	  gain	  reasons	  for	  actions.	  	  
	  
A	  large	  component	  of	  this	  endeavour	  to	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  what	  psychological	  
processes	  make	  self-­‐understanding	  possible	  will	  be	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  should	  see	  
emotion	  as	  integral	  to	  this	  process	  of	  narrative	  understanding.	  Finding	  a	  role	  for	  
emotion	  is	  something	  that	  G&K	  have	  an	  explicit	  commitment	  to,	  but	  it	  is	  unclear	  
what	  role	  they	  give	  it	  in	  their	  account.	  	  
While	  they	  mention	  that	  memory	  and	  imagination	  “involve	  the	  activation	  of	  
relevant	  perceptual,	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  systems	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  
environmental	  stimulus”	  (p.	  599,	  emphasis	  added),	  they	  do	  not	  expand	  on	  what	  
role	  emotion	  has	  here31.	  	  They	  also	  suggest	  that	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  that	  
ventromedial	  patients	  have	  in	  making	  decisions	  is	  that	  they	  “make	  impersonal	  
judgements	  without	  experiencing	  the	  conflict	  produced	  in	  normal	  subjects	  by	  
personal	  and	  emotional	  aspects	  of	  a	  situation”	  (p.	  588).	  Again,	  they	  do	  not	  expand	  
on	  why	  emotions	  are	  useful	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  They	  do,	  however,	  mention	  that	  a	  
lack	  of	  emotion	  is	  responsible	  for	  ventromedial	  patients	  finding	  it	  hard	  to	  form	  
judgements	  that	  motivate	  them	  to	  act	  (p.	  605).	  In	  their	  conclusion	  they	  also	  
mention	  that	  a	  diachronic	  sentimentalist	  may	  argue	  that	  emotion	  is	  “recruited	  
when	  we	  imagine	  another’s	  situation”.	  But	  this	  could	  well	  be	  understood	  as	  
emotion	  having	  a	  subsidiary	  role	  in	  moral	  agency,	  which	  at	  heart	  is	  constituted	  by	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  However,	  they	  do	  expand	  on	  this	  further	  in	  their	  2017	  paper.	  Here	  they	  make	  explicit	  
what	  they	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  MTT	  to	  be.	  Similar	  to	  me,	  G&K	  argue	  that	  
emotion	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  MTT,	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  inhabited.	  
This	  is	  central	  to	  its	  motivating	  character.	  However,	  unlike	  me,	  they	  do	  not	  expand	  on	  this	  
to	  provide	  an	  elaborate	  theory	  of	  moral	  cognition	  and	  agency	  that	  centers	  on	  emotion.	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our	  explicit	  memories	  and	  imaginings.	  So	  their	  commitment	  in	  including	  emotion	  
as	  a	  constituent	  of	  moral	  agency	  appears	  unfulfilled.	  	  	  
	   	  What	  I	  will	  do	  in	  the	  proceeding	  chapters	  is	  explain	  how	  emotions	  are	  
crucial	  for	  the	  embodied	  perspective	  characteristic	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  
and	  therefore	  MTT.	  And	  it	  is	  the	  embodied	  nature	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  that	  
enables	  our	  understanding	  to	  be	  intrinsically	  connected	  to	  our	  ability	  to	  act.	  	  
	  
	   4.2.	  General	  methodology	  
We’ve	  now	  gathered	  together	  the	  main	  commitments	  that	  I	  will	  be	  inheriting	  from	  
Prinz	  and	  G&K.	  Both	  are	  committed	  to	  moral	  internalism,	  giving	  some	  place	  to	  
emotion	  in	  agency,	  and	  using	  empirical	  evidence	  as	  one	  source	  to	  assess	  a	  theory	  
of	  agency	  by.	  From	  G&K,	  I	  will	  be	  continuing	  their	  endeavour	  to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  
what	  processes	  enable	  the	  self-­‐understanding	  through	  which	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  act	  
for	  reasons.	  However,	  how	  we	  understand	  ‘self-­‐understanding’	  will	  go	  through	  a	  
transformation.	  In	  particular,	  we	  shall	  see	  that	  self-­‐understanding	  will	  no	  longer	  
necessarily	  imply	  the	  activity	  of	  thinking	  about	  our	  own	  psychological	  processes.	  	  
	   The	  project	  I	  am	  about	  to	  embark	  on,	  is	  arguing	  that	  there	  are	  a	  multitude	  
of	  reasons	  that	  at	  once	  speak	  against	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  moral	  judgements	  and	  in	  
favour	  of	  an	  account	  of	  agency	  centred	  on	  self-­‐understanding.	  The	  methodology	  
used	  to	  argue	  this	  will	  rarely	  involve	  straightforward	  refutation	  of	  Prinz,	  nor	  an	  
obvious	  winning	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  alternative	  account.	  Instead	  what	  will	  be	  
presented	  is	  a	  network	  of	  considerations,	  empirical	  and	  conceptual,	  and	  the	  
proposal	  is	  that	  Prinz’s	  theory	  cannot	  make	  sense	  of	  these	  considerations.	  But	  we	  
can	  best	  account	  for	  these	  considerations	  if	  we	  adopt	  the	  theory	  that	  embodied	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  constitutive	  of	  agency.	  Such	  an	  account	  adopts	  an	  
alternative	  set	  of	  conceptual	  considerations	  from	  Prinz,	  namely	  the	  considerations	  
that	  McDowell	  presents	  us	  with	  above.	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  alternative	  to	  Prinz	  I	  
will	  be	  presenting	  does	  not	  meet	  him	  on	  his	  own	  terms,	  and	  therefore	  shifts	  the	  
debate	  rather	  than	  directly	  undermining	  his	  position.	  	  
We	  may	  wonder	  why	  I	  should	  switch	  grounds,	  whether	  I	  could	  translate	  my	  
account	  into	  a	  brute	  naturalist	  story,	  whether	  I	  can	  remain	  on	  Prinz’s	  ground	  while	  
simultaneously	  rejecting	  his	  type	  of	  sentimentalism.	  While	  such	  a	  translation	  may	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be	  possible,	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  Further,	  McDowell’s	  observations	  bring	  into	  
view	  the	  possibility	  that	  Prinz’s	  ground	  is	  not	  one	  where	  an	  explanation	  of	  agency	  
or	  judgements	  can	  be	  provided,	  because	  it	  could	  render	  incomprehensible	  how	  my	  
proposal	  relates	  to	  agency	  and	  the	  activity	  of	  judging.	  	  
My	  alternative	  to	  Prinz	  integrates	  important	  insights	  from	  various	  thinkers	  
and	  shows	  how	  they	  are	  consistent,	  provides	  various	  novel	  insights	  into	  how	  we	  
can	  understand	  agency,	  and	  makes	  sense	  of	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  empirical	  findings.	  So	  
one	  major	  drive	  in	  the	  argument	  is	  explanatory	  force:	  if	  we	  understand	  these	  
things	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  explain	  and	  make	  coherent	  various	  lines	  of	  thinking.	  	  
	   One	  strategy	  used	  will	  involve	  presenting	  it	  as	  a	  virtue	  if	  a	  theory	  can	  make	  
coherent	  relevant	  phenomenological	  observations	  and	  particular	  empirical	  
findings.	  However,	  why	  this	  should	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  theory	  choice	  is	  not	  obvious.	  It	  
is	  not	  obvious	  at	  all	  that	  phenomenologists	  should	  care	  about	  what	  the	  science	  
says,	  nor	  that	  scientists	  should	  care	  about	  the	  phenomenology.	  So	  it	  worth	  
explaining	  why	  we	  should	  think	  that	  their	  consistency	  matters.	  	  
	   One	  explanation	  comes	  from	  Wheeler	  (2013).	  Wheeler	  argues	  that,	  while	  
neither	  discipline	  may	  decisively	  prove	  the	  other	  right	  or	  wrong,	  they	  mutually	  
inform	  one	  another.	  We	  can	  understand	  how	  this	  is	  possible,	  he	  suggests,	  if	  we	  
apply	  McDowell’s	  distinction	  between	  constitutive	  understanding	  and	  enabling	  
understanding.	  As	  we	  saw	  above,	  constitutive	  understanding	  is	  reached	  through	  
the	  activity	  of	  describing	  and	  refining	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  some	  phenomenon	  
the	  kind	  of	  thing	  it	  is.	  Enabling	  understanding	  is	  reached	  when	  we	  can	  give	  some	  
causal	  story	  for	  how	  that	  phenomenon	  could	  be	  generated.	  Phenomenology	  can	  
contribute	  to	  our	  constitutive	  understanding	  of	  experience,	  neuroscience	  can	  give	  
us	  enabling	  understanding	  of	  how	  experience	  is	  possible.	  Specifically,	  
phenomenology	  can	  give	  us	  constitutive	  understanding	  of	  the	  transcendental	  kind.	  
It	  does	  not	  just	  give	  us	  information	  we	  gain	  from	  everyday	  introspection,	  but	  
information	  gained	  from	  careful	  analysis	  concerning	  the	  conditions	  that	  make	  
experience	  possible.	  
	   The	  science,	  then,	  takes	  its	  cue	  about	  what	  it	  is	  looking	  for	  partly	  from	  
phenomenology.	  Phenomenology	  says:	  here’s	  a	  description	  of	  the	  conditions	  that	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make	  experience	  possible,	  and	  neuroscience	  responds:	  ok	  then,	  I’ll	  see	  if	  there’s	  a	  
neural	  mechanism	  that	  would	  explain	  how	  those	  conditions	  could	  obtain.	  	  
In	  return,	  the	  phenomenologist	  is	  constrained	  by	  science	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
phenomenological	  descriptions	  shouldn’t	  be	  mysterious.	  That	  is,	  there	  should	  be	  
some	  scientific	  explanation	  possible	  for	  how	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  descriptions	  
phenomenology	  gives	  of	  experience	  could	  be	  realised	  by	  stuff	  that	  science	  can	  
explain.	  If	  our	  best	  science	  cannot	  offer	  an	  enabling	  explanation,	  then	  
phenomenologists	  should	  at	  least	  reconsider	  their	  descriptions	  of	  the	  
transcendental	  conditions	  for	  experience.	  	  
Further,	  scientific	  evidence	  may	  provide	  positive	  evidence	  that	  allows	  
phenomenologists	  to	  reconceive	  what	  the	  best	  descriptions	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  
experience	  is.	  Wheeler	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  research	  in	  situated	  robotics	  that	  
apparently	  showed	  that	  one	  can	  make	  nuanced	  distinctions	  between	  types	  of	  
representations	  such	  that	  some	  prereflective	  experience	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  
involving	  minimal	  representations	  that	  help	  direct	  attention,	  without	  needing	  rich	  
representations.	  Hence	  phenomenology	  and	  science	  are	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  semi-­‐
dependence,	  where	  they	  can	  mutually	  influence	  one	  another,	  and	  yet	  neither	  holds	  
absolute	  authority	  over	  the	  other.	  	  
Consistency	  between	  these	  two	  disciplines,	  then,	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  good	  sign	  
because	  their	  agreement	  gives	  us	  some	  reason	  to	  accept	  both	  the	  phenomenology	  
and	  the	  science.	  That	  is,	  when	  in	  agreement,	  they	  lend	  each	  other	  mutual	  support.	  
We	  know	  that	  our	  explication	  of	  the	  conditions	  of	  experience	  can	  be	  made	  sense	  of	  
through	  science,	  and	  we	  know	  our	  science	  can	  be	  made	  sense	  of	  through	  our	  
phenomenological	  explications.	  	  We	  have	  a	  more	  complete	  and	  rounded	  sense	  of	  
the	  world	  when	  these	  two	  things	  are	  in	  harmony.	  	  
This	  is	  a	  way	  of	  expressing	  the	  more	  general	  methodology	  too.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  
the	  fit	  between	  phenomenology	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  will	  be	  presented	  as	  a	  
virtue,	  but	  the	  fit	  between	  other	  logical	  or	  conceptual	  considerations	  –	  which	  serve	  
to	  further	  our	  constitutive	  understanding	  of	  agency	  –	  and	  the	  empirical	  evidence.	  	  
This	  form	  of	  argumentation	  makes	  the	  structure	  of	  this	  thesis	  complicated.	  
The	  argument	  takes	  a	  web-­‐like	  form,	  where	  issues	  interconnect	  in	  various	  ways,	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and	  are	  therefore	  revisited,	  but	  for	  different	  purposes.	  This	  is	  another	  way	  of	  





This	  chapter	  has	  surveyed	  the	  response	  of	  G&K	  to	  Prinz’s	  sentimentalism.	  I	  have	  
used	  it	  to	  pull	  out	  the	  underlying	  criticism	  of	  Prinz’s	  argument	  that	  deliberative	  
process	  can	  be	  important	  for	  causing	  moral	  judgements	  but	  that	  they	  do	  not	  
constitute	  such	  judgements.	  First,	  it	  looks	  like	  their	  argument	  poses	  no	  real	  
challenge	  to	  this	  claim,	  but	  serves	  to	  embellish	  what	  causal	  processes	  are	  
necessary	  for	  a	  moral	  emotion	  to	  be	  produced.	  However,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  once	  
we	  think	  more	  carefully	  about	  agency,	  we	  find	  a	  more	  fundamental	  criticism	  of	  
Prinz’s	  set-­‐up,	  where	  he	  appears	  to	  moves	  seamlessly	  between	  two	  inconsistent	  
modes	  of	  understanding.	  On	  this	  understanding	  of	  agency,	  made	  explicit	  by	  
McDowell,	  Prinz’s	  claim	  that	  emotions	  are	  causally	  related	  to	  deliberation	  and	  yet	  
constitute	  moral	  judgements	  becomes	  opaque.	  If	  he	  makes	  his	  reasoning	  
consistent	  according	  to	  McDowell’s	  framework,	  he	  is	  left	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  he	  
either	  has	  to	  accept	  moral	  emotions	  are	  fully	  conceptual,	  or	  that	  he	  has	  not	  given	  
us	  an	  account	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  	  
	   Additionally,	  I	  have	  used	  this	  chapter	  to	  introduce	  Velleman’s	  account	  of	  
agency	  as	  requiring	  self-­‐understanding,	  a	  claim	  that	  G&K	  see	  themselves	  as	  
providing	  a	  psychological	  and	  neurological	  account	  of.	  While	  I	  will	  adopt	  and	  
adapt	  Velleman’s	  account,	  and	  I	  inherit	  G&K’s	  methodology	  of	  finding	  an	  enabling	  
story	  for	  it,	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  start	  to	  question	  the	  role	  that	  they	  give	  MTT	  
and	  the	  vmPFC.	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  begin	  the	  enterprise	  of	  explaining	  why	  
emotion	  must	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  why	  people	  with	  vmPFC	  have	  the	  
issues	  with	  decision-­‐making	  that	  they	  have.	  	  	  
Building	  an	  alternative	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements	  to	  Prinz	  will	  take	  some	  
time	  and	  patience.	  So,	  in	  the	  next	  two	  chapters,	  I	  bracket	  Prinz,	  and	  instead	  begin	  
developing	  my	  alternative.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  respond	  to	  G&K’s	  claim	  that	  
mental	  time	  travel	  is	  important	  for	  making	  and	  acting	  on	  responsible	  decisions.	  In	  
90	   	  
chapter	  4,	  I	  put	  this	  back	  into	  the	  context	  of	  agency.	  I	  develop	  this	  into	  an	  account	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Emotion	  in	  Narrative	  Understanding	  and	  Mental	  Time	  Travel	  
Are	  all	  of	  us	  the	  same,	  I	  wonder,	  navigating	  our	  lives	  by	  interpreting	  the	  silences	  
between	  words	  spoken,	  analysing	  the	  returning	  echoes	  of	  our	  memory	  in	  order	  to	  chart	  
the	  terrain,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  around	  us.	  	  




Mental	  time	  travel,	  as	  we	  saw,	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  imagine	  oneself	  in	  the	  future	  and	  re-­‐
experience	  the	  past.	  It	  evokes	  sensory	  experiences:	  we	  may	  visualise	  the	  
mischievous	  smile	  on	  a	  child’s	  face,	  imagine	  the	  jarring	  tone	  in	  our	  teacher’s	  voice,	  
or	  feel	  the	  rhythm	  of	  the	  dance	  we	  waltzed	  last	  night.	  Mental	  time	  travel	  (MTT)	  is	  
also	  experiential	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  emotional:	  memories	  of	  that	  mischievous	  
smile	  warm	  our	  heart,	  of	  that	  imagined	  tone	  of	  voice	  come	  with	  being	  annoyed	  and	  
anxious,	  and	  remembering	  that	  dance	  is	  partnered	  with	  elation.	  This	  observation	  
forms	  the	  basis	  of	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis.	  For	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  next	  two,	  
we	  will	  be	  concentrating	  on	  the	  affective	  dimension	  of	  narrative	  thinking,	  in	  
chapter	  6	  we	  will	  return	  to	  see	  why	  this	  cannot	  be	  separated	  off	  from	  the	  sensory	  
aspect.	  	  
Gerrans	  &	  Kennett	  (G&K)	  claim	  the	  capacity	  for	  MTT	  is	  necessary	  for	  being	  
a	  moral	  agent.	  This	  is	  because	  MTT	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  subjectively	  
inhabit	  our	  past	  and	  to	  imagine	  our	  future.	  In	  turn,	  this	  is	  necessary	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  
have	  reasons	  for	  acting	  that	  are	  normatively	  felt	  because	  “engaging	  in	  this	  
normative	  domain	  just	  is	  the	  process	  of	  learning	  to	  transcend	  the	  present	  moment,	  
both	  cognitively	  and	  behaviourally”	  (G&K,	  2010,	  p.	  602.).	  To	  support	  this	  idea	  G&K	  
make	  reference	  to	  the	  philosophers	  Velleman,	  Bratman	  &	  Korsgaard,	  who	  express	  
the	  view	  that	  to	  be	  an	  agent	  is	  to	  have	  reasons	  to	  act,	  and	  one	  has	  reasons	  to	  act	  
when	  one	  tries	  to	  act	  ways	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  one’s	  values.	  MTT,	  for	  G&K,	  is	  
that	  capacity	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  have	  an	  autobiographical	  context	  to	  one’s	  decision-­‐
making.	  We	  use	  this	  context	  to	  make	  decisions	  about	  what	  we	  have	  reasons	  to	  do,	  
because	  it	  is	  with	  this	  information	  that	  we	  form	  our	  ideas	  of	  what	  matters	  to	  us,	  
and	  how	  we	  want	  to	  lead	  our	  life.	  
92	   	  
Furthermore,	  G&K	  are	  internalists	  about	  moral	  judgements:	  they	  think	  
moral	  judgements	  necessarily	  motivate	  us	  to	  act.	  ‘Reasons	  for	  an	  agent’	  must	  be	  
reasons	  that	  have	  some	  motivational	  force.	  For	  them	  MTT	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  
means	  to	  have	  ‘reasons	  for	  actions’	  not	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  helps	  us	  make	  
decisions	  about	  what	  to	  do,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  is	  involved	  in	  motivating	  us	  to	  do	  
what	  we	  have	  decided	  to	  do.	  	  
What	  is	  crucial	  for	  G&K	  is	  that	  MTT	  provides	  us	  with	  more	  than	  semantic	  
knowledge	  about	  our	  future	  and	  past,	  it	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  ‘inhabit’	  the	  past	  and	  
future,	  to	  feel	  ‘personally	  connected’	  to	  those	  events	  we	  imagine	  and	  remember.	  
They	  support	  this	  claim	  with	  the	  example	  of	  patient	  M.L.,	  who	  has	  semantic	  
knowledge	  about	  his	  past	  life,	  but	  feels	  ‘subjective	  distance’	  (p.	  603,	  original	  
emphasis)	  from	  it.	  Co-­‐occurring	  with	  this	  disconnection	  of	  M.L.	  from	  his	  past	  are	  
his	  problems	  with	  acting	  responsibly.	  For	  example,	  he	  appeared	  not	  to	  recognise,	  
or	  be	  able	  to	  act	  on,	  his	  parental	  responsibilities.	  	  
It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  best	  way	  of	  accounting	  for	  this	  ‘inhabited’	  aspect	  of	  
MTT	  is	  to	  conceive	  it	  as	  a	  fundamentally	  experiential	  activity.	  Without	  an	  
experiential	  component	  it	  is	  unclear	  how	  MTT	  differs	  from	  semantic	  memory	  or	  
logical	  reasoning	  about	  the	  past	  and	  future.	  It	  is	  the	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  
experience	  involved	  in	  MTT	  that	  characterizes	  it.	  In	  chapter	  6	  we	  will	  explore	  why	  
these	  are	  jointly	  sufficient	  for	  the	  perspectival	  character	  of	  MTT,	  in	  this	  chapter	  we	  
are	  going	  to	  look	  at	  the	  contribution	  of	  emotional	  experience	  to	  MTT.	  	  
I	  hope	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  should	  see	  MTT	  as	  a	  type	  of	  narrative	  
understanding.	  Narrative	  understanding	  crucially	  involves	  emotion,	  and	  emotional	  
experiences	  result	  in	  narratives	  being	  inhabited.	  Specifically,	  narrative	  
understanding	  involves	  emotional	  cadence:	  emotional	  sequences	  that	  follow	  from	  
each	  other	  in	  a	  predictable	  and	  coherent	  way	  (Velleman,	  2003).	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  elaborate	  on	  what	  narrative	  understanding	  
is,	  why	  MTT	  is	  a	  type	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  why	  a	  lack	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  can	  explain	  the	  behavior	  of	  M.L.	  This	  chapter	  also	  proposes	  that	  the	  
ability	  to	  metarepresent	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  this	  explanation.	  	  
	  	   A	  more	  distal	  objective	  is	  to	  start	  to	  put	  together	  a	  positive	  account	  of	  the	  
role	  of	  emotions	  in	  moral	  agency.	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  explain	  why	  narrative	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understanding	  is	  important	  for	  agency,	  but	  will	  bracket	  the	  question	  of	  moral	  
agency.	  Chapter	  5	  will	  relate	  narrative	  understanding	  back	  to	  moral	  agency.	  In	  this	  
chapter	  we	  will	  also	  see	  why	  my	  account	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  poses	  
problems	  for	  Prinz.	  In	  particular,	  it	  will	  challenge	  his	  account	  that	  concepts	  and	  
emotions	  are	  fully	  independent.	  
	  	   The	  last	  objective,	  which	  runs	  throughout	  this	  chapter	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  
thesis	  is	  to	  find	  a	  place	  for	  emotions	  in	  our	  capacity	  to	  be	  subjectively	  present	  in	  
virtual	  situations.	  That	  is,	  to	  fill	  the	  gap	  that	  G&K	  introduced	  when	  they	  failed	  to	  
spell	  out	  a	  role	  for	  emotions	  in	  their	  account	  of	  agency.	  In	  doing	  this	  I	  show	  how	  
Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  emotions	  helps	  us	  explain	  why	  emotions	  do	  matter	  for	  acting	  for	  
moral	  reasons.	  	  
	  
2.	  The	  lay	  of	  the	  virtual	  land	  	  
	  
First	  it	  is	  important	  to	  get	  clear	  on	  exactly	  what	  counts	  as	  MTT.	  This	  concept	  is	  
vague	  and	  evolving,	  but	  I’ll	  be	  using	  a	  fairly	  permissive	  description	  used	  by	  
Suddendorf	  and	  Corballis	  (2007).	  This	  account	  of	  MTT	  is	  important	  for	  the	  claim	  
that	  to	  explain	  the	  importance	  of	  MTT	  to	  moral	  agency,	  what	  we	  are	  actually	  doing	  
is	  explaining	  why	  our	  narrative	  abilities	  are	  crucial	  to	  moral	  agency.	  	  	  
Suddendorf	  and	  Corballis	  suggest	  that	  mental	  time	  travel	  refers	  “to	  the	  
faculty	  that	  allows	  humans	  to	  mentally	  project	  themselves	  backwards	  in	  time	  to	  
re-­‐live,	  or	  forwards	  in	  time	  to	  pre-­‐live,	  events”	  (p.	  299).	  	  MTT	  is	  understood	  to	  
depend	  on	  the	  episodic	  memory	  system,	  which	  is	  involved	  in	  false,	  and	  not	  just	  
veridical,	  memory.	  So,	  the	  dependence	  of	  MTT	  on	  episodic	  memory	  means	  that	  
MTT	  need	  not	  be	  defined	  by	  whether	  the	  episode	  is	  veridical.	  Instead	  it	  can	  be	  
defined	  by	  whether	  our	  mental	  travelling	  involves	  the	  phenomenological	  
experience	  of	  ourself	  travelling	  to	  a	  different	  time	  or	  place	  (or,	  at	  least	  some	  sense	  
in	  which	  we	  feel	  that	  we	  are	  travelling	  even	  if	  there	  is	  also	  a	  sense	  of	  knowing	  that	  
we	  are	  in	  fact	  here	  and	  now).	  	  The	  character	  of	  this	  phenomenology	  will	  be	  
expanded	  on	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  chapter	  6.	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This	  account	  of	  MTT	  suits	  my	  purposes	  here,	  because	  it	  focuses	  on	  what	  is	  
common	  to	  both	  memory	  and	  imagination,	  and	  my	  claim	  about	  the	  role	  of	  memory	  
and	  imagination	  in	  moral	  agency	  also	  focuses	  on	  what	  they	  hold	  in	  common.	  Both	  
participate	  in	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  concerning	  who	  one	  is	  and	  what	  would	  
make	  sense	  for	  one	  to	  do.	  Remembering	  my	  past	  is	  not	  just	  about	  making	  sense	  of	  
it,	  but	  making	  sense	  of	  myself,	  which	  is	  used	  to	  decide	  what	  I	  should	  do	  in	  the	  
future.	  Imagining	  the	  future,	  too,	  can	  be	  used	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  person	  
one	  is,	  for	  example,	  by	  registering	  one’s	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  the	  imagined	  
events.	  	  
So	  it	  is	  precisely	  what	  imagination	  and	  memory	  share	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  to	  
me	  here:	  MTT	  is	  important	  as	  an	  ability	  that	  allows	  one	  to	  understand	  oneself,	  and	  
learning	  about	  ourselves	  directs	  our	  actions,	  and	  hence	  our	  future.	  Non-­‐veridical	  
MTT	  concerning	  the	  past	  can	  perform	  this	  function.	  As	  explained	  later,	  because	  
what	  is	  important	  in	  MTT	  is	  that	  the	  emotional	  cadence	  expresses	  something	  of	  
what	  we	  value,	  the	  veridicality	  of	  the	  memory	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  matter.	  	  
What	  follows	  from	  this	  is	  that	  even	  in	  cases	  where	  we	  (re)construct	  our	  
past	  from	  information	  we	  learn	  through	  others	  or	  our	  environment,	  we	  may	  be	  
said	  to	  be	  mentally	  travelling,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  has	  the	  right	  phenomenology.	  So,	  
Samina,	  a	  person	  with	  amnesia	  who	  looks	  at	  childhood	  photos	  of	  herself	  and	  
listens	  to	  her	  parents	  recount	  her	  childhood	  adventures,	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  
mentally	  time	  travelling	  if	  she	  uses	  this	  information	  to	  ‘inhabit’	  a	  past	  where	  these	  
things	  happen.	  	  
A	  problem	  might	  occur	  if	  we	  notice	  that	  Samina	  can	  also	  inhabit	  a	  childhood	  
that	  has	  no	  factual	  bases.	  Note	  that,	  while	  I	  will	  later	  relate	  narrative	  
understanding,	  and	  mental	  time	  travel,	  to	  agency,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  veridical,	  a	  
constraint	  can	  be	  added.	  I	  am	  committed	  to	  both	  narrative	  understanding	  about	  
fictional	  events	  and	  non-­‐veridical	  mental	  time	  travel	  being	  informative	  through	  
what	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  our	  values,	  see	  chapter	  5.	  So,	  for	  example,	  
I	  may	  learn	  something	  about	  the	  world	  and	  what	  I	  value	  if	  I	  imagine	  myself	  as	  
Stalin,	  or	  imagine	  that	  I	  had	  an	  impoverished	  childhood	  when	  I	  didn’t.	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  
may	  learn	  something,	  in	  particular	  how	  I	  feel	  and	  so	  what	  matters	  to	  me,	  through	  
how	  I	  experience	  narratives.	  However,	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  requirement	  that	  if	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we	  are	  relying	  on	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  or	  MTT	  to	  provide	  us	  with	  factual	  
understanding,	  then	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  relatively	  accurate	  (see	  Schechtman,	  2007).	  So,	  
for	  example,	  a	  false	  belief	  that	  we	  are	  in	  Soviet	  Russia,	  based	  on	  a	  false	  memory,	  
would	  impede	  my	  current	  decision-­‐making.	  My	  account	  need	  not	  be	  committed	  to	  
claiming	  that	  an	  inaccurate	  experiential	  autobiography,	  that	  is	  taken	  as	  factually	  
accurate,	  is	  conducive	  to	  agency.	  	  	  	  
Another	  problem	  that	  arises	  is	  that	  while	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  conceptualise	  
that	  a	  person	  with	  amnesia	  is	  able	  to	  mentally	  time	  travel,	  this	  may	  only	  be	  
because	  we	  haven’t	  taken	  into	  consideration	  what	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  intimate	  link	  
between	  MTT	  and	  episodic	  memory	  (e.g.	  as	  noted	  by	  G&K,	  2010	  and	  Suddendorf	  &	  
Corballis,	  2007).	  It	  seems	  plausible	  that	  we	  need	  a	  system	  that	  can	  record	  past	  
experiences	  so	  that	  we	  can	  entertain	  and	  inhabit	  counter-­‐factual	  possibilities	  of	  
what	  could	  have	  happened,	  or	  might	  happen.	  That	  is,	  the	  neurological	  realizers	  of	  
fictional	  MTT	  may	  be	  the	  same	  as,	  or	  overlap	  with,	  the	  neurological	  realizers	  of	  
actual	  remembered	  experience.	  If	  that	  is	  so,	  then	  my	  example	  of	  Samina	  could	  be	  
leading	  us	  to	  wrong	  conclusions:	  people	  who	  have	  amnesia	  due	  to	  the	  obliteration	  
of	  their	  episodic	  memory	  systems	  may	  find	  it	  impossible	  to	  mentally	  time	  travel.	  
To	  accommodate	  this,	  I	  note	  that	  amnesia	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  affair.	  A	  person	  
can	  have	  gaps	  in	  their	  memory	  without	  having	  lost	  all	  their	  ability	  to	  re-­‐experience	  
the	  past.	  Not	  only	  can	  one	  have	  blackout	  due	  to	  the	  heavy	  consumption	  of	  alcohol	  
and	  other	  narcotics,	  but	  one	  can	  have	  selective	  loss	  of	  memory	  in	  both	  anterograde	  
and	  retrograde	  amnesia.	  In	  anterograde	  amnesia,	  people	  lose	  the	  ability	  to	  lay	  
down	  new	  memories	  after	  a	  brain	  injury,	  but	  have	  memories	  from	  prior	  to	  their	  
injury.	  In	  retrograde	  amnesia,	  where	  people	  lose	  access	  to	  their	  past	  prior	  to	  their	  
brain	  injury,	  it	  is	  often	  only	  access	  to	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  past	  that	  are	  lost.	  In	  all	  
these	  cases,	  some	  memory	  is	  lost,	  while	  the	  capacity	  for	  backward	  time	  travel	  may	  
be	  retained.	  Finally,	  considering	  that	  it	  appears	  that	  imagination	  and	  memory	  are	  
closely	  interlinked	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  some	  preservation	  of	  the	  
neurological	  realisers	  of	  the	  episodic	  memory	  system	  will	  generally	  co-­‐occur	  with	  
preservation	  of	  imagination.	  	  So,	  while	  it	  seems	  right	  that	  a	  particular	  episode	  of	  
past-­‐directed	  MTT	  need	  not	  be	  a	  memory	  to	  count	  as	  MTT,	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  
MTT	  being	  enabled	  by	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  episodic	  memory	  system.	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With	  this	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  still	  define	  MTT	  as	  our	  ability	  to	  imagine	  and	  
experience	  our	  past	  and	  future,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  imagining	  and	  
experiencing	  of	  the	  past	  is	  directly	  caused	  by	  our	  past	  experience.	  	  
	  
I	  aim	  to	  explain	  MTT	  through	  our	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  understanding.	  MTT,	  here,	  
differs	  from	  narrative	  understanding	  in	  that	  it	  is	  to	  do	  with	  our	  personal	  histories	  
and	  plans.	  Narrative	  understanding,	  in	  contrast,	  is	  more	  general,	  in	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
sense	  in	  which	  it	  may	  not	  involve	  us.	  While	  we	  are	  always	  prereflectively	  present	  
when	  we	  understand	  something	  narratively,	  the	  sequence	  of	  events	  may	  be	  
nothing	  to	  do	  with	  our	  daily	  lives.	  Think	  about	  being	  immersed	  in	  a	  novel.	  In	  a	  
novel	  you	  are	  directed	  towards	  characters	  and	  events	  that	  you	  have	  neither	  
encountered	  nor	  believe	  you	  ever	  will.	  MTT,	  I	  hope	  to	  show,	  involves	  a	  type	  of	  
narrative	  understanding:	  it	  is	  understanding	  a	  narrative	  about	  you	  or	  your	  life.	  	  
	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  will	  develop	  the	  view	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  
incorporates	  an	  emotional	  cadence.	  I	  argue	  that	  emotional	  cadence	  is	  a	  crucial	  
constituent	  of	  having	  a	  perspective	  on	  events	  that	  aren’t	  currently	  before	  us.	  
Narrative	  understanding	  on	  this	  account	  involves	  being	  able	  to	  understand	  
narratives	  through	  having	  an	  embodied	  and	  evaluative	  perspective	  on	  a	  sequence	  
of	  events.	  	  
	  
My	  view	  therefore	  contrasts	  with	  that	  of	  G&K	  who	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  MTT,	  rather	  than	  
narrative	  understanding,	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  agency.	  G&K	  use	  Bratman,	  Velleman	  
&	  Korsgaard	  to	  build	  their	  view	  of	  moral	  agency,	  all	  of	  whom,	  at	  least	  sometimes,	  
make	  our	  explicit	  understanding	  of	  our	  selves	  crucial	  to	  agency	  (e.g.	  Bratman,	  
2000,	  Korsgaard,	  2006,	  &	  Velleman,	  1992).	  G&K	  take	  their	  account	  to	  be	  consistent	  
with	  Bratman’s	  account	  of	  agency,	  where	  we	  are	  agents	  because	  “we	  conceive	  of	  
ourselves	  as	  agents	  who	  persist	  over	  time	  and	  so	  we	  construct	  and	  commit	  
ourselves	  to	  future	  directed	  plans”	  (2010,	  p.	  601).	  G&K,	  like	  Bratman,	  make	  our	  
understanding	  of	  our	  selves	  as	  psychological	  beings	  that	  exist	  through	  time,	  a	  part	  
of	  their	  explanation	  for	  agency.	  G&K	  think	  that	  we	  use	  MTT	  to	  increase	  our	  self-­‐
knowledge:	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Planning	  requires	  a	  capacity	  to	  imaginatively	  project	  oneself	  into	  the	  
future;	  this	  in	  turn	  requires	  both	  a	  sense	  of	  oneself	  as	  the	  very	  same	  
individual	  who	  will	  inhabit	  that	  future	  (autonoetic	  awareness),	  and	  also	  
the	  kind	  of	  detailed	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  is	  supported	  by	  autobiographical	  
memory.	  (ibid.)	  
	  
For	  G&K,	  our	  knowledge	  of	  our	  particular	  histories	  and	  particular	  projects	  
and	  goals	  is	  needed	  to	  inform	  our	  plans.	  	  
G&K	  use	  patient	  M.L.	  as	  an	  example	  of	  how	  agency	  is	  impaired	  when	  MTT	  is	  
impaired.	  Patient	  M.L.	  has	  damage	  to	  his	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC),	  
which	  co-­‐occurs	  with	  his	  problems	  with	  MTT.	  M.L.	  could	  only	  recognise	  whether	  
events	  were	  from	  his	  past	  by	  his	  sense	  of	  familiarity	  with	  them.	  He	  was	  unable	  to	  
re-­‐experience	  them	  and	  felt	  subjectively	  distant	  from	  them.	  	  These	  problems	  with	  
MTT	  appear	  to	  explain	  his	  poor	  decision-­‐making	  capacity	  and	  irresponsible	  
behaviour,	  which	  led	  him	  to	  require	  supervision.	  G&K	  take	  this	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  MTT	  
is	  necessary	  for	  moral	  agency.	  So	  G&K	  build	  a	  theory	  of	  agency	  where	  imagining	  
our	  own	  lives	  is	  central,	  through	  combining	  philosophical	  theories	  with	  lesion	  
studies.	  While	  they	  bring	  important	  philosophical	  theories	  and	  evidence	  to	  the	  
debate,	  I	  reconsider	  what	  aspects	  of	  these	  contributions	  are	  relevant	  to	  agency.	  	  
	  
I	  now	  turn	  to	  narrative	  understanding.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  starting	  point	  that	  I	  motivate	  
the	  view	  that	  emotions,	  as	  embodied	  appraisals,	  are	  important	  for	  the	  perspectival	  
quality	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  hence	  MTT	  too.	  	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  Embodied	  narrative	  understanding	  
	  	  
	   3.1.	  Velleman’s	  emotional	  narratives	  
We	  saw	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  that	  G&K	  want	  to	  include	  emotional	  processes	  as	  one	  
important	  factor	  in	  moral	  agency.	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  emotions	  play	  a	  role	  in	  
agency	  because	  they	  are	  constitutive	  of	  narrative	  understanding.	  But	  why	  would	  
one	  think	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  involves	  emotion?	  Velleman	  (2003)	  starts	  
motivating	  this	  proposal	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  narrative	  explanations	  imbue	  us	  with	  a	  
special	  type	  of	  understanding.	  Think	  about	  the	  function	  of	  fables.	  When	  we	  hear	  a	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fable,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  get	  a	  certain	  grasp	  on	  this	  world.	  It	  doesn’t	  seem	  that	  the	  
narrative	  structure	  of	  the	  fable	  is	  redundant	  to	  the	  explanation;	  we	  don’t	  think	  a	  
paragraph	  explaining	  the	  moral	  of	  the	  fable	  provides	  us	  with	  the	  same	  
understanding	  as	  actually	  hearing	  a	  fable.	  With	  narratives	  in	  general,	  it	  seems	  that	  
we	  gain	  something	  more	  from	  them	  than	  we	  would	  if	  those	  narratives	  were	  recast	  
in	  a	  non-­‐narrative	  form.	  	  
	   But	  why	  should	  this	  be?	  What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  dry	  description	  
and	  a	  juicy	  narrative?	  Velleman	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  discover	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
narrative	  contributes	  to	  understanding	  by	  giving	  an	  account	  of	  how	  a	  description	  
of	  events	  becomes	  a	  narrative.	  The	  key	  difference,	  he	  suggests,	  is	  that	  a	  narrative	  is	  
able	  to	  initiate	  and	  resolve	  a	  flow	  of	  emotions	  in	  its	  audience.	  	  So,	  it	  is	  the	  capacity	  
of	  a	  narrative	  to	  “initiate	  and	  resolve	  an	  emotional	  cadence”	  (2003,	  p.	  18)	  that	  
enables	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  to	  engender	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  understanding.	  	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  remembering	  that	  I	  will	  be	  using	  the	  term	  ‘narrative	  
understanding’	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  mode	  of	  engagement,	  so	  that	  understanding	  something	  
narratively	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  the	  events	  being	  understood	  and	  the	  agent’s	  
mode	  of	  engagement	  with	  those	  events.	  Narratives	  are	  the	  object	  of	  such	  
engagement.	  	  	  
	   Velleman	  goes	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  emotional	  cadence	  is	  necessary	  to	  explain	  a	  
crucial	  feature	  that	  narratives	  enable:	  that	  they	  have	  plots	  with	  a	  beginning,	  
middle	  and	  end.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  
beginning,	  middle	  and	  end.	  A	  purely	  descriptive	  account	  of	  history,	  for	  example,	  
has	  no	  non-­‐arbitrary	  place	  to	  start	  or	  end.	  	  By	  contrast,	  an	  emotional	  arc,	  which	  
follows	  a	  familiar	  pattern	  of	  feeling,	  is	  responsible	  for	  understanding	  a	  plot.	  So	  it	  is	  
through	  the	  natural	  cadence	  of	  emotions	  we	  can	  experience	  a	  sequence	  as	  having	  a	  
beginning,	  middle	  and	  end.	  	  
	   Emotions	  wax,	  wane	  and	  generally	  transform	  in	  a	  predictable	  way	  in	  life,	  
and	  these	  patterns	  are	  stored	  in	  	  “experiential,	  proprioceptive	  and	  kinaesthetic	  
memory”	  (2003,	  p.	  19).	  So	  in	  narrative,	  the	  flux	  of	  emotions	  we	  have	  in	  life	  is	  
simulated.	  
	   We	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  if	  we	  recall	  the	  theory	  of	  emotion	  we	  have	  
borrowed	  from	  Prinz,	  that	  they	  are	  embodied	  appraisals.	  When	  we	  feel	  an	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emotion,	  what	  we	  are	  experiencing	  is	  an	  embodied	  sense	  of	  our	  situation.	  Further,	  
such	  a	  sense	  contains	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  actions	  are	  possible.	  So,	  emotions	  come	  with	  
a	  kind	  of	  coupling	  to	  our	  environment,	  because	  they	  are	  part	  of	  how	  we	  
understand	  our	  environment	  and	  systematically	  alter	  the	  ways	  we	  interact	  with	  it.	  
If	  we	  take	  the	  world	  to	  behave	  somewhat	  predictably,	  then	  we	  can	  see	  how	  such	  
embodied	  cadence	  arises	  in	  life:	  there	  is	  a	  reciprocity	  between	  our	  emotions	  and	  
our	  situation,	  such	  that	  we	  (semi)	  systematically	  react	  to	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  world	  
systematically	  pushes	  back	  on	  us,	  which	  in	  turn	  (semi)	  systematically	  impacts	  us,	  
and	  so	  on.	  	  	  
	   Importantly,	  as	  Velleman	  observes,	  some	  emotions	  will	  typically	  initiate	  
narrative	  sequences	  and	  some	  generally	  provide	  resolution.	  Grief	  “can	  resolve	  an	  
emotion	  sequence	  but	  rarely	  initiates	  one”,	  while	  fear	  “can	  initiate	  or	  continue	  an	  
emotional	  sequence	  but	  it	  cannot	  resolve	  one”.	  Emotions	  can	  also	  “register	  the	  
impact	  of	  a	  prior	  emotion”	  (2003,	  p.	  15).	  We	  feel	  grief	  if	  we	  have	  lost	  someone	  or	  
something	  that	  we	  love.	  	  	  
	   Consider	  the	  fable	  of	  the	  fox	  who	  loses	  his	  tail:	  
	  
It	  happened	  that	  a	  Fox	  caught	  its	  tail	  in	  a	  trap,	  and	  in	  struggling	  to	  release	  
himself	  lost	  all	  of	  it	  but	  the	  stump.	  At	  first	  he	  was	  ashamed	  to	  show	  himself	  
among	  his	  fellow	  foxes.	  But	  at	  last	  he	  determined	  to	  put	  a	  bolder	  face	  upon	  
his	  misfortune,	  and	  summoned	  all	  the	  foxes	  to	  a	  general	  meeting	  to	  consider	  
a	  proposal	  which	  he	  had	  to	  place	  before	  them.	  When	  they	  had	  assembled	  
together	  the	  Fox	  proposed	  that	  they	  should	  all	  do	  away	  with	  their	  tails.	  He	  
pointed	  out	  how	  inconvenient	  a	  tail	  was	  when	  they	  were	  pursued	  by	  their	  
enemies,	  the	  dogs;	  how	  much	  it	  was	  in	  the	  way	  when	  they	  desired	  to	  sit	  
down	  and	  hold	  a	  friendly	  conversation	  with	  one	  another.	  He	  failed	  to	  see	  
any	  advantage	  in	  carrying	  about	  such	  a	  useless	  encumbrance.	  "That	  is	  all	  
very	  well,"	  said	  one	  of	  the	  older	  foxes;	  "but	  I	  do	  not	  think	  you	  would	  have	  
recommended	  us	  to	  dispense	  with	  our	  chief	  ornament	  if	  you	  had	  not	  
happened	  to	  lose	  it	  yourself."	  	  -­‐-­‐-­‐	  Distrust	  interested	  advice.32	  
	  
The	  story	  opens	  with	  a	  fearful	  scene:	  an	  animal	  is	  stuck.	  This	  initiates	  an	  action	  for	  
the	  main	  character:	  struggle.	  This	  struggle	  leads	  to	  an	  emotion	  of	  shame,	  which	  the	  
audience	  is	  expected	  to	  empathise	  with.	  In	  fear	  the	  fox	  acts	  with	  haste	  and	  this	  
resulted	  with	  an	  unfavourable	  outcome	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  status.	  Similarly	  
to	  fear,	  this	  shame	  initiates	  actions	  that	  try	  to	  resolve	  this	  emotion.	  Unfortunately	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  See:	  http://www.taleswithmorals.com/aesop-­‐fable-­‐the-­‐fox-­‐without-­‐a-­‐tail.htm	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for	  the	  fox,	  this	  action	  also	  involves	  a	  type	  of	  malicious	  intent,	  which	  results	  from	  
the	  feeling	  of	  embarrassment	  from	  the	  fox’s	  perspective.	  However	  it,	  also	  a	  brings	  a	  
sense	  of	  relief	  for	  the	  audience	  as	  the	  sharp	  minds	  of	  the	  older	  foxes	  allows	  the	  
audience’s	  apprehension,	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  cunning	  fox	  tricking	  
others,	  to	  subside.	  This	  apprehension	  points	  both	  backwards	  at	  information	  the	  
audience	  has	  previous	  learned	  but	  the	  old	  foxes	  aren’t	  aware	  of,	  and	  forward,	  
towards	  the	  possibility	  of	  unpleasant	  consequences.	  The	  tension	  caused	  by	  
dramatic	  irony,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  absurdity	  of	  foolish	  fox’s	  behavior,	  also	  
evokes	  amusement	  in	  the	  audience.	  
	   Note	  that	  the	  audience	  is	  taken	  on	  an	  emotional	  journey	  both	  through	  
empathising	  with	  the	  characters	  and	  by	  taking	  on	  an	  external	  perspective33.	  The	  
story	  is	  strung	  together	  as	  one	  emotional	  journey	  because	  each	  emotion	  leads	  to	  an	  
outcome	  and	  an	  emotion	  that	  is	  partially	  determined	  by	  the	  past	  emotion:	  fear	  
causes	  hasty	  action	  that	  leads	  to	  embarrassing	  or	  shameful	  feelings	  which	  leads	  to	  
further	  hasty	  action	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  these	  feelings.	  	  
	   The	  enmeshing	  of	  each	  emotion	  with	  the	  events	  and	  emotions	  that	  came	  
before	  it	  and	  follow	  it,	  allows	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  to	  be	  coherent	  through	  
time.	  This	  coherence	  is	  felt	  as	  an	  embodied	  emotional	  journey.	  	  
	   Here	  Velleman	  relies	  on	  DeLancey’s	  (2002)	  version	  of	  an	  affect	  program	  
theory.	  This	  theory	  suggests	  that	  psychologists	  and	  philosophers	  should	  delineate	  
emotions	  by:	  	  
1. The	  type	  of	  circumstance	  that	  triggers	  them;	  
2. The	  physiological	  changes	  that	  follow	  the	  trigger;	  
3. How	  they	  dispose	  us	  to	  behave;	  
4. What	  conditions	  lead	  them	  to	  decrease	  in	  intensity,	  and	  the	  thoughts	  that	  
they	  tend	  to	  result	  in.	  
Velleman’s	  suggestion	  then	  is	  that	  we	  understand	  narratives	  when	  our	  
engagement	  with	  a	  series	  of	  events	  allows	  us	  to	  cycle	  from	  steps	  1	  to	  4	  in	  a	  
predictable	  way.	  By	  stage	  4,	  we	  are	  also	  back	  to	  stage	  1	  of	  another	  emotion.	  And	  
since	  emotions	  involve	  physiological	  changes,	  when	  narratives	  take	  us	  through	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Goldie	  calls	  this	  slipping	  between	  perspectives	  ‘free	  indirect	  flow’.	  I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  
concept	  later.	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predictable	  patterns	  of	  emotion,	  the	  narrative	  makes	  sense	  to	  us	  experientially.	  
Narratives	  get	  under	  our	  skin,	  and	  we	  understand	  them	  in	  our	  bones34.	  	  	   	  
	   While	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  defend	  the	  notion	  of	  affect	  programs	  in	  it	  standard	  
use35,	  there	  are	  ways	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  and	  reconfigure	  the	  characteristics	  above	  in	  
relations	  to	  understanding	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisals.	  Embodied	  
appraisals,	  as	  containing	  both	  action	  affordances	  and	  being	  part	  of	  our	  perception	  
of	  events,	  are	  characterised	  by	  what	  the	  affect	  program	  theory	  understands	  as	  
stages.	  Step	  1	  is	  an	  explanation	  for	  how	  embodied	  appraisals	  come	  about:	  through	  
the	  registering	  of	  a	  situation.	  Step	  2	  &	  3	  is	  exactly	  what	  is	  embodied	  about	  
embodied	  explanations,	  although	  we	  do	  not	  see	  these	  as	  discrete	  steps,	  on	  an	  
embodied	  appraisal	  theory,	  but	  as	  two	  aspects	  of	  the	  same	  phenomena.	  Step	  4	  
seems	  a	  reasonable	  inference	  if	  we	  take	  emotions	  to	  be	  embodied	  appraisals,	  that	  
is,	  actually	  saying	  something	  about	  what	  our	  situation	  is.	  On	  this	  interpretation,	  if	  
our	  situation	  changes,	  then	  our	  emotions	  change.	  And,	  just	  like	  we	  take	  our	  senses	  
to	  influence	  (or	  be	  integrated)	  with	  what	  we	  think,	  because	  we	  think	  they	  have	  
some	  epistemic	  value,	  so,	  if	  emotions	  have	  some	  epistemic	  value,	  we	  should	  take	  it	  
that	  they	  will	  influence	  (or	  be	  integrated)	  with	  what	  we	  think.	  	  
	   Combined	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  such	  embodied	  appraisals	  also	  
involve	  action	  affordances,	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  why	  a	  theory	  of	  embodied	  
appraisals	  implies	  the	  existence	  of	  emotional	  cadence.	  Our	  environment	  and	  
emotions	  are	  coupled	  together	  through	  our	  actions	  varying	  somewhat	  predictably	  
based	  on	  our	  emotions,	  and	  our	  situation	  varying	  somewhat	  predictably	  with	  our	  
actions.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  get	  the	  cycling	  through	  the	  steps	  that	  I	  mentioned	  
above.	  Step	  3	  and	  4	  contribute,	  in	  combination	  with	  a	  semi-­‐predictable	  
environment,	  to	  what	  emotion	  we	  feel	  next.	  
Velleman	  also	  thinks	  that	  the	  involvement	  of	  emotions	  in	  narrative	  
understanding	  explains	  why	  narrative	  understanding	  involves	  a	  unique	  grasp	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Strictly	  speaking,	  narratives	  are	  not	  understood	  in	  our	  bones.	  If	  they	  are	  understood	  
emotionally,	  and	  we	  have	  an	  embodied	  account	  of	  emotion,	  then	  they	  are	  understood	  
through	  sensing	  our	  organs,	  the	  rhythm	  of	  our	  breath,	  the	  position	  of	  our	  muscles	  and	  
joints,	  and	  the	  accompanying	  feeling	  of	  comfort	  and	  discomfort	  (Barrett	  &	  Bar,	  2009).	  	  
35	  See	  review	  of	  the	  idea	  by	  Colombetti	  (2014)	  who	  critiques	  the	  idea	  that	  emotions	  are	  
hard-­‐wired	  in	  the	  way	  suggested	  by	  proponents	  of	  affect	  program	  theories.	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events	  as	  a	  coherent	  whole.	  That	  is,	  the	  emotion	  we	  are	  left	  with	  at	  a	  story’s	  end	  
expresses	  a	  stance	  on	  the	  story	  in	  its	  entirety.	  Because	  the	  emotional	  resolution	  of	  
a	  story	  often	  points	  back,	  and	  subsumes,	  the	  previous	  emotions,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  
sense	  of	  what	  the	  story	  means	  for	  us.	  	  
	   For	  example,	  in	  the	  fable	  of	  the	  fox	  that	  loses	  their	  tail,	  we	  may	  be	  left	  with	  
at	  least	  two	  emotions:	  empathy	  with	  the	  embarrassed	  fox	  and	  relief	  that	  no-­‐one	  
got	  tricked.	  This	  gives	  us	  a	  stance	  on	  the	  story	  that	  is,	  unsurprisingly	  for	  a	  fable,	  an	  
understanding	  of	  an	  important	  life	  lesson.	  For	  it	  tells	  us	  that	  we	  will	  be	  shamed	  for	  
acting	  like	  the	  naughty	  fox,	  but	  also	  teaches	  us	  the	  value	  of	  being	  shrewd	  in	  
assessing	  whom	  to	  believe.	  	  
	   Plot	  and	  coherence	  are	  therefore	  put	  forth	  as	  characteristics	  that	  allow	  us	  
to	  understand	  narratives	  in	  a	  different	  way	  to	  just	  a	  description	  of	  a	  chain	  of	  
events.	  Our	  emotional	  engagement	  explains	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  narrative	  to	  have	  
these	  defining	  features.	  	  
We	  may	  object	  that	  a	  description	  of	  a	  causally-­‐connected	  sequence	  of	  
events	  can	  be	  coherent	  via	  its	  inferential	  commitments	  and	  connotations.	  What	  is	  
important	  to	  remember	  is	  that	  Velleman	  is	  explaining	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  a	  story	  
has	  coherence	  that	  cannot	  be	  translated	  to	  description.	  So,	  while	  understanding	  
pure	  text	  may	  involve	  understanding	  coherences	  in	  some	  ways,	  
Velleman	  is	  trying	  to	  explain	  the	  coherence	  peculiar	  to	  narrative	  understanding.	  
	   It	  doesn’t	  seem	  true,	  though,	  that	  all	  the	  narratives	  we	  engage	  with	  are	  fully	  
coherent,	  with	  a	  nice	  beginning,	  middle	  and	  end.	  Velleman’s	  response	  to	  this	  is	  that	  
some	  of	  the	  things	  we	  think	  of	  as	  narratives:	  novels,	  oral	  story-­‐telling,	  film	  etc.,	  
may	  employ	  narrative	  as	  part	  of	  their	  tools,	  but	  are	  not	  always	  reducible	  to	  
narrative.	  Velleman	  argues	  that	  we	  if	  read	  a	  book	  that	  leaves	  us	  hanging,	  is	  firmly	  
irresolute,	  then	  that	  is	  because	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  employing	  narrative	  techniques.	  
Nonetheless,	  we	  could	  make	  a	  couple	  of	  other	  responses	  to	  this	  observation.	  One	  is	  
that	  narrative	  understanding	  consists	  of	  the	  knitting	  together	  of	  emotions	  so	  that,	  
in	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  a	  story,	  each	  emotion	  develops	  from	  the	  preceding	  
one	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  familiar	  to	  us.	  This	  loosens	  the	  need	  for	  the	  final	  emotion	  in	  a	  
story	  to	  resolve	  the	  previous	  emotions.	  Additionally,	  artistic	  narratives	  may	  
diverge	  from	  some	  of	  the	  structural	  regularities	  in	  our	  everyday	  narratives.	  This	  is	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similar	  to	  another	  suggestion	  Velleman	  makes:	  artistic	  narratives	  often	  toy	  with	  
the	  usual	  way	  that	  we	  would	  understand	  events	  narratively	  to	  create	  discordance.	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  narratives	  are	  those	  things	  we	  
listen	  to,	  watch,	  read,	  it	  should	  be	  remembered	  that	  ‘narrative	  understanding’	  is	  a	  
much	  broader	  category,	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  what	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  explain.	  Narratives,	  
in	  the	  sense	  of	  those	  things	  delivered	  by	  others	  in	  prose,	  pictures,	  or	  on	  screen,	  are	  
good	  at	  engendering	  narrative	  understanding	  in	  us	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  techniques	  
used.	  Narrative	  understanding	  remains	  the	  focus:	  that	  special	  way	  of	  
apprehending	  a	  string	  of	  events	  emotionally.	  	  
	  
Velleman	  makes	  a	  convincing	  case	  that	  emotions	  are	  one	  way	  our	  understanding	  
of	  a	  description	  of	  events	  becomes	  narrative,	  although	  some	  might	  not	  think	  he	  has	  
done	  enough	  to	  show	  emotions	  are	  necessary	  for	  narrative	  understanding.	  I	  want	  
to	  set	  the	  necessity	  claim	  aside	  in	  lieu	  of	  an	  alternative	  process	  that	  explains	  the	  
existence	  of	  plot	  and	  a	  unique	  of	  sense	  of	  coherence	  gained	  through	  narrative	  
understanding.	  	  
It	  is	  evident	  that	  an	  embodied,	  affective	  component	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  allows	  one	  to	  explain	  the	  features	  of	  narrative	  that	  Velleman	  is	  
interested	  in.	  Without	  a	  perspective	  embedded	  (as-­‐if)	  in	  a	  string	  of	  events36,	  we	  do	  
not	  have	  beginnings	  and	  ends.	  Beginnings	  and	  ends	  are	  not	  inherent	  to	  chains	  of	  
events,	  because	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  why	  any	  particular	  part	  of	  a	  chain	  is	  a	  start	  of	  
something	  or	  its	  conclusion.	  Devoid	  of	  a	  point	  of	  view	  from	  somewhere,	  any	  point	  
preceding	  or	  following	  would	  do	  equally	  well.	  Similarly,	  Velleman	  makes	  a	  
compelling	  case	  that	  emotion	  is	  one	  means	  for	  providing	  coherence,	  both	  for	  the	  
narrative	  moving	  along	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  sense	  and	  for	  the	  holistic	  
understanding	  one	  associates	  with	  narrative.	  	  
However,	  as	  will	  become	  clear	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  Velleman’s	  theory	  of	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  also	  compelling	  because	  it	  fits	  together	  with,	  and	  makes	  
sense	  of,	  many	  theories	  of	  (moral)	  agency.	  Furthermore,	  in	  this	  chapter	  and	  
chapter	  5,	  we	  will	  be	  presented	  with	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  support	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  point	  about	  having	  a	  perspective	  in	  a	  string	  of	  events	  when	  
discussing	  Goldie’s	  view	  of	  narrative.	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the	  claim	  that	  affect	  is	  one	  crucial	  constituent	  in	  having	  a	  perspective	  on	  past,	  
actual	  and	  fictional	  sequences	  of	  events.	  	  
	   So,	  while	  leaving	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  we	  can	  explain	  plot	  and	  
coherence	  in	  narratives	  by	  means	  other	  than	  emotion,	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  paper,	  
when	  I	  refer	  to	  ‘narrative	  understanding’,	  I	  mean	  the	  type	  of	  understanding	  that	  
involves	  emotional	  cadence.	  	  
	  
3.2.	  Emotions	  as	  perspective	  in	  narrative	  
Velleman’s	  enterprise	  starts	  with	  the	  realisation	  that	  narratives	  have	  a	  certain	  type	  
of	  meaning	  for	  us.	  He	  analyses	  this	  special	  type	  of	  meaning	  by	  the	  way	  that	  
narratives	  embed	  us	  within	  the	  situations	  they	  describe.	  Velleman	  describes	  
narratives	  as	  meaningful	  to	  us	  because	  the	  affect	  programmes	  they	  trigger	  allow	  us	  
to	  inhabit	  stories	  viscerally	  and	  kinaesthetically.	  That	  is	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  
‘narrative	  understanding’.	  I	  think	  this	  interlocks	  with	  an	  observation	  made	  by	  
Goldie,	  and	  a	  claim	  I	  want	  to	  make	  about	  the	  embodied	  perspectival	  nature	  of	  
narrative	  understanding.	  	  
	  
Goldie	  (2012)	  has	  claimed	  that	  a	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  understanding	  narrative	  
is	  that	  it	  involves	  a	  perspective	  or	  several	  perspectives.	  For	  him,	  an	  external	  
perspective	  is	  necessary	  for	  understanding	  a	  narrative.	  The	  “shaping,	  organising,	  
and	  colouring	  [of	  the	  narrative]	  is	  informed	  by	  something	  that	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  my	  
account	  of	  narrative:	  the	  narrator’s	  perspective	  or	  point	  of	  view	  from	  which	  the	  
events	  are	  narrated”	  (p.	  11).	  	  
The	  external	  perspective	  is	  able	  to	  provide	  “the	  three	  characteristics	  of	  
narrative:	  coherence,	  meaning,	  and	  evaluative	  and	  emotional	  import”	  (p.	  40).	  This	  
perspective	  organises	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  into	  a	  coherent	  whole,	  and	  provides	  a	  
meaningful	  interpretation	  and	  an	  evaluative	  or	  emotional	  response.	  In	  MTT	  the	  
thinker	  who	  thinks	  through	  the	  sequence	  of	  thoughts	  that	  make	  the	  narrative	  is	  
also	  the	  external	  perspective.	  	  
I	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  a	  slight	  reformulation	  of	  Goldie’s	  proposal	  is	  needed:	  
emotion	  is	  one	  form	  that	  perspective	  takes.	  As	  I	  will	  outline	  below,	  this	  is	  because	  
emotions	  are	  involved	  in	  our	  feeling	  of	  how	  we	  extend	  into	  space,	  how	  our	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situation	  bears	  on	  us,	  and	  what	  actions	  are	  available	  to	  us.	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  these	  
claims	  in	  chapter	  6.	  This	  account	  of	  emotion	  as	  a	  form	  of	  perspective	  helps	  us	  
understand	  how	  narratives	  are	  inhabited.	  That	  is,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  grasp	  more	  fully	  
how	  emotions	  can	  do	  the	  work	  within	  narrative	  understanding	  that	  Velleman	  
claims	  that	  they	  do.	  	  
When	  we	  understand	  that	  emotions	  co-­‐emerge	  with	  perspective	  we	  realise	  
that	  the	  characteristics	  Goldie	  identifies	  with	  narrative	  understanding	  are	  
interdependent.	  We	  should	  not	  think	  that	  perspective	  is	  the	  cause	  of	  coherence,	  
meaning	  and	  evaluative	  and	  emotional	  import.	  Rather,	  being	  a	  creature	  for	  which	  
there	  is	  coherence,	  meaning,	  and	  evaluative	  and	  emotional	  import	  is	  part	  of	  what	  it	  
means	  to	  be	  a	  creature	  with	  a	  perspective.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  argument	  against	  Goldie,	  
but	  a	  proposal	  of	  the	  most	  insightful	  way	  to	  understand	  his	  account.	  At	  the	  least,	  it	  
is	  a	  good	  way	  of	  summarising	  mine.	  My	  proposal	  for	  what	  moral	  agency	  consists	  in	  
includes	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  I	  think	  perspective	  and	  emotion	  co-­‐emerge,	  and	  
an	  explanation	  of	  why	  the	  ability	  to	  understand	  events	  as	  meaningful	  wholes	  is	  
constitutive	  of	  being	  a	  creature	  for	  which	  there	  is	  a	  moral	  outlook.	  	  
	  
In	  agreement	  with	  Velleman,	  I	  think	  the	  best	  way	  to	  talk	  of	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  as	  placing	  a	  person	  within	  a	  chain	  of	  events.	  While	  
Velleman	  does	  a	  good	  job	  of	  highlighting	  the	  way	  that	  emotions	  bring	  a	  particular	  
type	  of	  temporal	  continuity	  to	  a	  story,	  he	  also	  touches	  on	  something	  I	  expand	  on	  
below:	  that	  emotions	  not	  only	  allow	  us	  to	  live	  through	  a	  story	  temporally,	  but	  can	  
place	  us	  within	  the	  scenes	  of	  a	  story.	  This	  is	  also	  what	  Goldie	  is	  getting	  at	  through	  
his	  explanation	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  as	  perspectival.	  Words,	  I	  suggest,	  bring	  
an	  imagined	  world	  before	  us	  by	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  pattern	  of	  physiological	  responses.	  
This	  point	  depends	  on	  a	  particular	  theory	  of	  emotions,	  that	  they	  are	  ‘embodied	  
appraisals’,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  embodied	  character	  of	  emotions	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  
explain	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  involves	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  inhabiting	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counterfactual	  scenarios.	  I	  will	  be	  assuming	  this	  theory	  of	  emotions	  throughout	  
this	  chapter	  and	  beyond37.	  
If	  emotions	  are	  ‘embodied	  appraisals’	  (Prinz,	  2004)	  then	  they	  express	  a	  
sense	  of	  one’s	  situation,	  what	  matters	  to	  oneself	  in	  that	  situation,	  and	  a	  range	  or	  
affordances.	  These	  characteristics	  of	  emotions	  situate	  a	  creature.	  
Although	  the	  particular	  term	  ‘embodied	  appraisal’	  refers	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  
emotion	  by	  Jesse	  Prinz,	  a	  similar	  idea	  has	  been	  expressed	  by	  others	  (Ahmed,	  2004;	  
Colombetti,	  2014;	  Ratcliffe,	  2005).	  Emotions,	  in	  these	  theories,	  are	  simultaneously	  
physiological	  changes	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  the	  world	  is	  for	  an	  organism.	  Further,	  
Prinz	  (2004)	  names	  these	  physiological	  changes	  ‘signals’	  to	  indicate	  that	  they	  
function	  both	  as	  a	  perception	  of	  how	  one	  is	  related	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  as	  
action	  tendencies.	  So,	  feeling	  excited	  when	  I	  see	  a	  piece	  of	  chocolate	  is	  both	  a	  
perception	  that	  I	  am	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  something	  that,	  if	  I	  can	  get	  access	  to	  it,	  
would	  be	  beneficial,	  and	  it	  prepares	  me	  for	  acting	  in	  certain	  ways:	  in	  this	  case	  it	  
might	  prepare	  me	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  piece	  of	  chocolate	  and	  put	  it	  in	  my	  mouth38.	  	  
	   	  As	  such	  we	  can	  conceptualise	  emotions	  as	  having	  a	  bipolar	  structure.	  Since	  
emotions	  are	  perceptions	  of	  how	  the	  world	  is	  related	  to	  an	  organism,	  an	  emotion	  
expresses	  that	  ‘I	  am	  here’	  on	  one	  end	  of	  the	  bipole,	  that	  place	  that	  is	  being	  affected,	  
and	  that	  which	  does	  the	  affecting	  is	  ‘over	  there’,	  external	  to	  me	  (Ahmed,	  2004)39.	  
Because	  emotions	  are	  physiological	  changes	  that	  are	  felt,	  ‘I	  am	  here’	  is	  not	  just	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  There	  are	  many	  other	  ways	  of	  conceptualising	  emotions.	  We	  can	  be	  a	  cognitivist,	  that	  is,	  
see	  emotions	  as	  caused,	  or	  constituted	  by,	  propositional	  attitudes	  (e.g.	  Lazarus,	  1991),	  and	  
that	  such	  cognitive	  components	  are	  disembodied.	  The	  opposing	  view	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  
emotions	  are	  the	  feelings	  of	  bodily	  changes	  (e.g.	  James,	  1884).	  Yet,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  my	  first	  
chapter,	  Prinz	  has	  presented	  some	  good	  reasons	  for	  understanding	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  
appraisals,	  which	  differs	  by	  not	  depending	  on	  propositional	  attitudes,	  but	  maintaining	  that	  
our	  bodily	  feelings	  are	  appraisals.	  As	  he	  noted,	  while	  emotions	  co-­‐vary	  with	  our	  
understanding	  of	  a	  situation,	  there	  are	  experiential	  and	  empirical	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  
they	  are	  embodied,	  and	  do	  not	  require	  explicit	  thought	  to	  be	  triggered.	  Furthermore,	  this	  
theory	  of	  emotions	  has	  the	  explanatory	  value	  of	  making	  what	  initially	  appear	  to	  be	  
disparate	  notions	  of	  moral	  agency	  consistent.	  	  
38	  In	  this	  particular	  respect,	  any	  appraisal	  theory	  could	  play	  this	  function.	  However,	  the	  
embodied	  nature	  of	  emotions	  is	  important	  for	  other	  dimensions	  of	  the	  perspectival	  nature	  
of	  emotions,	  which	  I	  shall	  mention	  shortly.	  	  
39	  Disgust	  may	  complicate	  this:	  we	  might	  think	  of	  it	  as	  the	  appraisal	  that	  something	  
external	  to	  me	  is	  contaminating	  me,	  or	  within	  me,	  that	  the	  boundary	  between	  internal	  and	  
external	  has	  been	  violated	  in	  some	  way	  (Ahmed,	  2004).	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conceptual	  truth,	  but	  feeling	  anchors	  a	  creature	  in	  the	  physical	  world	  
experientially.	  I	  am	  where	  the	  emotions	  are	  felt.	  Perspective	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  an	  
ability	  to	  locate	  ourselves	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
	   Further,	  emotions	  are	  perceptions	  of	  what	  external	  things	  matter,	  and	  how	  
they	  matter.	  That	  lion	  running	  towards	  me	  matters,	  and	  it	  matters	  because	  it	  can	  
kill	  me.	  Perspective	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  grasp	  that	  a	  world	  bears	  on	  me,	  
and	  how	  it	  bears	  on	  me40.	  	  
Finally,	  emotions	  involve	  taking	  a	  stance	  on	  the	  world	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  
“allow	  us	  to	  literally	  perceive	  that	  situations	  afford	  a	  range	  of	  behaviour	  
responses”	  (Prinz,	  2004,	  p.	  228)41.	  So	  if	  we	  see	  a	  lion	  and	  feel	  fear	  our	  world	  is	  
experienced	  as	  consisting	  of	  several	  different	  routes	  to	  run	  through,	  a	  grass	  to	  fall	  
and	  freeze	  on,	  or	  places	  to	  hide	  behind.	  Perspective	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  
grasp	  how	  I	  can	  act	  on	  the	  world42.	  In	  chapter	  6,	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  what	  
it	  means	  to	  have	  a	  perspective,	  and	  how	  perspective	  arises	  through	  examining	  the	  
sense	  in	  which	  affect	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  interdependent	  and,	  in	  their	  
interaction,	  contribute	  to	  perspective.	  	  	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  narrative	  understanding	  can	  have	  a	  perspectival	  
quality,	  and	  both	  may	  occur	  when	  engaging	  with	  the	  same	  narrative.	  When	  we	  
understand	  narratives,	  we	  can	  place	  ourselves	  within	  the	  narrative	  as	  a	  character,	  
or	  we	  can	  have	  an	  external	  perspective	  watching	  what	  happens.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  Slaby	  &	  Stephan	  (2008)	  have	  a	  similar	  view	  of	  affectivity	  as	  self-­‐disclosing	  through	  
“[making]	  manifest	  what	  is	  currently	  of	  relevance	  to	  us”	  (p.	  508).	  Bemudez	  (2001)	  also	  
ties	  nonconceptual	  self-­‐consciousness	  in	  both	  with	  our	  sense	  of	  our	  body,	  the	  way	  it	  
delineates	  self	  from	  world,	  and	  the	  way	  it	  is	  incorporated	  into	  perception	  as	  a	  sense	  of	  
what	  the	  world	  affords.	  	  
41	  For	  a	  similar	  account	  of	  emotions	  see	  Slaby	  (2012)	  where	  he	  understands	  emotions	  as	  
the	  type	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  that	  comes	  with	  ‘a	  sense	  of	  ability’.	  Although	  she	  doesn’t	  
mention	  affect,	  Hurley’s	  (1997)	  argues	  that	  the	  perspectival	  quality	  nonconceptual	  self-­‐
consciousness	  emerges	  with	  an	  ability	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  our	  actions	  
and	  what	  is	  perceived.	  	  
42	  Note	  that	  although	  I	  can	  express	  these	  characteristics	  of	  perspective	  and	  emotion	  
separately,	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that,	  within	  an	  occurrence	  of	  emotion,	  these	  characteristics	  
come	  apart.	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The	  view	  that	  emotions	  co-­‐emerge	  with	  perspective	  makes	  sense	  of	  Goldie’s	  
observation	  that	  the	  way	  our	  emotions	  relate	  to	  the	  narrative	  coincides	  with	  
whether	  we	  have	  an	  external	  perspective	  on,	  or	  internal	  perspective	  as	  if	  from	  
within,	  a	  story	  (2012,	  p.11).	  He	  notes	  that	  if	  one’s	  emotions	  match	  those	  of	  a	  
character	  within	  a	  narrative	  then	  our	  perspective	  is	  internal	  to	  the	  narrative.	  That	  
is,	  we	  take	  the	  character’s	  perspective.	  If	  emotion	  matches	  that	  of	  the	  external	  
narrator,	  then	  the	  perspective	  is	  located	  ‘outside’	  the	  story	  looking	  in.	  
	   MTT,	  as	  narratives	  about	  our	  own	  lives,	  takes	  both	  these	  forms.	  We	  can	  
create	  and	  understand	  narratives	  of	  our	  past	  and	  possible	  life	  while	  taking	  the	  
perspective	  of	  someone	  external	  to	  the	  events.	  In	  which	  case	  our	  emotional	  
reactions	  are	  directed	  to	  the	  characters,	  including	  ourselves,	  and	  events,	  and	  those	  
emotions	  contain	  something	  of	  our	  assessment	  of	  what	  the	  events	  and	  actions	  
within	  the	  narrative	  mean	  for	  us.	  However,	  there	  are	  times	  where	  we	  become	  
ourselves	  within	  an	  imaginary	  (or	  remembered)	  realm.	  At	  such	  times	  the	  emotions	  
are	  those	  of	  the	  character	  acting	  out	  the	  story.	  Those	  emotions	  situate	  us	  as	  an	  
actor	  within	  the	  narrative,	  and	  are	  involved	  in	  our	  assessment	  of	  the	  imagined	  
situation.	  	  
	  So,	  if	  I	  am	  remembering	  that	  time	  I	  argued	  with	  my	  sibling,	  the	  experience	  
of	  anger	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  place	  me	  within	  the	  story,	  as	  that	  thing	  being	  attacked,	  
while	  the	  feeling	  of	  guilt	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  place	  me	  external	  to	  the	  event,	  as	  that	  
thing	  that,	  in	  retrospect,	  feels	  bad	  for	  shouting.	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  viewing	  a	  narrative	  from	  the	  inside	  it	  might	  seem	  that	  there	  is	  
no	  narrator	  perspective,	  which	  Goldie	  claims	  is	  necessary	  for	  narrative.	  Yet	  in	  this	  
case	  the	  internal	  perspective	  is	  able	  to	  play	  the	  same	  role	  as	  he	  gives	  the	  narrator	  
perspective.	  It	  is	  involved	  in	  “shaping,	  organising,	  and	  colouring”	  events	  from	  
within.	  Further,	  at	  the	  least	  it	  seems	  that	  narratives	  often	  switch	  between	  external	  
and	  internal	  perspectives.	  So,	  if	  we	  think	  that	  a	  narrator	  is	  external	  to	  the	  
characters	  within	  the	  story,	  in	  any	  particular	  self-­‐narrative	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  
some	  points	  within	  it	  that	  contain	  a	  narrator’s	  perspective.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  a	  possibility	  that	  both	  perspectives	  can	  be	  taken	  simultaneously.	  
Goldie	  talks	  of	  ‘free	  indirect	  style’	  as	  a	  characteristic	  of	  many	  narratives	  (2012,	  p.	  
32-­‐40).	  It	  occurs	  when	  it	  is	  ambiguous	  which	  perspective	  is	  being	  taken,	  or	  when	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two	  perspectives	  seem	  blurred.	  The	  theory	  that	  emotion	  is	  a	  form	  of	  perspective	  is	  
also	  consistent	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  ambiguous	  and	  mixed	  perspectives	  –	  mixed	  
or	  ambiguous	  emotions	  constitute	  co-­‐occurring	  or	  ambiguous	  perspectives.	  
We	  can	  also	  understand	  Velleman’s	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  emotion	  that	  provides	  us	  
with	  a	  gestalt	  sense	  of	  the	  entire	  narrative	  in	  this	  light.	  The	  emotional	  state	  we	  are	  
left	  in	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  narrative	  encapsulates	  a	  perspective	  on	  the	  narrative,	  an	  
embodied	  sense	  of	  what	  the	  completed	  narrative	  means	  for	  us.	  	  
So,	  we	  should	  see	  Velleman’s	  idea	  that	  the	  essential	  work	  emotion	  does	  
within	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  to	  re-­‐awaken	  patterns	  stored	  in	  “experiential,	  
proprioceptive	  and	  kinaesthetic	  memory”	  (2003,	  p.	  19)	  as	  another	  way	  of	  spelling	  
out	  Goldie’s	  view	  that	  perspective	  is	  a	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  narrative	  
understanding.	  Emotions	  work	  to	  bring	  us	  within	  the	  situation	  that	  the	  narrative	  
lays	  out,	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  come	  together	  with	  a	  perspective	  in	  and/or	  on	  the	  story43.	  	  
	  
At	  this	  point,	  we	  might	  be	  wondering	  how	  extensive	  I	  am	  taking	  ‘narrative	  
understanding’	  to	  be.	  Is	  all	  experience	  narrative	  or	  only	  some	  experiences?	  Under	  
my	  view,	  narrative	  understanding	  can	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  degree	  where	  the	  extent	  of	  it	  
can	  vary	  under	  several	  dimensions.	  Much	  of	  human	  experience	  falls,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  under	  the	  category	  of	  “narrative	  understanding”.	  Experience	  is	  narrative	  
depending	  on	  intensity	  of	  its	  affective	  quality,	  and	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  affective	  
experience	  is	  coherent,	  where,	  as	  Velleman	  suggests,	  coherence	  can	  be	  understand	  
as	  occurring	  both	  through	  time,	  and	  when	  we	  take	  an	  overall	  perspective	  on	  a	  
sequence	  of	  events.	  
	   Further,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  chapter	  5,	  narrative	  understanding	  depends	  on	  
some	  kind	  of	  recombinable	  system	  –	  which	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  some	  kind	  of	  
understanding	  where	  parts	  can	  be	  used	  in	  various	  ways.	  (I	  will	  expand	  on	  this	  
explanation	  later).	  In	  the	  human	  case,	  we	  often	  have	  language	  –	  a	  type	  of	  
recombinable	  system	  that	  we	  can	  use	  to	  reflect.	  Thus	  the	  type	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  many	  humans	  have	  is	  special	  –	  they	  experience	  things	  narratively	  
not	  just	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  there	  is	  an	  emotional	  cadence	  to	  their	  understanding	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  None	  of	  this	  means	  that	  emotion	  is	  the	  only	  process	  in	  perspective-­‐formation.	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events,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  can	  reflect	  on	  and	  revise	  their	  (affective)	  
understanding	  of	  those	  events.	  	   	  
	   A	  recombinable	  system	  produces	  another	  dimension	  through	  which	  we	  can	  
understand	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  some	  experience	  is	  narrative.	  Narrative	  
understanding,	  as	  a	  gestalt,	  can	  be	  the	  coming	  together	  or	  more	  or	  less	  parts.	  The	  
combination	  of	  just	  a	  few	  parts	  does	  not	  encompass	  the	  richness	  of	  coherence	  
achievable	  in	  a	  complex	  system.	  Because	  language,	  in	  the	  human	  case,	  is	  a	  complex	  
recombinable	  system,	  the	  type	  of	  gestalt	  that	  is	  emerges	  with	  are	  also	  rich	  and	  
complex.	  Human	  narrative	  experience	  therefore	  also	  varies	  as	  a	  dimension	  in	  
which	  our	  affective	  experience	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  richly	  narrative,	  because	  the	  
type	  of	  coherence	  these	  experience	  have	  can	  be	  more	  or	  less	  complex	  and	  rich.	  	  
To	  the	  extent	  that	  that	  some	  types	  of	  deliberative	  thinking	  might	  be	  less	  
strongly	  affective	  (but	  still	  experienced	  in	  some	  way),	  it	  is	  experienced	  less	  
narratively.	  And	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  coherence	  of	  experience	  breaks	  down,	  perhaps	  
in	  psychosis,	  experience	  is	  less	  narrative.	  An	  experience	  is	  narrative	  in	  a	  less	  
sophisticated	  way	  when	  it	  is	  structured	  by	  a	  simpler	  recombinable	  system	  than	  
language.	  An	  experience	  is	  not	  narrative	  at	  all	  if	  it	  is	  not	  structured	  by	  a	  
recombinable	  system.	  	  
	  
3.3.	  Scientific	  support	  for	  emotion	  in	  perspective	  and	  narrative	  	  	  
There	  is	  good	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  emotions	  are	  involved	  in	  
perspective	  formation	  within	  imagined	  and	  remembered	  narratives.	  	  
Markowitsch	  and	  Staniloiu	  (2011)	  review	  evidence	  that	  emotions,	  among	  
other	  things,	  are	  involved	  in	  diachronic	  self-­‐awareness.	  Particularly	  they	  are	  
concerned	  with	  what	  is	  involved	  in	  ‘episodic-­‐autobiographic	  memory’	  (EAM).	  That	  
is,	  memory	  that	  involves	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  of	  self	  as	  existing	  through	  
time.	  Reviewing	  the	  neurological	  literature	  shows	  that	  emotional	  hubs,	  such	  as	  the	  
amygdala	  are	  active	  during	  EAM.	  So,	  they	  argue	  that,	  
The	  reliving	  of	  the	  subjective	  experiences	  from	  the	  encoding	  context	  is	  
usually	  intimately	  linked	  to	  an	  emotional	  evaluation	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  
these	  past	  experiences	  for	  oneself	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  one’s	  own	  position	  in	  
his	  [sic]	  social	  and	  biological	  environment.	  This	  emotional	  evaluation	  may	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in	  turn	  shape	  someone’s	  motivation	  for	  planning	  for	  the	  future	  and	  
engaging	  in	  future	  acts.	  (p.	  19.)	  
	  
However,	  other	  psychologists	  they	  cite	  make	  a	  bolder	  claim,	  arguing	  that	  
emotion	  is	  “intrinsic”	  to	  EAM	  (p.	  20).	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  evidence	  that	  brain	  
circuitry	  associated	  with	  providing	  the	  emotional,	  biological	  and	  social	  
significance	  of	  information	  is	  involved	  in	  EAM.	  Circuits	  thought	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  
these	  tasks,	  the	  Papez	  circuit	  and	  basolateral	  limbic	  loop	  (which	  includes	  the	  
amygdala),	  are	  activated	  when	  people	  engage	  in	  EAM.	  More	  circumstantially,	  the	  
ability	  to	  engage	  in	  EAM,	  both	  within	  an	  individual’s	  lifetime	  and	  through	  
evolutionary	  development,	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  reflected	  in	  structural	  and	  functional	  
changes	  that	  include	  circuits	  involved	  in	  emotion.	  Similarly,	  the	  degeneration	  of	  
von	  Economo	  neurons	  (VEN)	  is	  associated	  with	  both	  decreased	  emotional	  
awareness	  and	  changes	  in	  self-­‐consciousness.	  Levine	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  also	  cite	  several	  
imaging	  studies	  where	  “self-­‐generated	  autobiographical	  material	  show	  activations	  
in	  ventral	  limbic	  and	  paralimbic	  regions	  associated	  with	  emotion…even	  when	  
emotional	  memories	  are	  not	  explicitly	  requested”44	  (p.	  1641).	  	  
Markowitsch	  &	  Staniloiu	  also	  cite	  evidence	  that	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  
amygdala	  increases	  if	  one	  experiences	  oneself	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  situation	  rather	  
than	  observing	  from	  outside.	  I	  note	  that	  even	  an	  external	  perspective	  is	  in	  some	  
sense	  inhabited.	  If	  we	  are	  external	  to	  a	  narrative	  there	  is	  still	  a	  sense	  that	  we	  
have/take	  a	  perspective	  on	  it,	  since	  we	  place	  ourselves	  outside	  of	  the	  narrative	  
looking	  in.	  Nonetheless,	  our	  sense	  of	  perspective	  presumably	  comes	  in	  degrees,	  a	  
sense	  that	  we	  are	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  situation,	  rather	  than	  observing	  it,	  may	  
increase	  this	  feeling.	  
Finally,	  the	  view	  that	  narrative	  is	  importantly	  emotional	  is	  congruent	  with	  
neurolinguistic	  evidence.	  Brain	  imaging	  has	  revealed	  that	  understanding	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  This	  evidence	  falls	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  theory	  by	  the	  neuroscientist	  Antonio	  
Damasio	  (1999).	  He	  posits	  that	  emotion	  and	  implicit	  self-­‐awareness	  of	  oneself	  in	  the	  
present	  (what	  he	  calls	  “core	  consciousness”)	  share	  largely	  overlapping	  neural	  
structures.	  The	  function	  of	  these	  structures,	  he	  believes,	  is	  to	  represent	  the	  body	  and	  
its	  potential	  actions,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  related	  to	  the	  world.	  He	  reaches	  this	  conclusion	  
mainly	  through	  his	  observations	  of	  different	  neurological	  conditions,	  where	  lack	  of	  
core	  consciousness	  and	  emotions	  coincide.	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narratives	  involves	  the	  amygdala	  and	  limbic	  system	  to	  a	  greater	  degree	  than	  word	  
and	  sentence	  comprehension.	  These	  are	  brain	  regions	  associated	  with	  emotion	  
(Xu	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
The	  view	  of	  emotion	  I	  have	  outlined	  above	  chimes	  with	  these	  data	  and	  
claims	  from	  neuropsychology.	  If	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  appraisals	  then	  the	  
feeling	  of	  an	  emotion	  is	  the	  feeling	  of	  our	  body	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  no	  
surprise	  then,	  that	  emotion	  is	  involved	  in	  consciousness	  of	  the	  self,	  and	  therefore	  
in	  self-­‐referential	  processes.	  	  
	  
	  
4. Narrative	  understanding	  &	  mental	  time	  travel	  
	  
4.1.	  Mental	  time	  travel	  as	  a	  type	  of	  self-­‐narrative	  
We	  started	  off	  defining	  MTT	  as	  the	  ability	  to	  subjectively	  (re)experience	  our	  past	  
and	  future,	  but	  now	  it	  looks	  like	  it	  just	  might	  be	  a	  type	  of	  narrative	  understanding.	  
Narrative	  understanding,	  after	  all,	  requires	  us	  inhabiting	  a	  string	  of	  events	  either	  
by	  our	  experienced	  emotional	  cadence	  co-­‐emerging	  with	  us	  surveying	  those	  events	  
from	  the	  outside,	  or	  through	  our	  emotional	  journey	  placing	  us	  within	  the	  events	  
(or	  any	  mixture	  of	  the	  two).	  Narrative	  understanding	  is	  essentially	  perspectival	  
and	  inhabited,	  and	  involves	  understanding	  events	  through	  time,	  both	  
characteristics	  we	  take	  to	  define	  MTT.	  One	  crucial	  component	  that	  appears	  to	  be	  
present	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  MTT	  but	  missing	  from	  this	  portrayal	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  sensory	  imagery.	  Yet	  I	  think	  this	  distinction	  fails,	  as	  I	  explain	  in	  
the	  chapter	  6	  –	  for	  sensory	  experience	  is	  also	  necessary	  for	  narrative	  
understanding.	  
	   	  I	  think	  we	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  MTT	  by	  understanding	  it	  as	  a	  type	  of	  
narrative	  understanding,	  one	  which	  concerns	  our	  selves	  and	  our	  lives.	  Once	  we	  do	  
this,	  we	  can	  understand	  why	  MTT	  motivates	  our	  action.	  	  
If	  we	  go	  down	  this	  route,	  we	  can	  also	  explain	  why	  MTT	  has	  an	  embodied	  
perspectival	  quality.	  In	  part,	  it	  is	  because	  of	  its	  emotional	  character.	  I	  propose	  this	  
perspectival	  quality	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  one	  can	  ‘inhabit’	  MTT.	  MTT	  has	  this	  
phenomenology	  because	  it	  engages	  our	  emotions.	  So,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  M.L.,	  who	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doesn’t	  feel	  subjectively	  connected	  to	  what	  has	  happened	  to	  him	  in	  the	  past,	  it	  is	  
likely	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  him	  not	  feeling	  emotionally	  connected	  to	  those	  events.	  	  
The	  reason	  relates	  to	  Velleman’s	  explanation	  of	  narrative	  understanding:	  narrative	  
understanding	  relies	  on	  an	  emotional	  continuity	  through	  time.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  
typical	  instances	  of	  MTT,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  story	  that	  leads	  from	  our	  past	  to	  our	  
current	  self,	  or	  from	  our	  current	  self	  to	  our	  future	  self,	  involves	  some	  emotional	  
continuity	  such	  that	  we	  feel	  connected	  to	  our	  time	  travelling	  selves.	  MTT	  involves	  
an	  emotional	  cadence	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  each	  emotion	  is	  coherent	  with	  the	  emotion	  
it	  follows	  from	  and	  leads	  to.	  Because	  emotions	  and	  perspective	  co-­‐emerge,	  
emotional	  continuity	  can	  involve	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  same	  embodied	  being	  is	  
involved	  in	  the	  past	  and	  the	  future.	  While	  emotional	  cadence	  is	  necessary	  for	  plot,	  
it	  can	  also	  result	  in	  the	  continuity	  of	  a	  character’s	  perspective.	  In	  what	  we	  normally	  
take	  to	  be	  standard	  cases	  of	  MTT,	  we	  often	  identify	  the	  character’s	  perspective	  as	  
our	  own.	  	  
Returning	  to	  our	  scenario	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  chapter,	  concerning	  Samina	  the	  
(partial)	  amnesiac	  who	  recreates	  her	  childhood	  based	  on	  experiences	  she	  has	  no	  
direct	  access	  to,	  we	  can	  also	  explain	  why	  this	  counts	  as	  narrative	  understanding.	  
While	  her	  narrative	  is	  not	  caused	  by	  the	  events	  that	  happened	  but	  is	  constructed,	  
what	  matters	  is	  that	  the	  thing	  that	  she	  has	  constructed	  includes	  an	  emotional	  
cadence	  that	  creates	  continuity	  between	  her	  childhood	  self	  and	  her	  current	  self.	  
Not	  only	  does	  she	  mentally	  time	  travel,	  but	  her	  MTT	  has	  a	  narrative	  structure.	  
However,	  for	  Samina’s	  re-­‐construction	  of	  her	  past	  to	  give	  her	  appropriate	  factual	  
information	  about	  her	  own	  life,	  we	  should	  note,	  as	  before,	  that	  it	  should	  be	  
relatively	  accurate.	  	  
It	  is	  Samina’s	  ability	  to	  construct	  narratives	  that	  enables	  her	  to	  mentally	  
time	  travel.	  She	  can	  imagine	  what	  would	  have	  been	  a	  coherent	  way	  for	  her	  
younger	  self	  to	  have	  felt	  and	  can	  relate	  this	  to	  how	  she	  feels	  now.	  Further,	  for	  
Samina	  to	  be	  able	  to	  mentally	  time	  travel	  it	  is	  enough	  that	  she	  can	  create	  
narratives	  about	  a	  possible	  way	  her	  life	  has	  been	  or	  will	  be;	  it	  does	  not	  need	  to	  
involve	  factual	  information.	  For	  us	  all,	  this	  is	  sometimes	  the	  case,	  as	  when	  we	  
imagine	  our	  futures.	  So	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  sufficient	  for	  us	  to	  engage	  in	  
MTT.	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This	  interpretation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  emotion	  in	  MTT,	  as	  suggested	  at	  the	  
start,	  depends	  on	  identifying	  what	  memory	  and	  imagination	  hold	  in	  common.	  
While	  much	  of	  the	  above	  scientific	  evidence	  concerns	  memory,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  
we	  can	  extrapolate	  it	  to	  imagining	  the	  future	  too,	  as	  they	  share	  a	  similar	  
phenomenology.	  If	  we	  take	  emotion	  to	  play	  an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  ability	  for	  
us	  to	  inhabit	  our	  past,	  and	  we	  also	  need	  an	  explanation	  for	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  
to	  inhabit	  the	  future,	  then	  it	  seems	  legitimate	  to	  put	  forward	  emotion	  as	  an	  
explanation	  for	  how	  this	  is	  also	  possible.	  So,	  for	  example,	  my	  feeling	  of	  
nervousness	  before	  a	  session	  with	  my	  supervisors	  is	  constitutive	  of	  my	  
perspective	  on	  a	  likely	  future	  situation	  in	  which	  my	  ego	  is	  damaged.	  My	  
feeling	  of	  embarrassment	  as	  I	  imagine	  my	  exegesis	  of	  Charles	  Taylor	  being	  
picked	  apart	  is	  constitutive	  of	  a	  future	  scenario	  that	  I	  place	  myself	  within,	  
where	  my	  embarrassment	  is	  constitutive	  of	  a	  perspective	  as-­‐if	  I	  am	  currently	  
being	  criticised.	  Here,	  there	  is	  some	  sense	  in	  which	  emotion	  places	  me	  in	  an	  
imagined	  future	  scenario.	  Embarrassment,	  here,	  is	  part	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  
an	  imagined	  scenario	  where	  my	  faults	  are	  on	  show.	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  affect	  in	  narrative	  understanding	  provides	  a	  way	  to	  
explain	  why	  people	  can	  act	  on	  what	  they	  discover	  through	  narrative	  imagining.	  As	  
emotions	  are	  both	  an	  evaluation	  of	  one’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  environment	  and	  
present	  a	  range	  of	  affordances	  for	  action,	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  our	  capacity	  to	  act	  
on	  what	  matters	  to	  us.	  	  
	  
On	  this	  account	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  all	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  pre-­‐
reflectively	  self-­‐involving.	  Even	  when	  we	  read	  a	  story,	  or	  listen	  to	  our	  friends	  
recount	  their	  latest	  adventure,	  we	  understand	  it	  narratively	  when	  we	  have	  a	  sense	  
of	  perspective,	  constituted	  by	  our	  emotional	  cadence.	  Such	  narrative	  engagement	  
is	  self-­‐narrative	  in	  a	  way:	  all	  narrative	  understanding	  depends	  on	  the	  involvement	  
of	  our	  perspective	  on	  it,	  it	  depends	  on	  how	  we,	  as	  embodied	  subjects,	  relate	  to	  it.	  In	  
this	  particular	  sense,	  all	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  self-­‐narrative.	  Such	  narrative	  
understanding	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  us	  thinking	  about	  ourselves	  as	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  
narrative.	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Narrative	  understanding	  occurs	  also	  when	  we	  engage	  in	  MTT	  and	  when	  we	  
conceptualise	  ourselves	  diachronically.	  When	  someone	  engages	  in	  MTT	  they	  
understand	  narratives	  about	  their	  own	  lives.	  Note	  we	  may	  be	  prereflectively	  
present	  here	  too.	  We	  may	  remember	  events	  that	  happen	  to	  us,	  and	  experience	  
them	  as	  happening	  to	  us,	  without	  really	  thinking	  of	  ourselves	  as	  psychological	  
beings.	  But	  then	  we	  may	  also	  tell	  metarepresentational	  stories:	  we	  may	  explicitly	  
understand	  ourselves	  as	  representational	  things.	  For	  example,	  we	  may	  understand	  
our	  beliefs	  as	  beliefs.	  In	  metarepresentational	  stories,	  this	  enables	  us	  to	  
conceptualise	  ourselves	  as	  diachronic	  psychological	  beings	  with	  both	  the	  
experience	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  character	  known	  as	  ‘me’.	  Experiencing	  the	  flux	  of	  
emotions	  as	  we	  mentally	  time	  travel	  is	  partly	  constitutive	  of	  experiencing	  
ourselves	  as	  a	  continuing	  character	  (that	  character	  that	  is	  me)	  through	  time;	  and	  
the	  explicit	  story	  can	  also	  contain	  references	  to	  our	  history,	  relationships,	  the	  
future	  plans,	  the	  intentions,	  hopes	  and	  fears.	  Think	  of	  Samina.	  When	  she	  
understands	  herself	  narratively	  she	  could	  be	  representing	  herself	  as	  a	  
psychological	  being	  as	  well	  as	  experiencing	  herself	  diachronically.	  	  
G&K	  take	  this	  last	  type	  of	  self-­‐narrative	  to	  be	  a	  fundamental	  capacity	  for	  
making	  decisions:	  not	  only	  do	  we	  experience	  ourselves	  as	  subjectively	  present	  in	  
MTT,	  but	  this	  prereflective	  awareness	  is	  integral	  to	  building	  metarepresentational	  
stories,	  which	  allow	  us	  to	  make	  plans	  that	  we	  are	  committed	  to.	  That	  is,	  according	  
the	  G&K,	  decision	  making	  depends	  on	  understanding	  metarepresentational	  
stories:	  stories	  that	  are	  explicitly	  about	  who	  we	  are	  and	  our	  mental	  states.	  Such	  
stories	  are	  connected	  to	  us	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  through	  us	  inhabiting	  these	  stories,	  
and	  so	  we	  are	  motivated	  to	  act	  on	  our	  plans.	  Now	  I	  want	  to	  explain	  why	  MTT	  is	  not	  
necessary	  to	  explain	  the	  behaviour	  of	  M.L.	  and	  one	  other	  vmPFC	  patient.	  Because	  a	  
lack	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  a	  non-­‐metarepresentational	  capacity,	  is	  sufficient	  
for	  explaining	  their	  behaviour,	  an	  inability	  to	  metarepresent	  is	  not	  necessary	  to	  
explain	  their	  behaviour.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  expand	  on	  this	  notion	  that	  MTT	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4.2 Explaining	  ventromedial	  patients	  without	  metarepresentation	  
While	  G&K	  make	  MTT	  crucial	  to	  stories	  about	  loss	  of	  responsible	  decision-­‐making,	  
I	  think	  we	  can	  explain	  M.L.’s	  behaviour	  without	  claiming	  that	  his	  poor	  decision-­‐
making	  is	  due	  to	  his	  inability	  to	  mentally	  time	  travel.	  If	  M.L.	  lacks	  narrative	  
understanding	  then	  he	  loses	  the	  capacity	  for	  understanding	  virtual	  scenarios	  in	  an	  
affective	  and	  embodied	  way,	  a	  way	  that	  is	  linked	  to	  his	  capacity	  to	  act	  on	  his	  
understanding	  of	  counterfactual	  possibilities.	  His	  inability	  to	  understand	  events	  
narratively,	  to	  feel	  his	  way	  through	  virtual	  worlds,	  underlies	  his	  inability	  to	  MTT.	  
That	  is,	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  common	  cause	  that	  would	  both	  prevent	  M.L.	  from	  
mentally	  time	  travelling,	  and	  behaving	  responsibly.	  Both	  require	  narrative	  
understanding.	  	  
	   Note	  that	  metarepresentation	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  narrative	  understanding.	  
You	  can	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  an	  outcome	  being	  bad,	  and	  that	  can	  influence	  your	  actions,	  
without	  explicitly	  thinking	  about	  yourself.	  The	  capacity	  to	  foresee	  the	  total	  
devastation	  caused	  by	  climate	  change	  could	  prompt	  you	  to	  recycle,	  and	  thinking	  
about	  your	  own	  life	  would	  not	  be	  necessary.	  Much	  of	  M.L.’s	  irresponsible	  
behaviour	  may	  be	  due	  to	  his	  inability	  to	  engage	  in	  narrative	  understanding	  like	  
this,	  rather	  than	  his	  inability	  to	  engage	  in	  MTT.	  	  
MTT,	  as	  relating	  more	  directly	  to	  your	  life,	  may	  be	  important	  too,	  but	  that	  
just	  comes	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  understand	  events	  narratively.	  So,	  for	  instance,	  MTT	  
informs	  your	  decision	  not	  to	  go	  on	  holiday	  if	  you	  envision	  too	  much	  work	  waiting	  
for	  you	  when	  you	  get	  back.	  Again,	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  be	  representing	  yourself	  as	  a	  
psychological	  being.	  You	  have	  to	  have	  certain	  psychological	  processes,	  like	  
believing	  that	  having	  too	  much	  work	  is	  bad,	  but	  you	  don’t	  have	  to	  represent	  
yourself	  as	  having	  those	  processes.	  Here,	  you	  are	  thinking	  about	  your	  life,	  but	  you	  
are	  not	  yet	  metarepresenting.	  	  
Similarly,	  the	  case	  of	  EVR	  is	  congruent	  with	  him	  having	  a	  problem	  with	  
narrative	  understanding	  in	  general,	  rather	  than	  MTT	  and	  metarepresentational	  
MTT	  in	  particular.	  Patient	  EVR,	  who	  also	  has	  a	  vmPFC	  lesion,	  is	  hopelessly	  
indecisive	  and	  finds	  it	  hard	  to	  act	  on	  decisions	  he	  does	  make.	  Again,	  we	  can	  see	  
that	  EVR	  would	  have	  this	  problem	  if	  he	  lacks	  narrative	  understanding,	  if	  he	  lacks	  
the	  possibility	  of	  inhabiting	  counterfactuals	  and	  what	  they	  would	  mean	  for	  him.	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I	  am	  not	  currently	  claiming	  that	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  accept	  my	  hypothesis	  
over	  the	  alternative.	  This	  is	  just	  to	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  competing	  hypothesis	  to	  
the	  one	  that	  G&K	  propose.	  In	  my	  next	  chapter	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  my	  hypothesis,	  that	  
agency	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  being	  a	  creature	  capable	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  is	  
preferable	  to	  their	  alternative,	  that	  agency	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  conceiving	  of	  oneself	  as	  a	  
psychological	  creature.	  	  
What	  is	  important	  here	  is	  how	  wide-­‐ranging	  our	  narrative	  capacities	  are;	  
how	  inhabiting	  counterfactuals	  occurs	  frequently	  without	  us	  explicitly	  considering	  
our	  own	  lives.	  Decision-­‐making	  incorporates	  understanding	  we	  gain	  from	  our	  
narrative	  understanding	  of:	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  events;	  history;	  the	  lives	  
of	  famous	  people;	  the	  television	  shows,	  films	  and	  plays	  we	  watch;	  the	  books	  we	  
read;	  the	  stories	  our	  friends	  tell	  us	  about	  their	  lives	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  others	  they	  
know	  etc.	  It	  is	  unclear	  why	  metarepresentation	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  decisions	  we	  
make	  using	  these	  narratives.	  	  	  
	  
This	  explanation	  faces	  a	  potential	  objection.	  I’ve	  made	  emotions	  central	  to	  the	  
perspectival	  nature	  of	  narrative,	  and	  yet	  these	  patients	  have	  suffered	  a	  lesion	  to	  
their	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC),	  not	  an	  area	  of	  the	  brain	  always	  
associated	  with	  emotions45.	  	  	  
	   As	  G&K	  argue,	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  ventromedial	  
prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC)	  plays	  some	  kind	  of	  role	  in	  enabling	  a	  sense	  of	  self.	  I	  
think	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  vmPFC	  does	  this	  by	  playing	  a	  more	  general	  role	  
in	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  perspective	  on	  a	  complex	  situation	  or	  a	  series	  of	  
events	  –	  whether	  it	  is	  one’s	  own	  or	  another’s.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  how	  I	  think	  we	  
should	  understand	  the	  common	  denominator	  in	  the	  different	  activities	  that	  the	  
vmPFC	  contributes	  to.	  
	  	   First,	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  implicated	  in	  cognitive	  empathy	  i.e.	  the	  ability	  to	  
understand	  how	  another	  person	  understands	  the	  world	  (Walter,	  2012).	  Second,	  in	  
an	  analysis	  of	  several	  tasks	  where	  the	  only	  common	  theme	  is	  to	  construct	  a	  scene,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  One	  thing	  to	  be	  clear	  about	  here,	  is	  that	  I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	  emotion	  is	  sufficient	  for	  
the	  complex	  perspective-­‐taking	  involved	  in	  narrative	  understanding.	  Not	  only	  do	  I	  think	  
that	  sensory	  experience	  is	  also	  necessary	  (chapter	  6),	  but	  (as	  will	  become	  clear	  in	  chapter	  
4	  &	  5)	  conceptual	  processes	  are	  too.	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but	  where	  only	  some	  were	  directed	  to	  explicitly	  self-­‐involving	  processes46,	  the	  
vmPFC	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  circuit	  involved	  in	  all	  conditions	  (Hassabis	  &	  
Maguire,	  2007).	  Scene	  construction	  here	  involves	  “the	  process	  of	  mentally	  
generating	  and	  maintaining	  a	  complex	  scene	  of	  event”(p.	  299).	  Finally,	  as	  G&K	  
note,	  vmPFC	  is	  activated	  in	  the	  recollection	  of	  autobiographical	  memories	  (Gilboa,	  
2004).	  The	  common	  denominator	  of	  the	  capacities	  implicated	  in	  these	  studies	  is,	  I	  
suggest,	  that	  vmPFC	  is	  involved	  in	  inhabiting	  a	  perspective	  where	  complex	  
temporal	  and/or	  spatial	  factors	  come	  together,	  whether	  it	  is	  one’s	  own	  or	  
another’s.	  If	  scene	  construction	  is	  not	  obviously	  indicative	  of	  this,	  note	  that	  we	  
cannot	  have	  a	  scene	  before	  us	  unless	  there	  is	  at	  least	  an	  implicit	  sense	  of	  the	  self	  
that	  the	  scene	  is	  before.	  This	  will	  be	  expanded	  on	  more	  fully	  in	  chapter	  6.	  	  
	   In	  line	  with	  this	  suggestion,	  Roy	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  argue	  that	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  a	  hub	  
region,	  or	  ‘a	  system	  of	  systems’	  that	  co-­‐ordinates	  “episodic	  memory,	  
representation	  of	  the	  affective	  qualities	  of	  sensory	  events,	  social	  cognition,	  
interoceptive	  signals	  and	  evolutionarily	  conserved	  affective	  physiological	  and	  
behavioural	  responses”	  (p.	  147).	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  allows	  an	  organism	  to	  
conceptualise	  itself	  in	  context,	  what	  that	  context	  means	  for	  it,	  and	  thereby	  
understand	  the	  ‘affective	  meaning’	  of	  a	  situation.	  They	  used	  a	  database	  of	  4,400	  
studies	  to	  pick	  up	  patterns	  in	  data,	  and	  supported	  their	  analysis	  with	  animal	  lesion	  
studies.	  From	  this	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  an	  integrative	  centre	  for	  affective,	  
motor,	  and	  simulation	  systems.	  It	  is	  action	  guiding,	  but	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  
complex	  situations	  and	  the	  context-­‐specific	  formation	  of	  goals.	  	  
I	  think	  we	  can	  see	  how	  this	  is	  congruent	  with	  the	  vmPFC	  patients	  having	  a	  
problem	  with	  narrative	  understanding	  in	  general,	  rather	  than	  MTT	  or	  
metarepresentational	  MTT,	  in	  particular.	  Narrative	  understanding	  is	  a	  perspectival	  
view	  of	  a	  series	  of	  events,	  where	  affect	  is	  a	  crucial	  constituent	  in	  enabling	  an	  
embodied	  sense	  of	  what	  a	  current	  or	  counterfactual	  situation	  is.	  It	  basically	  is	  the	  
capacity	  for	  an	  embodied	  understanding	  of	  particular,	  complex	  situations	  and	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  	  For	  instance,	  tasks	  that	  obviously	  involve	  the	  self	  included	  remembering	  ones	  own	  
past,	  while	  general	  imaginative	  tasks,	  navigation	  and	  vivid	  dreaming	  were	  counted	  as	  
tasks	  that	  did	  not	  involve	  an	  self-­‐referring	  characteristics.	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  paper	  claim	  
that	  these	  tasks	  don’t	  involve	  self-­‐awareness	  at	  all,	  but	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  lack	  of	  
consideration	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  prereflective	  self-­‐awareness.	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outcomes.	  It	  is	  no	  surprise	  then	  that	  if	  you	  knock	  out	  the	  vmPFC,	  the	  perspectival	  
nature	  of	  understanding	  events	  can	  be	  significantly	  harmed.	  The	  vmPFC	  co-­‐
ordinates	  and	  integrates	  affective	  information	  with	  other	  systems.	  Remove	  the	  
vmPFC	  and	  you	  remove	  a	  part	  of	  the	  brain	  that	  contributes	  significantly	  to	  a	  
perspectival	  and	  embodied	  view	  on	  a	  sequence	  of	  actual	  and	  non-­‐actual	  events.	  	  
	  
	  
5. Conclusion	  	  
	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  G&K	  have	  got	  something	  very	  importantly	  right.	  It	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  
certain	  characteristics	  of	  MTT	  that	  MTT	  contributes	  to	  our	  capacity	  to	  make	  
responsible	  decisions,	  and	  to	  act	  on	  decisions	  we	  do	  make.	  There	  is	  something	  
important	  about	  being	  able	  to	  subjectively	  inhabit	  non-­‐occurring	  events.	  When	  you	  
can	  do	  this,	  you	  can	  understand	  how	  the	  possible	  actions	  you	  are	  faced	  with	  now	  
will	  play	  out,	  and	  you	  have	  prereflective	  access	  to	  what	  those	  consequences	  will	  
mean	  for	  you.	  Your	  decisions,	  reached	  through	  consideration	  of	  counterfactuals	  
(whether	  in	  your	  life	  or	  through	  fiction),	  are	  embodied	  and	  action-­‐orientated.	  
Nonetheless,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  capacity	  is	  based	  in	  narrative	  understanding,	  
which	  is	  broader	  than	  MTT.	  A	  competing	  explanation,	  therefore,	  to	  the	  one	  that	  
G&K	  propose,	  is	  that	  vmPFC	  patients	  have	  problems	  with	  decision-­‐making	  because	  
they	  have	  damaged	  narrative	  understanding,	  rather	  than	  because	  they	  have	  a	  
particular	  problem	  with	  MTT.	  Further,	  when	  we	  understand	  what	  narrative	  
understanding	  allows	  us	  to	  do,	  it	  seems	  we	  need	  some	  further	  motivation	  for	  why	  
metarepresentation	  is	  needed	  for	  good	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  now	  is	  examine	  why	  narrative	  understanding,	  not	  MTT	  in	  
particular	  or	  metarepresentation,	  is	  sufficient	  for	  agency.	  Narrative	  understanding,	  
I	  argue,	  is	  what	  enables	  MTT	  and	  metarepresentaiton,	  and	  moreover	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  sufficient	  for	  us	  to	  be	  a	  unified	  self.	  	  
In	  chapter	  5	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  combined	  emotional	  and	  conceptual	  content	  of	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  crucial	  for	  its	  role	  in	  moral	  agency,	  by	  allowing	  us	  to	  be	  
interpretive	  creatures	  that	  can	  articulate	  what	  is	  of	  qualitatively	  higher	  value.	  
Finally,	  in	  chapter	  6,	  I	  complete	  my	  account	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  how	  it	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is	  involved	  in	  moral	  agency	  by	  expanding	  on	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  inhabit	  a	  
sequence	  of	  events.	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  through	  the	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  
emotional	  experience.	  Because	  such	  interdependence	  enables	  the	  experience	  of	  an	  
embodied	  presence	  in	  narratives,	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  act	  on	  our	  narrative	  
understanding,	  through	  enabling	  an	  embodied	  identity	  between	  our	  current	  selves	  
and	  the	  narrative	  sequence.	  Thus,	  in	  narrative	  understanding,	  our	  moral	  sense	  and	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Narrative	  Agency	  
	  
The	  Universe	  is	  made	  of	  stories	  
not	  of	  atoms.	  




In	  the	  last	  chapter	  we	  saw	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  competes	  with	  
metarepresentation	  and	  mental	  time	  travel	  (MTT)	  as	  an	  explanation	  for	  how	  we	  
make	  responsible	  decisions	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  act	  on.	  The	  issue	  of	  agency	  was	  
bracketed	  because	  I	  wanted	  to	  first	  get	  clear	  on	  what	  narrative	  understanding	  is,	  
and	  why	  it	  includes,	  but	  is	  not	  reducible	  to,	  MTT.	  Here	  we	  return	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  
agency.	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  scope	  limitation,	  I	  will	  continue	  with	  the	  foundational	  
premise	  behind	  the	  claims	  of	  Velleman,	  from	  whom	  this	  theory	  originates.	  And	  that	  
is	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  a	  creature	  who	  cares	  about	  acting	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  sense.	  	  
This	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  an	  agent	  is	  a	  rational	  being.	  	  
	   However,	  G&K	  tie	  this	  ability	  to	  the	  capacity	  for	  metarepresentation.	  What	  
is	  pivotal	  for	  them,	  beyond	  the	  experience	  of	  ourselves	  as	  diachronic,	  is	  that	  we	  
use	  our	  self-­‐knowledge,	  garnered	  through	  autobiographical	  understanding,	  in	  
order	  to	  plan.	  By	  claiming	  this,	  they	  make	  MTT	  relevant	  to	  agency	  insofar	  as	  it	  
relates	  to	  our	  capacity	  for	  “causal-­‐psychological”	  reasoning.	  Like	  G&K,	  I	  think	  MTT	  
has	  some	  features	  that	  are	  crucial	  for	  agency.	  Unlike	  them,	  I	  think	  this	  is	  part	  of	  a	  
broader	  capacity	  of	  narrative	  understanding.	  This	  capacity	  does	  not	  make	  
metarepresentation	  essential	  to	  agency.	  	  
	   To	  sharpen	  this	  contrast,	  I	  will	  explain	  Velleman’s	  distinction	  between	  his	  
causal-­‐psychological	  and	  narrative	  theories	  of	  agency.	  	  Contrary	  to	  Velleman,	  I	  
argue	  that	  you	  can	  explain	  the	  former	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  latter.	  This	  provides	  
conceptual	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  much	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  MTT	  and	  
metarepresentation	  to	  agency	  relies	  on	  our	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  understanding.	  
As	  such,	  narrative	  understanding,	  rather	  than	  MTT	  and	  metarepresentation,	  has	  
explanatory	  priority.	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Yet,	  this	  does	  not	  yet	  explain	  how	  narrative	  understanding,	  in	  the	  absence	  
of	  metarepresentation	  could	  contribute	  to	  agency.	  So,	  further,	  I	  will	  explain	  how	  
narrative	  understanding	  could	  be	  sufficient	  for	  being	  a	  coherent	  agent	  that	  can	  do	  
what	  would	  make	  sense,	  so	  a	  capacity	  for	  reasoning	  about	  the	  psychological	  is	  not	  
necessary.	  For	  an	  agent’s	  coherence	  can	  be	  created	  through	  our	  narrative	  
understanding	  forming	  systematic	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  world,	  which	  does	  not	  
require	  metarepresentation.	  	  
Once	  we	  have	  this	  distinction	  clear	  we	  will	  be	  able	  to	  see	  what	  is	  right	  and	  
what	  is	  wrong	  about	  Galen	  Strawson’s	  attack	  on	  narrative	  theories	  of	  selfhood.	  His	  
attack	  is	  prominent	  in	  the	  debate	  concerning	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  
therefore	  a	  response	  to	  his	  objections	  is	  warranted.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  he	  is	  right	  to	  
be	  sceptical	  that	  metarepresentational	  narratives	  are	  a	  fundamental	  part	  of	  our	  
psychology.	  Since	  metarepresentation	  is	  not	  endemic	  in	  human	  thought,	  making	  
metarepresentation	  central	  to	  agency	  rules	  out	  too	  many	  people	  as	  agents.	  
Nonetheless,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  he	  is	  wrong	  to	  conclude	  that	  a	  more	  minimal	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  either	  trivial	  or	  unnecessary.	  Both	  of	  my	  responses	  to	  
Strawson	  fall	  out	  of	  the	  richer	  explanation	  of	  what	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  that	  
I	  developed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  Since	  we	  now	  have	  this	  richer	  view	  on	  the	  table,	  we	  
are	  able	  to	  clear	  up	  some	  confusions.	  	  
The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  therefore	  to	  get	  clear	  on	  what	  my	  minimal	  
requirements	  for	  agency	  are,	  and	  why.	  The	  claim	  is	  not	  only	  that	  narrative	  
understanding	  meets	  the	  minimal	  criteria	  for	  agency,	  but	  that	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  
explain	  many	  other	  capacities	  involved	  in	  agency.	  Note	  that	  the	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  
other	  capacities	  don’t	  enhance	  our	  agency.	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  Velleman,	  and	  his	  two	  
supposedly	  distinct	  ways	  of	  spelling	  out	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  can	  be	  agents.	  	  
	  
	  
2. Narrative	  understanding	  &	  causal-­‐psychological	  understanding	  
	  
2.1. Velleman’s	  distinction	  
To	  get	  clear	  on	  what	  the	  dispute	  is	  between	  my	  account	  on	  agency	  and	  the	  one	  
that	  G&K	  suggest,	  it	  helps	  to	  look	  at	  a	  two	  apparently	  distinct	  accounts	  of	  agency	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provided	  by	  Velleman,	  which	  I	  will	  do	  in	  this	  section.	  In	  section	  2.2,	  I	  will	  suggest	  
that	  narrative	  understanding	  underlies	  our	  capacity	  for	  metarepresentation.	  
However,	  we	  may	  not	  yet	  understand	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  could	  be	  
sufficient	  for	  agency.	  Representing	  a	  self	  as	  a	  self	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  explain	  how	  
we	  can	  get	  the	  self-­‐consistency	  needed	  for	  agency.	  Why	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  
sufficient	  for	  this	  is	  explained	  in	  section	  2.3.	  
	  
In	  his	  2007	  Reply	  to	  Catriona	  Mackenzie	  Velleman	  admits	  that	  he	  has	  been	  using	  
two	  parallel	  theories	  of	  agency	  without	  acknowledging	  that	  they	  are	  different,	  and	  
without	  explaining	  the	  way	  they	  are	  connected.	  Initially,	  Velleman	  described	  an	  
“autonomous	  agent	  as	  understanding	  himself	  in	  causal-­‐psychological	  terms”	  
(2007,	  p.	  284).	  This	  is	  an	  essentially	  metarepresentational	  understanding.	  It	  means	  
that	  I	  have	  “the	  ability	  to	  understand	  what	  I	  am	  doing	  as	  done	  by	  a	  creature	  who	  I	  
am”	  (p.	  259,	  2006).	  This	  allows	  me	  to,	  “round	  on	  my	  entire	  self	  and	  wonder,	  “What	  
is	  this	  creature	  up	  to?””	  (ibid.,	  p.	  260).	  This	  ability	  allows	  us	  be	  coherent	  because	  
once	  we	  have	  beliefs	  about	  our	  motives,	  beliefs	  and	  goals,	  we	  can	  choose	  an	  action	  
that	  make	  sense	  in	  light	  of	  our	  psychological	  character47.	  For	  example,	  if	  Pablo	  
believes	  that	  sexism	  is	  wrong,	  and	  he	  realises	  that	  he	  has	  some	  implicitly	  sexist	  
attitudes,	  then	  he	  may	  be	  motivated	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  change	  his	  implicit	  attitudes	  to	  
better	  match	  his	  explicit	  beliefs.	  	  
	  	   Later,	  in	  his	  explanation	  of	  action,	  Velleman	  moves	  on	  to	  narrative	  
understanding,	  which	  we	  have	  seen	  is	  explained	  through	  an	  emotional	  cadence	  
that	  ends	  with	  a	  final	  affective	  sense	  of	  the	  story	  as	  a	  whole.	  On	  the	  first	  account	  
we	  make	  decisions	  based	  on	  what	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  do,	  given	  what	  we	  
represent	  ourselves	  as	  being,	  but	  on	  the	  latter	  we	  make	  decisions	  based	  on	  what	  
would	  make	  sense	  given	  our	  self-­‐narrative	  up	  to	  now.	  	  
This	  narrative	  account,	  for	  Velleman,	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  certain	  
human	  behaviour	  that	  cannot	  be	  made	  sense	  of	  by	  understanding	  agents	  as	  homo	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  For	  discussion	  of	  his	  causal-­‐psychological	  theory,	  see	  Velleman’s	  paper	  The	  Centered	  
Self	  (In	  Self	  to	  Self,	  2006).	  For	  discussion	  on	  the	  contribution	  of	  our	  desire	  for	  consistency,	  
see	  What	  Happens	  when	  Someone	  Acts	  (1992)	  and	  From	  Self	  Psychology	  to	  Moral	  
Philosophy	  (2000).	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economicus48.	  For	  instance,	  we	  try	  to	  make	  the	  best	  of	  our	  misfortune,	  make	  
lemonade	  out	  of	  lemons,	  but,	  “if	  life	  hands	  you	  a	  lemon,	  the	  instrumentally	  rational	  
course	  may	  be	  to	  throw	  it	  away	  and	  look	  for	  a	  kumquat	  instead”	  (2007,	  p.	  286).	  If	  
agents	  are	  narrative	  creatures,	  however,	  then	  their	  life	  consists	  of	  rich	  emotional	  
meaning,	  where	  bad	  events	  are	  made	  sense	  of	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  comes	  afterwards.	  
This	  is	  why	  we	  try	  to	  make	  lemonade,	  rather	  than	  finding	  a	  sweeter	  fruit.	  	  
This	  contrast	  distils	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  account	  I	  favour	  and	  G&K’s	  
account.	  While	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  narrative	  agency	  is	  of	  central	  importance,	  G&K	  
make	  causal-­‐psychological	  agency	  at	  least	  as	  important.	  	  
	   	  However,	  implicit	  in	  their	  account,	  and	  to	  be	  argued	  for	  by	  me,	  is	  an	  idea	  
that	  these	  two	  senses	  of	  agency	  are	  continuous.	  Velleman,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
thinks	  that	  a	  causal-­‐psychological	  and	  a	  narrative	  account	  of	  agency	  both	  provide	  
independent	  contributions	  to	  our	  capacity	  for	  agency:	  
To	  the	  question	  how	  I	  reconcile	  narrative	  and	  causal-­‐psychological	  self-­‐
understanding,	  then,	  the	  answer	  is	  that,	  to	  some	  extent,	  I	  don’t…	  At	  the	  
theoretical	  level	  they	  constitute,	  in	  my	  view,	  independent	  and	  potentially	  
competing	  modes	  of	  practical	  reasoning49	  (2007,	  p.	  287.)	  
	  
	   On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if,	  as	  I	  will	  argue,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  our	  capacity	  for	  
causal-­‐psychological	  reasoning	  depends	  on	  narrative	  understanding,	  then	  
whatever	  contribution	  our	  psychological-­‐causal	  reasoning	  makes	  to	  agency	  
will	  partly	  depend	  on	  what	  narrative	  understanding	  contributes.	  This	  makes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Homo	  economicus	  being	  a	  term	  describing	  the	  view	  that	  humans	  are	  rational,	  and	  that	  
their	  rationality	  consists	  in	  economic	  reasoning	  i.e.	  balancing	  costs	  and	  benefits.	  	  
49	  Velleman	  doesn’t	  make	  clear	  why	  he	  thinks	  these	  types	  of	  understanding	  are	  
independent	  and	  sometimes	  competing.	  He	  does,	  at	  one	  point,	  contrast	  instrumental	  
reasoning,	  where	  it	  appears	  irrational	  to	  invest	  in	  projects	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  failing,	  to	  a	  
narrative	  approach.	  When	  he	  does	  this,	  he	  seems	  to	  understand	  instrumental	  reasoning	  as	  
understanding	  “our	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  motivating	  aims”	  (p.	  285).	  Since	  this	  is	  a	  case	  
of	  metarepresentation,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  he	  thinks	  of	  causal-­‐psychological	  reasoning	  and	  
instrumental	  reasoning	  as	  integrated	  or	  the	  same	  process.	  In	  which	  case,	  we	  can	  
understand	  his	  statement	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  causal-­‐psychological	  
understanding	  are	  independent	  and	  sometimes	  competing	  as	  supported	  by	  the	  suggestion	  
that	  causal-­‐psychological	  understanding	  and	  narrative	  understanding	  offer	  competing	  
answers	  to	  questions	  such	  as	  whether	  we	  should	  continue	  to	  invest	  in	  currently	  failing	  
projects.	  But	  it	  seems	  false	  that	  their	  answers	  must	  be	  competing:	  causal-­‐psychological	  
understanding	  can	  incorporate	  our	  awareness	  of	  our	  narrative	  tendencies.	  For	  example,	  if	  
I	  explicitly	  realise	  that	  I	  need	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  where	  my	  current	  actions	  make	  sense	  in	  terms	  
of	  my	  past	  commitments	  then	  my	  causal-­‐psychological	  understanding	  does	  not	  compete	  
with	  narrative	  understanding.	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narrative	  understanding	  the	  more	  fundamental	  ingredient	  in	  our	  theory	  of	  
agency,	  and	  makes	  our	  theory	  of	  agency	  coherent.	  
	  
2.2. Reconciling	  narrative	  &	  causal-­‐psychological	  understanding	  
What	  may	  already	  have	  started	  to	  come	  into	  view	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapter	  is	  how	  
these	  two	  capacities,	  that	  Velleman	  (2007)	  thinks	  of	  as	  “independent	  and	  
potentially	  competing	  modes	  of	  practical	  reasoning”,	  are	  actually	  integrated.	  There	  
I	  suggested	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  self-­‐narrative	  in	  three	  ways.	  First,	  all	  narrative	  
understanding,	  including	  narratives	  about	  lives	  and	  events	  that	  are	  ostensibly	  
nothing	  to	  do	  with	  you,	  are	  self-­‐narratives,	  because	  all	  narrative	  understanding	  
includes	  a	  prereflective	  sense	  of	  self.	  Then	  there	  is	  the	  type	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  involved	  in	  MTT.	  That	  is,	  understanding	  narratives	  about	  your	  own	  
past	  and	  future.	  Finally,	  there	  are	  metarepresentational	  narratives,	  where	  you	  
explicitly	  represent	  yourself	  as	  a	  psychological	  being	  leading	  your	  life50.	  	  
	   Causal-­‐psychological	  understanding,	  in	  this	  way,	  is	  the	  third	  type	  of	  
narrative.	  We	  understand	  ourselves	  as	  psychological	  beings	  insofar	  as	  we	  
understand	  ourselves	  as	  having	  a	  particular	  perspective	  that	  is	  continuous	  through	  
time.	  Just	  like	  we	  can	  wonder	  about	  the	  intentions	  of	  characters	  in	  novels	  and	  soap	  
operas,	  we	  can	  wonder	  ‘what	  am	  I	  up	  to?’.	  	  
To	  take	  a	  reflective	  stance	  towards	  ourselves	  in	  this	  way	  first	  requires	  us	  to	  
have	  a	  perspective	  to	  reflect	  on.	  Specifically,	  to	  have	  a	  perspective	  we	  identify	  as	  
our	  perspective.	  And	  to	  have	  a	  perspective	  we	  identify	  as	  our	  perspective	  we	  need	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  experience	  our	  perspective	  as	  continuous	  through	  time.	  This	  is	  what	  
happens	  in	  MTT:	  we	  experience	  our	  self	  as	  the	  agent/character	  for	  whom	  there	  are	  
beliefs,	  motivations,	  and	  specific	  attitudes.	  We	  thus	  implicitly	  experience	  ourself	  as	  
a	  diachronic	  agent.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50	  There	  is	  a	  further	  issue	  of	  whether	  even	  the	  implicit	  self-­‐awareness	  present	  in	  all	  
narrative	  is	  in	  some	  sense	  metarepresentational,	  i.e.	  a	  representation	  of	  a	  psychological	  
subject.	  Someone	  like	  Damasio	  (1999)	  might	  have	  such	  a	  view	  where	  we	  become	  
prereflectively	  aware	  of	  ourselves	  only	  when	  our	  brain	  represents	  our	  body	  as	  being	  
altered	  by	  an	  object.	  However,	  I	  take	  this	  debate,	  about	  neural	  representation,	  to	  be	  
orthogonal	  to	  my	  purposes	  here.	  For	  my	  purposes,	  metarepresentation	  means	  being	  
explicitly	  aware	  of	  representational	  states,	  like	  beliefs,	  as	  representational	  states.	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Our	  ability	  to	  reflect	  on	  ourselves	  as	  causal-­‐psychological	  beings	  may	  
involve	  additional	  capacities	  aside	  from	  narrative	  understanding.	  But	  without	  first	  
experiencing	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  diachronic	  psychological	  being	  this	  stance	  would	  
be	  incomprehensible,	  for	  there	  would	  be	  no	  content	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  
a	  psychological	  thing	  is.	  What	  a	  psychological	  thing	  has	  to	  fundamentally	  consist	  in	  
is	  a	  thing	  for	  which	  there	  is	  a	  single	  perspective	  across	  time	  and	  situations.	  It	  is	  
hard	  to	  understand	  something	  as	  having	  a	  mind	  that	  does	  not	  involve	  the	  idea	  of	  
an	  entity	  that	  exists	  through	  time,	  makes	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  in	  a	  relatively	  
systematic	  way51,	  and	  where	  the	  sense-­‐making,	  because	  it	  is	  that	  of	  a	  single	  entity,	  
persists	  through	  different	  contexts	  and	  times,	  with	  the	  entity.	  Narrative	  
understanding,	  where	  we	  experience	  the	  perspective	  on	  a	  diachronic	  psychological	  
creature,	  gives	  content	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  ourselves	  as	  psychological	  
creatures.	  	  
We	  saw	  this	  earlier	  with	  Samina.	  Samina,	  remember,	  has	  amnesia	  but	  has	  
not	  lost	  her	  ability	  to	  understand	  events	  narratively.	  Once	  she	  has	  narrative	  
understanding,	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  a	  perspective	  on	  and	  in	  a	  sequence	  of	  events,	  
she	  knows	  what	  it	  is	  to	  exist	  as	  a	  diachronic	  psychological	  agent.	  She	  doesn’t	  even	  
have	  to	  engage	  in	  MTT	  to	  do	  this,	  she	  could	  read	  Harry	  Potter	  instead.	  But	  it	  is	  the	  
capacity	  for	  narrative	  understanding	  that	  means	  that	  she	  can	  represent	  a	  being	  as	  
a	  psychological	  being	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  She	  could	  not	  represent	  this,	  in	  that	  
‘psychological	  being’	  could	  not	  refer	  for	  her,	  if	  she	  did	  not	  first	  have	  an	  implicit	  
understanding	  of	  there	  being	  things	  which	  could	  have	  a	  perspective,	  and	  could	  
have	  a	  perspective	  through	  time.	  Because	  she	  has	  narrative	  understanding,	  that	  is,	  
because	  she	  can	  experience	  a	  perspective	  as	  existing	  through	  time,	  Samina	  can	  
represent	  that	  perspective	  as	  a	  perspective.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  implicit	  
understanding,	  or	  the	  experience	  of,	  a	  diachronic	  perspective	  is	  prior	  to	  
metarepresentation.	  Metarepresentations	  depends	  on	  narrative	  understanding.	  	  
We	  may	  wonder	  why	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  Samina	  has	  narrative	  
understanding.	  Why	  is	  it	  important	  that	  she	  inhabit	  counterfactuals,	  when	  she	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  We	  can	  even	  wonder	  whether	  the	  idea	  of	  something	  making	  sense	  implies	  
systematicity.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  understand	  how	  we	  can	  understand	  anything	  as	  meaningful	  
without	  some	  ability	  to	  understand	  how	  different	  things	  are	  related	  to	  each	  other.	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inhabits	  a	  sequence	  of	  factual	  situations?	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  it	  would	  be	  possible,	  
without	  the	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  understanding,	  that	  a	  creature	  can	  go	  through	  a	  
sequence	  of	  events	  without	  experiencing	  diachronicity.	  What	  is	  sometimes	  called	  a	  
‘minimal’	  or	  ‘core’	  sense	  of	  self	  can	  consist	  in	  an	  awareness	  of	  the	  moment	  and	  
perhaps	  the	  proximal	  past	  and	  future	  (e.g	  .Damasio,	  1999;	  Metzinger,	  2004),	  
without	  any	  real	  experience	  of	  a	  continued	  experience	  through	  time.	  Narrative	  
understanding,	  by	  contrast,	  requires	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  perspective	  continuing	  
through	  a	  sequence	  of	  events,	  events	  that	  are	  non-­‐actual	  and	  distal52.	  This	  is	  the	  
type	  of	  perspective	  we	  associate	  with	  complex	  psychological	  beings	  such	  as	  
ourselves,	  beings	  with	  desires,	  beliefs,	  hopes	  and	  goals.	  	  	  	  
A	  possible	  objection	  to	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  a	  
perspective	  is	  needed	  for	  one	  to	  be	  able	  to	  metarepresent,	  is	  that	  it	  doesn’t	  
generally	  seem	  necessary	  to	  understand	  what	  it	  is	  like	  to	  be	  something	  to	  
understand	  that	  thing.	  One	  can	  understand	  a	  square	  without	  inhabiting	  
squareness.	  Note	  however,	  that	  subjectivity	  is	  (in)famously	  not	  analogous	  in	  this	  
regard53.	  There	  is	  something	  it	  is	  like	  to	  inhabit	  a	  perspective	  that	  isn’t	  exhausted	  
by	  explaining	  it	  from	  a	  third-­‐person	  perspective	  (e.g.	  Jackson,	  1982;	  Nagel,	  1974;	  
Taylor,	  1983).	  	  Similarly,	  to	  theorise	  about	  the	  goals	  one	  pursues	  over	  time,	  one	  
must	  first	  experience	  oneself	  as	  existing	  as	  an	  embodied	  perspective	  through	  time.	  
Because	  this	  is	  the	  type	  of	  thing	  it	  takes	  to	  exist	  for	  goals	  to	  exist.	  Goals	  are	  not	  
free-­‐floating.	  They	  belong	  to	  some	  thing	  for	  which	  there	  is	  a	  future.	  And,	  as	  we	  
have	  seen	  in	  chapter	  2,	  to	  be	  a	  thing	  for	  which	  there	  is	  a	  future	  is	  an	  important	  
aspect	  of	  diachronic	  agency.	  	  
What	  I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  above	  is	  that	  we	  have	  conceptual	  reasons	  for	  
thinking	  that	  causal-­‐psychological	  thinking	  piggybacks	  on	  perspectival	  narrative	  
thinking.	  	  In	  the	  strongest	  form,	  this	  is	  proposed	  as	  an	  argument	  from	  necessity:	  it	  
just	  doesn’t	  seem	  possible	  to	  conceive	  of	  a	  diachronic	  perspective	  if	  we	  haven’t	  
first	  experienced	  ourselves	  as	  being	  a	  diachronic	  perspective.	  At	  the	  least,	  
engaging	  in	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  a	  good	  way	  to	  explain	  how	  we	  
metarepresent,	  even	  if	  it	  may	  not	  be	  a	  necessary	  move.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  That	  is,	  not	  just	  about	  the	  happen	  the	  very	  next	  moment.	  
53	  To	  be	  clear,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  acknowledge	  this	  while	  being	  a	  materialist.	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This	  is	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  an	  agent.	  We	  saw	  in	  the	  
last	  chapter	  that	  G&K,	  and	  those	  they	  take	  themselves	  as	  following	  –	  Velleman,	  
Korsgaard	  and	  Bratman	  –	  all	  argue	  that	  our	  causal-­‐psychological	  capacities	  can	  
explain	  agency.	  What	  we	  have	  seen	  now	  is	  that	  we	  have	  conceptual	  reasons	  to	  
think	  that	  such	  explicit	  awareness	  is	  enabled	  by	  narrative	  understanding.	  Thus	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  explanatory	  how	  metarepresentation	  is	  possible.	  As	  we	  
saw	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  there	  is	  some	  empirical	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  problems	  
with	  narrative	  thinking	  co-­‐occurs	  with	  problems	  with	  making	  and	  acting	  on	  
decisions.	  What	  swings	  the	  debate	  in	  my	  favour	  is	  that	  the	  upcoming	  arguments	  
that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  sufficient	  for	  unifying	  our	  selves,	  and	  that	  
emphasis	  on	  metarepresentational	  capacities	  doesn’t	  categorise	  the	  right	  people	  as	  
agents.	  	  
There	  is	  an	  issue	  I	  have	  not	  addressed	  yet,	  that	  I	  will	  take	  up	  in	  the	  next	  
subsection.	  That	  is,	  metarepresentation,	  through	  allowing	  us	  to	  focus	  on	  our	  
psychological	  processes,	  is	  often	  taken	  as	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  be	  self-­‐consistent,	  
which	  in	  turn	  is	  needed	  for	  agency.	  It	  is	  not	  (yet)	  clear	  how	  narrative	  
understanding,	  which	  does	  not	  involve	  reasoning	  about	  ourselves	  as	  psychological	  
creatures,	  can	  do	  this.	  	  
Yet	  a	  final	  potential	  flaw	  in	  my	  proposal	  arises	  when	  I	  combine	  my	  
reasoning	  above	  with	  a	  claim	  from	  my	  last	  chapter,	  that	  the	  ventromedial	  
prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC)	  is	  important	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  
and	  with	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  EVR,	  who	  had	  a	  vmPFC	  lesion,	  performs	  at	  
least	  as	  well	  as	  controls	  on	  tasks	  to	  do	  with	  social	  cognition.	  Saver	  &	  Damasio	  
(1991)	  conclude	  that	  “damage	  to	  the	  ventromedial	  frontal	  sector	  does	  not	  
compromise	  the	  activation	  and	  manipulation	  of	  neural	  records	  that	  define	  the	  
varied	  parameters	  of	  social	  knowledge	  e.g.	  social	  rules,	  current	  contingencies,	  
possible	  response	  options	  and	  future	  outcomes”	  (p.	  1245).	  If	  vmPFC	  is,	  on	  my	  
theory,	  crucial	  for	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  a	  
condition	  on	  the	  possibility	  for	  metarepresentational	  narrative,	  then	  the	  capacity	  
of	  a	  person	  who	  has	  a	  vmPFC	  lesion	  to	  engage	  in	  reasoning	  about	  what	  people	  do	  
in	  what	  contexts,	  and	  what	  the	  outcomes	  are	  of	  actions,	  may	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	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my	  account.	  One	  explanation	  for	  EVR’s	  success	  is	  that	  he	  is	  representing	  people’s	  
mental	  state	  while	  having	  a	  deficit	  in	  narrative	  understanding.	  	  
However,	  because	  this	  interpretation	  is	  counter	  to	  a	  wealth	  of	  other	  
empirical	  considerations,	  which	  are	  supported	  by	  a	  coherent	  theory,	  there	  is	  a	  
motive	  to	  account	  for	  this	  data	  through	  other	  means.	  These	  include:	  
• Noting	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  precisely	  what	  part	  the	  vmPFC	  is	  playing	  in	  
humans,	  and	  while	  it	  seems	  important	  in	  the	  normal	  case,	  it	  may	  be	  
that	  there	  are	  other	  brain	  regions	  that	  perform	  similar	  enough	  
functions.	  For	  example,	  Ferstl	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  found	  in	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  
that	  one	  section	  of	  the	  vmPFC	  and	  one	  section	  of	  the	  dorsomedial	  
PFC	  (another	  part	  of	  the	  medial	  PFC)	  were	  active	  in	  discourse	  
understanding.	  Thus	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  an	  adjacent	  region	  is	  also	  
significantly	  contributing	  to	  overlapping	  abilities.	  	  
• It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  EVR	  is	  using	  metarepresentation.	  The	  vmPFC	  does	  
normally	  seem	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  metarepresentation	  because	  it	  is	  
active	  when	  understanding	  another’s	  cognitive	  perspective	  (Walter,	  
2012).	  In	  light	  of	  this	  we	  might	  understand	  EVR	  as	  predicting	  other	  
people’s	  behaviour	  by	  learning	  regularities	  between	  cause	  and	  affect	  
that	  do	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  representation	  of	  psychology.	  	  
• The	  evidence	  above	  implies,	  at	  the	  least,	  a	  developmental	  story.	  
Here,	  one	  first	  has	  to	  understand	  having	  a	  perspective	  through	  time	  
before	  one	  can	  understand	  a	  metarepresentational	  narrative.	  Since	  
EVR’s	  lesion	  happened	  later	  in	  life,	  he	  had	  developed	  
metarepresentation	  already,	  and	  this	  capacity	  might	  thus	  be	  
distributed	  far	  wider	  than	  just	  the	  vmPFC.	  If	  we	  accept	  that	  certain	  
capacities	  may	  be	  enabled	  by	  widely	  distributed	  brain	  regions,	  then,	  
while	  a	  particular	  area	  might	  be	  initially	  pivotal	  in	  the	  development	  
of	  a	  capacity,	  and,	  in	  the	  normal	  case,	  may	  remain	  in	  use,	  we	  can	  
understand	  how	  ‘graceful	  degradation’	  could	  be	  possible	  when	  one	  
part	  of	  the	  distributed	  network	  enabling	  a	  capacity	  is	  removed.	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• Remembering	  that	  the	  brain	  is	  highly	  malleable,	  it	  is	  plausible	  that	  
some	  parts	  of	  the	  brain	  take	  over	  activities	  normally	  associated	  with	  
other	  parts	  in	  the	  case	  of	  lesions	  (Hurley	  &	  Noë,	  2003).	  
These	  explanations	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  Regions	  other	  than	  the	  
vmPFC	  are	  likely	  involved	  in	  enabling	  the	  understanding	  of	  behavioural	  sequences,	  
and	  either	  through	  development	  and/or	  through	  a	  response	  to	  lesions,	  other	  areas	  
may	  compensate	  for	  the	  function	  initially	  strongly	  dependent	  on	  the	  vmPFC.	  While	  
these	  regions	  may	  enable	  some	  sense	  of	  a	  diachronic	  perspective,	  this	  may	  be	  an	  
impoverished	  sense,	  but	  one	  that	  is	  ameliorated	  for	  EVR	  by	  a	  strong	  behaviourist	  
understanding	  of	  human	  interaction.	  	  
	  Moreover,	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  chapter	  3	  that	  EVR,	  in	  regards	  to	  his	  own	  
situation,	  can	  theorise	  about	  what	  to	  do	  while	  not	  be	  able	  to	  turn	  that	  into	  action.	  
This	  indicates	  that	  while	  there	  are	  surface	  similarities	  between	  his	  capacity	  to	  
explain	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  and	  those	  without	  vmPFC	  lesions,	  there	  are	  some	  
differences	  too.	  For	  most	  adults,	  providing	  a	  description	  of	  how	  to	  make	  friends	  
involves	  some	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  execute	  the	  actions	  involved	  in	  this	  
situation,	  whereas	  for	  EVR	  it	  means	  nothing	  to	  him	  in	  terms	  of	  behaviour.	  This,	  I	  
believe,	  is	  because	  of	  a	  deficit	  in	  how	  his	  explanation	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  is	  
connected	  to	  a	  perspectival,	  embodied	  stance,	  or,	  at	  least,	  how	  richly	  embodied	  
this	  stance	  is.	  	  
	  
Not	  only	  is	  there	  something	  parsimonious	  in	  explaining	  why	  apparently	  different	  
processes	  are	  actually	  continuous,	  there	  is	  also	  some	  additional	  explanatory	  value	  
that	  comes	  from	  explaining	  one	  process	  partly	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  other.	  For	  instance,	  
we	  can	  explain	  how	  causal-­‐psychological	  processes	  motivate:	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  
that	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  motivates.	  This	  is	  something	  that	  G&K	  indicate.	  
Causal-­‐psychological	  reasoning	  motivates	  when	  the	  decisions	  we	  come	  to	  through	  
it	  incorporate	  a	  sense	  that	  the	  perspective	  in	  the	  future,	  for	  which	  these	  decisions	  
will	  matter,	  is	  ours.	  That	  the	  actions	  we	  take	  now	  will,	  through	  narrative,	  affective,	  
embodied	  continuity,	  become	  the	  future	  we	  aim	  to	  live.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  there	  might	  be	  something	  special	  about	  
psychological	  narratives.	  While	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  go	  into	  depth	  about	  this,	  we	  get	  an	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indication	  of	  what	  this	  might	  be	  with	  the	  example	  of	  Pablo	  who	  believes	  he	  is	  not	  
sexist	  but	  has	  come	  to	  realise	  he	  has	  some	  implicit	  sexist	  attitudes,	  which	  in	  turn	  
cause	  some	  sexist	  behaviours.	  Pablo’s	  introspective	  narrative	  enables	  him	  to	  
recognise	  the	  distance	  between	  his	  judgements	  between	  how	  he	  ought	  to	  act	  (not	  
being	  sexist)	  and	  his	  current	  behaviour.	  He	  can	  determine	  ways	  for	  his	  behaviour	  
to	  be	  more	  in	  line	  with	  his	  narrative,	  so	  he	  doesn’t	  act	  in	  sexist	  ways.	  In	  some	  
cases,	  bringing	  our	  behaviour	  more	  in	  line	  with	  how	  we	  understand	  ourselves	  to	  
be	  may	  be	  possible	  through	  reflection	  and	  self-­‐control.	  Pablo	  might	  think	  more	  
carefully	  about	  whether	  some	  of	  his	  beliefs	  and	  values	  contradict	  his	  
egalitarianism	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  be	  more	  coherent	  and	  renew	  his	  commitment	  to	  
egalitarianism	  (a	  strong	  commitment	  to	  egalitarianism	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  
implicit	  attitudes	  affecting	  behaviour	  (Moskowitz	  &	  Li,	  2011)).	  In	  other	  cases	  we	  
may	  avoid	  certain	  environments	  (e.g.	  if	  one	  is	  a	  recovering	  alcoholic	  who	  has	  
realised	  that	  when	  they	  go	  to	  a	  pub	  they	  desire	  drink)	  or	  change	  our	  environment	  
(Pablo	  might	  plaster	  counter-­‐stereotypical	  images	  of	  women	  around	  his	  house,	  as	  
this	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  alter	  implicit	  gender	  biases	  (Blair,	  2002)).	  That	  is,	  
narratives	  about	  our	  own	  psychology	  may	  enhance	  our	  capacity	  to	  do	  what	  would	  
make	  sense,	  given	  our	  understanding	  of	  who	  we	  are.	  	  
	  
2.3. Narrative	  understanding	  in	  agency	  
What	  I	  have	  argued	  above	  is	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  
metarepresentational	  self-­‐understanding	  are	  not	  entirely	  distinct.	  Instead,	  the	  
latter	  depends	  upon,	  and	  makes	  use	  of,	  the	  former.	  Further,	  there	  is	  some	  
explanatory	  value	  once	  we	  see	  it	  this	  way:	  we	  can	  understand	  why	  our	  
metarepresentational	  narratives	  motivate	  action.	  Now	  I	  explain	  why	  narrative	  
understanding,	  the	  more	  basic	  of	  the	  two,	  is	  sufficient	  for	  agency.	  That	  is,	  the	  
former	  section	  established	  that	  metarepresentation	  is	  enabled	  by	  narrative	  
understanding,	  but	  it	  neither	  established	  that	  metarepresentation	  wasn’t	  a	  vital	  
development	  in	  our	  narrative	  capacities,	  nor	  explained	  how	  narrative	  
understanding	  could	  be	  sufficient	  for	  agency.	  	  
	  Remember	  that,	  here,	  agency	  is	  doing	  what	  would	  make	  sense	  in	  light	  of	  
the	  type	  of	  thing	  we	  are.	  Velleman	  argues	  that	  we	  can	  do	  this	  either	  through	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narrative	  understanding	  or	  causal-­‐psychological	  understanding.	  Both	  of	  these	  are	  
meant	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  form	  a	  coherent	  perspective	  from	  which	  to	  experience	  the	  
world,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  choose	  plans	  and	  actions	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  who	  we	  
are.	  It	  is	  our	  drive	  for	  our	  actions	  to	  make	  sense	  that	  explains	  how	  we	  can	  act	  for	  
reasons.	  We	  care	  about	  being	  coherent,	  so	  it	  is	  in	  light	  of	  some	  narrative	  
understanding	  of	  ourselves,	  or	  some	  explicit	  expression	  of	  who	  we	  are,	  that	  we	  
make	  plans	  and	  goals.	  For	  Velleman,	  these	  are	  two	  separate	  ways	  that	  we	  can	  
become	  coherent,	  although	  he	  suggests	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  use	  both.	  In	  contrast,	  what	  I	  
am	  suggesting	  is	  that	  causal-­‐psychological	  understanding	  becomes	  possible	  
through	  narrative	  understanding.	  	  
Similar	  to	  Velleman,	  G&K	  see	  agency	  as	  involving	  both	  causal-­‐psychological	  
and	  narrative	  understanding.	  There	  are	  some	  reasons	  why	  one	  might	  think	  that	  
metarepresentation,	  and	  not	  just	  non-­‐metarepresentational	  narrative,	  may	  be	  
necessary	  for	  this.	  To	  act	  in	  light	  of	  who	  we	  are	  requires	  that	  who	  we	  are	  is	  
relatively	  consistent.	  As	  Korsgaard	  (1989)	  notes,	  we	  need	  to	  be	  relatively	  unified	  
so	  that	  we	  can	  choose	  how	  to	  act.	  Otherwise,	  contradictory	  plans	  and	  projects	  
present	  themselves	  to	  us,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  resolve	  them.	  The	  fact	  that	  we	  act	  
at	  all	  shows	  that	  there	  was	  a	  way	  to	  decide	  between	  alternatives.	  The	  question	  is:	  
what	  is	  it	  that	  helps	  us	  to	  decide	  to	  pursue	  one	  course	  of	  action	  rather	  than	  all	  the	  
other	  possibilities?	  Explicit	  understanding	  of	  ourselves	  might	  avail	  us	  here.	  
Because	  it	  seems	  that	  it	  is	  through	  thinking	  about	  who	  we	  are	  explicitly	  that	  we	  are	  
most	  likely	  to	  spot	  contradictions	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  ourselves	  and	  form	  a	  
coherent	  sense	  of	  self.	  	  
In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	  psychological-­‐causal	  understanding	  is	  not	  
crucial	  to	  agency	  because	  it	  is	  not	  crucial	  to	  having	  a	  unified	  self.	  	  Narrative	  
understanding	  can	  do	  the	  heavy	  lifting	  in	  explaining	  how	  we	  can	  come	  to	  a	  
consistent	  self-­‐understanding	  on	  which	  we	  can	  act	  on.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  I	  depart	  from	  
the	  causal-­‐psychological	  account	  that	  G&K	  give	  of	  agency.	  
	   My	  central	  observation	  here	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  think	  about	  ourselves	  
as	  psychological	  creatures	  to	  have	  a	  unified	  perspective	  on	  the	  world.	  We	  can	  think	  
about	  the	  world,	  and	  make	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  consistent.	  What	  
133	   	  
follows	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  makes	  
possible	  a	  unified	  agent.	  	  
The	  first	  thing	  to	  point	  out,	  is	  that	  the	  pre-­‐reflective	  nature	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  draws	  self-­‐understanding	  and	  world-­‐understanding	  together.	  They	  
are	  two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  affective,	  relational,	  nature	  of	  
embodiment:	  inhabiting	  a	  series	  of	  events	  means	  understanding	  what	  those	  events	  
mean	  to	  you.	  The	  final	  perspective	  we	  end	  up	  with	  in	  a	  narrative	  implicitly	  tells	  us	  
something	  about	  ourselves	  (what	  something	  means	  for	  us)	  and	  something	  about	  
nature	  of	  the	  situation	  (the	  type	  of	  stuff	  out	  there,	  where	  ‘type’	  depends	  on	  how	  it	  
relates	  to	  oneself).	  So	  self-­‐understanding	  and	  world	  understanding	  happen	  in	  
tandem	  in	  narrative	  understanding.	  	  
	   The	  second	  point	  to	  draw	  out	  is	  that	  narrative	  understanding,	  on	  my	  
account,	  involves	  a	  recombinant	  system,	  and	  not	  just	  affect.	  I	  will	  briefly	  explain	  
this	  here,	  but	  it	  will	  be	  developed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  A	  recombinant	  system,	  in	  
this	  context,	  is	  any	  system	  that	  allows	  the	  offline	  recombination	  of	  parts,	  which	  
may	  include	  intentions	  and	  perceptions,	  and	  means	  and	  ends	  (Hurley,	  2003;	  
2008).	  Narrative	  understanding	  involves	  employing	  a	  recombinant	  system	  to	  take	  
us	  through	  the	  sequence	  of	  events.	  Further,	  some	  narrative	  understanding	  involves	  
recombinant	  systems,	  such	  as	  language,	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  reflect	  and	  draw	  
inferences.	  In	  this	  case,	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  under	  intentional	  control.	  
This	  is	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  interpretive	  creatures	  that	  I	  claim	  
we	  are	  in	  the	  next	  chapter:	  that	  the	  stories	  we	  understand,	  by	  their	  nature,	  are	  
always	  open	  to	  revision.	  But	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case	  then	  we	  need	  to	  be	  clear	  that	  
‘narrative	  understanding’,	  when	  it	  uses	  a	  system	  like	  language,	  is	  really	  shorthand	  
for	  ‘narrative	  understanding	  and	  production’.	  Understanding	  narratives	  relies	  on	  
the	  capacities	  needed	  to	  produce	  a	  narrative.	  A	  creature	  who	  understands	  
narratives	  is	  understanding	  how	  parts	  are	  organised	  to	  produce	  a	  whole.	  Such	  an	  
understanding	  can	  be	  actively	  deployed	  to	  produce	  a	  narrative	  too.	  	  
This	  is	  supported	  by	  neurological	  literature.	  Mar	  (2004)	  reviewed	  and	  
compared	  stories	  showing	  which	  brain	  regions	  are	  active	  in	  story	  comprehension	  
and	  production.	  He	  found	  there	  was	  large	  overlap:	  “few	  regions	  appear	  to	  be	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associated	  uniquely	  with	  comprehension	  or	  production”	  (p.	  1424).	  Further,	  he	  
claims	  that,	  	  
There	  is	  a	  good	  theoretic	  reason	  why	  narrative	  comprehension	  and	  
production	  should	  be	  related…at	  the	  level	  of	  narrative	  the	  ability	  to	  
organise	  the	  meaning	  of	  connected	  sentences	  in	  order	  to	  form	  holistic	  
representations	  for	  either	  understanding	  or	  communication	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  
shared	  necessity.	  (p.	  1424-­‐1425.)	  	  
	  
So,	  in	  fact,	  narrative	  understanding,	  to	  some	  extent,	  depends	  on	  the	  capacity	  for	  
production.	  To	  understand	  a	  narrative	  one	  has	  to	  be	  able	  to	  construct	  for	  oneself	  
the	  sequence	  of	  events.	  	  While	  this	  may	  be	  done	  passively,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  one	  is	  
constructing	  for	  oneself	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  through	  listening	  to	  someone	  else	  tell	  
a	  story,	  it	  can	  also	  be	  done	  actively,	  as	  when	  one	  creates	  a	  new	  narrative.	  	  
It	  matters	  that	  we	  can	  produce	  narratives	  using	  language,	  because	  language	  
–	  in	  allowing	  inferential	  promiscuity,	  productivity	  and	  systematicity54	  –	  enables	  
the	  capacity	  to	  create	  and	  maintain	  coherence.	  However,	  this	  is	  the	  case	  regardless	  
of	  what	  we	  are	  using	  language	  to	  describe.	  Because	  we	  can	  manipulate	  language	  
and	  draw	  inferences	  from	  it,	  when	  we	  use	  it	  to	  understand	  the	  world,	  we	  come	  to	  
coherent	  and	  novel	  descriptions	  of	  the	  world.	  For	  example,	  if	  I	  believe	  that	  all	  
living	  things	  die,	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  my	  spider	  plant	  is	  a	  living	  thing,	  then	  I	  can	  infer	  
that	  my	  spider	  plant	  will	  die.	  	  
Stories	  have	  this	  structure	  too.	  Stories	  do	  not	  just	  make	  sense	  
experientially,	  to	  some	  extent,	  they	  make	  sense	  logically55.	  If	  Harry	  is	  the	  hero,	  and	  
Voldemort	  is	  a	  baddie,	  and	  heroes	  fight	  baddies,	  then	  Harry	  (unless	  otherwise	  
prevented)	  will	  fight	  Voldemort.	  If	  heroes	  are	  good,	  and	  good	  conquers	  bad,	  then	  
Harry	  will	  conquer	  badness.	  Narrative	  understanding	  enables	  us	  to	  form	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Inferential	  promiscuity	  means	  that	  each	  proposition	  can	  be	  combined	  with	  myriad	  
other	  propositions	  to	  form	  novel	  conclusions.	  Productivity	  is	  the	  emergence	  of	  novel	  
conclusions	  from	  those	  prior	  ones.	  Systematicity	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  inferences	  
are	  logical	  relations	  where,	  for	  example,	  contradictions	  are	  looked	  for,	  spotted	  and	  
removed.	  	  
55	  It	  may	  be	  objected	  that	  the	  ‘twist	  in	  the	  tale’	  is	  evidence	  against	  this.	  First,	  I	  am	  not	  
suggesting	  that	  narrative	  is	  always	  fully	  logical.	  More	  importantly,	  an	  unexpected	  twist	  
works	  because	  we	  are	  led	  down	  one	  inferential	  path,	  and	  then	  we	  are	  shown	  that	  another	  
one	  was	  possible.	  Events	  still	  hang	  together	  in	  the	  unexpected	  narrative.	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coherent	  perspective	  on	  the	  world	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  produces	  an	  understanding	  
of	  how	  events,	  actors	  and	  contexts	  hang	  together	  and	  causally	  interact.	  	  
It	  is	  relevant	  that,	  despite	  the	  fantasy	  often	  involved	  in	  narrative,	  the	  
sequence	  of	  cause	  and	  effect	  in	  a	  narrative	  has	  something	  to	  say	  about	  how	  we	  
understand	  the	  actual	  world.	  Once	  we	  have	  some	  understanding	  of	  how	  heroes	  act,	  
and	  we	  can	  identify	  people	  in	  our	  life	  with	  a	  similar	  character,	  we	  can	  form	  certain	  
expectations	  of	  how	  they	  will	  act,	  and	  what	  the	  pattern	  of	  cause	  and	  consequence	  
will	  be.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  start	  understanding	  our	  colleague	  as	  heroic,	  and	  then	  
we	  get	  a	  new	  tyrannical	  boss,	  we	  might	  form	  the	  expectation	  that	  our	  colleague	  
will	  stand	  up	  for	  our	  rights.	  Or,	  if	  I	  am	  a	  freedom	  fighter,	  fighting	  world	  evil,	  then	  I	  
expect	  to	  win.	  If	  my	  opponents	  are	  the	  owners	  of	  the	  means	  of	  
production/terrorists/western	  colonialists,	  and	  they	  are	  the	  source	  of	  evil,	  then	  I	  
expect	  them	  to	  be	  conquered.	  	  
We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  see	  why	  narrative	  understanding	  allows	  us	  to	  
create	  and	  sustain	  self-­‐coherence:	  
i) In	  narrative	  understanding,	  all	  experiential	  understanding	  of	  the	  
world	  also	  involves	  a	  pre-­‐reflective	  understanding	  of	  self;	  
ii) Narrative	  understanding	  comes	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  create	  and	  
maintain	  coherence	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world;	  
iii) Therefore,	  narrative	  understanding	  enables	  the	  creation	  and	  
maintenance	  of	  a	  coherent	  experiential	  understanding	  of	  self	  and	  
world.	  	  
	  Crucially,	  iii)	  follows	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  narratives	  involve	  our	  own	  lives	  
(MTT)	  or	  whether	  metarepresentation	  is	  involved.	  When	  and	  if	  narrative	  
understanding	  involves	  the	  intertwining	  of	  language	  and	  affect,	  even	  a	  story	  that	  
only	  explicitly	  focuses	  on	  the	  world,	  and	  not	  the	  self,	  will	  implicitly	  contribute	  to	  
the	  coherence	  of	  self.	  We	  form	  a	  systematic	  and	  relatively	  unified	  set	  of	  beliefs	  
about	  the	  way	  that	  the	  world	  is,	  and	  will	  unfold,	  through	  narrative.	  This	  has	  
consequences	  for	  our	  own	  actions.	  For	  example,	  Leïla	  does	  not	  have	  to	  believe	  that	  
she	  believes	  that	  sexism	  is	  wrong,	  for	  her	  to	  believe	  that	  sexism	  is	  wrong.	  And	  if	  
she	  believes	  that	  sexism	  is	  wrong,	  and	  that	  Jack	  is	  sexist,	  then	  she	  might	  decide	  
that	  she	  should	  challenge	  Jack’s	  behaviour.	  The	  action	  that	  she	  takes,	  or	  is	  disposed	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to	  take,	  may	  well	  be	  informed	  by	  background	  narrative	  scripts	  about	  how	  events	  
should	  unfold,	  such	  as	  implicitly	  taking	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  heroine	  that	  fights	  
against	  bad.	  Similarly,	  her	  understanding	  of	  what	  ‘sexism’	  consists	  of,	  and	  why	  it	  is	  
bad,	  and	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  it,	  may	  involve	  patterns	  of	  cause	  and	  consequence	  that	  
take	  a	  narrative	  form.	  
What	  matters	  about	  this	  being	  narrative	  is	  that	  the	  process	  that	  tells	  us	  
what	  events	  mean	  for	  us	  prompts	  us	  to	  act.	  Narrative	  understanding	  of	  a	  scene	  
before	  us	  and	  how	  it	  should	  play	  out	  is	  affective	  and	  so	  perspectival.	  In	  coming	  to	  
understanding	  how	  events	  cohere	  we	  also	  come	  to	  a	  coherent	  perspective	  from	  
which	  to	  understand,	  and	  respond	  to,	  those	  events.	  We	  unify	  our	  understanding	  of	  
the	  world	  to	  unify	  our	  selves.	  	  
	   What	  MTT	  and	  metarepresentation	  are	  meant	  to	  enable	  is	  a	  coherent	  self,	  
the	  organisation	  of	  our	  ideas	  and	  behaviours	  into	  a	  relatively	  unified	  whole.	  But	  
we	  can	  see	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  can	  also	  do	  this.	  It	  allows	  us	  to	  organise	  
our	  perspective	  and	  motivates	  us	  to	  act	  on	  the	  understandings	  we	  come	  to.	  On	  a	  
narrative	  using	  metarepresentation,	  Pablo	  believes	  that	  he	  believes	  that	  sexism	  is	  
wrong,	  becomes	  aware	  of	  his	  implicit	  sexist	  attitude	  and	  takes	  action	  accordingly,	  
according	  to	  his	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  how	  anti-­‐sexist	  people	  behave.	  Or	  
behaviour	  can	  be	  consistent	  with	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  without	  
metarepresentation,	  but	  through	  the	  systematicity	  and	  productivity	  of	  language,	  
combined	  with	  the	  perspectival	  nature	  of	  emotion.	  As	  when	  Leïla	  questions	  Jack	  on	  
his	  beliefs	  and	  behaviour	  because	  he	  acts	  in	  a	  sexist	  way.	  	  	  
One	  may	  worry	  that	  metarepresentation	  does	  increase	  our	  ability	  to	  be	  
consistent	  through	  time,	  because	  someone	  who	  metarepresents	  thinks	  of	  
themselves	  as	  one	  being.	  Without	  this,	  one	  could	  have	  many,	  sometimes	  
conflicting,	  context-­‐sensitive	  narratives.	  The	  potential	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  might	  
make	  one	  less	  likely	  to	  act	  consistently	  through	  time.	  	  
What	  we	  have	  to	  be	  clear	  on	  here	  is	  the	  possible	  ways	  of	  accounting	  for	  
agency.	  Velleman’s	  basic	  notion	  is	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  a	  creature	  that	  wants	  to	  be	  
intelligible	  (to	  itself).	  At	  its	  most	  basic,	  this	  does	  not	  have	  to	  involve	  diachronic	  
agency	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  making	  and	  following	  long-­‐term	  plans	  –	  what	  it	  does	  require	  
is	  a	  way	  to	  have	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  values	  and	  attitudes	  through	  which	  some	  actions,	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and	  not	  others,	  make	  sense.	  This	  will	  mean	  that	  a	  creature	  acts	  relatively	  
consistently	  through	  time	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  those	  values	  and	  attitudes	  persist.	  For	  
diachronic	  agency	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  pursuing	  plans	  and	  goals,	  some	  explicit	  
recognition	  of	  self	  seems	  necessary	  so	  that	  one	  can	  identify	  ones	  actions	  as	  part	  of	  
a	  wider	  plan	  through	  time.	  However,	  this	  understanding	  of	  self	  may	  not	  be	  
metarepresentation.	  It	  can	  be	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  body	  as	  our	  body,	  along	  with	  
the	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  that	  we	  have.	  	  
However,	  it	  seems	  that	  metarepresentation	  will	  sometimes	  help	  us	  act	  
consistently	  through	  time.	  If	  we	  are	  away	  that	  our	  current	  behaviour	  is	  being	  
influenced	  by	  factors	  that	  distort	  our	  perspective,	  for	  instance	  if	  we	  are	  drunk	  or	  
furious,	  metarepresentation	  is	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  understand	  that	  our	  current	  
perspective	  is	  uncharacteristic	  of	  our	  general	  point	  of	  view.	  This	  may	  often	  help	  to	  
steer	  our	  behaviour	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  more	  consistent	  with	  our	  norm.	  Recognising	  
that	  the	  red	  haze	  in	  front	  of	  my	  eyes	  is	  a	  result	  of	  rage	  because	  the	  toddler	  I	  look	  
after	  has	  been	  obstreperous	  all	  day	  –	  and	  that	  I	  should	  probably	  sit	  down	  and	  
recollect	  myself	  before	  I	  pursue	  my	  interactions	  with	  him	  –	  is	  a	  good	  way	  to	  
prevent	  myself	  transgressing	  from	  my	  general	  understanding	  of	  good	  childcare.	  An	  
understanding	  of	  my	  own	  psychology	  is	  very	  helpful	  here	  and	  helps	  me	  to	  be	  
consistent.	  Recognising	  times	  when	  metarepresentational	  capacities	  expand	  our	  
agency,	  however,	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  metarepresentational	  capacities	  are	  a	  
minimal	  condition	  of	  agency.	  	  
Yet	  metarepresentation	  may	  be	  limited	  in	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  facilitates	  
consistency.	  If	  it	  were	  not	  limited,	  then	  understanding	  ourselves	  as	  compassionate,	  
rational,	  and	  independently-­‐minded	  agents	  would	  be	  enough	  to	  prevent	  us	  acting	  
in	  the	  way	  that	  we	  tend	  to	  in	  the	  Milgram	  experiments56	  (1963	  &	  1974),	  and	  that	  
doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  It	  seems	  situational	  factors	  have	  quite	  a	  strong	  affect	  
on	  us,	  and	  therefore	  contribute	  to	  us	  acting	  inconsistently	  through	  time,	  regardless	  
of	  metarepresentation.	  Furthermore,	  if	  we	  can	  compare	  and	  contrast	  narratives	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  These	  are	  the	  famous	  experiments	  where	  someone	  who	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  scientist	  
informed	  participants	  that	  they	  should	  press	  a	  button	  if	  another	  person,	  who	  was	  being	  
asked	  questions,	  got	  those	  questions	  wrong.	  The	  participants	  were	  told	  that	  this	  button	  
would	  cause	  an	  electric	  shock,	  although	  this	  was	  not	  true.	  Most	  participants	  did	  what	  the	  
scientist	  had	  asked	  them	  to	  do.	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about	  the	  world,	  we	  can	  pick	  out	  inconsistencies	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  
world.	  Because	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  it	  is	  the	  consistency	  of	  our	  perspective	  that	  drives	  
the	  consistency	  of	  our	  actions,	  such	  a	  world-­‐directed	  perspective	  should	  
contribute	  to	  us	  acting	  consistently	  through	  time.	  	  
I	  think	  there	  are	  further	  merits	  to	  understanding	  narrative	  understanding,	  
rather	  than	  metarepresentation,	  as	  fundamental	  to	  agency,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  next.	  It	  
allows	  us	  to	  respond	  to	  Galen	  Strawson’s	  concern	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  
not	  an	  important	  part	  of	  most	  people’s	  psychology,	  and	  it	  does	  better	  at	  explaining	  
our	  intuitions	  concerning	  who	  counts	  as	  agents.	  This	  is	  what	  I	  turn	  to	  next.	  I	  start	  
of	  with	  elaborating	  on	  Strawson’s	  central	  insight,	  before	  explaining	  why	  a	  more	  
precise	  theory	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  defuses	  his	  criticisms	  of	  its	  contribution	  
to	  agency.	  This	  allows	  me	  to	  further	  illustrate	  my	  view,	  and	  respond	  to	  a	  
prominent	  objection	  to	  narrative	  accounts	  of	  self.	  	  
	  
	  
3.	  Criticism	  of	  narrative	  agency	  
	  
3.1.	  Counting	  in	  the	  right	  individuals	  	  	  
Galen	  Strawson,	  in	  his	  2004	  paper	  ‘Against	  Narrativity’,	  argues	  that	  explicit	  
narrative	  understanding	  of	  oneself	  is	  not	  important	  for	  selfhood.	  He	  claims	  this	  
must	  be	  true	  because	  some	  people	  have	  coherent	  selves	  without	  engaging	  in	  
(much)	  self-­‐narrative.	  In	  particular,	  they	  don’t	  engage	  in	  any	  non-­‐trivial	  sense	  of	  
narrative	  understanding.	  A	  trivial	  sense	  of	  narrative	  is	  claiming	  that,	  	  “making	  
coffee	  is	  a	  narrative	  that	  involves	  Narrativity,	  because	  you	  have	  to	  think	  ahead,	  do	  
things	  in	  the	  right	  order,	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  that	  everyday	  life	  involves	  many	  such	  
narratives”	  (p.	  430).	  For	  him,	  “Narrativity”,	  in	  the	  non-­‐trivial	  sense,	  is	  the	  ability,	  
consciously	  or	  not,	  to	  seek	  coherence	  and	  form	  in	  the	  recounting	  of	  the	  events	  of	  
one’s	  life,	  “One	  must	  have	  some	  sort	  of	  relatively	  large-­‐scale	  coherence-­‐seeking,	  
unity-­‐seeking,	  pattern-­‐seeking,	  or	  most	  generally	  [F]	  form-­‐finding	  tendency	  when	  
it	  comes	  to	  one’s	  life,	  or	  relatively	  large-­‐scale	  parts	  of	  one’s	  life”	  (p.	  441).	  One	  must	  
seek	  that	  form	  finding	  through	  a	  story-­‐telling	  structure,	  detecting	  “developmental	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coherencies”	  (p.	  443)	  and	  “deep	  personal	  constancies”	  (ibid.)	  that	  are	  present	  
through	  one’s	  life.	  	  
	   Strawson	  objects	  to	  Narrativity	  being	  necessary	  for	  selfhood	  on	  the	  grounds	  
that	  it	  isn’t	  needed	  for	  self-­‐understanding,	  and	  is	  quite	  often	  a	  hindrance	  to	  it.	  
Understanding	  oneself	  narratively	  can	  obscure	  self-­‐understanding	  due	  to	  the	  kind	  
of	  “changes,	  smoothings,	  enhancements,	  shifts	  away	  from	  the	  facts”	  (p.	  447)	  that	  
occur	  when	  we	  try	  to	  make	  our	  life	  into	  a	  narrative.	  So	  this	  activity,	  of	  weaving	  life	  
into	  narrative,	  often	  obscures	  our	  nature	  rather	  than	  illuminating	  it.	  For	  Strawson,	  
self-­‐understanding	  need	  not	  involve	  the	  putting	  together	  of	  bits	  of	  one’s	  life	  into	  a	  
narrative.	  Even	  in	  psychotherapy,	  one	  can	  benefit	  from	  learning	  about	  how	  effects	  
in	  one’s	  past	  are	  related	  to	  one’s	  current	  anxieties	  without	  having	  to	  understand	  
one’s	  history	  narratively57.	  Form-­‐finding,	  if	  necessary	  for	  agency	  because	  it	  is	  
required	  for	  self-­‐understanding,	  does	  not	  have	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  form	  of	  Narrativity.	  	  
Strawson’s	  comments	  about	  human	  psychology	  are	  important	  for	  this	  
project,	  because	  if	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  not	  a	  common	  and/or	  useful	  feature	  
of	  our	  thinking	  and	  decision-­‐making,	  then	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  claim	  it	  plays	  an	  important	  
role	  in	  agency.	  Additionally,	  his	  claim	  that	  Narrativity	  obscures	  self-­‐understanding	  
may	  appear	  to	  contradict	  my	  claim	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  the	  central	  way	  
that	  we	  have	  (implicit)	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  
	   	  I	  will	  later	  go	  on	  to	  show	  why	  Strawson’s	  claims	  against	  the	  contribution	  of	  
Narrativity	  to	  our	  psychology	  can	  be	  defused	  with	  a	  more	  detailed	  and	  
determinate	  understanding	  of	  narrative.	  For	  now	  I	  want	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  is	  right	  
about	  Strawson’s	  analysis,	  which	  has	  implications	  for	  G&K’s	  use	  of	  
metarepresentation	  in	  their	  theory	  of	  agency.	  	  
	   Strawson’s	  argument	  denies	  that	  metarepresentational	  narratives	  are	  
necessary	  for	  selfhood.	  He	  claims	  that	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  life	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  not	  
something	  he	  does,	  nor	  something	  that	  many	  other	  people	  do.	  But	  failing	  to	  do	  this	  
does	  not	  stop	  a	  person	  from	  being	  an	  agent.	  A	  psychological	  activity	  that	  many	  
adults	  never	  engage	  in	  seems	  like	  a	  bad	  candidate	  for	  an	  activity	  crucial	  for	  agency.	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  point	  out	  now	  is	  that	  it	  is	  only	  when	  we	  exclude	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Strawson	  doesn’t	  elaborate	  on	  how	  this	  is	  possible	  and	  why	  this	  possibility	  differs	  from	  
a	  narrative	  approach	  to	  therapy.	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metarepresentational	  narrative	  from	  a	  minimal	  account	  of	  agency	  that	  we	  
delineate	  the	  right	  creatures	  as	  agents.	  	  
	   If	  we	  take	  Strawson	  at	  his	  word,	  and	  agree	  that	  many	  people	  don’t	  normally	  
engage	  in	  metarepresentational	  narratives,	  it	  seems	  wrong,	  on	  that	  basis,	  to	  not	  
consider	  them	  agents.	  They	  can	  consider	  counterfactuals	  and	  decide	  how	  to	  act	  on	  
that	  bases.	  They	  can	  have	  a	  relatively	  unified	  outlook	  with	  which	  to	  assess	  and	  
respond	  to	  events.	  So	  they	  can	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  themselves	  and	  what	  matters	  to	  
them,	  and,	  through	  this,	  act	  based	  on	  these	  attitudes.	  	  
Moreover,	  we	  have	  more	  evidence	  than	  Strawson’s	  testimony	  that	  
metarepresentational	  accounts	  can’t	  make	  the	  right	  delineations	  between	  agent	  
and	  non-­‐agent.	  The	  anthropologist	  Maurice	  Bloch	  (2011)	  has	  claimed	  that	  there	  
are	  societies	  where	  people	  only	  occasionally	  engage	  in	  metarepresentational	  
thinking.	  Bloch	  notes	  that	  anthropological	  data	  has	  exposed	  that	  in	  some	  societies,	  
people	  are	  generally	  understood	  as	  “points	  in	  social	  systems,	  while	  their	  internal	  
states,	  their	  intentions,	  their	  absolute	  individuality	  and	  personal	  desires	  are	  
irrelevant”	  (p.	  4).	  This	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  a	  metarepresentational	  account,	  because	  it	  
implies	  that	  there	  are	  many	  adult	  people	  who	  are	  severely	  limited	  in	  the	  extent	  of	  
their	  agency,	  not	  because	  of	  any	  obvious	  impairment,	  but	  because	  they	  rarely	  
explicitly	  understand	  themselves	  or	  others	  in	  psychological	  terms.	  	  Nonetheless,	  
Bloch	  supports	  the	  notion	  that	  in	  all	  societies,	  people	  have	  narrative	  selves	  that	  go	  
beyond	  a	  mere	  experience	  of	  themselves	  as	  existing	  through	  time,	  to	  include	  an	  
understanding	  of	  themselves	  as	  actors	  within	  a	  social	  group,	  with	  certain	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities.	  Such	  narrative	  understanding	  needn’t	  involve	  explicit	  awareness	  
of	  psychological	  states.	  	  
Bloch’s	  levels	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  involve	  a	  different	  taxonomy	  from	  
the	  one	  that	  I	  am	  proposing.	  However,	  what	  is	  provided	  through	  Bloch’s	  account	  is	  
empirical	  data	  that	  confirms	  Strawson’s	  claim	  that	  many	  people	  rarely	  engage	  in	  
metarepresentational	  narratives.	  Yet	  these	  are	  generally	  people	  we	  would	  count	  as	  
agents	  and	  who	  have	  narrative	  understanding.	  So	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  
account,	  but	  not	  a	  metarepresentational	  account,	  counts	  the	  same	  creatures	  as	  
agents	  as	  an	  everyday	  understanding	  of	  agency.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  our	  
everyday	  understanding	  of	  agency	  should	  be	  dogmatically	  defended.	  However,	  if	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two	  accounts	  both	  explain	  some	  everyday	  category,	  but	  only	  one	  also	  ends	  up	  
counting	  in	  the	  same	  individuals	  as	  tokens	  of	  that	  category	  as	  our	  everyday	  
understanding,	  then	  we	  should	  prefer	  the	  one	  that	  meets	  both	  conditions.	  	  	  
Further,	  Bloch’s	  analysis	  gives	  us	  a	  useful	  way	  of	  understanding	  how	  we	  can	  
act	  on	  goals	  and	  plans	  without	  metarepresentation.	  If	  we	  have	  an	  implicit	  
understanding	  of	  our	  selves	  as	  existing	  through	  time,	  and	  an	  explicit	  
understanding	  of	  our	  roles	  and	  responsibilities,	  then	  we	  have	  a	  way	  to	  plan	  
without	  metarepresentation.	  For	  example,	  we	  might	  remember	  “I	  told	  my	  friend	  I	  
would	  make	  them	  dinner	  tonight”	  and	  that	  understanding	  of	  our	  plans	  gives	  us	  a	  
way	  to	  act	  on	  previous	  decisions.	  	  
However,	  one	  may	  counter	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  people	  who	  generally	  
understand	  themselves	  narratively	  through	  an	  implicit	  understanding	  of	  
themselves	  existing	  through	  time,	  and	  through	  seeing	  themselves	  as	  actors	  with	  
certain	  roles	  and	  responsibilities,	  can’t	  metarepresent,	  just	  that	  they	  generally	  
don’t.	  Both	  Bloch	  and	  Strawson	  admit	  it	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  degree.	  So,	  one	  could	  say,	  
what	  is	  important	  for	  agency	  is	  that	  one	  has	  the	  capacity,	  not	  that	  one	  exercises	  it.	  	  
This	  ignores	  the	  fact	  that	  metarepresentation	  is	  given	  a	  functional	  role	  
within	  G&K’s	  account	  of	  agency.	  G&K	  claim	  that	  what	  MTT	  contributes	  to	  agency	  
largely	  consists	  in	  endowing	  a	  creature	  with	  self-­‐knowledge	  in	  the	  light	  of	  which	  
the	  creature	  can	  act.	  	  Their	  argument	  is	  that	  through	  thinking	  about	  our	  
autobiography	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  ourselves,	  and	  can	  choose	  actions	  that	  are	  in	  
accordance	  with	  our	  self-­‐conception.	  My	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  should	  resist	  giving	  
metarepresentation	  in	  MTT	  and	  narrative	  understanding	  such	  vital	  importance.	  	  It	  
is	  clear	  that	  those	  creatures	  we	  count	  as	  agents	  frequently	  engage	  in	  narrative	  
understanding	  but	  not	  necessarily	  metarepresentation.	  And	  narrative	  
understanding,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  above,	  allows	  us	  to	  have	  a	  coherent	  self-­‐
understanding	  which	  we	  are	  motivated	  to	  act	  in	  line	  with.	  Metarepresentation,	  
although	  it	  enables	  new	  ways	  of	  forming	  coherent	  self-­‐understanding,	  isn’t	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3.2.	  Defending	  narrative	  understanding	  	  
Once	  we	  have	  the	  elaborated	  description	  of	  ‘narrative	  understanding’	  I	  have	  
presented,	  and	  we	  concede	  Strawson’s	  point	  about	  metarepresentational	  
narratives,	  we	  see	  that	  his	  objections	  towards	  narrative	  agency	  dissipate.	  	  	  
Strawson’s	  confusions	  about	  what	  defines	  ‘narrative’	  are	  shared	  by	  those	  he	  
engages	  with.	  We	  have	  seen	  above	  that	  Velleman	  alternated	  between	  causal-­‐
psychological	  and	  narrative	  explanations	  until	  Mackenzie	  (2007)	  prompted	  his	  
clarification.	  Similarly,	  G&K	  talk	  about	  diachronic	  experience	  and	  autobiographical	  
narratives	  in	  parallel	  without	  examining	  how	  they	  are	  related.	  	  
So	  we	  need	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  account	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  before	  we	  
can	  assess	  which	  of	  Strawson’s	  criticisms	  are	  valid.	  We	  now	  know	  that	  narrative	  
understanding	  can	  be	  ‘self-­‐narrative’	  minimally:	  a	  self-­‐narrative	  in	  that	  it	  contains	  
some	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  what	  things	  mean	  to	  you.	  	  We	  can	  give	  a	  more	  concrete	  
descriptions	  of	  what	  narrative	  understanding	  consists	  in,	  other	  than	  Strawson’s	  
assertion	  that	  it	  is	  ‘form-­‐finding’.	  While	  ‘form-­‐finding’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  inferential	  
coherence	  might	  be	  one	  characteristic	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  what	  is	  intrinsic	  
to	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  especially	  interesting	  about	  it,	  is	  emotional	  
cadence.	  If	  by	  ‘form-­‐finding’	  Strawson	  means	  explicit	  consideration	  of	  one’s	  life	  
and	  psychology,	  this	  isn’t	  necessary	  for	  narrative	  understanding.	  What	  becomes	  
apparent,	  then,	  is	  that	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  have	  suffered	  through	  a	  lack	  of	  
clarity	  of	  what	  defines	  ‘narrative’.	  	  
Once	  we	  have	  this	  definition	  in	  place,	  we	  have	  the	  tools	  to	  respond	  to	  
Strawson’s	  critique.	  First,	  Strawson’s	  worry	  about	  non-­‐metareprentational	  
narratives	  being	  trivial	  dissipates	  once	  we	  have	  a	  more	  determinate	  sense	  of	  what	  
we	  mean	  by	  ‘narrative	  understanding’.	  Now	  we	  understand	  that	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  
narrative	  understanding	  involves	  emotional	  cadence	  and	  a	  recombinable	  system.	  
On	  this	  account,	  coffee-­‐making,	  or	  thinking	  about	  coffee-­‐making,	  is	  narratively	  
experienced	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  it	  is	  an	  affective	  endeavour	  understood	  through	  
using	  a	  recombinable	  system.	  So,	  if	  one	  quite	  likes	  coffee	  then	  these	  activities	  may	  
be	  experienced	  only	  slightly	  narratively,	  but	  if	  one	  is	  addicted	  to	  coffee	  or	  hates	  it,	  
or	  is	  a	  passionate	  coffee	  connoisseur,	  then	  it	  will	  be	  experienced	  more	  narratively.	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Further,	  as	  mentioned	  in	  the	  last	  chapter,	  although	  an	  emotional	  cadence	  is	  
characteristic	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  once	  that	  exists,	  there	  are	  other	  
dimensions	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  sequence	  is	  narrative:	  	  
• The	  extent	  to	  which	  our	  coffee	  narrative	  results	  in	  holistic	  
understanding.	  The	  more	  parts	  of	  the	  narrative	  that	  are	  consistent	  
with	  one	  another,	  the	  more	  narrative	  it	  is.	  	  
• Whether	  this	  holistic	  understanding	  involves	  complex	  parts	  coming	  
together.	  If	  you	  are	  a	  coffee	  connoisseur,	  and	  there	  are	  many	  parts	  
and	  variables	  to	  your	  coffee	  making,	  then	  your	  narrative	  may	  be	  
richer	  gestalt.	  	  
• Whether	  we	  understand	  this	  narrative	  through	  the	  type	  of	  
recombinable	  system	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  reflect,	  i.e.	  language.	  If	  this	  is	  
case,	  then	  it	  is	  the	  type	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  specific,	  as	  far	  as	  
we	  know,	  to	  human	  agency.	  More	  will	  be	  said	  about	  this	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter.	  	  
Interestingly,	  once	  this	  is	  explicit,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  troubling	  
about	  the	  coffee-­‐making	  example.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  obvious	  
affective	  significance,	  and	  a	  rather	  simple	  gestalt,	  that	  makes	  the	  coffee-­‐making	  
narrative	  seem	  deficient:	  without	  the	  context	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  our	  day,	  and	  how	  coffee	  
fits	  into	  it,	  a	  coffee-­‐making	  narrative	  is	  generally	  rather	  short,	  simple	  and	  dull.	  As	  
soon	  as	  we	  link	  it	  to	  our	  prior	  drowsiness,	  and	  our	  future	  invigoration,	  we	  get	  both	  
a	  more	  obvious	  emotional	  cadence,	  and	  the	  coming	  together	  of	  complex	  parts	  to	  
form	  a	  whole.	  That	  I	  am	  willing	  to	  call	  even	  a	  rather	  decontextualized	  and	  trivial	  
understanding	  of	  coffee-­‐making	  minimally	  narrative	  is	  due	  to	  commitments	  that	  I	  
explain	  in	  chapter	  6	  concerning	  how	  our	  understanding	  of	  sensorimotor	  activities	  
is	  interdependent	  with	  affect.	  
Given	  that	  this	  theory	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  can	  explain	  why	  we	  find	  
some	  sequences	  of	  events	  to	  be	  more	  obviously	  narrative	  than	  others,	  it	  does	  not	  
make	  narrative	  understanding	  trivial,	  it	  just	  makes	  it	  relatively	  ubiquitous.	  The	  
charge	  of	  triviality	  would	  stick	  only	  if	  our	  explanation	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  
had	  no	  interesting	  features.	  Compare	  this	  to	  a	  philosopher	  who	  thinks	  all	  cognition	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is	  conceptual.	  We	  would	  only	  call	  this	  theory	  of	  cognition	  trivial	  if	  such	  a	  
philosopher	  could	  not	  explain	  what	  characterises	  ‘concepts’.	  	  
Further,	  with	  the	  distinction	  between	  different	  ways	  narrative	  
understanding	  can	  contribute	  to	  self-­‐understanding,	  we	  saw	  above	  that	  we	  have	  
the	  capacity	  to	  explain	  Strawson’s	  intuition	  that	  explicitly	  thinking	  about	  one’s	  
whole	  life	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  we	  come	  to	  self-­‐understanding.	  His	  resistance	  to	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  dependent	  on	  a	  notion	  that	  the	  only	  non-­‐trivial	  sense	  of	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  one	  where	  what	  one	  is	  trying	  to	  understand	  is	  one’s	  life	  
as	  a	  whole.	  	  Particularly,	  he	  is	  concerned	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  introspecting	  on	  one’s	  
own	  motives	  and	  beliefs	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  self.	  That	  is,	  he	  has	  a	  problem	  
with	  the	  necessity	  of	  metarepresentation,	  and	  I’ve	  upheld	  that	  objection	  while	  
maintaining	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  still	  important	  for	  our	  sense	  of	  self.	  	  
It	  is	  also	  questionable	  whether	  non-­‐narrative	  self-­‐understanding	  does	  exist.	  
One	  might	  think	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  seems	  limited	  because	  our	  ability	  to	  
imagine	  what	  we	  would	  feel	  in	  the	  future	  may	  be	  markedly	  different	  from	  how	  we	  
would	  feel	  in	  a	  certain	  situation.	  For	  example,	  I	  might	  imagine	  that	  if	  a	  scientist	  
were	  to	  ask	  me	  to	  electrocute	  someone	  for	  answering	  a	  question	  wrong	  (see	  the	  
Milgram	  experiments,	  1963	  &	  1974),	  I	  would	  feel	  horrified	  and	  therefore	  refuse	  to	  
do	  it.	  My	  knowledge	  of	  the	  way	  the	  majority	  of	  people	  act	  might	  allow	  me	  to	  make	  
a	  different	  judgment	  about	  my	  future	  self,	  and	  to	  imagine	  different	  possibilities.	  
Strawson	  might	  point	  out	  that,	  in	  these	  cases,	  my	  theoretical	  understanding	  of	  
myself	  may	  be	  more	  accurate	  than	  my	  narrative	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  
While	  I	  agree	  that	  friends,	  science	  and	  sociology	  are	  important	  sources	  of	  
information	  about	  one’s	  self,	  I	  don’t	  think	  that	  that	  the	  contributions	  these	  sources	  
make	  to	  our	  self-­‐understanding	  are	  non-­‐narrative.	  When	  thinking	  through	  the	  idea	  
that	  myself	  or	  another	  person	  would	  electrocute	  someone	  for	  purportedly	  getting	  
an	  answer	  to	  a	  question	  wrong,	  my	  experience	  of	  revulsion	  expresses	  my	  
understanding	  that	  this	  is	  an	  unacceptable	  way	  for	  someone	  to	  act.	  There	  is	  an	  
emotional	  cadence	  experienced	  when	  thinking	  through	  this	  sequence	  of	  events,	  
and	  that	  is	  why	  we	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  these	  events	  mean	  for	  us.	  
When	  I	  apply	  Milgram’s	  finding	  to	  myself	  it	  helps	  me	  understand	  that,	  as	  a	  
human,	  someone’s	  status	  will	  influence	  me	  regardless	  of	  whether	  I	  want	  it	  to	  or	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not.	  It	  is	  the	  embodied	  understanding	  of	  events	  that	  allows	  me	  both	  to	  judge	  what	  I	  
think	  of	  those	  actions,	  and	  to	  take	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  participant	  and	  the	  person	  
that	  could	  have	  ended	  up	  being	  electrocuted,	  and	  that	  enables	  me	  to	  apply	  this	  
factual	  understanding	  to	  my	  own	  possible	  behaviours	  and	  their	  consequences.	  I	  
have	  widen	  my	  repertoire	  of	  what	  it	  is	  I	  can	  imagine	  myself	  doing,	  in	  a	  way	  I	  
couldn’t	  if	  such	  imaginings	  were	  purely	  intuitive.	  Nonetheless,	  these	  imaginings	  
are	  affective,	  and	  therefore	  understood	  through	  narrative.	  	  
Therefore,	  what	  Milgram’s	  psychological	  study	  adds	  to	  my	  self	  narrative	  is	  a	  
belief	  that	  my	  behaviour	  is	  not	  only	  caused	  by	  my	  explicit	  values,	  but	  also	  by	  more	  
implicit	  factors,	  such	  as	  whether	  I	  recognise	  another	  as	  more	  authoritative	  than	  
myself.	  So	  narrative	  understanding	  can	  lead	  to	  self-­‐understanding	  through	  
incorporating	  factual	  or	  theoretical	  knowledge	  that	  contradicts	  my	  pre-­‐theoretical	  
understanding	  of	  myself.	  What	  scenarios	  like	  our	  understanding	  of	  Milgram	  
experiments	  show	  is	  not	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  limited,	  but	  that	  our	  
intuitive	  ideas	  of	  ourselves	  can	  be.	  	  
Note	  that	  much	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  Milgram	  experiments	  can	  be	  
learned	  though	  a	  minimal	  sense	  of	  self-­‐narrative.	  Thinking	  through	  the	  Milgram	  
experiments	  involves	  a	  certain	  emotional	  cadence,	  but	  it	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  
involve	  explicit	  reflection	  on	  who	  I	  am	  as	  an	  agent,	  or	  on	  my	  life	  as	  a	  whole.	  I	  may	  
not	  use	  the	  Milgram	  experiments	  to	  explicitly	  reconceive	  my	  own	  motives,	  instead	  
I	  could	  incorporate	  it	  into	  a	  narrative	  about	  the	  world	  that	  people	  generally	  do	  
what	  they	  are	  told	  to	  do	  if	  they	  are	  told	  to	  do	  it	  by	  someone	  who	  is	  an	  authority,	  
and	  that	  some	  people	  with	  authority	  are	  dangerous.	  Here,	  I	  add	  another	  dimension	  
to	  my	  narrative	  that	  could	  lead	  me	  to	  feel	  fear	  in	  response	  to	  authority	  figures,	  
which	  is	  part	  of	  a	  skeptical	  attitude	  that	  increases	  my	  attention	  towards	  their	  
behaviour,	  alerting	  me	  more	  easily	  to	  those	  authority	  figures	  who	  should	  not	  be	  
trusted,	  and	  maybe	  causing	  me	  to	  avoid	  such	  people	  when	  I	  identify	  them.	  	  My	  
attention,	  in	  this	  case,	  is	  directed	  at	  the	  world,	  and	  my	  sense	  of	  self	  is	  present	  pre-­‐
reflectively.	  Similarly,	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  scientist	  who	  orders	  the	  
electrocution	  and	  the	  participants	  who	  obey	  them	  may	  include	  an	  implicit	  sense	  of	  
their	  perspective.	  Thinking	  through	  the	  experiment	  is	  a	  type	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  that	  affects	  my	  future	  reactions,	  whether	  or	  not	  I	  envision	  the	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experiment	  as	  part	  of	  my	  life,	  or	  use	  it	  to	  explicitly	  think	  about	  what	  type	  of	  being	  I	  
take	  myself	  to	  be.	  It	  does	  require	  me	  to	  see	  other	  people	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  roles	  
(including	  their	  status)	  and	  responsibilities,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  require	  me	  to	  explicitly	  
represent	  them	  as	  psychological	  things.	  	  
	   What	  surfaces	  in	  applying	  a	  more	  precise	  and	  detailed	  account	  of	  narrative	  
to	  Strawson’s	  argument	  is	  that	  there	  is	  less	  need	  for	  dispute	  than	  initially	  appears.	  
Strawson’s	  claim	  about	  metarepresentation	  has	  some	  weight.	  His	  further	  claims	  
about	  narrative	  understanding	  in	  general	  do	  not	  follow	  from	  his	  scepticism	  about	  
metarepresentational	  narratives.	  But	  the	  confusion	  is	  understandable	  when	  
considering	  that	  his	  interlocutors	  slide	  between	  these	  senses	  of	  narrative	  at	  least	  





This	  chapter	  shows	  why	  my	  narrative	  understanding	  account	  of	  agency	  is	  
preferable	  to	  that	  of	  G&K’s	  metarepresentational	  account.	  	  It	  provides	  a	  minimal	  
account	  on	  how	  we	  can	  act	  rationally,	  that	  is,	  how	  we	  can	  act	  in	  a	  way	  coherent	  
with	  our	  sense	  of	  self.	  This	  minimal	  account	  has	  explanatory	  value:	  it	  explains	  how	  
it	  is	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  take	  a	  reflective	  stance	  on	  our	  own	  psychologies	  and	  why	  it	  
is	  that	  such	  a	  stance	  can	  motivate	  us	  to	  act.	  So	  we	  can	  see	  how	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  a	  fundamental	  capacity	  that	  metarepresentation	  depends	  upon.	  
Because	  of	  this,	  any	  contribution	  that	  metarepresentation	  makes	  to	  our	  rationality	  
is	  partly	  because	  it	  is	  an	  elaborated	  form	  of	  self-­‐narrative.	  And,	  unlike	  a	  
metarepresentational	  account,	  my	  account	  makes	  the	  right	  claims	  about	  which	  
people	  we	  should	  count	  as	  agents.	  
The	  context	  this	  chapter	  falls	  in,	  though,	  is	  a	  thesis	  that	  is	  providing	  an	  
alternative	  account	  to	  Prinz’s	  of	  the	  role	  of	  emotions	  in	  acting	  for	  moral	  reasons.	  
Prinz,	  remember,	  thinks	  that	  emotions	  are	  the	  constituents	  of	  our	  moral	  
judgements,	  which	  count,	  to	  Prinz,	  as	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  act.	  He	  thinks	  that	  
emotions	  can	  play	  this	  role	  because	  they	  are	  caused	  by	  our	  deliberative	  processes	  
and,	  therefore,	  emotions	  are	  a	  result	  of	  our	  agency.	  So,	  the	  question	  now	  is,	  why	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does	  my	  narrative	  account	  of	  agency	  have	  anything	  specifically	  to	  with	  our	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Narrative	  Moral	  Agency	  
	  
Being	  your	  own	  story	  means	  you	  can	  always	  choose	  the	  tone.	  It	  also	  means	  that	  you	  can	  
invent	  the	  language	  to	  say	  who	  you	  are	  and	  how	  you	  mean.	  But	  then	  I	  am	  a	  teller	  of	  stories…	  
so	  from	  my	  point	  of	  view,	  which	  is	  that	  of	  a	  storyteller,	  I	  see	  your	  life	  as	  already	  artful.	  
Waiting,	  just	  waiting,	  and	  ready,	  for	  you	  to	  make	  it	  art.	  




I	  have	  proposed	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  depends	  upon	  experiencing	  events	  
in	  terms	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  emotional	  structure.	  An	  emotional	  cadence	  composed	  
of	  one	  emotion	  leading	  into	  another	  in	  a	  partially	  predictable	  way	  is	  constitutive	  of	  
narrative	  understanding.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  emotional	  component	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  offered	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  narrative	  is	  embodied	  and	  
perspectival.	  We	  inhabit	  narratives.	  	  	  
	   In	  this	  chapter	  I	  am	  going	  to	  relate	  this	  to	  moral	  agency,	  and	  this	  in	  turn	  will	  
have	  implications	  for	  my	  main	  interlocutor,	  Prinz.	  In	  particular,	  I	  will	  be	  
presenting	  an	  alternative	  to	  his	  proposal	  that	  deliberative	  reasoning	  is	  not	  
constitutive	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  but	  only	  an	  important	  cause.	  Instead,	  I	  propose	  
that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  the	  articulation	  of	  narrative-­‐level	  phenomena,	  that	  are	  
jointly	  constituted	  through	  affects	  and	  concepts.	  The	  stories	  we	  tell	  and	  
understand	  provide	  a	  relatively	  unified	  network	  of	  attitudes	  that	  co-­‐constitute	  the	  
moral	  standpoint	  on	  which	  we	  act.	  The	  activity	  of	  making	  these	  attitudes	  explicit	  is	  
the	  activity	  of	  making	  a	  judgement.	  	  
On	  this	  account,	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  always	  involves	  conceptual	  
capacities,	  and	  making	  a	  judgement	  requires	  exercising	  these	  capacities.	  This	  
means	  that	  the	  division	  is	  not	  between	  deliberative	  and	  emotional	  capacities,	  but	  
between	  the	  passive	  employment,	  and	  active	  deployment,	  of	  affective-­‐conceptual	  
capacities.	  	  
	   So,	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Prinz’s	  proposal,	  my	  proposal	  will	  sit	  within	  an	  
alternative	  framework	  concerning	  how	  we	  should	  understand	  agency,	  concepts	  
and	  judgements,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  these	  ideas,	  which	  will	  be	  outlined	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shortly.	  Since	  my	  presentation	  of	  this	  alternative	  does	  not	  involve	  a	  refutation	  of	  
Prinz’s	  proposal,	  this	  chapter	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  presenting	  a	  competing	  and	  
compelling	  theory,	  rather	  than	  a	  simple	  dismissal	  of	  Prinz’s	  theory.	  	  	  
Picking	  up	  on	  the	  threads	  of	  chapter	  2,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  conception	  of	  
narrative	  understanding	  as	  self-­‐understanding	  developed	  in	  the	  chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  I	  
develop	  the	  view	  that	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  provides	  a	  
relatively	  coherent	  moral	  viewpoint	  through	  which	  we	  make	  judgements	  and	  act.	  
In	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	  see	  that	  this	  viewpoint	  is	  conceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  
possible	  –	  although	  perhaps	  not	  easy	  –	  to	  articulate	  and	  reformulate.	  Through	  this	  
possibility	  of	  articulation	  and	  reformulation,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  our	  moral	  viewpoint	  
justifies	  our	  actions,	  and	  that	  we	  are	  responsible	  for	  our	  moral	  viewpoint.	  Charles	  
Taylor	  (1985)	  helps	  elucidate	  why	  this	  viewpoint	  is	  a	  moral	  viewpoint.	  In	  short,	  it	  
is	  because	  our	  evaluations	  of	  what	  is	  of	  higher	  value,	  what	  is	  worthy	  or	  base	  to	  us	  
(i.e.	  what	  Taylor	  calls	  “strong	  evaluations”),	  are	  formed	  through	  a	  web	  of	  affective	  
moral	  concepts.	  	  	  
There	  are	  several	  reasons	  for	  why	  we	  should	  accept	  this	  view.	  First	  there	  
are	  philosophical	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  conceptual,	  as	  
outlined	  by	  McDowell.	  These	  reasons	  act,	  alongside	  phenomenological	  
considerations,	  as	  a	  motivation	  for	  accepting	  the	  theory	  of	  moral	  agency	  proposed	  
by	  Charles	  Taylor	  below.	  Included	  in	  these	  considerations	  is	  the	  observation	  that	  
our	  moral	  reasoning	  is	  continually	  affective,	  rather	  than	  affective	  only	  at	  isolated	  
moments.	  Finally,	  there	  are	  empirical	  considerations	  that	  support	  this	  theory	  of	  
moral	  agency	  and	  further	  incentivise	  Prinz	  to	  resolve	  his	  ambiguity	  towards	  
understanding	  moral	  concepts	  as	  affective.	  The	  empirical	  considerations	  are	  
results	  that	  show	  how	  narratives	  and	  moral	  judgement	  co-­‐emerge,	  and	  that	  
abstract	  concepts,	  which	  I	  suggest	  includes	  moral	  concepts,	  are	  affective.	  The	  claim	  
is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fit	  between	  what	  McDowell’s	  theory	  leads	  us	  to	  expect,	  the	  
phenomenology	  of	  agency,	  and	  empirical	  considerations,	  if	  we	  hold	  the	  narrative	  
theory	  of	  moral	  agency.	  That	  the	  narrative	  theory	  of	  moral	  agency	  renders	  all	  these	  
considerations	  intelligible	  is	  meant	  to	  act	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  theory.	  	  
	   As	  we	  can	  see,	  this	  chapter	  both	  elaborates	  on	  why	  narrative	  understanding	  
is	  necessary	  for	  moral	  agency,	  and	  explains	  how	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  view	  of	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moral	  agency	  can	  accommodate	  evidence	  that	  Prinz’s	  theory	  isn’t	  obviously	  
compatible	  with.	  Prinz,	  remember,	  thinks	  that	  our	  deliberative	  capacities	  are	  
important	  causes,	  but	  not	  constituents	  of,	  moral	  emotions.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  this	  
chapter	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  shown	  that	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  adopt	  an	  alternative	  to	  this	  
position.	  	  	  
	   	  	  
	  
2. Contrasting	  conceptual	  frameworks	  
	  
2.1.	  Explaining	  the	  commitments	  
To	  begin	  this	  chapter,	  it	  is	  worth	  getting	  the	  main	  issues	  of	  contention	  on	  the	  table.	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  get	  these	  clear,	  so	  that	  we	  can	  keep	  site	  of	  the	  key	  issues	  for	  the	  
rest	  of	  the	  chapter.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  now	  is	  recap	  some	  of	  the	  issues	  raised	  in	  
chapter	  2,	  and	  explain	  some	  issues	  further.	  Once	  we	  have	  these	  explained,	  I	  will	  
summarise	  what	  this	  means	  for	  how	  my	  framework	  differs	  from	  Prinz’s.	  
	  
First,	  lets	  refresh	  our	  memories	  of	  Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  how	  these	  
relate	  to	  concepts,	  and	  the	  reasons	  we	  have	  to	  question	  his	  account.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  
chapter	  1,	  Prinz	  seems	  to	  call	  emotions	  conceptual,	  while	  denying	  they	  are	  
involved	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  This	  creates	  an	  uneasy	  hybrid,	  where	  emotion	  
both	  are,	  and	  are	  not,	  concepts	  according	  to	  Prinz’s	  own	  theory	  of	  what	  a	  concept	  
is.	  In	  chapter	  2,	  we	  saw	  that	  if	  we	  take	  Prinz	  seriously	  as	  aiming	  to	  give	  us	  an	  
account	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  concepts	  are	  
constitutively	  involved.	  We	  have	  an	  additional	  reason	  to	  give	  emotions	  full	  
conceptual	  status,	  on	  this	  account,	  because	  for	  a	  process	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  
involved	  in	  judging,	  it	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  being	  involved	  in	  our	  deliberative	  
capacities	  of	  giving	  and	  asking	  for	  reasons.	  	  
In	  chapter	  1	  we	  saw	  that	  one	  part	  of	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  constitute	  
moral	  concepts.	  He	  says	  this	  because	  he	  wants	  to	  explain	  how	  emotions	  can	  
constitute	  our	  moral	  knowledge,	  and	  since	  epistemic	  states	  such	  are	  judgements	  
are	  conceptual,	  and	  he	  thinks	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  constituted	  through	  
moral	  emotions,	  it	  seems	  that	  moral	  emotions	  must	  constitute	  concepts.	  	  
151	   	  
However,	  we	  saw	  that	  this	  is	  in	  tension	  with	  Prinz’s	  sentimentalist	  leanings,	  
where	  what	  separates	  sentimentalism	  from	  rationalism	  is	  that	  making	  a	  moral	  
judgement	  isn’t	  the	  exercise	  of	  our	  deliberative	  capacities.	  This,	  combined	  with	  
Prinz’s	  theory	  that	  concepts	  are	  representations	  that	  are	  consciously	  manipulable,	  
creates	  a	  tension.	  In	  his	  interpretation	  of	  dumbfounding	  results	  and	  his	  description	  
of	  how	  emotions	  are	  merited,	  he	  creates	  a	  chasm	  between	  deliberative	  reasoning	  
and	  emotions,	  where	  the	  former	  causes	  the	  latter.	  However,	  if	  emotions	  are	  caused	  
by,	  rather	  than	  participants	  in,	  deliberative	  reasoning,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  
emotions	  (according	  to	  Prinz’s	  own	  theory	  of	  concepts)	  could	  constitute	  moral	  
concepts.	  Moreover,	  if	  emotions	  were	  participants	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning,	  then	  
Prinz	  would	  be	  as	  much	  a	  rationalist	  as	  a	  sentimentalist.	  It	  is	  presumably	  for	  these	  
reasons	  that	  he	  equivocates	  on	  whether	  emotions	  constitute	  concepts.	  	   	  
	   We	  saw	  in	  chapter	  2	  that	  having	  only	  a	  causal	  connection	  between	  our	  
deliberative	  activities	  and	  our	  moral	  judgements	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  
commitment	  to	  bald	  naturalism,	  a	  commitment	  we	  need	  not	  hold.	  Bald	  naturalism	  
is	  a	  type	  of	  naturalism	  that	  assumes	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  epistemic	  states	  in	  
purely	  causal	  terms.	  	  
	   To	  understand	  how	  we	  could	  be	  a	  naturalist	  and	  hold	  something	  different	  
we	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  difference	  between	  a	  constitutive	  explanation	  and	  an	  
enabling	  explanation.	  While	  a	  constitutive	  explanation	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  
characterises	  some	  thing,	  an	  enabling	  explanation	  is	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	  
mechanisms	  would	  enable	  a	  thing	  like	  that	  to	  exist.	  So,	  what	  characterises	  my	  
friend	  Asher	  is	  that	  he	  is	  very	  funny,	  and	  what	  enables	  him	  to	  be	  funny	  may	  be	  
explained	  in	  different	  types	  of	  causal	  language	  including,	  but	  not	  limited	  to,	  
neurological	  mechanisms.	  	  	   	  	  
	   A	  bald	  naturalist	  understands	  terms	  such	  as	  ‘judgements’	  as	  both	  
constituted,	  and	  enabled	  by,	  causal	  language.	  We	  can	  resist	  this,	  while	  still	  being	  
naturalists,	  by	  claiming	  that	  judgements	  are	  constituted	  by	  their	  capacity	  to	  justify	  
our	  beliefs	  and	  actions,	  and	  can	  only	  be	  explained	  in	  causal	  terms	  if	  that	  
explanation	  is	  an	  enabling	  explanation.	  	  
We	  might	  think	  this	  is	  true	  because	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  able	  to	  
understand	  judgements	  through	  causal	  language.	  Further,	  we	  may	  suspect	  there	  is	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a	  fundamental	  disconnect	  in	  explaining	  things	  like	  judgements,	  that	  can	  be	  right	  or	  
wrong,	  and	  causal	  mechanisms,	  where	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  understand	  how	  they	  could	  be	  
right	  or	  wrong.	  The	  idea	  here	  is	  that	  normative	  language	  –	  such	  as	  that	  of	  
judgements,	  knowledge,	  responsibility,	  concepts	  and	  reasons	  –	  are	  used	  to	  
characterise	  what	  we	  mean	  by	  agency.	  Causal	  language,	  as	  I	  noted	  in	  chapter	  2,	  
does	  not	  seem	  normative	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  allow	  us	  to	  characterise	  agency.	  	  	  
A	  similar	  explanation	  is	  offered	  by	  Rorty	  (1980).	  He	  argues	  that	  to	  have	  
knowledge	  that	  something	  is	  the	  case	  is	  a	  claim	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  
creature	  and	  proposition.	  To	  assess	  whether	  a	  creature	  knows	  that	  something	  is	  
the	  case	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  a	  creature	  has	  a	  justification	  for	  believing	  a	  
proposition.	  But	  “it	  is	  rarely	  the	  case	  that	  we	  appeal	  to	  the	  proper	  function	  of	  our	  
organism	  as	  a	  justification”(p.	  141,	  original	  emphasis),	  because	  an	  assessment	  of	  
whether	  a	  creature	  has	  some	  knowledge	  that	  some	  proposition	  is	  true	  concerns	  
the	  logical	  relations	  between	  propositions,	  rather	  than	  a	  mechanical	  explanation.	  
	   In	  this	  light,	  Prinz	  runs	  into	  additional	  difficulties,	  where	  his	  idea	  of	  
emotions	  as	  both	  epistemic	  states,	  and	  caused	  by,	  rather	  than	  part	  of,	  our	  
deliberative	  agency,	  would	  be	  classed	  as	  a	  mongrel	  concept.	  	  
Prinz’s	  moral	  judgements	  are	  things	  we	  can	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  (2007,	  
p.	  114).	  And	  we	  can	  hold	  a	  person	  accountable	  for	  a	  moral	  judgement	  because	  
moral	  judgements	  are	  merited,	  that	  is	  they	  fall	  under	  rational	  deliberative	  control.	  
The	  sense	  in	  which	  they	  fall	  under	  our	  rational	  control	  is	  that	  they	  are	  caused	  by	  
rational	  processes,	  rather	  than	  being	  justified	  by	  rational	  processes.	  I	  say	  
emotions,	  on	  Prinz’s	  account	  are	  caused	  rather	  than	  justified,	  because	  according	  to	  
McDowell,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  say	  that	  emotions	  could	  be	  justified,	  we	  would	  be	  claiming	  
that	  they	  could	  be	  articulated	  and	  thus	  take	  part	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  This	  is	  
not	  a	  commitment	  Prinz	  appears	  to	  have.	  
Because	  of	  this,	  for	  McDowell,	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  emotions	  being	  caused	  by	  
rational	  processes	  takes	  them	  outside	  of	  the	  activities	  involved	  in	  agency.	  For	  
McDowell,	  agency	  is	  defined	  through	  the	  capacity	  to	  justify,	  rather	  than	  causation.	  	  
Remembering	  that	  it	  is	  conceptual	  processes	  that	  participate	  in	  reasoning,	  
Prinz’s	  claim	  seems	  to	  involve	  the	  idea	  that	  emotions	  have	  some	  conceptual	  and	  
nonconceptual	  characteristic.	  And	  they	  have	  these	  characteristics	  both	  in	  relation	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to	  his	  own	  theory	  and,	  as	  we	  are	  focusing	  on	  now,	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  type	  of	  
naturalism	  that	  is	  sceptical	  of	  causal	  explanations	  being	  a	  constitutive	  explanation	  
of	  agency.	  In	  this	  framework,	  Prinz’s	  emotions	  are	  “mongrels	  resulting	  from	  a	  
crossbreeding	  of	  two	  ideas”	  (Sellars,	  1956,	  p.	  132).	  They	  are	  conceptual,	  according	  
to	  Sellars,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  appraisals	  that	  can	  correctly	  or	  incorrectly	  
represent	  a	  situation.	  This	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  emotions	  for	  Prinz:	  “if	  emotions	  represent	  
concerns,	  they	  can	  be	  correct	  or	  incorrect.	  If	  Jones	  fears	  the	  captive	  snake,	  she	  is	  
literally	  representing	  the	  snake	  as	  dangerous.	  This	  is	  an	  error58”	  (Prinz,	  2007,	  p.	  
64).	  However,	  unlike	  a	  conceptual	  process	  they	  are	  not	  justified	  or	  justifying	  but	  
caused	  and	  causing.	  This	  presents	  a	  problem	  for	  Prinz,	  because	  this	  move	  is	  a	  
switch	  to	  a	  causal	  mode	  of	  explanation.	  But,	  according	  to	  McDowell,	  to	  count	  as	  
judgements,	  and	  to	  really	  be	  seen	  as	  correctly	  or	  incorrectly	  representing	  our	  
situation,	  emotions	  must	  fall	  into	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  However,	  when	  we	  are	  
understanding	  a	  process	  as	  falling	  into	  the	  space	  of	  reasons,	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  
applying	  causal	  explanation	  (McDowell,	  1994),	  as	  explained	  above.	  	  	  
One	  might	  respond	  that	  ‘merited’	  for	  Prinz	  just	  means	  caused	  in	  the	  right	  
way:	  caused	  by	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  But	  the	  point	  is	  that	  when	  we	  understand	  
something	  as	  wrong	  or	  right	  based	  on	  only	  including	  causal	  explanation	  we	  lose	  
something	  understandable	  as	  a	  judgement.	  Judgements	  are	  an	  activity	  that	  agents	  
engage	  in,	  in	  that	  they	  can	  be	  questioned,	  clarified	  and	  justified.	  They	  are	  explained	  
through	  normative	  language,	  but	  this,	  arguably,	  takes	  judgements	  out	  of	  a	  realm	  of	  
causal	  descriptions.	  In	  losing	  this	  sense	  of	  judgement,	  we	  also	  lose	  the	  agent,	  
because	  the	  behaviour	  we	  are	  holding	  a	  creature	  responsible	  for	  is	  no	  longer	  
something	  that	  a	  creature	  has	  done,	  but	  something	  that	  happens	  to	  a	  creature.	  
Because,	  on	  Prinz’s	  view,	  the	  moral	  emotion	  on	  which	  we	  act	  is	  caused,	  rather	  than	  
capable	  of	  being	  part	  of,	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  	  Remember,	  however,	  that	  if	  our	  
behaviour	  is	  just	  something	  that	  happens	  to	  a	  creature,	  then	  we	  don’t	  seem	  to	  be	  
explaining	  agency	  any	  more.	  When	  we	  lose	  normative	  language,	  and	  characterise	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  Note	  that	  Prinz	  does	  not	  think	  this	  feature	  of	  emotions	  makes	  them	  conceptual.	  Sellar’s	  
argument	  is	  that	  Prinz	  is	  wrong	  in	  this	  respect.	  Because	  Prinz	  characterizes	  them	  as	  
epistemic	  states,	  capable	  of	  justifying	  or	  failing	  to	  justify,	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  
conceptual.	  Or,	  as	  McDowell	  would	  put	  it,	  part	  of	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	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process	  as	  mechanistic,	  it	  is	  unclear	  why	  we	  should	  say	  the	  creature	  is	  responsible	  
for	  the	  behaviour	  caused	  by	  that	  process59.	  	  
This	  argument,	  however,	  relies	  on	  philosophical	  commitments	  that	  I	  
explained	  in	  chapter	  2,	  namely	  that	  we	  should	  not	  be	  bald	  naturalists,	  something	  
that	  Prinz	  and	  I	  appear	  to	  differ	  on.	  Unlike	  the	  bald	  naturalist,	  McDowell	  argues	  
that	  there	  is	  another	  legitimate	  type	  of	  naturalistic	  explanation.	  This	  type	  of	  
explanation	  concerns	  the	  understanding	  a	  creature	  as	  existing	  within	  a	  certain	  
mode	  of	  life.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  creatures	  that	  are	  agents,	  this	  is	  the	  mode	  of	  life	  of	  
following	  goals,	  articulating	  beliefs	  and	  justifying	  judgements.	  	  
Since	  I	  will	  not	  offer	  further	  justification	  for	  this	  switch	  of	  underlying	  
assumption,	  the	  perspective	  of	  moral	  judgements	  I	  develop	  in	  this	  chapter	  will	  not	  
directly	  disprove	  Prinz’s	  theory.	  What	  has	  become	  apparent	  through	  the	  
juxtaposition	  of	  Prinz’s	  position	  with	  McDowell’s,	  however,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  
necessary	  to	  adopt	  Prinz’s	  conceptual	  framework.	  	  	  
On	  the	  philosophical	  picture	  I	  am	  adopting,	  if	  we	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  
explaining	  moral	  judgements	  then	  it	  looks	  like	  our	  explanations	  of	  what	  enables	  us	  
to	  judge	  needs	  to	  stick	  to	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  We	  need	  to	  make	  judgements	  the	  
activity	  of	  an	  agent	  rather	  than	  something	  that	  happens	  to	  an	  agent.	  My	  proposal	  is	  
that	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  account	  of	  moral	  agency	  allows	  us	  to	  see	  the	  moral	  
perspective	  through	  which	  we	  understand	  the	  world	  as	  formed	  of	  affective	  
concepts.	  It	  may	  not	  be	  that	  we	  always	  use	  this	  perspective	  to	  make	  explicit	  
judgements,	  but	  because	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  a	  conceptual	  activity,	  we	  can	  
draw	  on	  narrative	  understanding	  to	  form	  explicit	  judgements	  and	  reformulate	  
them.	  	  
Now	  we’ve	  got	  the	  explanations	  of	  two	  different	  philosophical	  frameworks	  
on	  the	  table,	  I	  want	  to	  take	  an	  interlude	  to	  explain	  key	  terms.	  First,	  I	  will	  
summarise	  how	  these	  different	  frameworks	  result	  in	  the	  same	  terms	  having	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  contrast	  this	  view	  with	  a	  compatabilist	  world-­‐view,	  since	  the	  
view	  I	  am	  proposing	  is	  coherent	  with	  a	  type	  of	  compatabilism	  that	  states	  that	  a	  
mechanistic	  enabling	  explanation	  is	  compatible	  with	  agency.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  this	  view	  would	  
not	  be	  congruent	  with	  a	  type	  of	  compatabilism	  that	  claims	  that	  we	  can	  characterise	  agency	  
through	  causal	  processes.	  Nonetheless,	  my	  starting	  point	  was	  to	  characterise	  agency	  as	  
the	  ability	  to	  act	  for	  reasons,	  something	  that	  is	  widely	  accepted.	  This,	  I	  am	  now	  claiming,	  is	  
to	  characterise	  agency	  in	  a	  non-­‐causal	  way.	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different	  meaning.	  This	  will	  also	  anticipate	  some	  of	  the	  arguments	  to	  come.	  The	  
point	  is	  to	  gather	  into	  one	  spot	  some	  quite	  expansive	  discussions.	  Second,	  I	  want	  to	  
introduce	  some	  new	  terms	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  my	  project.	  	  	  
	  
	   2.2.	  Interlude:	  understanding	  key	  terms	  
There	  are	  at	  least	  four	  key	  terms	  that	  need	  to	  be	  defined:	  agency,	  judgement,	  
concepts	  and	  rationality.	  These	  are	  interrelated	  in	  both	  Prinz’s	  theory	  and	  the	  one	  
I	  am	  proposing.	  	  
	   ‘Agency’,	  in	  both	  cases,	  starts	  off	  roughly	  the	  same,	  but	  is	  inflected	  with	  how	  
it	  is	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  terms.	  For	  both	  theories,	  an	  agent	  is	  a	  
creature	  that	  we	  hold	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  Similarly,	  there	  is	  agreement	  as	  
to	  why	  we	  hold	  a	  creature	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions:	  because	  they	  are	  rational.	  
In	  both	  theories,	  the	  actions	  for	  which	  we	  hold	  an	  agent	  responsible	  are	  those	  
motivated	  by	  judgements.	  In	  both,	  judgements	  are	  conceptual.	  Finally,	  in	  both	  
theories	  those	  judgements	  are	  related,	  in	  important	  ways,	  to	  an	  agent’s	  rationality.	  	  
	   Here,	  however,	  things	  start	  to	  diverge.	  	  
	   How	  judgements	  are	  related	  to	  rationality	  differs.	  For	  Prinz,	  judgements	  are	  
“triggered”	  by	  our	  rational	  capacities.	  It	  is	  enough	  for	  judgements	  to	  be	  triggered	  
by	  our	  rational	  capacities	  for	  us	  to	  say	  those	  judgements	  are	  merited.	  For	  
McDowell,	  and	  others,	  judgements	  are	  justified	  by	  reasons,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  they	  stand	  in	  a	  certain	  causal	  relation	  to	  those	  reasons.	  Instead	  it	  is	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  we	  can	  assess	  those	  reasons	  in	  deliberation.	  Once	  we	  start	  using	  causal	  
language,	  we	  have	  switched	  out	  of	  the	  language	  of	  reasons.	  	  
	   Further,	  these	  differences	  are	  related	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  
‘concept’.	  For	  Prinz,	  a	  concept	  is	  a	  representation	  we	  can	  intentionally	  control,	  and	  
it	  is	  because	  of	  this	  that	  there	  is	  a	  tension	  in	  his	  idea	  that	  moral	  emotions	  
constitute	  moral	  concepts.	  When	  he	  explains	  what	  moral	  judgements	  are,	  he	  
positions	  them	  as	  caused	  by	  processes	  he	  believes	  we	  can	  control	  (i.e.	  
deliberation),	  rather	  than	  part	  of	  those	  processes.	  	  
	   On	  the	  view	  I	  am	  adopting,	  as	  proposed	  by	  McDowell	  and	  (as	  we	  shall	  see)	  
shared	  by	  Taylor,	  conceptual	  activity	  is	  any	  activity	  that	  we	  could,	  if	  we	  wanted	  to,	  
reflect	  on	  and	  articulate	  in	  deliberation.	  On	  this	  account,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  take	  a	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stance	  on	  whether	  we	  can	  wilfully	  manipulate	  concepts.	  Instead,	  whatever	  it	  is	  that	  
we	  are	  doing	  when	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  explain	  or	  justify	  our	  beliefs	  and	  actions,	  is	  a	  
conceptual	  activity.	  Such	  activity	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  practice,	  rather	  
than	  as	  the	  manipulation	  of	  mental	  representations.	  Our	  experiences	  are	  shaped	  
by	  concepts,	  and	  themselves	  are	  conceptual,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  giving	  and	  asking	  for	  reasons.	  	  
	   Because	  of	  this,	  for	  McDowell	  and	  Taylor,	  our	  rationality	  is	  defined	  through	  
our	  practices	  as	  normative	  creatures,	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  manipulation	  of	  
mental	  representations.	  We	  are	  rational	  because	  we	  can	  give	  reasons,	  and	  the	  
process	  of	  giving	  reasons	  involves	  actively	  using	  our	  conceptual	  capacities,	  that	  is,	  
making	  explicit	  what	  we	  believe	  and	  why.	  	  	  
	   ‘Moral	  judgements’	  on	  my	  view	  are	  activities	  of	  a	  conceptual	  creature,	  while	  
for	  Prinz	  they	  are	  emotions	  that	  could	  be	  triggered	  by	  reasoning.	  While	  for	  Prinz,	  
we	  can	  have	  an	  unarticulated	  judgement	  in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  emotional	  reaction	  
(2006,	  p.	  34),	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  on	  my	  proposal.	  For	  me,	  while	  we	  act	  for	  reasons	  
when	  we	  act	  on	  our	  narrative	  understanding,	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  does	  
not	  always	  take	  the	  form	  of	  a	  judgement.	  Such	  narrative	  understanding	  would	  only	  
be	  a	  judgement	  if,	  through	  engaging	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  giving	  reasons,	  we	  make	  it	  
explicit.	  	  Our	  narrative	  understanding	  forms	  the	  reasons	  on	  which	  we	  act,	  because	  
we	  could	  formulate	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  as	  a	  judgement	  if	  we	  wanted	  to.	  
	  	   	  	  
Finally,	  not	  only	  will	  I	  be	  using	  the	  same	  terms	  in	  slightly	  different	  ways	  to	  Prinz,	  I	  
will	  also	  introduce	  some	  new	  language.	  Throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  thesis,	  I	  use	  the	  
word	  ‘expression’	  to	  replace	  Prinz’s	  use	  of	  ‘representations’,	  a	  contrast	  that	  Taylor	  
makes	  concerning	  how	  to	  think	  of	  mental	  processes	  in	  general.	  However,	  I	  will	  be	  
adopting	  the	  term	  ‘expression’	  to	  refer	  to	  emotions	  in	  particular.	  Emotions	  are	  
expressive	  rather	  than	  representational	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  do	  not	  point	  to	  
something	  wholly	  outside	  themselves.	  That	  is,	  expression	  is	  an	  activity	  where	  the	  
act	  of	  revealing	  coincides	  with	  what	  is	  being	  revealed.	  Importantly,	  emotional	  
activity	  is	  always	  embodied,	  so	  that	  meaning	  cannot	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  matter	  
involved	  in	  the	  activity.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  	  ‘representation’	  where	  meaning	  arises	  
due	  to	  some	  inner	  activity	  that	  bears	  a	  particular	  relation	  with	  some	  outer	  object.	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As	  an	  example	  of	  representation,	  Taylor	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  a	  barometer	  which	  
“‘reveals’	  rain	  indirectly”	  (1985,	  p.	  91).	  That	  is,	  to	  get	  meaning	  from	  a	  
representation	  in	  a	  barometer	  we	  need	  to	  make	  an	  inference	  between	  the	  sign	  and	  
what	  it	  might	  be	  a	  sign	  of.	  In	  contrast,	  	  
When	  I	  make	  plain	  my	  anger	  or	  my	  joy,	  in	  facial	  or	  verbal	  expression,	  
there	  is	  no	  such	  contrast.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  second	  best,	  the	  dropping	  of	  clues	  
that	  enable	  one	  to	  infer.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  manifestation	  of	  anger	  or	  joy	  is.	  
(Ibid,	  original	  emphasis.)	  
	  
Similarly,	  we	  might	  think	  that	  the	  materiality	  of	  art	  does	  not	  just	  represent	  
some	  object	  beyond	  the	  medium.	  Instead	  of	  having	  to	  make	  an	  inference	  from	  
the	  painting	  to	  what	  it	  means,	  the	  medium	  expresses	  the	  meaning	  itself.	  The	  
paint	  and	  canvas	  in	  Guernica	  reveals	  the	  terror	  of	  war	  and	  fascism.	  	  
I	  will	  also	  be	  using	  the	  words	  language	  and	  recombinant	  system	  in	  
particular	  ways.	  What	  I	  mean	  by	  recombinant	  system	  is	  any	  process	  that	  possesses	  
at	  least	  a	  coarse-­‐grained	  recombinant	  structure	  between	  intentions	  and	  
perception,	  and	  means	  and	  ends,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  taken	  offline	  to	  be	  used	  in	  
simulations	  (Hurley,	  2003;	  2006;	  2008).	  A	  creature	  that	  uses	  this	  type	  of	  
recombinant	  structure	  “distinguishes	  ends	  from	  means,	  recognises	  that	  there	  can	  
be	  different	  means	  to	  the	  same	  end,	  that	  the	  same	  behaviour	  can	  be	  means	  to	  
different	  ends;	  and	  that	  the	  same	  behaviour	  can	  be	  an	  ends	  or	  a	  means”	  (2006,	  p.	  
148).	  When	  such	  a	  creature	  can	  take	  this	  process	  offline	  to	  simulate	  the	  
relationship	  between	  their	  goal,	  their	  context,	  and	  what	  means	  would	  achieve	  that	  
goal	  in	  that	  context,	  this	  creature	  is	  using	  a	  recombinant	  system.	  A	  recombinant	  
system	  need	  not	  be	  comprised	  of	  symbols	  (e.g.	  like	  words	  or	  numbers),	  it	  can	  
consist	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  simulate	  perceptions,	  actions	  and	  goals.	  	  
Language	  is	  a	  type	  of	  recombinant	  system	  here.	  It	  is	  the	  type	  of	  
recombinant	  system	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  articulate	  a	  sense	  further.	  Language	  not	  
only	  enables	  us	  to	  make	  inferences,	  but	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  see	  our	  inferences	  as	  
inferences.	  So	  it	  is	  a	  system	  where	  questions	  of	  clarifying	  and	  justifying	  are	  
appropriate.	  It	  does	  not	  obviously	  have	  to	  consist	  of	  words	  (including	  hand	  
gestures	  in	  sign	  language)	  as	  we	  normally	  understand	  them,	  although,	  given	  
further	  argument,	  we	  might	  conclude	  that	  the	  functions	  of	  language	  put	  strong	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limitations	  on	  the	  form	  it	  can	  take60.	  As	  I	  understand	  it,	  this	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  
Charles	  Taylor	  means	  by	  language.	  I	  now	  return	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  
and	  why	  we	  should	  see	  them	  as	  constituted	  by	  our	  narrative	  understanding,	  which	  
is	  both	  conceptual	  and	  affective.	  	  
	  
	  
3. Moral	  narratives	  	  
	  
3.1.	  Strong	  evaluations	  and	  narratives	  
We	  saw	  in	  summary	  above,	  and	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  2	  that	  we	  have	  
philosophical	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  moral	  judgements	  are	  conceptual.	  Perhaps	  
it	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  they	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  reasons	  for	  action.	  What	  is	  left	  
out	  of	  this	  consideration	  is	  a	  detailed	  positive	  theory	  of	  how	  we	  make	  moral	  
judgements.	  Below,	  I	  want	  to	  show	  how	  a	  theory	  of	  embodied	  narrative	  
understanding	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements,	  and	  why	  it	  is	  
supported	  by	  a	  phenomenological	  analysis.	  We	  get	  clearer,	  I	  suggest,	  on	  why	  the	  
theory	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  helps	  explains	  moral	  agency,	  if	  we	  follow	  an	  
analysis	  by	  Charles	  Taylor	  (1985)	  of	  moral	  agency.	  He	  explains	  why	  agency	  
integrates	  our	  conceptual	  and	  affective	  resources.	  However,	  it	  is	  worth	  explaining	  
what	  ingredients	  we	  already	  have	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  that	  may	  
help	  explain	  moral	  agency.	  	  
To	  see	  why	  narrative	  understanding	  can	  be	  moral,	  we	  return	  first	  to	  its	  
affective	  characteristic,	  where	  affect	  here	  consists	  of	  an	  embodied	  
appreciation	  of	  what	  some	  object	  (a	  scene,	  a	  person,	  the	  world	  in	  general)	  
means	  for	  us.	  Or,	  in	  the	  language	  we	  have	  just	  introduced,	  our	  affect	  expresses	  
what	  matters	  to	  us,	  how	  we	  understand	  an	  object	  as	  bearing	  on	  us.	  Affect	  
therefore	  comes	  together	  with	  a	  basic	  sense	  of	  value.	  Affectivity	  discloses	  to	  a	  
creature	  what	  parts	  of	  the	  environment	  are	  important	  to	  them	  and	  how	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  Conversely,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  a	  recombinant	  system,	  of	  various	  grains,	  might	  allow	  for	  
clarifying	  and	  justifying,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  might	  be	  expressed	  or	  altered	  by	  a	  creature	  if	  
the	  creature	  meets	  normative	  pressures.	  ‘Language’	  would	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  misleading	  
word,	  if	  a	  broad-­‐range	  of	  capacities	  quite	  different	  from	  what	  we	  understand	  as	  language	  
fulfil	  this	  role.	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they’re	  important.	  For	  instance,	  fear	  might	  express	  that	  your	  physical	  
integrity	  is	  under	  threat.	  So,	  in	  this	  case,	  fear	  discloses	  the	  value	  of	  your	  
physical	  integrity,	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  maintain	  it.	  	  
	   However,	  this	  understanding	  of	  affect	  doesn’t	  suffice	  to	  make	  it	  moral	  
judgement.	  A	  rabbit	  can	  feel	  fear,	  but	  we	  would	  be	  hesitant	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  making	  
a	  moral	  judgement	  in	  doing	  so.	  Prinz’s	  explanation	  for	  this	  is	  that	  it	  is	  because	  the	  
rabbit’s	  fear	  is	  not	  caused	  by	  rational	  deliberation.	  Because	  the	  fear	  could	  not	  have	  
been	  caused	  by	  rational	  deliberation	  we	  cannot	  hold	  the	  rabbit	  responsible	  for	  
having	  it.	  	  	  
	   Yet	  narrative	  understanding,	  like	  Prinz’s	  theory,	  does	  not	  just	  involve	  affect.	  
How	  have	  we	  been	  thinking	  about	  narrative	  understanding?	  Narrative	  
understanding	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  think	  through	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  in	  an	  
embodied	  way.	  We	  have	  a	  perspective	  on	  events,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  understand	  
how	  they	  matter	  to	  us,	  because	  this	  perspective	  emerges	  with	  our	  affective	  
engagement	  with	  them.	  	  
But	  such	  thinking	  involves	  understanding	  that	  there	  are	  certain	  relations	  
between	  parts	  of	  the	  story:	  there	  are	  patterns	  of	  cause	  and	  affect,	  and	  patterns	  in	  
the	  roles	  and	  intentions	  of	  a	  character	  and	  their	  actions.	  Additionally,	  it	  is	  possible	  
to	  articulate	  these	  relationships	  even	  if	  we	  are	  not	  currently	  doing	  so.	  We	  can	  
understand	  why	  poor	  people	  shouldn’t	  be	  given	  financial	  support	  if	  we	  think	  poor	  
people	  are	  lazy	  and	  selfish,	  and	  financial	  support	  will	  encourage	  this	  behaviour.	  
Without	  these	  connections	  between	  poverty	  and	  a	  character	  trait,	  financial	  
support	  and	  the	  encouraging	  of	  unattractive	  character	  traits,	  we	  cannot	  
understand	  the	  narrative.	  If	  we	  fail	  to	  understand	  the	  connection	  then	  we	  have	  no	  
narrative	  understanding.	  If	  we	  question	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  premises	  but	  
understand	  the	  connections	  between	  the	  parts	  then	  we	  understand	  it	  as	  a	  false	  
narrative	  (as	  long	  as	  we	  also	  think	  it	  is	  a	  narrative	  that	  aims	  to	  represent	  the	  
truth).	  	  
	   So,	  we	  should	  think	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  as	  not	  just	  an	  exercise	  of	  our	  
emotional	  understanding	  but	  an	  exercise	  of	  our	  capacity	  to	  use	  a	  recombinant	  
system.	  Storytelling	  and	  understanding	  involve	  parts,	  or	  concepts,	  that	  can	  come	  
together	  and	  recombine	  in	  various	  ways.	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   We	  could	  understand	  these	  conceptual	  and	  affective	  capacities	  as	  coming	  
apart	  in	  narrative	  understanding,	  or	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  recombinant	  system	  
that	  we	  use	  to	  understand	  narratives	  as	  itself	  affective.	  Above	  I	  have	  indicated	  that	  
there	  are	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  the	  latter.	  If	  we	  think	  that	  emotions	  are	  conceptual,	  
and	  conceptual	  processes	  are	  those	  we	  are	  capable	  of	  using	  in	  reasoning,	  then	  
emotions	  are	  themselves	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  our	  reasoning.	  On	  McDowell’s	  
understanding	  of	  judgements,	  emotions	  could	  only	  participate	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  
judging	  if	  they	  are	  conceptual,	  that	  is,	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  our	  deliberative	  
reasoning.	  	  
Charles	  Taylor	  provides	  a	  theory	  that	  makes	  sense	  of	  this	  suggestion	  that	  is,	  
at	  times	  implicitly,	  driven	  by	  phenomenological	  considerations.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  
stories	  we	  can	  articulate	  co-­‐emerge	  with	  our	  affective	  and	  moral	  sense61.	  In	  this	  
discussion	  we	  will	  go	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  theory	  and	  phenomenology	  because	  
they	  mutually	  inform	  each	  other	  on	  Taylor’s	  (1985)	  account.	  	  
	   For	  Taylor,	  our	  strong	  evaluations,	  which	  emerge	  through	  our	  capacity	  to	  
use	  moral	  concepts,	  are	  affective	  yet	  constituted	  through	  our	  moral	  language.	  
Further,	  strong	  evaluations	  are	  the	  product	  of	  a	  narrative	  process,	  and	  they	  exist	  in	  
a	  web	  of	  interrelated	  ideas	  and	  evaluations.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  phenomenological	  observation	  that	  is	  explained	  by	  claiming	  that	  
moral	  concepts	  are	  affective.	  Which	  is	  that	  our	  moral	  language	  is	  experienced	  as	  
already	  emotional,	  rather	  than	  leading	  to	  an	  emotion.	  Consider	  words	  like	  ‘justice’	  
and	  ‘purity’.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  possible	  to	  understand	  the	  concepts	  involved	  
without	  some	  affective	  experience.	  To	  grasp	  their	  conceptual	  content	  is	  to	  feel	  
something.	  If	  we	  take	  the	  phenomenology	  seriously,	  this	  implies	  that	  our	  moral	  
concepts	  are	  constitutively	  affective,	  because	  to	  grasp	  the	  concept	  is,	  in	  part,	  to	  feel	  
something.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Taylor’s	  theory	  is	  associated	  with	  his	  realist	  meta-­‐ethical	  position.	  That	  is,	  he	  thinks	  
that	  our	  interpretations	  are	  an	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  an	  ethical	  truth	  beyond	  what	  is	  good	  
for	  a	  person	  or	  culture	  (Taylor,	  2007).	  Prinz	  (2007,	  chapter	  5),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  
subjectivist,	  he	  thinks	  ethical	  truths	  are	  relative	  to	  individuals.	  However,	  I	  don’t	  think	  a	  
particular	  meta-­‐ethical	  position	  is	  implied	  by	  the	  discussion	  here.	  I	  remain	  agnostic	  on	  
whether	  our	  storytelling	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  a	  subject-­‐dependent	  or	  subject-­‐
independent	  truth.	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Taylor	  thinks	  that	  what	  distinguishes	  moral	  creatures	  is	  their	  capacities	  to	  
make	  ‘strong	  evaluations’,	  where	  strong	  evaluations	  are	  constructed	  through	  a	  
creature’s	  interpretive	  abilities.	  Strong	  evaluations	  are	  the	  background	  evaluations	  
through	  which	  we	  form	  particular	  evaluations	  of	  modes	  of	  being	  and	  living,	  as	  well	  
as	  actions	  and	  events.	  Strong	  evaluations	  involve	  evaluations	  of	  what	  is	  of	  
qualitatively	  higher	  or	  lower	  worth.	  And	  they	  are	  enabled	  by	  what	  Taylor	  (1985)	  
calls	  contrastive	  language:	  language	  concerning	  what	  is	  virtuous	  or	  vicious,	  good	  
or	  evil,	  pure	  or	  tainted	  etc.	  Our	  strong	  evaluations	  arise	  through	  the	  
interconnections	  and	  contrasts	  between	  different	  moral	  terms,	  and	  these	  terms	  
are	  set	  in	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  life	  or	  world	  is	  of	  qualitatively	  
highest	  value62.	  	  	  
	   Taylor	  brings	  strong	  evaluations	  into	  focus	  by	  contrasting	  them	  with	  weak	  
evaluations:	  	  
In	  weak	  evaluations,	  for	  something	  to	  be	  judged	  good	  it	  is	  sufficient	  that	  it	  
be	  desired,	  whereas	  in	  strong	  evaluations	  there	  is	  also	  a	  use	  of	  ‘good’	  or	  
some	  evaluative	  term	  for	  which	  being	  desired	  is	  not	  sufficient;	  indeed	  
some	  desires	  or	  desired	  consummations	  can	  be	  judged	  as	  bad,	  base,	  
ignoble…	  etc	  (1985,	  p.18.)	  	  
	  
While	  positive	  weak	  evaluations	  may	  incline	  us	  to	  seek	  the	  object	  of	  those	  
evaluations,	  we	  can	  consider	  these	  evaluations	  in	  a	  process	  of	  weighing	  up	  
preferences.	  Because	  of	  this,	  weak	  evaluations	  allow	  us	  to	  reject	  some	  course	  of	  
action	  based	  on	  contingent	  and	  circumstantial	  reasons,	  as	  will	  be	  illustrated	  
shortly.	  Whereas	  with	  weak	  evaluations,	  there	  is	  no	  moral	  weight,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  
evaluating	  something	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  qualitative	  worth,	  in	  strong	  evaluations	  “the	  
conflict	  is	  deeper;	  it	  is	  not	  contingent”	  (p.	  21)	  because	  what	  is	  rejected	  is	  rejected	  
because	  it	  is	  base	  or	  low.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Note	  that	  everything	  said	  about	  strong	  evaluations	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  
metarepresentation	  is	  not	  necessary	  for	  moral	  agency.	  Our	  emotions,	  while	  containing	  a	  
pre-­‐reflective	  sense	  of	  self	  via	  expressing	  what	  matters	  to	  us,	  do	  not	  have	  to	  involve	  an	  
explicit	  representation	  of	  self.	  And	  when	  we	  make	  explicit	  our	  emotional	  commitments	  of	  
what	  is	  important,	  that	  too	  can	  be	  directed	  at	  the	  world	  and	  need	  not	  imply	  that	  I	  
articulate	  in	  overt	  terms	  how	  I,	  as	  an	  agent,	  want	  to	  live.	  	  For	  example,	  narrative	  
understanding	  can	  involve	  the	  articulation	  that	  harmonious	  interactions	  between	  all	  life-­‐
forms	  are	  important,	  and	  can	  direct	  and	  justify	  my	  actions,	  without	  me	  making	  assertions	  
about	  mental	  states.	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To	  see	  this	  consider	  that	  we	  may	  not	  just	  have	  competing	  evaluations,	  for	  
example,	  between	  flying	  to	  the	  Caribbean	  for	  sunshine,	  sea	  and	  tropical	  fruit,	  and	  
going	  hiking	  in	  the	  highlands	  of	  Scotland	  for	  some	  handsome	  views,	  good	  exercise	  
and	  a	  sense	  of	  achievement	  (similar	  to	  Taylor’s	  example,	  1985,	  p.	  24).	  We	  may	  
make	  our	  decisions	  based	  on	  some	  sense	  of	  which	  desires	  are	  morally	  good	  or	  bad.	  
We	  choose	  hiking	  in	  the	  highlands	  because	  flying	  involves	  a	  qualitative	  judgement	  
of	  lowliness	  of	  seeking	  gratification	  for	  selfish	  reasons.	  If	  our	  decision	  to	  go	  on	  
holiday	  is	  based	  on	  a	  weak	  evaluation	  we	  might	  choose	  the	  cheaper	  holiday.	  In	  
such	  a	  case,	  if	  our	  circumstances	  changed	  so	  that	  we	  had	  more	  money,	  then	  we	  
would	  have	  gone	  on	  the	  more	  luxurious	  holiday.	  But	  if	  we	  pick	  our	  next	  holiday	  
based	  on	  strong	  evaluation	  then	  we	  don’t	  go	  abroad	  because	  we	  believe	  that	  flying	  
is	  an	  unworthy	  action.	  In	  this	  case,	  our	  decisions	  are	  not	  changed	  by	  circumstances	  
in	  the	  way	  our	  weak	  evaluations	  can	  be.	  
Again,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  appeal	  here	  is	  based	  on	  our	  experience,	  what	  Taylor	  
is	  offering	  us	  is	  a	  theory	  that	  explains	  that	  experience.	  The	  phenomenology	  to	  be	  
explained	  is	  that	  of	  our	  experience	  of	  a	  contrast	  between	  decisions	  where	  we	  feel	  
no	  strong	  commitment	  to	  the	  alternatives	  other	  than	  what	  is	  practical,	  or	  what	  we	  
would	  prefer,	  and	  those	  decisions	  where	  we	  feel	  called	  to	  honour	  some	  
commitment	  of	  what	  is	  good	  or	  of	  highest	  worth.	  While	  we	  may	  not	  always	  honour	  
such	  commitments,	  they	  come	  with	  a	  sense	  that	  we	  should	  do.	  We	  might	  see	  our	  
feelings	  of	  guilt	  when	  we	  don’t	  as	  expressive	  of	  our	  feeling	  that	  we	  have	  failed	  to	  
live	  up	  to	  our	  moral	  commitments.	  	  
This	  background	  experience	  of	  some	  objects	  being	  of	  qualitatively	  highest	  
worth	  is	  present	  even	  in	  those	  who	  try	  to	  measure	  everything	  quantitatively.	  They	  
also	  have	  some	  background	  strong	  evaluations.	  Such	  people	  may	  “admire	  the	  
mode	  of	  life	  in	  which	  one	  calculates	  consciously	  and	  clairvoyantly	  as	  something	  
higher	  than	  the	  life	  of	  self-­‐indulgent	  illusions”	  (1985,	  p.	  23).	  If	  we	  have	  admiration	  
for	  science	  above	  other	  modes	  or	  enquiry,	  or	  a	  commitment	  to	  (certain	  types	  of)	  
utilitarianism,	  then	  we	  have	  an	  admiration	  of	  what	  is	  measurable	  and	  objective.	  
We	  might	  think	  that	  these	  are	  the	  only	  methods	  that	  are	  honest	  and	  courageous,	  
and	  there	  is	  something	  childish	  and	  delusional	  about	  other	  modes	  of	  life	  (Taylor,	  
2007).	  But	  then	  such	  attitudes	  also	  rely	  on	  strong	  evaluations:	  if	  we	  endeavour	  for	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a	  life	  centred	  on	  what	  is	  rational,	  measurable	  and	  objective,	  we	  see	  this	  mode	  of	  
life	  as	  of	  qualitative	  higher	  worth	  than	  an	  emotional,	  subjective	  mode	  of	  life.	  
	   Strong	  evaluations	  are	  enabled	  by	  our	  capacity	  to	  be	  narrative	  creatures	  
(which,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  shortly,	  is	  tied	  to	  our	  capacity	  to	  be	  interpretive	  creatures	  
i.e.	  moral	  agents).	  The	  type	  of	  contrastive	  language	  that	  we	  use	  to	  tell	  stories	  is	  
constitutive	  of	  a	  moral	  standpoint,	  a	  kind	  of	  paradigm	  concerning	  the	  way	  we	  view	  
what	  we	  ought	  to	  do.	  It	  is	  a	  paradigm	  in	  that	  we	  cannot	  simultaneously	  understand	  
both	  moral	  standpoints.	  When	  we	  go	  from	  understanding	  one	  narrative	  network	  to	  
another,	  we	  undergo	  a	  paradigm	  shift.	  If	  I	  see	  acting	  compassionately	  as	  ultimately	  
valuable,	  then	  I	  shun	  flying	  abroad	  as	  a	  selfish	  act.	  However,	  if	  I	  view	  pursuing	  my	  
own	  satisfaction	  as	  the	  most	  worthy	  motive,	  then	  I	  might	  see	  going	  to	  the	  Scottish	  
highlands	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  others	  as	  somewhat	  pompous.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  is	  
possible	  for	  one	  creature	  to	  see	  things	  from	  both	  points	  of	  view,	  it	  will	  be	  by	  
shifting	  between	  perspectives.	  As	  Taylor	  puts	  it,	  	  
With	  strong	  evaluations,	  however,	  there	  can	  be	  and	  often	  is	  a	  plurality	  of	  
ways	  of	  envisaging	  a	  predicament,	  and	  the	  choice	  may	  not	  just	  be	  between	  
what	  is	  clearly	  higher	  and	  lower,	  but	  between	  two	  incommensurable	  ways	  
of	  looking	  at	  the	  choice.	  (1985,	  p.	  26).	  	  
	  
What	  we	  have	  here	  is	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  that	  amounts	  to	  
a	  holistic	  perspective	  through	  which	  we	  evaluate	  courses	  of	  action.	  As	  I	  will	  
illustrate	  later,	  this	  perspective	  is	  narrative	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  involves	  an	  
understanding	  of	  cause	  and	  consequences,	  of	  how	  actions	  and	  events	  unravel	  and	  
relate	  to	  each	  other.	  Our	  perspective	  situates	  our	  current	  predicament	  in	  a	  
meaningful	  relationship	  to	  events	  through	  time.	  	  
Further,	  the	  holism	  of	  this	  perspective	  shares	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  story,	  
where	  each	  part	  of	  story	  makes	  sense	  in	  terms	  of	  another	  part,	  and	  so	  different	  
stories	  about	  what	  is	  good	  present	  incommensurable	  perspectives.	  Change	  enough	  
parts	  of	  a	  story,	  and	  much	  of	  the	  rest	  has	  to	  shift	  for	  it	  to	  hang	  together	  as	  a	  whole.	  
Again,	  this	  has	  a	  phenomenological	  underpinning:	  we	  experience	  a	  gestalt	  shift	  in	  
our	  modes	  of	  evaluating,	  as	  we	  change	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  what	  the	  
good	  life,	  or	  the	  best	  world,	  is.	  	  
164	   	  
This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  strong	  evaluations	  and	  being	  
interpretive	  creatures.	  What	  is	  experienced	  in	  the	  example	  above	  is	  that	  our	  
articulation	  of	  what	  is	  of	  higher	  and	  lower	  worth	  emerges	  together	  with	  a	  
orientation	  to	  a	  situation.	  If	  our	  articulations	  change,	  our	  orientation	  to	  the	  
situation	  changes,	  and	  the	  experiential	  sense	  of	  the	  situation	  changes	  for	  us.	  To	  
Taylor,	  this	  is	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  are	  interpretive	  creatures:	  our	  articulations	  
shape	  our	  experience:	  “human	  life	  is	  never	  without	  interpreted	  feeling;	  the	  
interpretation	  is	  constitutive	  of	  that	  feeling”	  (1985,	  p.	  63).	  	  
And	  this	  is	  another	  phenomenological	  point:	  we	  experience	  the	  world	  
differently	  as	  our	  conception	  of	  it	  changes,	  and	  sometimes	  our	  conception	  changes	  
as	  we	  try	  to	  make	  more	  distinct	  what	  our	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  is.	  For	  example,	  a	  
woman	  might	  become	  aware	  of	  some	  of	  the	  effort,	  humiliation	  and	  unease	  
involved	  in	  her	  daily	  interactions.	  Finding	  feminist	  theory	  a	  good	  articulation	  of	  
her	  predicament,	  her	  daily	  interactions	  immediately	  strike	  her	  differently:	  
eavesdropping	  on	  a	  conversation	  between	  a	  man	  and	  a	  woman	  in	  a	  café,	  she	  no	  
longer	  hears	  a	  woman	  being	  rightly	  corrected	  by	  a	  man,	  but	  a	  man	  as	  patronising	  
and	  dismissing	  a	  woman.	  In	  regard	  to	  strong	  evaluations,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  our	  
experience	  of	  what	  is	  virtuous	  and	  vicious	  etc.	  is	  constituted	  through	  our	  
contrastive,	  and	  moral,	  language.	  Our	  language	  makes	  possible,	  and	  brings	  into	  
focus,	  our	  moral	  sense63.	  	  
However,	  “interpretation”	  has	  a	  richer	  meaning	  for	  Taylor.	  These	  
articulations	  through	  which	  we	  understand	  the	  world	  are	  not	  formed	  willy-­‐nilly,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	  We	  may	  question	  this	  by	  pointing	  to	  cases	  where	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  appears	  
not	  to	  change	  even	  though	  we’ve	  articulated	  some	  novel	  judgement.	  For	  instance,	  it	  may	  
be	  that	  someone	  comes	  to	  believe	  that	  women	  are	  not	  treated	  as	  human	  as	  men	  or	  as	  
competent	  as	  them,	  but	  still	  experiences	  the	  above	  situation	  as	  one	  where	  a	  woman	  is	  
being	  rightly	  corrected	  by	  a	  man.	  Yet	  I	  don’t	  think	  it	  would	  be	  true	  that	  this	  articulation	  
has	  not	  changed	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  situation.	  Once	  we	  recognise	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  
perception	  of	  someone	  as	  a	  woman	  affects	  our	  interpretation	  of	  them	  in	  certain	  ways,	  our	  
reading	  of	  situations	  like	  the	  one	  above	  will	  be	  framed	  by	  the	  possibility	  that	  what	  appears	  
to	  be	  going	  on	  is	  not	  in	  fact	  what	  is	  going	  on.	  There	  is	  a	  qualitative	  shift	  in	  how	  the	  scene	  is	  
experience	  just	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  come	  to	  recognise	  that	  it	  is	  interpreted,	  and	  so	  possibly	  
misinterpreted.	  In	  less	  metarepresentational	  terms,	  while	  I	  may	  continue	  to	  experience	  
sausages	  as	  delicious	  despite	  my	  newly	  articulated	  concerns	  with	  the	  meat	  industry,	  it	  is	  
not	  that	  my	  experience	  of	  sausages	  hasn’t	  changed.	  Now,	  my	  experience	  of	  them	  is	  a	  more	  
complex	  affective	  response,	  of	  both	  dislike	  and	  like.	  Or,	  perhaps,	  I	  feel	  some	  disgust	  or	  
anger	  at	  my	  love	  for	  sausages.	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they	  are	  based	  on	  some	  emotional	  sense	  of	  who	  we	  are	  and	  what	  matters	  to	  us.	  
Neither	  are	  these	  articulations	  mere	  translations	  of	  facts.	  They	  are	  interpretative	  
because	  they	  are	  an	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  some	  emotionally	  felt	  truth,	  but	  that	  
articulation	  can	  never	  be	  a	  perfect	  translation,	  it	  always	  leaves	  some	  questions	  
unanswered,	  and	  room	  to	  go	  back	  and	  try	  to	  re-­‐articulate.	  Each	  articulation	  leaves	  
some	  further	  thing	  to	  be	  explained.	  For	  example,	  once	  we	  articulate	  our	  sense	  of	  
embarrassment	  in	  a	  given	  situation,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  of	  what	  values	  and	  
attitudes	  make	  that	  feeling	  possible64.	  	  
Why?	  Because	  it	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  being	  language-­‐users,	  that	  is,	  creatures	  
who	  have	  a	  conceptual	  structure	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  ask	  for	  justifications	  and	  
clarifications.	  
To	  say	  that	  language	  is	  constitutive	  of	  emotion	  is	  to	  say	  that	  experiencing	  
an	  emotion	  essentially	  involves	  seeing	  that	  certain	  descriptions	  apply;	  or	  a	  
given	  emotion	  involves	  some	  (degree	  of)	  insight.	  (Taylor,	  1985,	  p.	  71)	  
	  
Because,	  as	  language-­‐users	  our	  experiences	  exist	  in	  a	  space	  or	  reasons,	  they	  imply	  
the	  possibility	  that	  we	  can	  ask	  for	  explication	  or	  justification	  of	  them.	  Our	  moral	  
perspective	  does	  not	  cause	  an	  emotion,	  which	  in	  turn	  causes	  action,	  our	  moral	  
perspective	  exists	  as	  a	  web	  of	  related	  affective	  concepts,	  which	  justify	  and	  
motivate	  our	  actions.	  So,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Prinz’s	  position,	  Taylor’s	  theory	  enables	  us	  
to	  understand	  how	  an	  agent	  could	  act	  rather	  than	  just	  behave.	  For	  if	  action	  is	  
characterised	  as	  behaviour	  that	  is	  justified	  by	  normative	  capacities,	  then	  Taylor’s	  
account	  explains	  how	  this	  is	  possible.	  
	  
Narrative	  production	  and	  understanding	  is	  important	  for	  being	  interpretive	  
creatures	  because	  it	  is	  not	  singular	  issues	  or	  acts	  that	  we	  try	  to	  articulate,	  but	  how	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  focus	  of	  our	  interpretive	  stories	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  on	  our	  
psychologies.	  Feelings	  of	  aversion	  to	  some	  global	  event	  may	  prompt	  us	  to	  articulate	  why	  
that	  event	  is	  disheartening	  regardless	  of	  whether	  we	  turn	  inwards.	  Watching	  in	  horror	  at	  
the	  escalating	  violence	  in	  Syria,	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  proxy	  war	  and	  dissent	  into	  a	  
bloodbath,	  can	  prompt	  one	  to	  discuss	  exactly	  what	  is	  horrific	  and	  base	  about	  these	  events	  
without	  representation	  of	  our	  psychologies.	  We	  could,	  for	  example,	  understand	  the	  
badness	  of	  events	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  various	  parties	  to	  uphold	  their	  roles	  and	  
responsibilities,	  or	  by	  the	  equality	  of	  all	  human	  life.	  Of	  course,	  many	  would	  be	  tempted	  by	  
more	  metarepresentational	  concepts	  involving	  malicious	  intent,	  opportunism,	  desire	  for	  
power	  etc.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  this	  is	  not	  necessary.	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things	  are	  related.	  Our	  attempt	  to	  articulate	  our	  sense	  of	  what	  matters	  is	  also	  an	  
attempt	  to	  tell	  better	  narratives	  (e.g.	  1985,	  p.	  36	  –	  38).	  In	  this	  way	  we	  try	  to	  give	  an	  
explicit	  narrative	  characterisation	  that	  makes	  the	  most	  sense	  of	  our	  experience,	  
and	  in	  making	  our	  experience	  clearer,	  we	  change	  our	  experience	  itself.	  	  
To	  illustrate,	  consider	  Audre,	  who,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  
her	  life	  tells	  a	  story	  about	  herself	  as	  a	  care-­‐giver,	  why	  it	  matters	  to	  her,	  and	  how	  it	  
has	  been	  part	  of	  her	  life.	  Maybe	  spurred	  by	  a	  moment	  of	  exhaustion,	  she	  reworks	  
her	  narrative	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  caring	  about	  others	  as	  a	  narrative	  about	  
how	  she	  has	  not	  taken	  enough	  care	  of	  herself.	  Trying	  to	  express	  what	  matters	  to	  
her,	  in	  her	  case	  furthering	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  those	  she	  spends	  her	  life	  with,	  she	  now	  
places	  herself	  as	  character	  towards	  which	  this	  sentiment	  should	  be	  directed.	  
Reflecting	  on	  her	  past	  her	  narrative	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  one	  of	  acting	  in	  a	  caring	  way,	  
but	  selectively	  acting	  that	  way	  towards	  all	  those	  other	  than	  herself65.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  the	  dance	  between	  explicit	  reason	  and	  emotion	  
that	  happens	  in	  these	  cases.	  Of	  course	  it	  may	  be	  that	  Audre	  has	  heard	  people	  argue	  
that	  one	  must	  look	  after	  oneself,	  and	  she	  followed	  the	  reasoning.	  However,	  for	  it	  to	  
be	  meaningful	  to	  herself	  depends	  on	  her	  felt	  understanding	  of	  her	  life.	  Maybe	  she	  
feels	  unease	  at	  her	  sense	  of	  fragility	  and	  emotional	  exhaustion,	  which	  leads	  her	  to	  
consider	  how	  she	  treats	  herself.	  These	  emotions	  express	  what	  her	  life	  is	  like	  at	  the	  
moment,	  that	  some	  part	  of	  how	  she	  lives	  is	  self-­‐destructive.	  The	  explicit	  inferences,	  
once	  she	  comes	  to	  this	  point	  in	  her	  life,	  make	  sense	  to	  her	  emotionally	  as	  well	  as	  
merely	  logically.	  They	  allow	  her	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  her	  unease	  and	  distress,	  her	  
affectionate	  feelings	  towards	  others,	  and	  her	  desire	  to	  be	  a	  caring	  person.	  	  
This	  new	  narrative	  that	  Audre	  co-­‐constructs	  through	  emotion	  and	  explicit	  
reasoning	  has	  real	  implications	  for	  the	  direction	  that	  Audre	  takes	  her	  life	  in	  next,	  
and	  therefore	  what	  she	  experiences.	  She	  learns	  to	  take	  her	  own	  needs	  and	  desires	  
into	  account	  when	  deciding	  how	  to	  spend	  her	  time.	  Her	  feelings	  of	  affection	  
towards	  herself	  grow,	  and	  maybe	  her	  relationships	  with	  others	  improve	  from	  her	  
renewed	  energy	  and	  feelings	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  This	  is	  a	  fictionalised	  account	  of	  the	  feminist	  theory	  of	  Audre	  Lorde.	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Thus	  the	  narrative	  she	  weaves	  about	  herself	  depend	  on	  what	  she	  feels,	  and	  
also	  change	  who	  she	  is.	  She	  can	  only	  articulate	  how	  important	  caring	  for	  people	  is	  
because	  of	  her	  feelings	  of	  affection	  and	  love.	  And	  she	  only	  understands	  that	  
something	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  in	  her	  life	  because	  her	  emotions	  direct	  her	  to	  
examine	  her	  own	  wellbeing.	  But	  language	  is	  needed	  to	  organise	  these	  feelings,	  and	  
to	  make	  clear	  to	  herself	  what	  her	  predicament	  is	  and	  what	  matters	  to	  her.	  In	  
making	  explicit	  what	  she	  values,	  she	  directs	  her	  life	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  	  
	   While	  this	  example	  involves	  metarepresentational	  narrative,	  not	  all	  
examples	  do.	  For	  example,	  if	  Jake	  watches	  a	  movie	  about	  a	  rock	  star	  who	  always	  
puts	  his	  career	  before	  his	  friends	  and	  family,	  then	  the	  emotional	  arc	  engendered	  in	  
Jake,	  culminating	  in	  a	  sense	  of	  heartache	  and	  loneliness,	  may	  lead	  him	  to	  think	  
‘close	  social	  relationships	  are	  important’	  and	  thereby	  affect	  what	  it	  is	  in	  life	  he	  
attends	  to	  and	  pursues66.	  
	   This	  analysis	  comes	  apart	  from	  Prinz’s	  analysis	  of	  how	  we	  come	  to	  our	  
moral	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  valuable	  and	  good	  because	  of	  the	  role	  that	  concepts	  play.	  
Strong	  evaluations	  are	  constituted	  through	  a	  narrative	  network,	  which	  is	  a	  space	  of	  
affective	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  narrative	  understanding	  forms	  a	  web	  of	  affective	  
concepts	  that	  is	  constitutive	  of	  a	  moral	  perspective.	  Audre’s	  sense	  of	  the	  
importance	  of	  self-­‐compassion	  is	  constituted	  through	  her	  story	  about	  her	  life.	  For	  
Jake,	  his	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  important	  is	  constituted	  through	  understanding	  the	  life	  of	  
a	  rock	  star.	  	  
	   Both	  Audre’s	  and	  Jake’s	  activities	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  narrative	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  they	  involve	  understanding	  a	  context	  through	  a	  set	  of	  causal	  interactions	  
through	  time.	  Jake,	  for	  instance,	  understands	  his	  interactions	  with	  people	  in	  terms	  
of	  intimacy	  and	  reciprocity	  through	  time,	  and	  his	  affective	  orientation	  when	  
considering	  whether	  those	  relationships	  are	  maintained	  or	  not.	  
What	  is	  of	  vital	  importance	  in	  my	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements	  is	  that	  it	  
allows	  us	  to	  see	  how	  moral	  judgements	  are	  judgements	  of	  an	  agent,	  they	  are	  
judgements	  we	  can	  hold	  someone	  responsible	  for	  because	  they	  are	  answerable	  to,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  There	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  here	  of	  the	  contribution	  of	  art	  to	  one’s	  self	  and	  moral	  
understanding,	  for	  relevant	  discussion	  of	  art,	  emotion	  and	  understanding,	  see	  Elgin	  
(2008).	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and	  not	  merely	  caused	  by,	  reason.	  What	  is	  meant	  by	  ‘responsibility’	  in	  this	  context	  
is	  just	  that	  some	  act	  or	  judgement	  is	  answerable	  to	  reason.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  contrast	  here	  between	  the	  framework	  I	  am	  working	  within	  and	  
Prinz’s.	  For	  Prinz,	  we	  are	  responsible	  for	  our	  moral	  judgements	  when	  they	  are	  
caused	  by	  reason.	  However,	  as	  we	  saw	  before,	  moral	  judgements,	  for	  Prinz,	  do	  not	  
take	  part	  in	  our	  deliberative	  processes.	  In	  this	  way,	  moral	  judgements	  are	  not	  
really	  conceptual,	  even	  by	  his	  own	  standards.	  	  
For	  me,	  however,	  our	  moral	  understanding	  is	  constituted	  through	  
understanding	  narratives	  that	  incorporate	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  of	  higher	  and	  lower	  
worth.	  When	  we	  act	  from	  a	  perspective	  constituted	  through	  understanding	  these	  
types	  of	  narratives,	  our	  actions	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  that	  understanding.	  
We	  make	  moral	  judgements	  when	  we	  articulate	  our	  narrative	  
understanding,	  and	  such	  moral	  judgements	  shape	  our	  understanding.	  Here,	  we	  see	  
that	  in	  narrative	  understanding,	  the	  affective	  sense	  through	  which	  we	  understand	  
a	  sequence	  of	  events	  is	  conceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  draw	  upon	  this	  
affective	  sense	  to	  spell	  out	  why	  we	  did	  something.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  our	  
narrative	  understanding	  justifies	  our	  behaviour	  and	  is	  therefore	  a	  reason	  for	  our	  
actions.	  	  
	   This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  easy	  for	  us	  to	  change	  our	  deepest	  sense	  of	  what	  
matters.	  This	  cannot	  necessarily	  happen	  without	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  reflection,	  struggle	  
and	  openness	  (Taylor,	  1985,	  p.	  41).	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  to	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  
something	  it	  must	  be	  easy	  that	  we	  can	  change.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  apparent	  that	  for	  
something	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  space	  of	  reasons	  it	  must	  be	  simple	  and	  effortless	  for	  us	  to	  
articulate	  our	  position	  further	  and	  examine	  the	  reasons,	  or	  lack	  of	  reasons,	  for	  it.	  	  
There	  is	  still	  a	  worry	  that	  this	  is	  a	  hyper-­‐rational	  stance:	  it	  doesn’t	  seem	  
obvious	  that	  to	  we	  should	  only	  call	  something	  a	  moral	  judgement	  when	  we	  have	  
reflectively	  reasoned	  about	  it.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  this	  worry	  in	  section	  3.4.	  	  
	   For	  now,	  we	  should	  note	  that	  we	  now	  have	  two	  competing	  
phenomenological	  stories:	  on	  Prinz’s	  view,	  our	  moral	  sense	  is	  arrived	  at	  through	  a	  
rational	  process	  that	  is	  not	  affective.	  Further	  the	  deliberative	  processes	  we	  use	  do	  
not	  permeate	  our	  affective	  and	  moral	  experience,	  but	  merely	  lead	  up	  to	  it.	  This	  is	  a	  
story	  of	  two	  halves:	  one	  deliberative,	  and	  the	  other	  affective.	  If	  this	  were	  to	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translate	  into	  a	  phenomenological	  story	  then	  our	  moral	  deliberations	  will	  be	  
experienced	  as	  non-­‐affective	  while	  the	  reactions	  they	  cause	  in	  us	  will	  be	  uniquely	  
affective.	  
However,	  on	  a	  narrative	  understanding	  theory,	  it	  is	  through	  this	  faculty	  of	  
telling	  and	  understanding	  stories,	  that	  we	  get	  our	  moral	  perspective	  which	  is	  also	  a	  
moral	  sense.	  Here,	  we	  experience	  our	  moral	  sense	  as	  open	  to	  articulation,	  and	  we	  
express	  and	  create	  this	  sense	  through	  telling	  stories	  about	  ourselves	  and	  the	  
world.	  When	  we	  start	  questioning	  old	  stories,	  and	  start	  telling	  new	  stories,	  we	  
experience	  our	  moral	  sense	  as	  being	  reconfigured	  and	  permeated	  by	  the	  stories	  we	  
tell.	  Further,	  our	  moral	  understanding	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  the	  stories	  involved	  in	  our	  
deliberations,	  are	  both	  experienced	  affectively.	  	  	  
	   The	  two	  phenomenological	  descriptions	  support	  two	  different	  theories:	  on	  
Prinz’s	  deliberation	  causes	  moral	  emotions,	  and	  on	  mine	  and	  Taylor’s,	  moral	  
deliberation	  and	  moral	  affective	  experience	  co-­‐constitute	  each	  other.	  	  
	   On	  McDowell’s	  account,	  which	  I	  am	  endorsing,	  it	  looks	  like	  concepts	  must	  
constitute	  moral	  judgements.	  It	  is	  only	  if	  moral	  judgements	  are	  conceptual	  that	  
they	  count	  as	  activities	  of	  normative	  agents,	  which	  are	  agents	  that	  we	  can	  hold	  
responsible	  for	  their	  actions,	  such	  as	  human	  agents.	  And	  I	  hope	  that	  the	  
phenomenology	  and	  theory	  that	  supports	  this	  is	  convincing:	  we	  do	  experience	  our	  
moral	  sense	  as	  being	  open	  to	  articulation	  and	  it	  is	  changed	  by	  our	  articulation.	  It	  is	  
because	  of	  this	  that	  we	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  our	  moral	  sense.	  	  
	   The	  shape	  of	  the	  argument	  here	  is	  not	  that,	  by	  developing	  a	  narrative	  
account	  of	  moral	  agency,	  we	  expose	  a	  detailed	  critique	  of	  Prinz.	  Instead,	  the	  
narrative	  account	  of	  moral	  agency	  is	  congruent	  with	  wider	  philosophical	  
considerations,	  and	  the	  detail	  counts	  towards	  developing	  a	  robust	  alternative	  to	  
Prinz’s	  theory.	  The	  detail	  counts	  towards	  the	  argument	  first,	  by	  giving	  us	  a	  firmer	  
grip	  on	  what	  an	  alternative	  account	  could	  look	  like,	  and	  second,	  by	  showing	  how	  it	  
is	  an	  account	  that	  is	  coherent	  with	  phenomenological	  and	  empirical	  
considerations.	  	  
Before	  I	  look	  at	  the	  empirical	  considerations,	  I	  want	  to	  flesh	  out	  the	  role	  of	  
deliberation	  in	  helping	  to	  constitute	  a	  unified	  perspective	  that	  emerges	  with	  moral	  
agency.	  I	  will	  clarify	  how	  this	  theory	  relates	  to	  issues	  such	  as	  moral	  dumbfounding,	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and	  then	  return	  to	  the	  potential	  issue	  that	  this	  theory	  is	  a	  hyper-­‐rationalist	  account	  
of	  agency.	  	  
	   	  	  
3.2.	  The	  role	  of	  explicit	  inferences	  in	  moral	  agency	  
Taylor’s	  theory	  of	  strong	  evaluations	  and	  self-­‐interpretation	  gives	  us	  a	  certain	  
theory	  of	  how	  emotions	  and	  recombinant	  systems	  are	  co-­‐constituents	  in	  our	  
ability	  to	  be	  moral	  agents.	  Further,	  this	  is	  a	  broadly	  narrative	  account	  of	  moral	  
agency	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  interpretation	  depends	  both	  on	  us	  being	  able	  to	  
understand	  narratives,	  and	  incorporates	  emotion	  as	  a	  component	  that	  expresses	  
our	  perspective	  or	  stance	  on	  what	  matters.	  Now	  I	  want	  to	  illustrate	  how	  
recombinant	  systems	  are	  also	  necessary	  for	  narrative	  coherence	  by	  enabling	  
coherent	  inferences	  between	  aspects	  of	  the	  narrative,	  and	  by	  allowing	  us	  to	  have	  
an	  explicit	  sense	  of	  causal	  trajectories.	  In	  allowing	  us	  to	  consider	  possibilities	  
beyond	  what	  is	  present	  now,	  recombinant	  systems	  are	  critical	  for	  us	  having	  
reasons	  to	  act.	  Yet,	  language	  is	  important	  for	  moral	  agency	  in	  a	  strong	  sense.	  It	  is	  
with	  language	  that	  we	  can	  step	  back	  and	  re-­‐articulate	  or	  reconsider	  our	  narratives,	  
so	  we	  become	  responsible	  for	  them	  in	  a	  new	  way.	  I	  do	  this	  to	  highlight	  and	  
distinguish	  some	  of	  the	  roles	  a	  recombinant	  system	  and	  language	  have	  in	  our	  
narrative	  and	  interpretive	  practices.	  	  
In	  Audre’s	  narrative	  her	  use	  of	  a	  recombinant	  system	  is	  involved	  in	  more	  
than	  just	  organising	  motivations	  hierarchically	  such	  that	  she	  can	  come	  to	  the	  
strongly-­‐evaluative	  conclusion	  that	  caring	  for	  herself	  is	  worthwhile.	  In	  addition,	  I	  
think	  it	  is	  also	  being	  used	  to	  organise	  her	  inferential	  commitments	  coherently,	  and	  
think	  through	  a	  sequence	  of	  events.	  	  
Maybe	  most	  fundamentally	  we	  can	  understand	  a	  recombinant	  system	  to	  be	  
necessary	  for	  narrative	  because	  it	  allows	  one	  to	  think	  through	  the	  sequence	  of	  
events	  that	  constitute	  a	  narrative.	  Human	  self-­‐understanding	  would	  not	  be	  
possible	  if	  we	  could	  not	  think	  through	  an	  event,	  its	  cause	  and	  its	  (often	  far	  
reaching)	  consequences.	  Audre	  has	  far	  less	  understanding	  of	  herself	  if	  she	  cannot	  
think	  through	  her	  past	  caring	  actions,	  that	  she	  did	  them	  out	  of	  love,	  that	  the	  
consequences	  were	  detrimental	  to	  her	  own	  wellbeing.	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Before	  I	  suggested	  that	  emotional	  cadence	  is	  necessary	  for	  MTT	  to	  be	  
inhabited,	  so	  that	  MTT	  without	  the	  right	  emotional	  structure	  is	  not	  narrative.	  What	  
I	  want	  to	  say	  here	  is	  that	  emotion	  and	  a	  recombinant	  system	  are	  both	  needed	  for	  
narrative.	  While	  plot	  may	  need	  emotional	  cadence,	  conceiving	  of	  a	  sequence	  of	  
events	  requires	  a	  recombinant	  system.	  	  
Since	  human	  narrative	  understanding	  contains	  some	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  
important	  to	  us	  through	  the	  emotions	  involved	  in	  it,	  thinking	  things	  through	  
narratively	  can	  potentially	  expose	  contradictions,	  whether	  we	  recognised	  them	  as	  
such	  or	  not.	  Watching	  the	  film	  of	  the	  rock	  star,	  we	  may	  both	  envy	  their	  life	  because	  
status	  is	  important	  to	  us,	  and	  feel	  sad	  at	  that	  meaningful	  relationships	  are	  lacking.	  
That	  recombinant	  systems	  enable	  coherent	  inferences	  means	  that	  through	  
understanding	  a	  story	  about	  what	  is	  a	  life	  worth	  living	  we	  can	  resolve	  these	  
contradictions.	  When	  recombinant	  systems	  involve	  moral	  values	  we	  can	  develop	  a	  
logically	  coherent	  self,	  with	  coherent	  moral	  commitments,	  we	  can	  become	  unified	  
creatures,	  whose	  values	  and	  motives	  hang	  together.	  	  
Further,	  by	  ‘coherence’	  here,	  I	  mean	  coherent	  enough	  at	  any	  one	  point	  for	  
some	  actions	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  one’s	  viewpoint,	  while	  others	  are	  not,	  so	  that	  we	  
are	  not	  paralysed	  with	  indecision,	  as	  we	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2.	  This	  does	  not	  
imply	  coherence	  through	  a	  lifetime,	  although,	  as	  mentioned	  before,	  continual	  shifts	  
in	  perspective	  such	  that	  one	  rarely	  followed	  a	  long-­‐term	  goal	  may	  be	  a	  problem	  for	  
the	  type	  of	  diachronic	  agency	  we	  often	  associate	  with	  people.	  	  
Still,	  if	  we	  return	  to	  Velleman’s	  original	  notion	  of	  agency,	  that	  it	  is	  the	  
capacity	  to	  act	  for	  reasons,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  agency	  that	  emerges	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  
form	  long-­‐term	  plans	  as	  one	  important	  aspect	  of	  most	  human	  agency,	  but	  not	  
identical	  to	  it.	  If	  agency	  requires	  us	  to	  act	  for	  reasons,	  and	  a	  relatively	  coherent,	  
narratively-­‐structured,	  viewpoint	  enables	  this,	  then	  a	  relatively	  coherent,	  
narratively-­‐structured,	  viewpoint	  enables	  agency.	  
Some	  kind	  of	  diachronicity	  will	  likely	  emerge	  with	  this:	  that	  is,	  insofar	  as	  
our	  viewpoint	  remains	  the	  same,	  we	  will	  express	  this	  viewpoint	  in	  different	  
situations	  through	  time.	  And	  if	  it	  is	  our	  desire	  for	  consistency	  that	  is	  the	  cause	  in	  a	  
change	  in	  viewpoint,	  as	  Korsgaard	  (1989)	  points	  out,	  our	  agency	  is	  exercised	  
regardless	  of	  changes	  through	  time.	  However,	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  of	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ourselves	  in	  terms	  of	  roles	  and	  responsibilities	  will	  enable	  us	  to	  form	  long-­‐term	  
plans,	  that	  we	  can	  act	  on	  through	  time,	  and	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  diachronic	  
agency	  that	  Bratman	  and	  G&K	  are	  interested	  in.	  Finally,	  once	  we	  have	  
metarepresentational	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  so	  the	  ability	  to	  explicitly	  
compare	  our	  current	  desires	  with	  our	  long-­‐term	  commitments	  and	  strong	  
evaluations,	  our	  capacity	  for	  diachronic	  agency	  will	  be	  enhanced.	  	  
	  
However,	  while	  Audre	  uses	  language	  to	  evaluate	  and	  change	  her	  narrative	  
understanding,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  something	  more	  basic,	  a	  recombinant	  
system,	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  a	  more	  basic	  type	  of	  agency	  (Taylor,	  1985,	  p.	  39).	  This	  is	  
the	  type	  of	  agency	  where	  we	  attribute	  someone’s	  actions	  to	  who	  they	  are,	  their	  
unique	  perspective.	  If,	  through	  understanding	  stories,	  someone	  comes	  to	  a	  unified	  
point	  of	  view,	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions.	  This	  
is	  responsibility	  in	  the	  weak	  sense	  of	  being	  attributable	  to	  a	  creature	  with	  a	  
particular	  perspective,	  a	  perspective	  we	  can	  judge	  as	  good	  or	  bad	  regardless	  of	  
how	  open	  to	  change	  this	  perspective	  may	  be67.	  	  
Because	  a	  recombinable	  system	  does	  not	  require	  a	  creature	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
think	  about	  inferences,	  we	  may	  be	  able	  to	  attribute	  this	  type	  of	  agency	  to	  all	  sorts	  
of	  creatures.	  Where	  creatures	  could	  be	  understood	  as	  having	  some	  type	  of	  
recombinable	  system,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  this	  system	  is	  partial,	  broad-­‐grained	  
and	  context	  dependent	  (Hurley,	  2003),	  we	  can	  think	  of	  them	  as	  acting.	  Whether,	  
for	  instance,	  a	  lion	  can	  ever	  act,	  would	  depend	  on	  whether,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  we	  
can	  understand	  a	  lion	  as	  being	  able	  to	  dissociate	  means	  and	  ends,	  and	  put	  action	  
sequences	  together	  in	  different	  ways	  dependent	  on	  context.	  	  
Because	  such	  a	  recombinable	  system	  is	  affective,	  the	  perspective	  
constituted	  by	  this	  system	  is	  always	  a	  value-­‐laden	  perspective,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  
the	  situation	  is	  understood	  through	  how	  it	  helps	  or	  hinders	  a	  creature	  (see	  
Thompson,	  2007).	  The	  outcome	  of	  my	  proposal	  therefore	  puts	  constraints	  on	  what	  
types	  of	  things	  we	  label	  ‘agents’.	  While	  an	  agent	  need	  not	  be	  a	  biological	  thing,	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67	  Although,	  see	  Hurley	  (2003)	  for	  a	  discussion	  about	  this	  being	  insufficient.	  She	  suggests	  
that	  you	  also	  need	  to	  have	  some	  teleological	  context,	  provided	  through	  evolutionary	  
and/or	  cultural	  practices,	  that	  is	  used	  to	  determine	  when	  a	  rule	  is	  misapplied.	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computer	  that	  cannot	  understand	  events	  affectively	  is	  not	  understood	  as	  an	  agent	  
on	  this	  account.	  	  
However,	  without	  a	  creature	  having	  the	  capacity	  to	  articulate	  their	  position,	  
and	  therefore	  question	  or	  clarify	  it,	  we	  could	  not	  hold	  them	  responsible	  in	  a	  
stronger	  sense.	  This	  is	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  moral	  
perspective	  because	  they	  could	  change	  it	  through	  reflecting	  on	  whether	  it	  was	  
justified.	  We	  hold	  a	  creature	  responsible	  in	  this	  sense,	  because	  we	  understand	  that	  
they	  could	  stand	  back	  and	  reflect	  on	  their	  perspective.	  So	  the	  claim	  here	  is	  that	  one	  
can	  be	  an	  agent	  in	  a	  weak	  or	  strong	  sense.	  Either	  a	  creature	  can	  put	  together	  a	  
relatively	  coherent	  position,	  without	  being	  able	  to	  change	  that	  position	  (a	  weak	  
sense	  of	  agency),	  or	  a	  creature	  can	  be	  able	  to	  change	  one’s	  perspective	  through	  
reflection	  (a	  strong	  sense	  of	  agency).	  	  	  
	  
That	  is,	  for	  agency	  in	  a	  stronger	  sense,	  we	  need	  to	  go	  beyond	  a	  recombinant	  
system,	  and	  have	  a	  system	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  reflect	  on	  what	  we	  understand	  as	  
good.	  I	  am	  calling	  this	  system	  ‘language’	  but	  by	  this	  I	  mean	  any	  system	  with	  the	  
function	  being	  described.	  Language	  is	  a	  system	  that	  not	  only	  allows	  for	  
combination	  and	  recombination,	  but	  also	  allows	  us	  to	  stand	  back	  from	  combining	  
and	  recombining	  and	  ask	  whether	  our	  attitudes	  are	  justified	  or	  unjustified.	  The	  
capacity	  to	  stand	  back	  and	  reflect	  enables	  us	  to	  be	  actively	  engaged	  in	  forming	  our	  
own	  perspective,	  to	  be	  creatures	  of	  our	  own	  making.	  It	  is	  when	  we	  can	  do	  this	  that	  
we	  can	  expect	  a	  creature	  to	  go	  beyond	  making	  links	  between	  beliefs	  that	  can	  be	  
justified	  or	  unjustified,	  to	  being	  a	  creature	  for	  whom	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  to	  ask	  
them	  to	  justify	  their	  perspective	  or	  articulate	  it	  further.	  It	  is	  here	  where	  we	  start	  
talking	  of	  a	  creature	  having	  conceptual	  abilities.	  
This	  is	  why	  language	  and	  responsibility	  co-­‐emerge:	  responsibility	  is	  
attributed	  to	  those	  creatures	  that	  can	  exist	  in	  a	  space	  of	  reasons,	  that	  is	  those	  
creatures	  for	  whom	  it	  is	  possible	  for	  them	  to	  stand-­‐back	  from	  their	  perspective	  to	  
scrutinise	  it.	  Actions,	  now,	  are	  attributable	  to	  not	  just	  a	  creature	  with	  a	  
perspective,	  but	  a	  creature	  who	  is	  responsible	  for	  their	  perspective.	  Further,	  moral	  
agency	  requires	  recombinant	  systems	  with	  the	  type	  of	  contrastive	  language	  that	  
enables	  us	  to	  make	  explicit	  what	  is	  of	  qualitatively	  higher	  and	  lower	  worth.	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For	  example,	  Audre	  is	  engaged	  in	  the	  task	  of	  trying	  to	  make	  several	  
different	  beliefs	  and	  experiences	  consistent	  with	  some	  overarching	  understanding	  
of	  herself	  and	  her	  life.	  Prior	  to	  reflection,	  it	  made	  sense	  for	  Audre	  to	  direct	  feelings	  
of	  affection	  and	  love	  towards	  others	  but	  not	  herself.	  After	  reflection	  this	  was	  
shown	  as	  inconsistent	  with	  her	  most	  strongly	  held	  values.	  Audre	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  
reflect	  on	  what	  kind	  of	  narrative	  is	  most	  coherent,	  and	  most	  in	  keeping	  with	  her	  
prereflective	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  of	  highest	  value.	  Audre	  can	  be	  asked	  to	  defend	  her	  
position,	  and	  she	  has	  a	  kind	  of	  control	  over	  what	  her	  position	  is	  that	  she	  lacks	  if	  
she	  cannot	  stand	  back	  and	  reflect	  on	  it.	  	  
It	  need	  not	  be	  the	  case	  that	  we	  are	  constantly	  reflecting	  for	  us	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  
agent,	  just	  that	  we	  can	  and	  we	  sometimes	  will,	  particularly	  if	  other	  people	  ask	  us	  to	  
explain	  our	  actions.	  This	  means	  that	  we	  can,	  to	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  exercise	  
our	  capacity	  to	  be	  self-­‐constituting	  creatures,	  depending	  on	  our	  propensity	  to	  
reflect.	  If	  someone	  very	  rarely	  engages	  in	  reflection	  then	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  they	  
have	  exercised	  their	  capacity	  to	  shape	  their	  own	  viewpoint	  less	  than	  someone	  who	  
has	  engaged	  in	  reflection	  a	  lot.	  However,	  both	  are	  as	  responsible	  for	  their	  
viewpoint	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  both	  could,	  if	  they	  wanted	  to,	  engage	  in	  reflection	  and	  
change	  their	  perspective.	  	  
In	  this	  way,	  the	  type	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  we	  have	  and	  the	  type	  of	  
agency	  we	  have	  co-­‐emerge.	  Using	  a	  recombinable	  system	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  a	  basic	  
type	  of	  agency,	  where	  an	  act	  is	  attributable	  to	  a	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  having	  language	  
co-­‐emerges	  with	  a	  stronger	  type	  of	  agency,	  where	  an	  act	  is	  attributable	  to	  a	  
creature	  who	  we	  hold	  responsible	  for	  their	  own	  point	  of	  view.	  Our	  capacity	  for	  
strong	  evaluations,	  which	  involves	  moral	  languages,	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  moral	  
agency.	  	  
	  
3.3. Clarifying	  narrative	  moral	  agency	  
There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  potential	  issues	  with	  the	  account	  of	  moral	  agency	  I	  have	  
suggested	  above.	  For	  example:	  does	  it	  mean	  that	  one	  is	  more	  moral	  if	  one	  engages	  
more	  in	  telling	  and	  understanding	  narratives?	  And,	  how	  does	  this	  account	  fit	  with	  
the	  evidence	  from	  dumbfounding?	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  clarify	  
my	  theory	  of	  narrative	  moral	  agency.	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While	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  moral	  
agency,	  it	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  case	  that	  this	  view	  entails	  that	  people	  who	  tell	  more	  
stories	  are	  more	  moral.	  This	  depends	  on	  our	  meta-­‐ethical	  position.	  If	  one	  
understands	  moral	  truths	  to	  not	  just	  depend	  on	  an	  individual,	  either	  because	  one	  is	  
a	  moral	  realist	  or	  because	  one	  is	  a	  relativist	  who	  defines	  morality	  as	  relative	  to	  a	  
culture	  or	  group,	  then	  one	  cannot	  become	  more	  moral	  merely	  by	  telling	  more	  
stories.	  It	  also	  depends	  on	  whether	  the	  stories	  we	  tell	  are	  actually	  making	  available	  
to	  us	  moral	  truths.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  amount	  of	  stories	  we	  understand	  that	  
matters,	  but	  the	  quality	  of	  our	  story	  or	  stories.	  What	  matters	  here	  is	  whether	  the	  
attitudes	  that	  constitute	  our	  stories	  are	  true	  of	  the	  world,	  or	  your	  culture’s	  view	  of	  
the	  world.	  	  
Similarly,	  reflecting	  more	  will	  not	  be	  the	  only	  way	  to	  gain	  more	  accurate	  
stories,	  although	  it	  is	  one	  way,	  because	  there	  may	  be	  aspects	  of	  our	  pre-­‐reflective	  
attitudes	  that	  make	  us	  more	  prone	  to	  notice	  moral	  issues.	  For	  example,	  perhaps	  
being	  brought	  up	  in	  a	  caring	  environment	  enables	  some	  people	  to	  register	  moral	  
facts	  better	  through	  the	  way	  their	  attention	  has	  been	  directed	  by	  others.	  In	  this	  
case,	  some	  people’s	  pre-­‐reflective	  narrative	  understanding	  may	  be	  more	  attuned	  
to	  moral	  facts.	  	  	  
Of	  course,	  if	  you	  are	  an	  individualist	  relativist,	  then	  the	  question	  of	  how	  one	  
becomes	  more	  moral	  is	  a	  strange	  question.	  More	  moral	  compared	  to	  what?	  It	  
appears	  that	  you	  are	  either	  moral	  or	  not.	  Being	  more	  or	  less	  moral	  may	  not	  make	  
sense	  if	  there	  is	  no	  standard	  to	  compare	  one’s	  own	  morals	  too.	  In	  this	  case,	  if	  you	  
are	  capable	  of	  reflective	  narrative	  understanding	  then	  you	  are	  a	  moral	  agent	  and	  
you	  cannot	  be	  more	  moral68.	  Or,	  a	  relativist	  could	  judge	  the	  extent	  of	  another’s	  
morality	  just	  based	  on	  whether	  another’s	  perspective	  matches	  their	  own.	  If	  this	  is	  
the	  case	  then,	  again,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  someone	  is	  moral	  is	  a	  qualitative	  question	  
about	  the	  types	  of	  stories	  being	  told,	  rather	  than	  the	  number	  of	  stories.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  the	  involvement	  of	  deliberation	  in	  agency	  makes	  my	  account	  
peculiar	  in	  this	  regard:	  it	  implies	  that	  one	  is	  more	  moral	  when	  one	  reflects	  more.	  But	  this	  
cannot	  be	  the	  case,	  because	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  moral	  agency	  also	  relies	  on	  deliberation.	  His	  
moral	  judgements	  are	  judgements	  because	  they	  are	  a	  result	  of	  agency,	  by	  which	  he	  means	  
our	  capacity	  to	  deliberate.	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An	  outcome	  of	  this	  account	  is	  that	  we	  now	  have	  a	  different	  explanation	  to	  the	  
moral	  dumbfounding	  cases	  than	  Prinz	  presented	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  his	  
sentimentalism.	  Moral	  dumbfounding	  is	  when	  people	  are	  presented	  with	  evidence	  
against	  their	  reasons	  for	  holding	  a	  moral	  judgement,	  but	  continue	  to	  hold	  that	  
judgement.	  For	  example,	  after	  reading	  a	  vignette	  about	  sibling	  incest,	  participants	  
continue	  to	  claim	  it	  is	  wrong	  despite	  their	  reasons	  –	  e.g.	  “it	  will	  cause	  psychological	  
harm”	  –	  not	  being	  a	  good	  reflection	  of	  the	  story	  they	  have	  been	  told.	  Since	  
emotions	  and	  moral	  judgements	  correlate	  in	  these	  cases,	  Prinz	  has	  suggested	  that	  
this	  is	  evidence	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  emotions,	  and	  not	  deliberation,	  constitute	  moral	  
judgements.	  	  
I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  that	  taboos,	  such	  as	  incest,	  are	  cases	  of	  cultural	  rigid	  
narrative	  understanding,	  that	  do	  not	  easily	  change	  when	  presented	  with	  counter-­‐
stereotypical	  narratives.	  For	  example,	  we	  understand	  incest	  within	  a	  cultural	  
narrative	  where	  people	  suffer	  negative	  psychological	  consequences	  if	  they	  engage	  
in	  it.	  This	  is	  important,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  wise	  to	  generalise	  from	  taboos	  to	  all	  moral	  
judgements,	  considering	  taboos	  stand	  out	  as	  particular	  types	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  
That	  is,	  judgements	  that	  are	  hard	  to	  change.	  So	  dumbfounding,	  when	  it	  happens,	  
perhaps	  reflects	  a	  difficulty	  people	  have	  with	  understanding	  cultural	  taboos	  within	  
a	  narrative	  that	  departs	  widely	  from	  the	  one	  they	  have	  been	  brought	  up	  with.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  people	  are	  not	  always	  
dumbfounded	  when	  presented	  with	  taboo	  narratives.	  Feinberg	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  found	  
that	  if	  people	  were	  either	  naturally	  inclined	  to	  reassess	  their	  emotions,	  or	  were	  
prompted	  to	  by	  the	  experimental	  set-­‐up,	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  display	  
dumbfounding	  effects.	  That	  is,	  they	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  give	  reasons	  that	  
contradicted	  the	  narrative	  they	  were	  presented	  with,	  and	  their	  emotional	  
reactions	  and	  their	  explicit	  reasons	  were	  consistent.	  	  
So	  we	  can	  and	  do	  change	  our	  moral	  judgements	  when	  we	  deliberate	  and	  
understand	  taboo	  behaviour	  within	  a	  new	  narrative	  context.	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  
understand	  a	  narrative	  where	  the	  people	  engaging	  in	  incest	  are	  not	  psychological	  
harmed	  as	  a	  consequence.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  understand	  particular	  novel	  
narratives,	  this	  does	  not	  make	  it	  impossible.	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We	  may	  explain	  dumbfounding	  the	  way	  Prinz	  does:	  that	  it	  shows	  that	  
deliberative	  rationality	  does	  not	  constitute	  our	  moral	  judgements.	  However,	  we	  
can	  adopt	  a	  more	  sceptical	  attitude	  concerning	  whether	  one	  can	  easily	  change	  a	  
lifetime	  of	  learning	  a	  particular	  narrative	  through	  one	  anecdote.	  If,	  in	  addition	  to	  
this,	  we	  also	  note	  that	  not	  all	  moral	  judgements	  concern	  taboos,	  and	  we	  combine	  
these	  considerations	  with	  a	  broader	  empirical	  picture	  of	  what	  is	  going	  on,	  then	  we	  
can	  explain	  dumbfounding	  through	  our	  narrative	  tendencies.	  As	  usual,	  the	  
evidence	  underdetermines	  the	  theory,	  and	  dumbfounding	  can	  be	  interpreted	  
multiple	  ways.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  what	  becomes	  more	  apparent	  on	  this	  picture	  of	  agency	  is	  that	  the	  idea	  that	  
we	  need	  a	  specific	  drive	  for	  self-­‐consistency,	  as	  Velleman	  is	  committed	  to,	  is	  
misguided.	  We	  have	  a	  drive	  for	  consistency,	  which	  includes,	  but	  is	  not	  limited	  to,	  
our	  selves.	  Self-­‐consistency	  is	  a	  result	  of	  us	  being	  normative	  creatures	  in	  general,	  
creatures	  that	  want	  their	  beliefs	  to	  be	  justified	  by	  other	  beliefs,	  and	  their	  actions	  to	  
be	  consistent	  with	  their	  beliefs,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  think	  of	  their	  beliefs	  as	  
beliefs.	  Or,	  to	  put	  it	  in	  McDowellian	  language,	  we	  are	  creatures	  that	  want	  to	  engage	  
in	  the	  activity	  of	  giving	  and	  asking	  for	  reasons.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  in	  how	  narrative	  
understanding	  need	  not	  involve	  self-­‐reflection	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  having	  a	  
consistent	  viewpoint.	  
	  
	   3.4.	  Allaying	  hyper-­‐rationalist	  fears	  
What	  remains	  a	  potential	  problem	  with	  this	  account	  is	  that	  it	  appears	  to	  imply	  that	  
we	  only	  act	  for	  moral	  reasons,	  in	  the	  strong	  sense,	  when	  we	  have	  reflected	  on	  our	  
reasons	  before	  that	  action.	  That	  is,	  action	  by	  an	  agent	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  result	  of	  
exercising	  our	  conceptual	  capacities	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  action	  that	  the	  
concepts	  justify.	  If	  a	  moral	  judgement	  depends	  on	  being	  able	  to	  further	  articulate	  
or	  justify	  one’s	  position	  then	  we	  seem	  to	  rarely	  make	  moral	  judgements,	  and	  then	  
rarely	  act,	  rather	  than	  just	  behave	  (or	  act	  in	  some	  weaker	  sense).	  	  
	   However,	  this	  depends	  on	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  understanding	  a	  process	  as	  
being	  conceptual.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  now	  is	  that	  the	  account	  of	  	  (strong)	  moral	  
agency	  above	  comes	  with	  a	  different	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  means	  for	  some	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process	  to	  be	  conceptual.	  On	  this	  understanding,	  concepts	  can	  be	  passively	  shaping	  
our	  experience	  without	  them	  being	  actively	  deployed.	  What	  makes	  it	  a	  conceptual	  
process	  is	  that	  one	  could,	  if	  they	  tried,	  clarify	  or	  justify	  the	  concepts	  in	  the	  moral	  
narratives	  through	  which	  our	  moral	  perspective	  is	  constructed.	  	  
	   Before	  I	  go	  on	  to	  expand	  on	  how	  this	  is	  possible	  it	  is	  worth	  reminding	  
ourselves	  of	  what	  would	  motivate	  us	  to	  take	  this	  route.	  The	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  
have	  a	  host	  of	  considerations	  that,	  when	  taken	  together,	  suggest	  that	  the	  moral	  
perspective	  through	  which	  we	  act	  is	  both	  experiential	  (an	  embodied	  moral	  sense)	  
and	  conceptual.	  However	  this	  theory	  appears	  to	  clash	  with	  the	  intuition	  that	  we	  
can	  act	  morally,	  and	  held	  responsible	  for	  those	  acts,	  without	  having	  reflected	  prior	  
to	  acting.	  For	  example,	  if	  Zia	  –	  who	  has	  been	  known	  to	  glorify	  violence	  and	  declare	  
men	  ‘wimps’	  for	  not	  being	  up	  for	  a	  fight	  –	  punches	  Farhad	  because	  Farhad	  said	  
Daniel	  Dennett	  was	  a	  poor	  philosopher,	  we	  would	  want	  to	  hold	  Zia	  responsible	  
regardless	  of	  whether	  he69	  had	  explicitly	  reasoned	  about	  his	  actions	  before	  hand.	  If	  
we	  want	  to	  uphold	  (as	  I	  do)	  both	  the	  theory	  and	  the	  intuition,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  
explain	  how	  they	  are	  consistent.	  	  
	   To	  make	  sense	  of	  both	  theory	  and	  intuition,	  we	  can	  return	  to	  a	  formulation	  
of	  perceptual	  experience	  that	  McDowell	  (2006)	  introduces.	  Here,	  in	  explaining	  
how	  a	  perceptual	  experience	  can	  justify	  a	  belief,	  he	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  
understand	  our	  immediate	  perceptual	  experience	  as	  “already,	  an	  actualisation	  of	  
the	  conceptual	  capacities	  that	  would	  be	  exercised	  by	  someone	  who	  explicitly	  
adopted	  a	  belief	  with	  that	  content”	  (p.	  133).	  So	  someone	  who	  unreflectively	  sees	  
that	  the	  ball	  is	  red	  has	  actualised	  the	  same	  conceptual	  capacities	  as	  someone	  who	  
comes	  to	  explicitly	  believe	  that	  the	  ball	  is	  red.	  The	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  latter	  
person	  has	  exercised	  the	  conceptual	  capacities,	  whereas,	  with	  the	  former	  example,	  
these	  capacities	  are	  being	  actualised	  without	  being	  exercised.	  Similarly,	  Zia	  seeing	  
Farhad	  as	  the	  right	  target	  for	  punching	  is	  the	  actualisation	  of	  certain	  concepts	  
pertaining	  to	  the	  value	  of	  violence	  in	  dealing	  with	  conflict,	  rather	  than	  the	  exercise	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  ‘Zia’,	  while	  it	  ends	  in	  an	  ‘a’,	  is	  generally	  a	  male	  name.	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of	  these	  concepts70.	  To	  see	  something	  as	  red,	  or	  to	  see	  someone	  as	  punch-­‐worthy,	  
does	  not	  require	  us	  to	  do	  anything:	  sometimes	  balls	  present	  themselves	  to	  us	  as	  
red,	  and	  sometimes	  people	  are	  perceived	  as	  punch-­‐worthy.	  While	  these	  are	  
passive	  processes,	  what	  gives	  our	  perception	  of	  the	  entities	  that	  populate	  the	  
world	  the	  character	  they	  have	  are	  our	  conceptual	  capacities.	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  our	  
conceptual	  capacities	  are	  shaping	  how	  we	  perceive	  the	  world,	  without	  us	  actively	  
engaging	  in	  conceptual	  practices.	  	  	  
	   This	  makes	  intelligible	  how	  someone	  could	  act	  for	  reasons	  without	  them	  
always	  reflecting	  before	  they	  act,	  because	  “what	  matters	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  step	  
back	  and	  assess	  whether	  putative	  reasons	  warrant	  action	  or	  belief”	  (2009,	  p.	  130).	  
It	  is	  not	  required	  that	  one	  always	  does.	  McDowell	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	  a	  woman	  
who	  sees	  a	  signpost	  pointing	  right	  and	  so	  turns	  right.	  He	  argues	  that,	  	  
What	  shows	  that	  she	  goes	  to	  the	  right	  in	  rational	  response	  to	  the	  way	  the	  
signpost	  points	  might	  be	  just	  that	  she	  can	  afterwards	  answer	  the	  question	  
why	  she	  went	  to	  the	  right	  –	  a	  request	  for	  her	  reason	  for	  doing	  –	  by	  saying	  
“There	  was	  a	  signpost	  to	  the	  right”.	  She	  need	  not	  have	  adverted	  to	  that	  
reason	  and	  decided	  on	  that	  basis	  to	  go	  to	  the	  right.	  (p.	  130.)	  
	  
We	  might	  think	  that	  this	  is	  post	  hoc	  rationalisation:	  maybe	  the	  woman	  
didn’t	  go	  right	  because	  she	  saw	  the	  signpost	  pointing	  right,	  she	  just	  said	  that	  
is	  why	  she	  went	  right	  after	  the	  fact	  to	  explain	  her	  behaviour.	  Or,	  more	  
accurately,	  she	  went	  right	  because	  she	  saw	  the	  sign	  pointing	  right,	  but	  the	  
psychological	  processes	  that	  was	  responsible	  for	  seeing	  the	  sign	  and	  
responding	  to	  it	  is	  nonconceptual.	  	  
One	  question	  here	  is	  how	  feasible	  that	  is:	  does	  it	  make	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  
the	  way	  we	  respond	  to	  symbolic	  expressions,	  such	  as	  an	  arrow	  pointing	  in	  a	  
particular	  direction,	  is	  not	  shaped	  by	  what	  we	  can	  talk	  about	  and	  reflect	  on?	  
Responding	  to	  culturally	  mediated	  objects	  such	  as	  symbols	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  
domain	  of	  language-­‐using	  creatures.	  Further,	  in	  terms	  of	  our	  experience	  of	  
arrows,	  it	  seems	  that	  before	  we	  reflect	  on	  what	  direction	  they	  are	  pointing	  us	  
to,	  we	  experience	  them	  as	  pointing	  us	  in	  a	  certain	  direction.	  We	  read	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  It	  important	  here	  that	  ‘concepts’	  are	  being	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  would	  be	  needed	  for	  
the	  stronger	  form	  of	  agency	  –	  that	  is,	  agency	  where	  we	  hold	  people	  responsible	  for	  their	  
own	  perspective	  because	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  reflecting.	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arrow’s	  meaning,	  instead	  of	  experiencing	  ourselves	  as	  moving	  in	  reaction	  to	  
them	  in	  the	  way	  our	  knee	  jerks	  if	  we	  hit	  the	  right	  spot.	  So	  how	  we	  
immediately	  understand	  the	  world	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  what	  we	  can	  
articulate.	  
Neither	  of	  these	  points	  prove	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  things	  the	  way	  
I	  am	  presenting	  them.	  What	  I	  am	  proposing	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  way	  of	  explaining	  
the	  role	  of	  reflection	  in	  moral	  agency	  without	  being	  hyper-­‐rationalist	  or	  
adopting	  Prinz’s	  framework.	  Moreover,	  something	  like	  this	  account	  is	  
congruent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  narrative	  abilities	  can	  both	  be	  articulated	  and	  
shaped	  by	  what	  we	  articulate.	  	  
In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  project,	  our	  moral	  perspective	  is	  conceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  our	  moral	  sense	  in	  a	  particular	  context	  is	  an	  actualisation	  of	  the	  concepts	  that	  
constitute	  our	  moral	  perspective.	  It	  is	  enough	  that	  we	  can	  reflect	  on	  it	  and	  
articulate	  it	  further	  through	  further	  storytelling	  at	  some	  point.	  Therefore	  we	  do	  
not	  have	  to	  be	  actively	  making	  moral	  judgements	  for	  our	  moral	  perspective	  to	  be	  a	  
reason	  for	  action.	  	  
What	  is	  crucially	  different	  between	  my	  theory	  and	  Prinz’s	  is	  that,	  on	  my	  
theory,	  the	  moral	  perspective	  on	  which	  we	  act	  is	  conceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  we	  
can,	  when	  we	  want	  to,	  use	  it	  in	  deliberation.	  So,	  even	  if	  we	  do	  not	  reflect	  before	  an	  
action,	  we	  can	  be	  asked	  to	  justify	  an	  action	  in	  retrospect.	  It	  is	  the	  conceptual	  nature	  
of	  our	  perspective	  that	  allows	  this.	  On	  his	  theory,	  in	  contrast,	  an	  emotion	  causes	  
our	  action.	  But,	  according	  to	  this	  view,	  an	  emotion	  is	  not	  something	  that	  
participates	  in	  rationality,	  it	  is	  just	  an	  output	  of	  it.	  Our	  actions,	  on	  this	  account,	  are	  
not	  merited	  in	  the	  sense	  we	  want	  them	  to	  be	  if	  they	  are	  an	  act	  of	  the	  agent,	  because	  
the	  cause	  of	  the	  action	  cannot	  act	  as	  a	  reason	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  actualisations	  of	  
a	  rational	  process.	  
Note	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  reflective	  capacities	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  
metarepresentation.	  I	  may	  reflect	  on	  my	  belief	  that	  the	  world	  is	  round,	  rather	  than	  
flat,	  but,	  as	  far	  as	  I	  am	  concerned,	  I	  am	  reflecting	  about	  the	  world.	  I	  could	  think:	  ‘is	  
the	  world	  round?	  It	  looks	  flat!’.	  This	  reflection	  is	  metarepresentational	  only	  when	  I	  
reflect	  on	  my	  belief	  as	  a	  belief.	  For	  instance,	  if	  I	  think,	  ‘should	  I	  believe	  the	  world	  is	  
round?	  I	  only	  believe	  that	  the	  world	  is	  round	  because	  someone	  has	  told	  me	  so’.	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We	  should	  not,	  then,	  see	  a	  theory	  of	  narrative	  moral	  agency	  as	  hyper-­‐
rationalist,	  because	  we	  can	  understand	  one’s	  experience	  as	  falling	  in	  the	  space	  of	  
reasons.	  This	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  we	  must	  think	  about	  our	  behaviour	  before	  we	  
behave	  for	  it	  to	  count	  as	  an	  action,	  but	  that	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  that	  we	  could	  stand	  
back	  from	  our	  behaviour	  and	  reflect	  on	  it.	  	  
	  
	  
4. Empirical	  support	  for	  the	  integration	  of	  concept	  and	  affect	  
	  
4.1.	  Narratives	  &	  affect	  
We	  have	  explored	  above	  different	  facets	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  reasons	  for	  actions	  
are	  constituted	  through	  concepts.	  However,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  arguments	  above	  is	  
contestable.	  It	  is	  controversial	  to	  suggest	  that	  talk	  of	  agency	  should	  be	  talk	  that	  
refers	  to	  a	  space	  of	  reasons.	  And	  it	  isn’t	  rare	  that	  people	  are	  unconvinced	  by	  
theories	  that	  are	  supported	  by	  observation	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  our	  experience.	  
However,	  the	  claim	  I	  want	  to	  make	  now	  is	  that	  there	  is	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  is	  
congruent	  with	  my	  theory,	  but	  appears	  to	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  Prinz’s.	  This	  means	  
there	  are	  several	  lines	  of	  convergence,	  between	  conceptual	  argument,	  
phenomenological	  description	  and	  empirical	  considerations,	  that	  are	  better	  
explained	  by	  a	  theory	  of	  narrative	  moral	  agency	  than	  Prinz’s	  sentimentalism.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  types	  of	  evidence	  I	  want	  to	  look	  at.	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  
congruency	  between	  the	  theory	  of	  narrative	  moral	  agency	  and	  a	  study	  concerning	  
the	  relationship	  between	  narratives	  and	  moral	  experience.	  The	  second	  piece	  
evidence	  concerns	  different	  studies	  on	  how	  abstract	  concepts	  are	  affective,	  which	  
both	  supports	  the	  theory	  of	  narrative	  moral	  agency,	  and	  poses	  problems	  for	  
Prinz’s	  theory.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  type	  of	  evidence	  is	  a	  study	  where	  participants	  read	  stories	  while	  having	  
their	  brain	  scanned.	  This	  study	  is	  useful	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  reasons.	  It	  fits	  in	  nicely	  
with	  the	  theory	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  our	  capacity	  to	  work	  out	  what	  is	  of	  higher	  
worth	  and	  our	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  are	  entangled.	  It	  also	  fits	  in	  with	  the	  analysis	  
in	  previous	  chapters	  that	  the	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  is	  important	  in	  these	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processes.	  In	  general,	  it	  gives	  us	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  a	  discourse	  
level,	  narrative,	  process	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  be	  moral	  creatures	  that	  act	  on	  what	  we	  
value.	  	  
	   In	  a	  recent	  study	  Kaplan	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  showed	  that	  reading	  stories	  engaged	  a	  
particular	  network	  in	  the	  brain,	  including	  the	  medial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (mPFC).	  
Interestingly,	  this	  network	  is	  the	  “default	  mode	  network”,	  previously	  thought	  to	  be	  
the	  resting	  network.	  Moreover	  they	  showed	  the	  same	  network	  was	  activated	  more	  
strongly	  when	  participants	  read	  stories	  that	  included	  “protected	  values”.	  Protected	  
values,	  here,	  are	  values	  that	  are	  understood	  by	  the	  person	  who	  holds	  them	  to	  be	  
values	  that	  they	  will	  not	  compromise	  on.	  In	  their	  study,	  Kaplan	  et	  al.	  collected	  
personal	  narratives	  from	  blogs,	  and	  asked	  participants	  from	  the	  U.S.,	  China	  and	  
Iran	  to	  read	  them	  while	  in	  an	  fMRI	  scanner.	  Afterwards,	  participants	  were	  given	  a	  
questionnaire.	  Included	  in	  it,	  participants	  were	  asked	  whether	  the	  protagonist’s	  
actions	  were	  valuable	  to	  themselves	  (the	  participant)	  or	  the	  protagonist.	  To	  
determine	  whether	  participants	  understood	  the	  stories	  as	  involving	  protected	  
values,	  they	  were	  asked	  whether	  the	  protagonist	  could	  be	  offered	  any	  amount	  of	  
money	  to	  act	  differently	  than	  those	  values	  prescribe,	  and	  whether,	  if	  they	  were	  in	  
the	  same	  scenario,	  they	  could	  be	  offered	  any	  money	  to	  act	  differently.	  	  Whether	  a	  
story	  was	  seen	  as	  engaging	  protected	  values	  involved	  using	  the	  responses	  to	  both	  
these	  questions.	  	  
Protected	  values	  seem	  to	  be	  ‘strong	  evaluations’	  in	  that	  we	  will	  not	  
compromise	  them.	  In	  this	  sense,	  despite	  the	  rough-­‐and-­‐ready	  nature	  of	  the	  probe,	  
we	  can	  see	  this	  experiment	  as	  looking	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  strong	  
evaluations	  and	  narrative.	  For	  our	  purposes	  this	  study	  shows	  three	  crucial	  things.	  
First	  we	  have	  good	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  mPFC,	  which	  contains	  
the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  (vmPFC),	  is	  involved	  in	  narrative	  
understanding.	  Second,	  Kaplan	  et	  al.	  found	  that	  the	  activity	  in	  the	  network	  they	  
studied	  also	  increases	  as	  the	  story	  continues.	  This	  supports	  the	  reading	  that	  mPFC	  
is	  involved	  in	  narrative	  understanding,	  considering	  that	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  
information	  needed	  to	  integrated	  increases,	  so	  does	  the	  activity	  in	  the	  mPFC	  and	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  network.	  	  Third,	  we	  have	  good	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  idea	  that	  
strong	  evaluations	  and	  our	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  are	  closely	  connected.	  We	  have	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reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  same	  brain	  network	  enables	  both,	  as	  activity	  in	  this	  
network	  is	  greater	  when	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  processing	  strong	  
evaluations.	  	  
	   Other	  interesting	  points	  come	  out	  in	  Kaplan	  et	  al.’s	  (2017)	  discussion	  which	  
support	  claims	  I	  have	  made	  in	  previous	  chapters.	  They	  recognise	  that	  the	  default	  
network	  seems	  to	  enable	  mental	  time	  travel,	  among	  many	  other	  capacities,	  and	  
that	  “interestingly,	  all	  these	  operations	  [social	  cognition,	  internally	  directed	  
processing,	  mental	  time	  travel	  and	  self-­‐related	  processing]	  are	  either	  involved	  in	  
the	  processing	  of	  narratives	  or	  rely	  on	  a	  narrative	  organisation	  of	  information”	  (p.	  
5).	  	  They	  also	  review	  other	  studies	  that	  appear	  to	  show	  that	  the	  mPFC	  is	  central	  in	  
finding	  and	  forming	  coherence,	  including	  coherence	  in	  stories.	  Further,	  they	  draw	  
on	  experimental	  literature	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  network	  that	  enables	  these	  tasks	  “is	  
ideal…as	  a	  high-­‐level	  coordinator	  across	  sensory,	  motor	  and	  memory	  domains”	  
and	  because	  it	  is	  central	  to	  integrating	  information,	  it	  draws	  on	  different	  affective	  
areas	  to	  enable	  “the	  complex	  emotions	  evoked	  by	  stories”	  (p.	  6).	  	  
	   This	  analysis	  not	  only	  echoes	  mine	  in	  many	  respects,	  but	  is	  consistent	  with	  
my	  description	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  as	  embodied	  and	  requiring	  one	  to	  hold	  
together	  a	  perspective	  on	  an	  array	  of	  features	  and	  events.	  As	  I	  have	  suggested	  
earlier,	  one	  way	  to	  understand	  this	  is	  that	  such	  a	  large-­‐scale	  integration	  of	  so	  many	  
conceptual,	  and	  experiential	  resources	  is	  a	  large	  part	  of	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  enable	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  perspective	  on	  and	  in	  the	  story.	  While	  this	  fits	  well	  with	  what	  I	  am	  
proposing,	  this	  evidence	  is	  not	  cited	  as	  knockdown	  evidence	  against	  alternative	  
accounts.	  Still,	  if	  one	  wants	  to	  claim	  that	  this	  evidence	  is	  consistent	  with	  Prinz’s,	  or	  
some	  other	  account	  that	  differs	  from	  mine,	  we	  are	  owed	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  it	  is	  
consistent.	  	  
	  
	   4.2.	  Concepts	  and	  affect	  
The	  empirical	  analysis	  above	  gives	  us	  a	  positive	  reason	  for	  accepting	  the	  idea	  that	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  important	  for	  moral	  judgements.	  However,	  there	  is	  
more	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  affect	  and	  concept	  that	  speaks	  
against	  Prinz’s	  account.	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   As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Prinz	  is	  ambivalent	  about	  whether	  moral	  emotions	  are	  
conceptual	  or	  not:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  says	  moral	  emotions	  constitute	  concepts,	  
and	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  he	  doesn’t	  give	  them	  the	  role	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning	  he	  
should,	  given	  his	  own	  definition	  of	  ‘concept’.	  	  
	   I	  want	  to	  present	  some	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  gives	  us	  some	  reason	  for	  
thinking	  that	  we	  should	  think	  be	  less	  ambivalent	  than	  Prinz	  is,	  and	  commit	  to	  
moral	  emotions	  constituting	  concepts.	  Again,	  this	  is	  not	  presented	  to	  prove	  my	  
proposal	  and	  disprove	  others.	  But	  it	  is	  evidence	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  explained	  (or	  
explained	  away)	  when	  discussing	  alternatives	  to	  my	  proposal.	  	  
The	  empirical	  data	  below	  looks	  at	  the	  relation	  between	  abstract	  concepts	  
and	  affect,	  and	  shows	  that	  abstract	  concepts	  are	  particularly	  affective.	  I	  think	  we	  
should	  see	  moral	  concepts	  as	  abstract	  concepts.	  Think	  of	  what	  terms	  are	  classed	  as	  
a	  strongly	  evaluative.	  Terms	  like:	  just/unjust,	  noble/base,	  
courageous/uncourageous.	  These	  are	  abstract	  terms	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  gather	  
a	  lot	  of	  seemingly	  diverse	  events	  and	  behaviours,	  and	  classify	  them,	  together.	  	  
Further,	  such	  studies,	  to	  investigate	  the	  difference	  between	  abstract	  and	  
concrete	  concepts,	  use	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  words.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  object	  
of	  study	  are	  concepts	  in	  the	  full	  sense,	  i.e.	  those	  that	  we	  use	  in	  deliberative	  
reasoning.	  Words,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  inner	  speech,	  are	  often	  what	  we	  use	  to	  deliberate.	  	  
	   Neuroimaging	  studies	  show	  that	  areas	  associated	  both	  with	  sensorimotor	  
and	  emotional	  processing	  are	  activated	  when	  abstract	  concepts,	  of	  which	  moral	  
concepts	  are	  a	  subclass,	  are	  processed	  (Pexman	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Wilson-­‐Mendenhall	  et	  
al.,	  2011).	  Vigliocco	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  found	  that	  emotion-­‐associated	  areas	  of	  the	  brain	  
were	  activated	  more	  strongly	  in	  abstract	  words	  compared	  to	  concrete	  words.	  
Additionally,	  they	  found	  that	  the	  stronger	  the	  affect,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  distance	  from	  
neutrality,	  the	  more	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  visual	  system	  were	  activated.	  	  
Kousta	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  found	  that	  abstract	  words	  tended	  to	  have	  a	  higher	  
emotional	  valence	  than	  concrete	  words.	  Finally,	  in	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  
neuroscience	  of	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  words,	  Binkofski	  &	  Borghi	  (2014)	  found	  
that	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  word	  processing	  both	  share	  sensorimotor	  networks,	  but	  
abstract	  words	  appear	  to	  require	  more	  affective	  processing	  and	  concrete	  words	  
greater	  sensorimotor	  processing.	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That	  is,	  the	  balance	  of	  affect	  and	  sensorimotor	  involvement,	  when	  
comparing	  abstract	  and	  concrete	  words,	  was	  one	  of	  emphasis.	  While	  concrete	  
words	  are	  based	  in	  particular	  sensorimotor	  patterns	  to	  a	  greater	  extent,	  abstract	  
words	  are	  no	  less	  experiential.	  Instead	  abstract	  words	  are	  less	  based	  in	  particular	  
sensorimotor	  patterns	  or,	  at	  least,	  encompass	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	  the	  general	  sense	  
that	  apparently	  disparate	  sensorimotor	  patterns	  express.	  Indeed,	  one	  way	  to	  
understand	  affect	  is	  that	  it	  requires	  an	  abstraction.	  Core	  relational	  themes	  abstract	  
from	  particulars.	  For	  example,	  we	  can	  feel	  fear	  (that	  we	  are	  in	  danger)	  in	  situations	  
that	  look	  different	  and	  where	  very	  different	  actions	  are	  suitable.	  If	  I’m	  scared	  of	  my	  
boss,	  maybe	  I	  should	  report	  their	  bad	  behaviour	  to	  my	  union	  representative.	  If	  I	  
am	  scared	  of	  that	  car	  hurtling	  towards	  me	  unexpectedly,	  I	  should	  run.	  In	  the	  next	  
chapter,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  particulars	  of	  a	  situation	  are	  included	  in	  affect,	  but	  
this	  will	  not	  be	  to	  dispute	  that	  affect	  also	  includes	  features	  of	  abstraction.	  Our	  fear	  
is	  modulated	  by	  the	  particulars,	  and	  yet	  we	  understand	  both	  instances	  of	  fear	  as	  
tokens	  of	  the	  same	  type,	  because	  there	  is	  some	  aspect	  that	  remains	  constant.	  	  
This	  observation	  about	  the	  abstract	  feature	  of	  affect	  is	  relevant	  to	  my	  
project	  because	  Prinz	  does	  not	  give	  moral	  emotions	  full	  conceptual	  status.	  
However,	  those	  concepts	  that	  we	  are	  most	  interested	  in	  here,	  concepts	  of	  what	  is	  
of	  value	  or	  what	  is	  good	  and	  praiseworthy	  and	  which	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  think	  are	  
involved	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning,	  are	  highly	  abstract	  concepts.	  As	  above,	  I	  do	  not	  
want	  to	  imply	  that	  we	  only	  experience	  a	  situation	  as	  just/unjust	  when	  we	  reflect	  
on	  it	  and	  apply	  a	  concept	  to	  it.	  Instead,	  the	  claim	  is	  that	  our	  experience	  is	  shaped	  
by	  our	  conceptual	  understanding.	  So	  we	  immediately	  understand	  a	  situation	  as	  
being	  just	  or	  unjust,	  before	  any	  reflection.	  Or,	  as	  McDowell	  would	  say,	  our	  
experience	  is	  the	  actualisation	  of	  concepts	  related	  to	  justice	  or	  injustice.	  This	  is	  a	  
visceral	  reaction	  because	  our	  conceptual	  understanding	  is	  affective:	  we	  experience	  
the	  injustice	  as	  bodily	  orientation,	  a	  readiness	  for	  action.	  	  
Finally,	  while	  these	  studies	  show	  that	  abstract	  words	  are	  more	  affective	  and	  
concrete	  words	  more	  sensorimotor,	  the	  theory	  in	  the	  next	  chapter,	  where	  sensory	  
and	  affective	  processes	  are	  interdependent	  but	  not	  identical,	  would	  predict	  that	  
this	  finding	  is	  one	  of	  degree	  rather	  than	  absolutes.	  That	  is,	  an	  affective	  
understanding	  of	  our	  situation	  incorporates	  some	  particulars	  of	  what	  is	  be	  sensed	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and	  vice	  versa.	  We	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  by	  noting	  that,	  in	  narrative	  
understanding,	  our	  abstract	  concepts	  are	  always	  contextualised,	  and	  so	  can	  be	  
modulated	  by	  the	  sense	  of	  their	  context	  –	  they	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  isolation	  but	  in	  
relation	  to	  other	  concepts	  and	  the	  situations	  that	  the	  narrative	  expresses.	  My	  
embodied	  experience	  of	  injustice,	  while	  retaining	  some	  commonality,	  may	  also	  
involve	  some	  degree	  of	  variation	  as	  the	  context	  that	  I	  am	  finding	  unjust	  varies.	  An	  
experience	  of	  injustice	  that	  one	  has	  not	  been	  consulted	  on	  some	  matter	  is	  not	  
identical	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  injustice	  at	  the	  affects	  of	  war.	  
So	  it	  is	  not	  just	  the	  case	  that,	  in	  experience,	  moral	  concepts	  are	  affective.	  
The	  neurological	  underpinning	  of	  conceptual	  understanding	  involves	  brain	  regions	  
associated	  with	  affect.	  Further,	  we	  can	  see	  why	  we	  find	  this	  more	  with	  abstract	  
concepts,	  because	  abstract	  concepts	  rely	  more	  heavily	  on	  higher-­‐order	  relations,	  
but	  our	  affective	  understanding	  already	  includes	  such	  a	  type	  of	  understanding.	  
Affective	  understanding	  includes	  an	  understanding	  of	  a	  general	  predicament	  and	  
whether	  it	  should	  be	  encouraged	  or	  changed.	  Abstraction	  and	  affectivity	  therefore	  
share	  a	  common	  structural	  feature.	  	  
A	  worry	  we	  might	  have	  is	  that,	  while	  such	  abstract	  affective	  concepts	  are	  
used	  in	  deliberation,	  they	  are	  not	  used	  in	  making	  moral	  judgements	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	  matters	  for	  Prinz.	  That	  is,	  they	  are	  not	  what	  we	  act	  on.	  To	  bolster	  this	  intuition	  
we	  might	  claim	  that	  concepts	  cannot	  motivate,	  only	  nonconceptual	  emotions	  (i.e.	  
emotions	  not	  involved	  in	  deliberation)	  can.	  Yet	  it	  isn’t	  obvious	  why	  the	  conceptual	  
nature	  of	  a	  processes	  would	  cause	  the	  action-­‐oriented	  character	  of	  emotion	  to	  
disappear.	  Further,	  some	  more	  work	  would	  have	  to	  be	  done	  to	  fully	  motivate	  this	  
argument;	  particularly	  because	  some	  interpretations	  of	  the	  neurological	  literature	  
undermine	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  cognition/conceptual	  capacities	  and	  emotions	  
(e.g.	  see	  Pessoa,	  2008;	  and	  Lindquist	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
	   From	  the	  empirical	  results	  it	  appears	  that	  Prinz	  is	  misguided	  in	  his	  
sentimentalism.	  We	  have	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  moral	  concepts,	  which	  are	  concepts	  
involved	  in	  deliberation,	  are	  affective.	  If	  deliberation	  is	  affective,	  this	  challenges	  
Prinz’s	  implicit	  dichotomy	  between	  deliberation	  and	  emotion.	  Further,	  the	  
possibility	  that	  how	  we	  feel	  can	  be	  involved	  in	  our	  explicit	  cognition,	  seems	  to	  be	  
supported	  by	  empirical	  work	  showing	  the	  abstract	  concepts	  are	  affective.	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5. Conclusion	  
	  
The	  theme	  throughout	  this	  chapter	  has	  been	  the	  interconnection	  between	  the	  
capacity	  to	  reflect	  and	  emotion.	  Using	  McDowell’s	  schema,	  where	  a	  psychological	  
process	  is	  conceptual	  whenever	  we	  can	  be	  asked	  to	  articulate	  and	  justify	  it,	  I	  
formulated	  a	  position	  that	  the	  emotional	  nature	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  
conceptual	  because	  we	  can	  use	  it	  to	  articulate	  our	  views	  and	  justify	  our	  actions.	  We	  
see	  this	  can	  be	  a	  moral	  activity	  through	  Taylor’s	  articulation	  of	  strong	  evaluations,	  
where	  our	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  of	  qualitatively	  higher	  worth	  is	  affective,	  yet	  both	  open	  
to	  articulation	  and	  constituted	  through	  it.	  This	  possibility	  is	  congruent	  with	  
neurolinguistic	  evidence,	  where	  abstract	  concepts,	  such	  as	  moral	  concepts,	  rely	  
more	  heavily	  on	  brain	  regions	  associated	  with	  emotions.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  
that	  Prinz	  could	  show	  this	  evidence	  to	  be	  congruent	  with	  his	  theory	  too,	  this	  would	  
at	  least	  take	  some	  argumentation	  from	  him.	  	  
In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  have	  explained	  how	  strong	  evaluations	  are	  part	  and	  parcel	  
of	  our	  capacity	  as	  interpretive,	  that	  is,	  narrative,	  creatures.	  And	  here	  we	  have	  a	  
double	  use	  of	  this	  observation,	  to	  make	  it	  clearer	  what	  the	  assumption	  is	  that	  Prinz	  
makes	  that	  we	  can	  call	  into	  question,	  and	  the	  other	  expanding	  on	  G&K	  and	  
Velleman’s	  discussion	  of	  agency.	  In	  response	  to	  Prinz,	  because	  we	  can	  resist	  
identifying	  moral	  sense	  with	  an	  isolated	  emotion,	  and	  instead	  view	  our	  moral	  
sense	  as	  a	  discursive,	  interpretive,	  process.	  This	  moral	  sense	  emerges,	  on	  the	  view	  
I	  have	  put	  forward	  here,	  through	  a	  network	  of	  affective-­‐conceptual,	  narratively-­‐
related,	  reasons.	  As	  an	  expansion	  of	  G&K’s	  theory,	  my	  view	  explains	  why	  emotion	  
is	  part	  of	  moral	  agency.	  Not	  only	  does	  emotion	  emerge	  with	  an	  experiential	  quality	  
that	  is	  action-­‐orientated,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  constituent	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  
strong	  evaluations,	  and	  so	  enables	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of,	  and	  act	  on,	  what	  is	  of	  
highest	  worth.	  	  
What	  gives	  us	  reason	  to	  accept	  this	  account	  is	  not	  one	  argument	  or	  type	  of	  
evidence,	  but	  how	  conceptual,	  phenomenological	  and	  empirical	  results	  can	  be	  
accommodated	  by	  the	  theory	  of	  narrative	  moral	  agency,	  but	  not	  by	  Prinz’s	  
sentimentalism.	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The	  Interdependence	  of	  Sensory	  and	  Emotional	  Experience	  
	  
The	  role	  of	  the	  body	  in	  memory	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  if	  memory	  is…an	  effort	  to	  reopen	  
time	  beginning	  from	  the	  implication	  of	  the	  present,	  and	  if	  the	  body,	  being	  our	  
permanent	  means	  of	  “adopting	  attitudes”	  and	  hence	  of	  creating	  pseudo-­‐presents,	  is	  the	  
means	  of	  our	  communicating	  with	  both	  time	  and	  space.	  
Maurice	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  2012,	  The	  Phenomenology	  of	  Perception,	  p.	  187.	  
	  
1. Introduction	  	  
	  
We	  have	  so	  far	  been	  considering	  two	  answers	  to	  the	  question:	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  to	  
form	  an	  attitude	  about	  what	  is	  good	  and	  valuable?	  Prinz	  argues	  that,	  while	  there	  
are	  all	  sorts	  of	  important	  causal	  components,	  the	  only	  constituent	  of	  our	  sense	  of	  
goodness	  and	  badness	  is	  emotion.	  This	  is	  a	  complex	  claim	  in	  some	  ways,	  because	  
while	  in	  his	  2006	  paper	  Prinz	  talks	  of	  emotions	  being	  sufficient	  for	  moral	  
judgements,	  in	  his	  2007	  book	  he	  argues	  that	  moral	  judgments	  are	  a	  compound	  
state	  that	  including	  an	  emotion	  and	  a	  representation	  of	  their	  object.	  I	  will	  explain	  
this	  more	  fully	  shortly.	  	  
In	  response	  to	  Prinz,	  Gerrans	  &	  Kennett	  (G&K)	  counter	  that	  our	  capacity	  for	  
diachronicity	  is	  central	  for	  moral	  judgements,	  specifically	  our	  capacity	  to	  re-­‐
experience	  our	  past,	  and	  imagine	  our	  future.	  So	  far,	  we	  have	  seen	  some	  kind	  of	  
synthesis	  of	  this,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  emotion	  has	  been	  put	  forward	  as	  an	  enabling	  
feature	  of	  our	  ability	  for	  mental	  time	  travel	  (MTT),	  and	  narrative	  understanding	  
more	  generally.	  
	   However,	  I	  have	  not	  yet	  talked	  about	  a	  vital	  characteristic	  of	  MTT.	  And	  that	  
is	  that	  MTT	  appears	  to	  involve	  a	  sensory	  component.	  When	  we	  remember	  or	  
imagine	  some	  place	  or	  event,	  there	  is	  some	  qualitative	  experience	  of	  what	  we	  
would	  sense,	  if	  we	  were	  actually	  there.	  So	  G&K	  make	  sensory	  experience	  central	  to	  
their	  conception	  of	  agency.	  Prinz,	  meanwhile,	  makes	  sensory	  experience	  important	  
to	  moral	  judgements	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  object	  that	  
forms	  a	  compound	  state	  with	  an	  emotion.	  	  
	   In	  contrast	  to	  both	  theories,	  it	  looks	  like	  I	  give	  no	  role	  to	  sensory	  
experience.	  When	  explaining	  my	  conception	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  I	  have	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mainly	  talked	  about	  how	  emotion	  is	  involved.	  Unlike	  MTT,	  it	  isn’t	  obvious	  why	  
sensory	  experience	  should	  be	  part	  of	  narrative	  understanding.	  However,	  in	  this	  
chapter	  I	  argue	  that	  sensory	  experience	  must	  be	  part	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  
because	  the	  integration	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  
perspectival	  sense	  that	  constitutes	  it.	  	  
In	  the	  end,	  I	  argue	  that	  G&K’s	  more	  embodied	  conception	  of	  moral	  agency	  
must	  be	  right.	  But	  that	  does	  not	  require	  that	  I	  adopt	  their	  stance	  that	  MTT	  is	  what	  
is	  crucial.	  Instead	  I	  submit	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  always	  does,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  include	  sensory	  understanding.	  But	  to	  understand	  why	  sensory	  experience	  
is	  involved	  in	  narrative	  understanding,	  we	  must	  reject	  Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  the	  
relationship	  between	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience.	  Because	  it	  is	  only	  through	  
the	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  
how	  they	  co-­‐emerge	  with	  a	  perspective.	  “Perspective”	  here	  is	  taken	  as	  one	  way	  to	  
understand	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  embodied	  and	  action	  orientated,	  as	  
will	  be	  explained	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
	   	  While	  this	  argument	  counters	  Prinz’s	  claim	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  
emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience,	  it	  also	  feeds	  into	  my	  positive	  proposal	  about	  
how	  to	  best	  understand	  moral	  agency	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  	  
i) Moral	  agency	  entails	  being	  able	  to	  act	  for	  reasons;	  	  
ii) Narrative	  understanding	  is	  necessary	  for	  acting	  for	  reasons;	  	  
iii) Emotional	  experience	  is	  a	  constituent	  of	  narrative	  understanding;	  	  
iv) Emotional	  experience	  is	  interdependent	  with	  sensory	  experience;	  	  
v) Therefore,	  sensory	  experience	  is	  integral	  to	  moral	  agency.	  	  
To	  make	  this	  point	  about	  the	  role	  of	  sensory	  experience	  in	  agency,	  however,	  
I	  will	  first	  argue	  that	  a	  sensory-­‐affective	  amalgam	  is	  constitutive	  of	  a	  subject	  
feeling	  present	  in	  the	  present.	  The	  claim	  is	  that	  our	  feelings	  of	  being	  present	  in	  
narratives,	  which	  is	  what	  I	  will	  claim	  is	  also	  our	  sense	  of	  perspective	  in	  them,	  are	  
constituted	  in	  a	  similar	  way.	  Much	  of	  the	  chapter,	  therefore,	  is	  concerned	  with	  our	  
capacity	  to	  have	  a	  perspective	  now.	  	  
So	  this	  discussion	  about	  the	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  
experience	  has	  a	  dual-­‐purpose	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  thesis	  dialectic.	  First,	  it	  
questions	  the	  relationship	  sensory	  experience	  has	  to	  emotions	  and	  moral	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judgements	  that	  Prinz	  proposes.	  For	  him	  emotions	  constitute	  the	  moral	  aspect	  and	  
sensory	  experiences	  are	  conjoined	  to	  that.	  Second,	  by	  establishing	  sensing	  and	  
feeling	  as	  co-­‐constituting	  each	  other,	  it	  establishes	  and	  explains	  why	  sensory	  
experience,	  in	  the	  service	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  is	  central	  to	  moral	  agency.	  	  
To	  establish	  the	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience,	  and	  
how	  this	  enables	  us	  to	  feel	  present	  in	  a	  world,	  I	  start	  with	  Merleau-­‐Ponty.	  He	  
provides	  a	  transcendental	  argument	  establishing	  this	  interdependence,	  which	  can	  
equally	  be	  understood	  as	  ‘inference	  to	  our	  current	  best	  explanation’.	  I	  use	  this	  as	  a	  
starting	  place	  to	  explain	  how,	  if	  we	  examine	  our	  everyday	  experience,	  this	  
interdependence	  is	  evident.	  Neuroscience	  corroborates	  the	  theory	  that	  sensory	  
and	  emotional	  experience	  are	  intertwined.	  Similarly,	  despite	  clinical	  psychology	  
apparently	  providing	  counterexamples,	  not	  only	  is	  it	  consistent	  with	  the	  
neuroscience	  and	  the	  phenomenology,	  but	  the	  phenomenological	  account	  provides	  
us	  with	  novel	  insights	  into	  what	  is	  going	  wrong	  in	  cases	  of	  psychosis.	  In	  all,	  I	  think	  
my	  account,	  compared	  to	  Prinz’s,	  more	  accurately	  describes	  our	  phenomenology,	  
allows	  more	  consistency	  between	  the	  disciplines,	  and	  allows	  greater	  insight	  into	  
certain	  psychological	  conditions.	  	  
Then	  I	  return	  to	  narrative	  understanding.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  our	  
imagined	  situation	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  our	  sensory-­‐affective	  access	  to	  it.	  Through	  the	  
embodiment	  that	  constitutes	  narrative	  understanding,	  we	  pre-­‐reflectively	  
experience	  an	  identity	  between	  our	  perspective	  in	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  
our	  everyday	  perspective.	  So	  the	  affordances	  we	  experience	  in	  narrative	  
understanding	  are	  available	  in	  the	  present.	  Our	  current	  perspective,	  and	  therefore	  
our	  ability	  to	  act,	  is	  inseparable	  from	  our	  status	  as	  narrative	  creatures.	  	  
	  
	  
2. Independence	  v.s.	  interdependence	  
	  
2.1.	  Prinz’s	  independence	  argument	  
Lets	  begin	  by	  looking	  at	  what	  Prinz’s	  claim	  that	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  experience	  
are	  independent	  consists	  in,	  and	  his	  motivation	  for	  this	  claim.	  	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  
while	  emotions	  are	  representations	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  organism	  and	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world	  (e.g.	  ‘fear’,	  for	  Prinz,	  represents	  that	  one	  could	  be	  harmed),	  sensory	  
experience	  is	  not	  a	  constituent	  of	  emotion,	  but	  is	  a	  partner	  to	  that	  feeling.	  He	  states	  
that,	  	  
While	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  emotions	  are	  directed	  at	  particular	  events,	  
that	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  represent	  those	  events…	  The	  events	  are	  
represented	  by	  mental	  states	  that	  combine	  with	  emotions.	  When	  I	  am	  sad	  
about	  the	  death	  of	  a	  child,	  I	  have	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  child’s	  death	  and	  
I	  have	  sadness	  attached	  to	  that	  representation	  	  (2004,	  p.	  62.)	  
	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  this	  theory,	  emotions,	  and	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  particulars	  of	  a	  
situation,	  are	  essentially	  distinct.	  They	  are	  conjoined,	  rather	  than	  inseparable.	  If	  
this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  leads	  us	  to	  expect	  that	  there	  should	  be	  some	  cases	  where	  either	  
sensory	  experience	  is	  highly	  distorted	  and	  emotion	  is	  experienced	  normally,	  or	  
emotion	  is	  experienced	  unusually	  but	  sensory	  experience	  is	  experienced	  normally.	  
The	  independence	  of	  two	  processes	  implies	  that	  neither	  are	  reliant	  on	  each	  other,	  
at	  least	  for	  their	  core	  functions,	  so	  that	  one	  process	  can	  be	  impaired	  while	  the	  
other	  one	  isn’t	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  	  
	  	   Prinz	  frames	  this	  issue	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘formal	  objects’	  of	  emotion	  versus	  the	  
‘particular	  objects’.	  The	  formal	  object	  is	  designated	  by	  the	  core	  relational	  theme.	  
Fear	  has	  an	  intentional	  object,	  it	  points	  towards	  danger,	  but	  this	  object	  is	  its	  formal	  
object.	  The	  particular	  object,	  for	  example,	  a	  lion,	  is	  an	  add-­‐on	  to	  the	  emotion,	  not	  a	  
part	  of	  it.	  	  
	   Prinz	  makes	  this	  move	  for	  several	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  
preserves	  different	  instances	  of	  the	  same	  type	  of	  emotion	  if	  emotions	  contain	  their	  
particular	  object.	  For	  example,	  if	  emotions	  include	  their	  particular	  object,	  then	  it	  is	  
not	  clear	  what	  makes	  fear	  the	  same	  type	  of	  feeling	  in	  each	  case.	  Sometimes	  fear	  is	  
caused	  by	  a	  tyrannical	  boss,	  sometimes	  it	  is	  caused	  by	  an	  exam,	  and	  sometimes	  it	  is	  
caused	  by	  lions.	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  what	  makes	  these	  uniformly	  fear	  in	  all	  cases	  is	  
that	  they	  are	  concerned	  with	  their	  formal	  object,	  that	  these	  are	  all	  threats	  to	  our	  
safety.	  As	  Prinz	  puts	  it,	  	  
One	  can	  generally	  find	  a	  common	  theme	  behind	  the	  range	  of	  things	  that	  
elicit	  any	  given	  emotion.	  Consider	  a	  number	  of	  things	  that	  might	  cause	  
sadness:	  a	  child’s	  death,	  a	  report	  on	  the	  political	  crises	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  
a	  divorce…	  They	  are	  alike	  in	  one	  respect:	  they	  all	  involve	  the	  loss	  of	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something	  valued…	  Emotions	  represent	  their	  formal	  object,	  not	  their	  
particular	  object.	  (p.	  61-­‐2.)	  	  
	  
	   Furthermore,	  Prinz	  objects	  to	  the	  general	  framing	  that	  occurs	  when	  the	  
particular	  object	  is	  seen	  as	  included	  in	  the	  emotion.	  To	  see	  emotions	  this	  way	  is,	  
for	  Prinz,	  to	  see	  emotions	  as	  secondary	  qualities,	  that	  is,	  as	  an	  experience	  enabled	  
by	  the	  property	  of	  an	  object.	  But	  Prinz	  protests	  that,	  unlike	  colour,	  which	  is	  a	  
secondary	  quality,	  we	  experience	  an	  emotion	  as	  within,	  rather	  than	  part	  of	  the	  
world:	  “the	  feeling	  of	  rage,	  for	  example,	  is	  not	  projected	  onto	  the	  object	  of	  rage;	  it	  
is	  experienced	  as	  a	  state	  within	  us”	  (p.	  61).	  Because	  emotions	  differ	  from	  colour	  in	  
this	  way,	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  cannot	  be	  secondary	  qualities.	  This	  quote	  also	  
indicates	  that	  Prinz	  understands	  his	  account	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  our	  phenomenology:	  
because	  emotions	  are	  interoceptive	  states,	  they	  are	  experienced	  as	  within,	  and	  
because	  sensory	  experiences	  are	  exteroceptive	  states,	  they	  are	  experienced	  as	  
without.	  The	  independence	  of	  the	  psychological	  processes	  of	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  
perception	  is	  mirrored	  in	  how	  our	  experiences	  present	  themselves	  to	  us.	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  are	  not	  secondary	  qualities	  because	  
emotions	  are	  not	  strictly	  speaking	  response-­‐dependent.	  They	  have	  a	  formal	  object	  
that	  represents	  a	  state	  of	  affair	  independently	  of	  including	  a	  particular	  object:	  	  
I	  can	  continue	  to	  think	  about	  the	  death	  after	  my	  sadness	  has	  subsided	  and	  I	  
can	  continue	  to	  be	  sad	  after	  my	  thoughts	  of	  the	  death	  subside.	  The	  mental	  
representation	  of	  an	  emotion’s	  particular	  object	  can	  be	  doubly	  dissociated	  
from	  the	  emotion	  it	  elicits	  (p.	  62.)	  
	  
	   So,	  Prinz	  thinks	  the	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  separable.	  But	  
this	  idea	  has	  an	  interesting	  relationship	  to	  his	  idea	  that	  emotions	  are	  sufficient	  for	  
moral	  judgements.	  This	  is	  the	  claim	  he	  makes	  in	  his	  2006	  paper,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  
claim	  made	  in	  his	  2007	  book.	  Remember,	  from	  chapter	  1,	  that	  Prinz	  thinks	  that	  
moral	  judgements	  are	  a	  compound	  state	  composed	  of	  an	  emotion	  and	  a	  
representation	  of	  their	  object.	  Here	  he	  claims	  that,	  when	  we	  form	  the	  moral	  
judgement	  that	  ‘pickpocketing	  is	  wrong’,	  	  
The	  anger	  that	  arises	  in	  the	  observer	  is	  not	  simply	  free-­‐floating	  rage.	  The	  
anger	  was	  triggered	  by	  the	  experience	  of	  pickpocketing,	  and	  it	  gets	  bound	  
to	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  pickpocketing.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  compound	  
state:	  anger	  at	  pickpocketing.	  This	  compound	  constitutes	  the	  judgement	  
that	  pickpocketing	  is	  wrong…	  (2007,	  p.	  96.)	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   Here,	  the	  particular	  object	  is	  included	  in	  the	  moral	  judgement.	  It	  is	  a	  
constituent	  and	  not	  cause	  in	  that	  the	  moral	  judgement	  is	  comprised	  of	  anger	  and	  a	  
representation	  of	  the	  pickpocketing.	  A	  representation	  of	  the	  pickpocketing	  has	  to	  
be	  included	  in	  the	  moral	  judgement,	  because	  for	  Prinz,	  the	  moral	  emotion	  only	  has	  
a	  formal	  object.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  moral	  anger,	  the	  formal	  object	  is	  either	  injustice	  
(when	  it	  is	  indignation),	  or	  the	  violation	  of	  rights	  (when	  it	  is	  righteous	  anger)	  
(2007,	  p.	  70).	  Because	  the	  moral	  judgement	  is,	  in	  this	  case,	  that	  “pickpocketing	  is	  
wrong”,	  and	  Prinz	  argues	  that	  emotions	  do	  not	  include	  the	  particular	  object,	  moral	  
judgements	  must	  be	  a	  compound	  state	  that	  includes	  not	  only	  emotions,	  but	  also	  a	  
representation	  of	  their	  particular	  object.	  	  	  	  
Therefore,	  Prinz	  doesn’t	  have	  a	  straightforward	  sufficiency	  thesis	  as	  long	  as	  
the	  representation	  of	  the	  pickpocketer	  includes	  sensory	  experience.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  
is	  the	  emotion,	  in	  the	  moral	  judgement,	  that	  provides	  the	  moral	  appraisal	  of	  the	  
situation.	  The	  sensory	  component,	  if	  there	  is	  one,	  fixes	  the	  particular	  object	  of	  that	  
moral	  sense.	  So	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  judgement	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  particular	  object	  is	  part	  
of	  the	  judgement,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  moral	  part	  of	  the	  judgement.	  What	  I	  present	  in	  
this	  chapter	  challenges	  Prinz	  in	  two	  ways.	  It	  challenges	  his	  theory	  of	  emotion,	  as	  
just	  involving	  the	  formal	  object,	  and	  it	  challenges	  the	  role	  he	  gives	  sensory	  
experience	  in	  moral	  judgement,	  because	  it	  proposes	  that	  sensory	  experience	  co-­‐
constitutes	  our	  moral	  sense,	  and	  is	  not	  just	  conjoined	  to	  it.	  	  
	   	  I	  do	  not	  seek	  to	  undermine	  Prinz’s	  assertion	  that	  emotions	  have	  formal	  
objects,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  this	  explains	  what	  is	  similar	  between	  different	  
instances	  of	  a	  type.	  Nonetheless,	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  our	  fear	  of	  different	  things	  (our	  
boss,	  an	  exam,	  a	  lion)	  isn’t,	  too	  some	  extent,	  altered	  by	  what	  that	  thing	  is.	  That	  is,	  it	  
is	  not	  clear	  whether	  emotions	  being	  understood,	  in	  part,	  by	  their	  formal	  object	  
excludes	  them	  also	  being	  understood,	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  particular	  object.	  In	  response	  
to	  his	  second	  and	  third	  objection,	  I	  think	  he	  has	  simply	  got	  the	  phenomenology	  
wrong.	  Emotions	  do	  seem,	  to	  some	  extent,	  to	  inflect	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  world,	  
and	  furthermore,	  the	  world,	  to	  some	  extent,	  seems	  to	  impact	  us	  bodily.	  That	  is,	  the	  
distinction	  between	  colour	  being	  ‘out	  there’	  and	  emotion	  being	  inside	  is	  less	  
absolute	  than	  Prinz	  suggests.	  	  Similarly,	  our	  feelings	  of	  sadness	  at	  death	  will	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incorporate	  some	  sensory	  imagery,	  and	  certain	  imagery	  to	  do	  with	  the	  death	  of	  a	  
loved	  one	  generally	  will	  incorporate	  some	  sadness.	  	  
	   Instead	  of	  diving	  into	  a	  detailed	  response	  to	  each	  of	  Prinz’s	  arguments	  now,	  
what	  I	  want	  to	  present	  in	  section	  3.1.	  is	  a	  robust	  phenomenological	  case	  for	  
thinking	  that	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  is	  interdependent.	  This	  will	  give	  
me	  the	  tools	  to	  express	  more	  fully	  what	  is	  unsatisfying	  with	  Prinz’s	  proposal.	  Then	  
I	  go	  on	  to	  look	  at	  what	  the	  neuroscientific	  and	  clinical	  psychological	  evidences	  
suggests.	  As	  explained	  in	  my	  second	  chapter,	  the	  phenomenology	  and	  science	  
mutually	  support	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  each	  other,	  by	  providing	  a	  constitutive	  and	  
enabling	  story	  that	  fit	  together.	  Further,	  Prinz’s	  theory	  is	  not	  supported	  by	  the	  
evidence,	  and	  makes	  it	  opaque	  how	  the	  phenomenological	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  
fit	  together.	  First,	  however,	  I	  want	  to	  say	  a	  bit	  more	  about	  the	  shape	  of	  my	  claim.	  	  
	  
2.2. Defining	  the	  alternative	  
In	  contrast	  to	  Prinz,	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  that	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  
interdependent.	  Note	  that	  I	  am	  not	  stating	  that	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  experience	  
are	  identical.	  Instead,	  they	  overlap,	  and	  both	  are	  enabled	  because	  of	  this	  significant	  
overlap.	  This	  leaves	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  there	  are	  some	  neural	  processes	  that	  
are	  more	  associated	  with	  emotional	  experience	  than	  sensory	  experience	  and	  vice	  
versa71.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  argue	  that	  my	  theory	  is	  preferable	  because	  it	  is	  more	  
accurate,	  enables	  different	  evidence	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  consistent,	  and	  it	  explains	  
more.	  	  
However,	  my	  claim	  may	  seem	  odd,	  given	  my	  habit	  of	  still	  using	  the	  
descriptions	  ‘emotions’	  or	  ‘embodied	  appraisals’	  and	  	  ‘sensing’.	  How	  can	  I	  use	  
these	  descriptions	  while	  concurrently	  claiming	  that	  they	  mutually	  constitute	  each	  
other?	  The	  answer	  is	  that	  we	  can	  see	  different	  descriptions,	  at	  least	  on	  the	  surface,	  
as	  picking	  out	  different	  characteristics.	  Yet	  these	  descriptions	  are	  not	  picking	  out	  
entirely	  different	  phenomena.	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  to	  characterise	  
significantly	  overlapping	  phenomena.	  Very	  roughly,	  we	  can	  think	  of	  sensory	  
experience	  as	  ‘experiencing	  an	  object’;	  emotional	  experience	  as	  ‘experiencing	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  See	  Pessoa	  (2008)	  for	  a	  similar	  observation	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  cognition	  
and	  emotion.	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meaning’;	  and	  experiencing	  action	  affordances	  as	  ‘the	  capacity	  to	  understand	  how,	  
and	  to	  what	  extent,	  I	  can	  engage	  with,	  and/or	  manipulate,	  an	  object’.	  In	  claiming	  
that	  all	  these	  activities	  co-­‐constitute	  each	  other,	  I	  am	  claiming	  that	  none	  of	  these	  
things	  come	  apart	  completely.	  So,	  on	  this	  picture,	  it	  is	  through	  the	  mutual	  
constitution	  of	  each	  that	  perception	  emerges.	  Unlike	  some	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  
‘perception’,	  I	  do	  not	  understand	  it	  as	  not	  reducible	  to,	  or	  synonymous	  with,	  non-­‐
affective	  sensory	  experience.	  
The	  phenomenology	  shows	  that,	  when	  we	  pay	  attention	  to	  our	  experience	  
of	  the	  world,	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  part	  of	  each	  other.	  Prinz,	  
however,	  claims	  these	  experiences	  are	  distinct.	  So	  my	  theory	  my	  accurately	  
describes	  our	  experience.	  The	  neuroscience	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  phenomenology,	  
and	  shows	  that	  the	  processes	  that	  enable	  each	  characteristic	  are	  constituted	  partly	  
by	  processes	  that	  realise	  the	  other	  characteristics.	  And	  the	  symptoms	  of	  mental	  
health	  disorders	  can	  be	  fruitfully	  explained	  by	  this	  theory,	  so	  clinical	  psychology	  is	  
enriched	  through	  the	  account	  that	  I	  present	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  
	  
To	  be	  able	  to	  talk	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  
experience	  I	  will	  be	  making	  use	  of	  the	  words	  ‘interoception’	  and	  ‘exteroception’.	  
Interoception	  is	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  state	  of	  one’s	  body,	  including	  sensing	  the	  
state	  of	  one’s	  organs,	  changes	  to	  one’s	  breathing	  rhythm,	  muscles,	  joints,	  and	  
feelings	  of	  comfort	  and	  discomfort	  (Barrett	  &	  Bar,	  2009).	  The	  theory	  of	  emotion	  I	  
have	  relied	  on,	  that	  of	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisals,	  depends	  on	  interoception	  
being	  constitutive	  of	  emotion,	  since	  emotion	  is	  the	  feeling	  of	  the	  body	  that	  
expresses	  what	  is	  of	  value,	  or	  what	  is	  meaningful,	  for	  us.	  However,	  ‘interoception’,	  
as	  I	  will	  be	  using	  it,	  is	  as	  a	  slightly	  broader	  category	  than	  bodily	  experience,	  since	  
by	  ‘experience’	  I	  mean	  something	  that	  we	  are	  conscious	  of.	  Interoception	  will	  refer	  
to	  both	  nonconscious	  information	  pertaining	  to,	  and	  conscious	  experiences	  of,	  the	  
body.	  	  
Exteroception	  is	  similar	  to	  what	  is	  often	  understood	  as	  the	  five	  senses,	  that	  
is,	  those	  senses	  that	  tell	  us	  something	  about	  the	  world	  beyond	  the	  skin.	  Similarly	  I	  
use	  exteroception	  to	  include	  non-­‐conscious	  processes.	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I	  want	  to	  show	  that	  both	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  experience	  rely	  on	  the	  
combination	  of	  interoception	  and	  exteroception.	  	  The	  phrases	  are	  important	  to	  
pursuing	  this	  project	  because	  one	  of	  the	  claims	  is	  that	  when	  we	  experience	  a	  
situation,	  nonconscious	  processing	  of	  the	  body	  and	  world	  have	  already	  occurred	  
and	  been	  integrated.	  	  
The	  use	  of	  ‘interoception’	  and	  ‘exteroception’	  also	  helps	  to	  clarify	  the	  way	  
that	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  experience	  may	  be	  interdependent	  rather	  than	  
identical.	  These	  phrases	  allow	  me	  to	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  sensing	  doesn’t	  
directly	  involve	  all	  of	  the	  interoceptive	  processing	  that	  enables	  emotion,	  and	  
emotion	  doesn’t	  directly	  involve	  all	  of	  the	  exteroceptive	  processing	  that	  enables	  
sensing72.	  	  	  
The	  theory	  of	  interdependence	  is	  important	  for	  my	  overall	  project	  in	  two	  
ways.	  Because	  it	  challenges	  the	  role	  Prinz	  gives	  sensory	  experience	  in	  moral	  
judgements.	  And	  because	  it	  is	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  
and	  emotional	  experience	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  has	  a	  perspectival	  
phenomenology	  and,	  with	  it,	  the	  capacity	  to	  motivate	  action.	  So,	  in	  this	  chapter,	  I	  
develop	  the	  theory	  of	  perspective	  that	  began	  in	  chapter	  3.	  	  
To	  begin	  to	  argue	  for	  these	  points,	  I	  start	  with	  the	  phenomenology.	  And	  
once	  we	  have	  this	  in	  place,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  review	  Prinz’s	  arguments.	  	  
	  
	  
3. Converging	  evidence	  
	  
3.1.	  The	  phenomenological	  perspective	  	  
3.1.1.	  A	  transcendental	  argument	  
The	  phenomenological	  perspective	  offers	  two,	  interrelated,	  types	  of	  arguments	  to	  
articulate	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  experience.	  The	  first	  is	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  transcendental	  
argument.	  The	  second	  are	  observations	  about	  everyday	  experience	  that	  take	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Pessoa’s	  (2008)	  account	  of	  the	  neural	  connectivity,	  where	  some	  
regions	  of	  the	  brain	  are	  ‘hub’	  regions	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  traditional	  categories	  
(in	  the	  case	  of	  his	  paper	  he	  is	  disputing	  the	  cognitive/affective	  distinction)	  while	  more	  
peripheral	  areas	  are	  dedicated	  to	  more	  specialist	  function.	  See,	  Lindquist	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  for	  a	  
similar	  conclusion	  about	  the	  neurological	  underpinnings	  of	  emotion.	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form	  of	  first-­‐person	  data.	  These	  two	  arguments	  are	  linked	  for	  me,	  because	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  transcendental	  argument	  provides	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  my	  articulation	  of	  
the	  relationship	  between	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  by	  providing	  a	  new	  
framework	  for	  understanding	  experience,	  one	  that	  undercuts	  the	  assumptions	  
Prinz	  needs	  for	  his	  characterisation	  of	  phenomenology.	  If	  the	  transcendental	  
argument	  works,	  then	  my	  characterisation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  sensory	  
and	  emotional	  experience	  must	  be	  broadly	  correct.	  Nonetheless,	  for	  some	  readers	  
the	  transcendental	  argument	  may	  arouse	  suspicion.	  For	  them,	  the	  more	  
straightforward	  characterisation	  of	  experience	  may	  be	  independently	  convincing.	  
So	  I	  present	  these	  two	  arguments	  separately.	  I	  start	  with	  introducing	  Merleau-­‐
Ponty,	  and	  his	  transcendental	  methodology.	  	  
One	  of	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  aims	  in	  his	  Phenomenology	  of	  Perception	  (2012)	  is	  
to	  fully	  capture	  and	  explicate	  the	  structure	  of	  human	  perceptual	  experience.	  In	  
doing	  so,	  he	  engages	  in	  transcendental	  phenomenology	  (Gardner,	  2015).	  He	  wants	  
to	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  we	  come	  to	  experience	  ourselves	  as	  a	  subject	  
within	  a	  world	  of	  objects.	  These	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  are,	  for	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  
simultaneously	  phenomenological	  and	  metaphysical.	  Before	  we	  experience	  
ourselves	  as	  subject	  among	  objects,	  we	  have	  a	  prereflective	  experience	  that	  is	  pre-­‐
objective	  and	  are	  able	  to	  explain	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  
world	  objectively.	  Such	  prereflective	  experience	  comes	  with	  a	  metaphysical	  claim	  
that	  we	  are	  not	  fundamentally	  subjects	  or	  objects,	  but	  a	  type	  of	  thing	  that	  
transcends	  that	  distinction.	  As	  Gardner	  argues,	  for	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  this	  is	  the	  
starting	  point	  from	  which	  we	  should	  articulate	  our	  experience.	  Our	  account	  of	  our	  
fundamental	  and	  prereflective	  experience	  should	  neither	  place	  us	  as	  an	  object	  
amongst	  objects,	  nor	  as	  pure	  subjects.	  	  
Abstractly,	  the	  method	  that	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  uses	  to	  lead	  us	  to	  this	  position	  
involves	  setting	  up	  a	  dialectic	  between	  a	  position	  he	  calls	  ‘empiricism’,	  and	  another	  
that	  he	  knows	  as	  ‘intellectualism’.	  The	  former	  is	  the	  thesis,	  and	  through	  the	  failure	  
of	  the	  thesis,	  we	  come	  to	  its	  antithesis.	  This	  fails	  too.	  And	  so	  we	  are	  led	  to	  a	  
synthesis	  that	  in	  some	  way	  combines	  notions	  from	  both	  thesis	  and	  antithesis,	  but	  
also	  rejects	  a	  common	  assumption.	  However,	  in	  taking	  something	  from	  both	  thesis	  
and	  antithesis,	  a	  dialectic	  also	  seeks	  to	  transform	  the	  notions	  used	  in	  these	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frameworks.	  While	  empiricism	  seeks	  to	  tell	  us	  about	  experience	  through	  the	  causal	  
powers	  of	  the	  object,	  and	  intellectualism	  from	  the	  constituting	  powers	  of	  the	  
subject,	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  synthesis,	  if	  done	  right,	  should	  transform	  our	  very	  
understanding	  of	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  be	  an	  object	  or	  a	  subject.	  This	  dialectic	  seeks	  to	  
lead	  us	  through	  various	  ways	  of	  understanding	  experience	  in	  a	  logical	  journey,	  so	  
that	  the	  dissolution	  of	  each	  step	  leads	  to	  the	  next,	  and	  the	  resulting	  synthesis	  
articulates	  and	  clarifies	  a	  truth	  that	  is	  self-­‐evident,	  but	  that	  we	  can	  only	  fully	  grasp	  
at	  the	  end	  of	  our	  dialectical	  journey.	  Having	  summarised	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  general	  
method,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  his	  particular	  dialectic	  concerning	  our	  capacity	  to	  have	  
sensory	  experience.	  	  
One	  commitment	  that	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  takes	  to	  characterise	  empiricism	  is	  
the	  claim	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  sensory	  experience	  through	  the	  way	  that	  objects	  
affect	  the	  organism.	  Conversely,	  intellectualism	  makes	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  organism	  
creates	  sensory	  experience.	  Empiricists	  have	  a	  purely	  passive	  view	  of	  sensory	  
experience.	  For	  them,	  experience	  is	  explained	  just	  as	  a	  chain	  of	  causal	  events	  from	  
the	  object	  to	  the	  organism,	  where	  the	  organism	  is	  an	  object	  in	  space	  that	  obeys	  the	  
laws	  of	  nature.	  Intellectualists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  a	  fully	  active	  view	  of	  
sensory	  experience:	  it	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  thinking	  thing	  that	  posits	  external	  
objects.	  	  
As	  usual,	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  view	  is	  a	  middle	  way:	  sensory	  experience	  can	  
only	  be	  understood	  if	  we	  can	  dissolve	  the	  theoretic	  divide	  between	  object	  and	  
subject.	  Because	  both	  give	  partial	  stories	  neither	  empiricism	  nor	  intellectualism	  
can	  explain	  sensory	  experience.	  While	  intellectualism	  and	  empiricism	  differ	  in	  
whether	  they	  take	  sensory	  experience	  to	  be	  an	  active	  or	  passive	  process,	  they	  also	  
share	  a	  fundamental	  assumption	  that	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  seeks	  to	  undermine.	  	  Both	  
take	  an	  objective	  grasp	  of	  the	  world	  as	  fundamental.	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  get	  things	  the	  
wrong	  way	  round:	  we	  cannot	  appeal	  to	  the	  objective	  world	  to	  explain	  sensory	  
experience,	  because	  it	  is	  the	  perspectival	  nature	  of	  sensory	  experience	  that	  
explains	  our	  ability	  to	  grasp	  the	  world	  objectively.	  In	  terms	  of	  empiricism,	  we	  can	  
only	  come	  to	  know	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  through	  how	  the	  world	  effects	  us,	  so	  
empiricism	  ignores	  what	  makes	  their	  explanation	  of	  sensory	  experience	  possible.	  
Merleau-­‐Ponty	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  understanding	  a	  cube	  in	  objective	  space.	  He	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notes	  that	  our	  primary	  way	  of	  understanding	  a	  cube	  is	  not	  by	  the	  “cluster	  of	  
objective	  correlations”	  (2012,	  p.	  210)	  between	  the	  system	  of	  moving	  body	  and	  
cube.	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  writes:	  	  
Now,	  if	  the	  words	  “enclose”	  and	  “between”	  have	  a	  sense	  for	  us,	  they	  must	  
borrow	  it	  from	  our	  experience	  as	  embodied	  subjects.	  In	  space	  itself,	  and	  
without	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  psycho-­‐physical	  subject,	  there	  is	  no	  direction,	  no	  
inside,	  no	  outside.	  A	  space	  is	  “enclosed”	  between	  the	  space	  of	  a	  cube	  as	  we	  
are	  enclosed	  between	  the	  walls	  of	  our	  room.	  (Ibid.)	  
	  
Our	  primary	  experience	  is	  of	  ourselves	  as	  bodies	  that	  are	  related	  to	  objects	  
external	  to	  us	  and	  it	  is	  through	  our	  experience	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  
concepts	  of	  empirical	  science:	  because	  we	  have	  a	  perspective	  on	  the	  world	  we	  
have	  the	  concept	  ‘between’.	  ‘Between’	  is	  then	  something	  we	  come	  to	  understand	  
through	  our	  embodied	  experience,	  and	  then	  apply	  to	  objects	  in	  objective	  space73.	  
The	  intellectualist	  flips	  the	  empiricist’s	  thesis,	  and	  tries	  to	  understand	  
experience	  through	  the	  activity	  of	  a	  constituting	  ego.	  However,	  intellectualism	  
shares	  an	  assumption	  with	  empiricism	  that	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  rejects:	  “it	  remains	  true	  
to	  say	  that	  intellectualism	  also	  takes	  the	  world	  as	  ready	  made”	  (p.	  215).	  The	  
subject	  of	  perception	  is	  an	  all-­‐powerful	  creator	  of	  a	  world	  of	  objects,	  which	  are	  set	  
out	  before	  us	  perfectly	  and	  in	  its	  entirety.	  
Through	  reflecting	  on	  experience,	  intellectualists	  come	  to	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  
an	  ego	  that	  creates	  the	  cube	  and	  sustains	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  cube,	  the	  
body,	  and	  the	  sensing	  mind:	  
The	  entire	  system	  of	  experience	  –	  world,	  one’s	  own	  body,	  and	  the	  empirical	  
self	  –	  is	  subordinated	  to	  a	  universal	  thinker,	  charged	  with	  sustaining	  the	  
relations	  among	  these	  three	  terms.	  But	  since	  this	  universal	  thinker	  is	  not	  
engaged	  in	  the	  system,	  the	  terms	  remain	  what	  they	  were	  in	  empiricism,	  
namely,	  causal	  relations	  laid	  out	  on	  the	  level	  of	  cosmic	  events.	  (p.	  215.)	  
	  
Because	  the	  cube	  is	  known	  to	  us	  through	  the	  constituting	  power	  of	  thought,	  
we	  know	  it	  completely,	  and	  its	  relation	  to	  us	  is	  fully	  grasped.	  	  
Crucially,	  this	  story	  contradicts	  our	  phenomenology.	  If	  intellectualism	  were	  
right,	  and	  we	  constitute	  the	  world,	  then	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  and	  ourselves	  
would	  be	  complete	  and	  perfect.	  Instead,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  For	  a	  good	  example	  of	  what	  our	  bodies	  contribute	  to	  our	  experience,	  see	  Merleau-­‐
Ponty’s	  discussion	  of	  depth	  in	  section	  B,	  chapter	  1,	  part	  2	  of	  Phenomenology	  of	  Perception.	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  We	  have	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  world,	  not	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  a	  system	  of	  relations	  that	  
fully	  determines	  each	  event,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  open	  totality	  whose	  synthesis	  
can	  never	  be	  completed.	  (p.	  228.)	  
	  
According	  to	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  explicate	  the	  experience	  of	  
sensing,	  we	  see	  that	  intellectualism	  must	  be	  wrong.	  The	  world	  is	  not	  ready-­‐made	  
or	  even	  ever	  fully	  made,	  it	  is	  partially	  made	  and	  remade.	  	  
	  
For	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  (2012),	  sensory	  experience	  does	  not	  come	  apart	  from	  our	  
ability	  to	  act	  in	  the	  world	  and	  vice	  versa.	  He	  claims	  we	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  our	  body	  
due	  to	  what	  actions	  are	  possible:	  our	  body	  is	  experienced	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  is	  
virtual,	  what	  it	  could	  do,	  rather	  than	  as	  “a	  thing	  in	  objective	  space”	  (p.	  260).	  To	  
have	  a	  sense	  of	  our	  body	  in	  space,	  however,	  takes	  more	  than	  just	  action	  tendencies.	  
It	  also	  involves	  what	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  calls	  a	  “spectacle”,	  the	  situation	  through	  which	  
my	  actions	  unfold.	  Spectacle,	  here,	  refers	  to	  the	  environment	  one	  experiences	  
oneself	  as	  immersed	  in74.	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  suggests	  that,	  	  
My	  body	  is	  geared	  into	  the	  world	  when	  my	  perception	  provides	  me	  with	  
the	  most	  varied	  and	  clearly	  articulated	  spectacle	  possible,	  and	  when	  my	  
motor	  intentions,	  as	  they	  unfold,	  receive	  the	  responses	  they	  anticipated	  
from	  the	  world.	  (p.	  261.)	  	  
	  
We	  inhabit	  the	  world	  when	  we	  experience	  ourselves	  as	  being	  immersed	  in	  a	  
spectacle	  that	  we	  have	  a	  perspective	  in	  and	  on.	  And	  our	  perception	  of	  a	  spectacle	  
before	  us,	  when	  it	  becomes	  clear(er),	  is	  itself	  experienced	  as	  an	  enticement	  to	  act	  
in	  certain	  ways.	  Perception	  involves	  being	  poised	  towards	  a	  spectacle,	  it	  is	  a	  
certain	  bodily	  attitude.	  But	  the	  experience	  of	  action	  affordances	  is	  integrated	  with	  
“the	  invitation	  of	  these	  very	  gestures”	  through	  our	  capacity	  to	  sense	  (ibid.).	  Both	  
are	  necessary	  for	  the	  feeling	  of	  our	  body	  as	  part	  of	  a	  world75.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  I	  take	  it	  that	  the	  use	  of	  “spectacle”	  indicates	  a	  scepticism	  towards	  talking	  of	  the	  objects	  
of	  perception	  in	  any	  purely	  mind-­‐independent	  way.	  
75	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  phenomenology	  therefore	  involves	  a	  particular	  metaphysical	  position.	  
For	  him,	  we	  constitute	  the	  world,	  but	  partially.	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  external	  world,	  as	  
mind-­‐independent,	  is	  absent	  from	  his	  metaphysics.	  	  
We	  may	  wonder	  whether	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  achieves	  the	  non-­‐problematic	  metaphysics	  
he	  seeks.	  For	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  problem	  of	  both	  the	  empiricist	  and	  intellectualist	  that	  
they	  took	  the	  external	  world	  for	  granted,	  and	  yet	  talk	  of	  the	  ‘world’	  slips	  into	  Merleau-­‐
Ponty’s	  framework	  again	  and	  again.	  Maybe	  we	  can	  bypass	  this	  problem	  if	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	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What	  we	  see	  through	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  is	  that	  experience	  cannot	  start	  though	  
objective	  awareness	  because	  the	  experience	  of	  objects	  presupposes	  our	  experience	  
of	  embodiment.	  Importantly,	  when	  we	  consider	  intellectualism	  we	  see	  that	  neither	  
can	  our	  experience	  be	  of	  a	  constituting	  subject,	  because	  such	  subjectivity	  entails	  
the	  same	  objective	  world	  that	  we’ve	  come	  to	  realise	  is	  presupposed	  by	  a	  more	  
fundamental	  experience.	  It	  just	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that,	  in	  our	  pre-­‐reflective	  
experience,	  we	  have	  a	  distinct	  or	  all	  encompassing	  grasp	  of	  ourselves	  or	  objects.	  
This	  leads	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  our	  pre-­‐reflective	  experience	  
precedes,	  and	  makes	  available,	  our	  experience	  of	  a	  subject	  as	  discrete	  from	  the	  
world.	  Our	  pre-­‐reflective	  experience	  is	  body-­‐involving	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  spectacle-­‐
involving,	  our	  bodily	  engagement	  includes	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  thing	  they	  are	  orientated	  
towards.	  We	  are	  led	  to	  this	  conclusion	  by	  the	  failures	  of	  empiricism	  and	  
intellectualism,	  and	  we	  end	  at	  a	  point	  that	  seems	  to	  make	  better	  sense	  of	  our	  
phenomenology.	  	  
I	  take	  this	  to	  be	  a	  transcendental	  argument	  that	  establishes	  that	  body	  and	  
world	  are	  entangled	  in	  pre-­‐reflective	  experience.	  Or	  we	  could	  say	  that	  experience	  
depends	  on	  an	  integrated	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process76.	  This	  implies	  that	  affect,	  
normally	  thought	  of	  as	  interoceptive,	  and	  sensory	  experience,	  normally	  thought	  of	  
as	  exteroceptive,	  are	  interdependent.	  	  	  
It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  while	  I	  have	  described	  the	  form	  of	  the	  argument	  as	  
transcendental,	  in	  the	  sense	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  has	  provided	  proof	  that	  only	  a	  
particular	  conceptualisation	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  how	  experience	  is	  possible,	  
we	  can	  also	  understand	  this	  argument	  (or	  transcendental	  arguments	  in	  general)	  as	  
‘inference	  to	  our	  current	  best	  explanation’.	  In	  this	  case,	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
doesn’t	  mean	  ‘world’	  as	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  external	  world,	  but	  to	  the	  totality	  of	  
experiences.	  For	  our	  purposes,	  we	  can	  see	  his	  argument	  as	  partly	  tackling	  how	  we	  ought	  
to	  understand	  the	  character	  of	  our	  experience	  and	  put	  broader	  metaphysical	  issues	  to	  one	  
side.	  	  	  
76	  I	  take	  reference	  to	  intero-­‐	  and	  exteroceptive	  process	  to	  be	  a	  more	  accurate,	  though	  less	  
poetic,	  way	  of	  understanding	  how	  our	  experience	  is	  constituted,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  rely	  
on	  a	  simple	  dichotomy	  between	  body	  and	  world.	  A	  simple	  dichotomy	  is	  not	  one	  that	  
Merleau-­‐Ponty	  wants	  to	  ascribe	  to,	  since	  our	  bodily	  orientation	  is	  world-­‐involving	  and	  our	  
experience	  of	  the	  world	  is	  body-­‐involving.	  The	  use	  of	  ‘interoception’	  and	  ‘exteroception’	  
enable	  us	  to	  explain	  how	  that	  is	  the	  case	  more	  clearly:	  experience	  of	  our	  bodies	  involves	  
an	  integrated	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process,	  as	  does	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  world.	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provided	  the	  best	  explanation	  so	  far	  of	  how	  experience	  is	  possible,	  and	  this	  
explanation	  is	  open	  to	  revision.	  	  
Prinz,	  however,	  may	  find	  this	  description	  unproblematic.	  After	  all,	  emotions	  
and	  sensory	  experience	  must	  be	  causally	  connected	  for	  him	  if	  emotions	  are	  to	  
represent	  what	  a	  situation	  means	  for	  an	  organism.	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  
remembered	  that	  emotions,	  for	  Prinz,	  are	  independent	  from	  sensory	  experience	  
insofar	  as	  they	  do	  not	  contain	  a	  particular	  object.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  this	  is	  the	  sense	  
that	  I	  am	  implying	  that	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  interdependent.	  A	  
question	  remains,	  however,	  concerning	  how	  much	  Prinz	  can	  agree	  with	  my	  
analysis	  while	  maintaining	  that	  we	  should	  understand	  sensory	  experience	  and	  
emotional	  experience	  as	  separate	  but	  closely	  causally	  related	  rather	  than	  
interdependent.	  I	  shall	  come	  back	  to	  this	  worry	  later.	  	  
In	  what	  follows	  I	  try	  another,	  although	  related,	  track	  to	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  
argument.	  And	  that	  is	  a	  simple	  characterisation	  of	  experience	  that	  I	  hope	  rings	  
true,	  and	  therefore	  undercuts	  Prinz’s	  assumptions	  about	  why	  emotions	  and	  their	  
particular	  objects	  must	  be	  independent.	  The	  characterisation	  is	  enabled	  and	  
implied	  by	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  philosophy,	  but	  cannot	  be	  straightforwardly	  read	  off	  
from	  it,	  since	  his	  comments	  that	  I	  think	  are	  most	  related	  to	  my	  endeavour	  do	  not	  
explicitly	  mention	  affect.	  	  
	  
3.1.2.	  Characterising	  experience	  
Merleau-­‐Ponty	  (2012)	  argues	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  perception	  follows	  this	  pattern	  of	  
the	  interdependence	  of	  body	  and	  world.	  What	  is	  sensed	  is	  a	  “communion”	  (p.	  219)	  
between	  the	  spectacle	  and	  a	  bodily	  attitude,	  so	  that	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  “about	  to	  be	  
sensed	  poses	  to	  my	  body	  a	  sort	  of	  confused	  problem”,	  for	  which,	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  
elucidated,	  my	  body	  “must	  find	  the	  response	  to	  a	  poorly	  formulated	  question”	  (p.	  
222).	  So,	  sensing	  follows	  a	  pattern	  of	  the	  (partial)	  resolution	  of	  ambiguity,	  when	  
the	  confusion	  of	  our	  experience	  prompts	  a	  bodily	  attitude	  that	  has	  a	  better	  grip	  on	  
our	  situation.	  This	  grip	  is	  constituted	  through	  the	  co-­‐emergence	  of	  sensory	  
experience	  and	  experience	  of	  action	  affordances.	  Note,	  that	  even	  before	  we	  resolve	  
our	  situation,	  our	  experience	  is	  sensori-­‐affective:	  our	  body	  relates	  (us)	  to	  the	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ambiguous	  situation	  as	  a	  problem,	  as	  a	  confused	  question,	  that	  is,	  as	  something	  
meaningful.	  	  
A	  particular	  example	  is	  that	  of	  perceiving	  ourselves	  and	  other	  objects	  in	  
space:	  
The	  spatial	  level	  is,	  then,	  a	  certain	  possession	  of	  the	  world	  by	  my	  body,	  a	  
certain	  hold	  my	  body	  has	  on	  the	  world…	  It	  sets	  itself	  up	  when,	  between	  my	  
body	  as	  the	  power	  for	  certain	  gestures…	  and	  the	  perceived	  spectacle,	  as	  the	  
invitations	  of	  these	  very	  gestures	  and	  as	  the	  theatre	  of	  these	  very	  actions,	  a	  
pact	  is	  established	  that	  gives	  me	  possession	  of	  space.	  (p.	  261,	  original	  
emphasis.)	  
	  
The	  perception	  of	  space	  depends	  on	  both	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  enticed	  by	  a	  
spectacle,	  and	  our	  body	  as	  being	  able	  to	  find	  a	  pattern	  that	  fits	  with	  this	  
enticement77.	  	  
One	  way	  to	  phrase	  this	  is	  that,	  to	  inhabit	  a	  world,	  interoception	  and	  
exteroception	  must	  become	  interconnected.	  For	  experience	  depends	  on	  both	  a	  
perturbation	  experienced	  as	  originating	  from	  the	  spectacle	  (i.e.	  exteroception)	  and	  
an	  embodied	  reaction	  to	  it	  (i.e.	  interoception).	  The	  interconnection	  of	  these	  two	  
poles	  enables	  the	  experience	  of	  being	  within	  a	  world	  that	  we	  move	  through.	  Our	  
feeling	  of	  presence	  in	  the	  world	  is	  the	  feeling	  of	  a	  body	  orientated	  to	  a	  situation,	  
and	  our	  situation	  as	  presenting	  a	  meaningful	  milieu	  for	  us.	  A	  milieu	  that	  presents	  
itself	  as	  to	  be	  engaged,	  or	  not	  engaged,	  with,	  and	  that	  impacts	  us	  from	  the	  start.	  
Our	  bodily	  orientation	  already	  incorporates	  what	  is	  external,	  and	  what	  is	  external	  
expresses	  a	  sense,	  which	  is	  already	  relational	  to	  us.	  Which	  is	  all	  another	  way	  of	  
saying	  that	  what	  we	  sense	  is	  affective,	  what	  is	  affective	  is	  sensory,	  and	  this	  
interdependence	  is	  crucial	  in	  constituting	  our	  perspective	  in	  the	  world.	  
This	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process	  manifests	  in	  general	  experience	  as	  the	  
interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  affective	  experience.	  The	  world	  before	  us	  speaks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  The	  description	  of	  how	  we	  inhabit	  space	  is	  particularly	  important	  for	  my	  project.	  Here	  
we	  have	  a	  description	  of	  what	  it	  takes	  to	  be	  immersed	  in	  an	  actual	  situation,	  and	  it	  
depends	  on	  the	  coming	  together	  of	  our	  experience	  of	  our	  bodies	  with	  “the	  perceived	  
spectacle”.	  Since	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  my	  topic,	  my	  ultimate	  concern	  here	  is	  how	  it	  
is	  possible	  for	  someone	  to	  experience	  a	  situation	  that	  is	  non-­‐occurrent.	  I	  will	  argue	  later	  
that	  there	  is	  an	  important	  continuity	  between	  our	  current	  experience	  of	  our	  situation	  and	  
our	  capacity	  for	  narrative	  understanding.	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to	  us.	  It	  is	  affectively	  coloured	  through	  the	  affordances	  it	  presents.	  It	  entices	  us,	  or	  
challenges	  us,	  facilitates	  our	  action	  or	  gets	  in	  the	  way.	  It	  is	  easy,	  and	  we	  sink	  into	  it,	  
or	  it	  rejects	  us	  and	  attacks	  us.	  What	  is	  sensed	  always	  has	  some	  significance,	  
expresses	  some	  values.	  The	  objects	  we	  see,	  hear,	  smell,	  evokes	  from	  the	  start,	  a	  
sense	  of	  themselves,	  which	  always	  includes	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  we	  are	  related	  to	  them.	  
The	  smell	  of	  coffee	  in	  the	  morning,	  when	  we	  experience	  it,	  already	  presents	  itself	  
as	  rewarding.	  And	  the	  grey	  sky,	  wind	  battered	  trees,	  and	  rain	  lashing	  on	  the	  
window	  has	  a	  mood.	  There	  is	  no	  perception	  without	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  perceived	  as	  
somehow	  related	  to	  us.	  That	  is,	  there	  is	  no	  perception	  that	  does	  not	  contain	  affect.	  	  
While	  it	  may	  be	  clear	  that	  weather	  and	  coffee	  are	  affectively	  experienced,	  
one	  may	  worry	  more	  about	  events	  and	  objects	  that	  are	  less	  obviously	  emotionally	  
charged.	  What	  about	  the	  experience	  of	  looking	  at	  a	  white	  wall,	  or	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  
floor?	  	  It	  seems	  likely	  that	  affective	  experience	  here	  is	  less	  intense.	  Yet	  we	  can	  
make	  sense	  of	  these	  situations	  if	  we	  understand	  sensory	  experience	  as	  being	  
narratively	  structured,	  in	  that	  our	  sensory	  experiences	  are	  constructed,	  in	  part,	  
through	  an	  emotional	  cadence.	  	  
In	  this	  vein,	  our	  particular	  experiences	  are	  meaningful	  through	  the	  
narrative	  context	  that	  frames	  them.	  Looking	  at	  something	  relatively	  homogenous	  
or	  familiar	  is	  a	  sensorimotor	  activity	  where	  consecutive	  actions	  are	  coupled	  with	  
the	  sensory	  experience	  one	  would	  expect.	  The	  affective	  experience	  of	  homogenous	  
walls	  and	  floors	  co-­‐occurs	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  ease	  or	  normality,	  in	  that	  what	  
they	  mean	  for	  our	  sensorimotor	  activity	  is	  predictable.	  This	  is	  already	  a	  kind	  of	  
narrative	  because	  there	  is	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  that	  are	  understood	  through	  our	  
expectations	  and	  both	  being	  easily	  met,	  and	  our	  activity	  being	  repetitive.	  Exactly	  
how	  this	  is	  experienced	  affectively	  depends	  on	  the	  particular	  narrative	  context.	  
One	  may	  be	  expecting	  more	  stimulation,	  in	  which	  case	  our	  sensory	  experience	  is	  
integrated	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  boredom,	  or	  one	  may	  be	  cherishing	  some	  
reprieve	  in	  a	  hectic	  day,	  in	  which	  such	  activities	  the	  homogeneity	  is	  perceived	  as	  
peaceful.	  If	  we	  think	  about	  minimalism	  design,	  this	  supports	  this	  observation.	  The	  
motivation	  behind	  minimalism	  is	  not	  that	  we	  will	  stop	  affectively	  experiencing	  our	  
surroundings	  once	  they	  are	  simplified,	  but	  that	  they	  will	  be	  experienced	  as	  
peaceful	  (or	  open	  in	  some	  way).	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This	  is	  the	  same	  for	  our	  experience	  of	  more	  obviously	  affective	  sensory	  
experience.	  Dark	  clouds	  and	  rain	  may	  be	  experienced	  as	  awesome	  (in	  the	  
traditional	  sense)	  rather	  than	  gloomy	  if	  one	  is	  wrapped	  up	  in	  warm	  waterproof	  
clothing,	  and	  the	  sky	  sets	  off	  a	  majestic	  scene	  during	  a	  walk	  in	  the	  Scottish	  
highlands.	  Our	  sensory	  experience	  in	  this	  case	  too	  is	  partially	  constituted	  by	  an	  
affective	  cadence	  that	  situates	  our	  current	  predicament	  inside	  a	  larger	  narrative	  of	  
the	  grandness	  and	  power	  of	  nature.	  	  	  	  
In	  common	  cognitive	  science	  parlance,	  we	  can	  put	  these	  affective	  
experiences	  simply	  in	  the	  language	  of	  affordances.	  The	  world	  already,	  from	  the	  
beginning,	  is	  something	  that	  we	  have	  a	  bodily	  orientation	  towards.	  But	  this	  bodily	  
orientation	  is	  not	  pure	  mechanics,	  it	  couldn’t	  be	  an	  orientation	  if	  it	  was78.	  Our	  
experience	  of	  the	  world	  is	  somewhat	  integrated	  with	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  
possible	  actions	  available.	  But	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  world	  that	  comes	  with	  those	  
possible	  actions	  has	  affective	  weight.	  We	  might	  say	  that	  perception	  is	  always	  
atmospheric,	  even	  when	  that	  atmosphere	  is	  cold	  and	  clinical,	  when	  we	  feel	  cut-­‐off	  
and	  distant,	  there	  is	  something	  meaningful	  about	  our	  perception.	  	  	  
	  Similarly,	  we	  can	  see	  affective	  experience	  as	  incorporating	  something	  of	  
what	  it	  points	  towards.	  A	  bodily	  orientation	  makes	  sense	  as	  an	  engagement	  with	  
some	  thing.	  Our	  poise	  is	  not	  (only)	  towards	  an	  abstract	  sense	  of	  what	  we	  are	  
related	  to,	  but	  a	  poise	  towards	  particular	  objects.	  It	  is	  the	  thing	  that	  has	  a	  sense	  for	  
me,	  that	  I	  am	  directed	  towards.	  My	  feeling	  of	  affection	  towards	  the	  smell	  of	  coffee	  
incorporates	  the	  particular	  bodily	  orientation	  I	  have	  towards	  coffee.	  The	  feeling	  is	  
inflected	  with	  the	  sense	  of	  its	  object,	  and	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  conjunct	  to	  it.	  My	  
melancholy	  at	  the	  dour	  Edinburgh	  weather	  is	  not	  the	  feeling	  of	  an	  abstract	  state	  of	  
affairs,	  somehow	  conjoined	  to	  an	  object,	  but	  is	  bound	  up	  with	  what	  is	  sensed79.	  	  
This	  brings	  into	  view	  something	  that	  is	  troubling	  in	  Prinz’s	  account.	  I	  am	  
arguing	  that	  it	  is	  not	  right	  to	  characterise	  our	  affective	  experience	  as	  involving	  only	  
a	  formal	  object.	  Instead	  the	  particular	  features	  of	  a	  situation	  are	  part	  of	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  That	  is,	  an	  orientation	  points	  beyond	  itself,	  but	  this	  cannot	  obviously	  be	  captured	  by	  a	  
mechanical	  explanation,	  where	  one	  things	  leads	  to	  another.	  
79	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  argument	  above	  is	  meant	  to	  bring	  us	  to	  a	  similar	  point	  to	  this,	  but	  
through	  a	  different	  argument.	  The	  language	  of	  affordances	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  one	  way	  
of	  explaining	  what	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  means	  by	  the	  body	  being	  geared	  towards	  the	  world.	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embodied	  orientation,	  through	  the	  actions	  they	  afford.	  When	  I	  fear	  various	  objects:	  
an	  exam,	  a	  boss	  or	  a	  lion,	  that	  fear	  expresses	  that	  I	  am	  in	  danger	  in	  each	  situation,	  
but	  my	  precise	  affective	  orientation	  also	  incorporates	  the	  particulars	  of	  the	  
situation.	  That	  is,	  my	  emotional	  experience	  of	  fear	  is	  not	  homogenous	  but	  inflected	  
with	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  particular	  situation.	  	  Partly	  because	  what	  something	  means	  to	  us	  
is	  far	  more	  nuanced	  than	  core	  relational	  themes	  allow:	  I	  fear	  the	  lion	  because	  what	  
is	  at	  stake	  is	  my	  physical	  integrity;	  I	  fear	  my	  boss	  because	  they	  have	  the	  power	  to	  
damage	  my	  social	  status	  and	  emotional	  wellbeing;	  and	  I	  fear	  the	  exam	  since	  my	  
intellectual	  credibility,	  and	  long-­‐term	  career	  options,	  are	  being	  called	  into	  
question.	  While	  the	  formal	  object	  can	  explain	  what	  stays	  constant	  in	  feelings	  of	  
fear	  it	  does	  not	  explain	  my	  precise	  feeling.	  The	  particular	  object	  makes	  an	  
important	  contribution	  to	  defining	  what	  matters.	  These	  differences	  in	  the	  
situations	  show	  up	  through	  inflecting	  the	  emotions	  experienced	  and	  comes	  
together	  with	  differences	  in	  my	  mode	  of	  interaction	  in	  these	  spheres,	  a	  bodily	  
engagement	  that	  expresses	  the	  particular	  way	  that	  a	  situation	  presents	  a	  danger	  
for	  me.	  	  
One	  could	  respond	  that	  emotions	  must	  be	  defined	  by	  their	  formal	  object.	  It	  
is	  through	  doing	  this	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  what	  is	  held	  in	  common	  between	  
different	  instances	  of	  the	  same	  emotions.	  	  However,	  if	  one	  wanted	  to	  use	  the	  
commonality	  between	  emotions	  to	  argue	  against	  emotions	  having	  particular	  
objects,	  one	  would	  have	  to	  argue	  that	  having	  a	  formal	  object	  and	  having	  a	  
particular	  object	  are	  mutually	  exclusive,	  which	  Prinz	  has	  not	  shown.	  What	  I	  am	  
arguing	  here	  is	  that	  emotions	  are	  characterised	  by	  both	  their	  formal	  and	  their	  
particular	  object.	  	  
Further,	  Prinz’s	  analysis	  of	  secondary	  qualities	  as	  being	  experienced	  as	  
outside,	  while	  emotions	  are	  experienced	  within,	  doesn’t	  seem	  so	  absolute	  when	  we	  
consider	  our	  experience.	  When	  we	  consider	  our	  experience,	  objects	  are	  
emotionally	  meaningful	  for	  us.	  The	  dark	  clouds	  express	  gloom,	  the	  smell	  of	  the	  
coffee	  is	  enticing.	  Barrett	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  make	  a	  similar	  point	  about	  what	  they	  call	  
‘background	  core	  affect’	  –	  our	  ongoing	  implicit	  affective	  states	  that	  shape	  our	  
experience	  of	  particular	  moments:	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Background	  core	  affect	  is	  experience	  as	  a	  property	  of	  the	  external	  world	  
rather	  than	  a	  person’s	  reaction	  to	  it.	  We	  experience	  some	  people	  as	  nice	  
and	  others	  as	  mean,	  some	  food	  as	  delicious	  and	  others	  as	  distasteful,	  some	  
pictures	  as	  pleasing	  and	  others	  as	  negative.	  (p.	  388.)	  	  
	  
So	  it	  isn’t	  that	  emotional	  experiences	  are	  experienced	  as	  fully	  within,	  instead	  
features	  of	  the	  world	  are	  also	  experienced	  as	  expressing	  some	  affective	  
characteristic.	  And,	  on	  the	  flipside,	  our	  sensory	  experiences	  are	  partly	  experienced	  
as	  action	  affordances.	  	  
	   These	  partial	  crossovers	  of	  our	  situation	  as	  experienced	  as	  affective	  and	  
involving	  a	  bodily	  orientation,	  and	  our	  affective	  bodily	  orientation	  as	  being	  
directed	  towards	  the	  world,	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  unification	  of	  our	  experiences.	  This	  is	  
why	  Prinz’s	  account	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  processes	  as	  distinct	  and	  separable	  
components	  of	  experience	  is	  unsatisfying.	  For	  experience	  does	  not	  present	  itself	  as	  
the	  addition	  of	  distinct	  parts,	  as	  though	  our	  experience	  of	  a	  particular	  situation	  has	  
decipherable	  components	  like	  the	  bricks	  of	  a	  building.	  	  	  
It	  is	  this	  brick	  like	  structure	  that	  presents	  a	  problem	  for	  Prinz	  in	  explaining	  
how	  experience	  situates	  us	  in	  a	  world.	  We	  can	  see	  this	  as	  another	  failure	  for	  Prinz’s	  
theory	  to	  account	  for	  the	  phenomenology.	  A	  collection	  of	  experiences	  does	  not	  add	  
up	  to	  an	  awareness	  of	  ourselves	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  situation.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  if	  our	  
experience	  was	  as	  Prinz	  describes	  it	  –	  where	  one	  part	  of	  our	  experience	  is	  an	  
internal	  experience	  of	  an	  abstract	  situation,	  and	  a	  separate	  part	  is	  our	  experience	  
of	  an	  external	  particular	  situation	  –	  then	  experience	  is	  of	  non-­‐integrated	  segments,	  
and	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  a	  subject	  is	  absent.	  To	  feel	  present	  is	  to	  experience	  our	  
bodies	  as	  pointing	  beyond	  themselves	  towards	  the	  situation	  we	  find	  ourselves	  in,	  
and	  we	  experience	  that	  beyond	  as	  communicating	  meaningfully	  to	  us,	  directing	  our	  
embodied	  stance	  in	  particular	  ways.	  For	  there	  to	  be	  a	  world	  before	  us	  at	  all,	  as	  
Merleau-­‐Ponty	  notes,	  is	  through	  a	  communion	  of	  body	  and	  world.	  The	  feeling	  of	  
presence	  in	  the	  world	  therefore	  requires	  that	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experiences	  
co-­‐constitute	  each	  other.	  	  	  
This	  observation	  about	  how	  perspective	  emerges	  serves	  several	  purposes.	  
It	  is	  central	  to	  the	  thrust	  of	  the	  chapter,	  yet	  it	  may	  not	  seem	  obvious	  because	  of	  the	  
way	  my	  arguments	  criss-­‐cross	  each	  other.	  It	  is	  part	  of	  the	  framework	  that	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undermines	  the	  possibility	  that	  emotion	  could	  be,	  by	  itself,	  sufficient	  for	  our	  moral	  
sense,	  by	  explicating	  how	  it	  cannot,	  by	  itself,	  exist.	  As	  we	  shall	  see,	  this	  is	  a	  central	  
point	  for	  explaining	  certain	  features	  of	  clinical	  psychology.	  Finally,	  it	  will	  be	  central	  
to	  explaining	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  explaining	  why	  
that	  phenomenology	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  our	  capacity	  to	  act	  on	  such	  understanding.	  
That	  is,	  it	  helps	  explain	  how	  we	  can	  act	  for	  reasons	  that	  are	  understood	  
narratively.	  	  
Prinz	  could	  suggest	  that	  his	  theory	  need	  not	  apply	  to	  our	  phenomenology.	  
His	  distinction	  between	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  processes	  may	  not	  be	  a	  distinction	  
that	  is	  present	  in	  experience.	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  is,	  as	  will	  be	  explained	  below,	  
that	  we	  also	  have	  neurological	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  
experience	  is	  interdependent.	  However,	  he	  could	  still	  maintain	  there	  are	  good	  
philosophical	  reasons	  for	  treating	  them	  as	  distinct,	  even	  while	  accepting	  all	  the	  
evidence	  I	  am	  offering.	  He	  could,	  for	  instances,	  accept	  what	  I	  am	  describing	  as	  a	  
good	  way	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  emotional	  part	  and	  the	  sensory	  part	  of	  a	  moral	  
judgement	  are	  linked.	  In	  that	  case,	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  tight	  integration	  of	  such	  a	  link	  
warrants	  us	  to	  understand	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  as	  not	  independent,	  
but	  interdependent.	  Nonetheless,	  if	  Prinz	  still	  prefers	  to	  think	  of	  these	  experiences	  
as	  separate	  but	  tightly	  linked,	  then	  the	  disagreement	  is	  semantic,	  which	  I	  would	  be	  
willing	  to	  accept.	  	  
	  
3.2.	  The	  neuroscientific	  perspective	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  Prinz’s	  theory	  doesn’t	  fit	  with	  our	  everyday	  experience.	  Yet,	  
maybe,	  what	  shows	  up	  in	  experience	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  the	  characterisation	  of	  
our	  psychology.	  It	  could	  be	  that	  a	  neurological	  description	  of	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  
perception	  shows	  them	  to	  be	  independent,	  but	  our	  experience	  of	  them	  is	  
integrated.	  However,	  this	  route	  is	  blocked	  for	  Prinz.	  The	  observation	  that	  emotion	  
and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  enmeshed,	  fits	  with	  a	  review	  of	  neuroscientific	  
literature	  by	  Barrett	  &	  Bar	  (2009).	  That	  is,	  the	  neuroscience	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  
experience.	  	  	  
Barrett	  &	  Bar	  (2009),	  in	  their	  review	  of	  the	  brain	  activity	  involved	  in	  
perception,	  conclude	  that,	  “an	  affective	  reaction	  is	  one	  component	  of	  the	  prediction	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that	  helps	  a	  person	  see	  the	  object	  in	  the	  first	  place”	  (p.	  1331).	  “Prediction”	  here	  is	  a	  
reference	  to	  the	  predictive	  processing	  theory	  of	  cognition	  (Clark,	  2015).	  In	  this	  
theory,	  our	  brain’s	  activity	  is	  constantly	  using	  past	  patterns	  of	  activity	  to	  predict	  
the	  present	  input.	  Input,	  if	  judged80	  to	  be	  salient	  information,	  is	  used	  to	  update	  the	  
prediction,	  or	  is	  ignored.	  Perception	  happens	  when	  the	  predictions	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  
match	  the	  input.	  So	  we	  can	  understand	  Barrett	  &	  Bar	  to	  be	  claiming	  that	  sensory	  
experience	  depends	  not	  just	  on	  predicting	  exteroceptive	  information	  but	  on	  
interoceptive	  predictions	  too.	  They	  base	  this	  conclusion	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  
orbitofrontal	  cortex	  (OFC),	  which	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  crucial	  for	  (visual)	  perception.	  
The	  OFC	  is	  thought	  to	  integrate	  information	  from	  interoception	  and	  exteroception	  
to	  enable	  a	  judgement	  to	  be	  formed	  on	  the	  value	  of	  a	  given	  situation	  for	  an	  
organism.	  	  
	   Barrett	  &	  Bar	  (2009)	  explain	  that	  neuroscientific	  evidence	  points	  towards	  
the	  medial	  OFC	  being	  the	  basis	  of	  basic	  ‘gist-­‐level’	  information	  concerning	  the	  
relevance	  of	  a	  situation	  to	  a	  person’s	  wellbeing	  and	  appropriate	  potential	  action.	  
This	  is	  integrated,	  through	  strong	  reciprocal	  connections,	  with	  visual	  information	  
concerning	  where	  an	  object	  is	  (i.e.	  the	  visual	  ‘where’	  pathway).	  These	  are	  quick	  
brain	  responses	  that	  allow	  the	  body	  to	  be	  prepared	  for	  a	  situation	  before	  objects	  or	  
events	  are	  consciously	  perceived.	  	  
The	  lateral	  OFC	  contains	  multimodal	  neurons	  that	  receive	  detailed	  
information	  about	  visual	  features	  (from	  the	  visual	  ‘what’	  pathway)	  and	  
interoceptive	  information	  from	  the	  anterior	  insular,	  which	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  
important	  for	  conscious	  emotional	  experience.	  These	  processes	  are	  slower.	  And	  
Barrett	  &	  Bar	  think	  they	  generate	  rich	  conscious	  multimodal	  perception	  that	  
includes	  the	  affective	  value	  of	  a	  situation.	  The	  affective	  value	  can	  either	  be	  attached	  
to	  the	  object	  of	  perception,	  or	  a	  subject’s	  reaction.	  You	  may	  experience	  the	  lion	  
running	  towards	  you	  as	  scary,	  or	  experience	  yourself	  as	  joyful	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
birth	  of	  a	  relative.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80	  We	  shouldn’t	  understand	  ‘judge’	  here	  in	  the	  everyday	  sense.	  What	  is	  being	  proposed	  is	  
not	  that	  there	  is	  an	  intentional	  being	  weighing	  up	  input	  and	  deciding	  what	  is	  important.	  
Instead,	  through	  mechanical	  biological	  processes,	  some	  input	  is	  able	  to	  change	  predictions	  
while	  other	  input	  is	  ignored.	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However,	  according	  to	  Barrett	  &	  Bar	  we	  should	  not	  understand	  the	  fast	  and	  
slow	  processes	  as	  two	  different	  types	  of	  sensori-­‐affective	  prediction.	  Rather,	  they	  
are	  likely	  to	  be	  one	  dynamically	  evolving	  process,	  so	  that	  gist-­‐level	  processes	  and	  
awareness	  of	  what	  an	  object	  is	  are	  mutually	  forming.	  This	  is	  because	  there	  are	  
reciprocal	  connections	  among	  all	  the	  brain	  areas	  involved:	  the	  medial	  OFC	  receives	  
some	  high	  resolution	  visual	  information,	  and	  the	  lateral	  OFC	  receives	  some	  gist	  
level	  visual	  information;	  the	  medial	  OFC	  and	  lateral	  OFC	  are	  connected	  through	  
intermediary	  brain	  regions;	  and	  the	  visual	  ‘where’	  and	  ‘what’	  pathway	  are	  strongly	  
interconnected.	  Hence,	  evidence	  from	  the	  activity	  in	  OFC	  suggests	  that	  perception	  
is	  constituted	  via	  dynamic	  sensori-­‐affective	  processes.	  	  	  
	   	  Other	  neurological	  evidence	  also	  points	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  right	  to	  see	  
affect	  as	  constituted	  through	  exteroception.	  Barlassina	  &	  Newen	  (2014)	  review	  
evidence	  that	  suggests	  that	  disgust	  is	  associated	  with	  brain	  regions	  that	  integrate	  
interoceptive	  and	  exteroceptive	  information.	  While	  the	  interoceptive	  information	  
related	  to	  disgust	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  posterior	  insular,	  disgust	  itself	  is	  
associated	  with	  the	  anterior	  insular,	  which	  combines	  both	  interoceptive	  
information	  with	  information	  from	  multimodal	  sensory	  regions.	  	  
	   Further,	  if	  we	  understand	  emotion	  not	  just	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  state	  of	  the	  body,	  
but	  also	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  body	  and	  world,	  then	  Barrett	  &	  
Bar’s	  (2009)	  evidence	  also	  suggests	  that	  exteroception	  is	  involved	  in	  emotion.	  It	  is	  
the	  medial	  OFC,	  where	  interoceptive	  and	  exteroceptive	  information	  meet,	  which	  is	  
responsible	  for	  the	  “initial	  affective	  information	  about	  what	  an	  object	  might	  mean	  
for	  a	  person’s	  wellbeing”	  (p.	  1329).	  	  This	  is	  based	  on	  various	  neurological	  evidence	  
showing	  that	  the	  medial	  OFC	  guides	  autonomic,	  hormonal	  and	  behavioural	  
responses	  to	  an	  object,	  all	  responses	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  affect	  (e.g.	  Barbas	  et	  al.,	  
2003).	  Furthermore,	  the	  lateral	  OFC	  integrates	  “bodily	  information	  with	  sensory	  
information	  from	  the	  world	  to	  establish	  an	  experience-­‐dependent	  representation	  
of	  an	  object	  in	  context…This	  conscious	  percept	  includes	  the	  affective	  value	  of	  an	  
object”	  (p.	  1330).	  It	  is	  not	  merely	  that	  sensory	  experience	  is	  affective:	  conscious	  
affective	  experience	  is	  enabled	  by	  intero-­‐	  and	  exeteroceptive	  information	  being	  
integrated.	  So	  the	  neural	  enablers	  of	  emotion,	  in	  both	  the	  medial	  and	  lateral	  OFC,	  
are	  not	  associated	  only	  with	  interoception,	  but	  with	  the	  point	  where	  interoceptive	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and	  exteroceptive	  information	  meet.	  Hence	  affective	  experience	  is	  as	  dependent	  on	  
exteroception	  as	  sensory	  experience	  is	  dependent	  on	  interoception.	  What	  comes	  in	  
to	  view	  in	  experience	  is	  a	  sensori-­‐affective	  situation.	  	  
This	  is	  consistent	  with	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  claim	  about	  how	  we	  have	  a	  
perspective	  on	  the	  world,	  because	  a	  perspective,	  for	  Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  depends	  on	  
the	  integration	  of	  body	  and	  world	  in	  experience.	  Insofar	  as	  we	  think	  that	  
phenomenology	  and	  neuroscience	  act	  to	  mutually	  inform	  and	  constrain	  each	  other,	  
and	  that	  their	  mutual	  agreement	  acts	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  theory	  success,	  this	  
supports	  the	  theory	  of	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  as	  interdependent.	  Again,	  
this	  evidence	  may	  not	  logically	  contradict	  Prinz’s	  theory.	  If	  he	  wants	  to	  maintain	  
that	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  of	  independent,	  yet	  concede	  all	  the	  
evidence,	  then	  the	  remaining	  dispute	  is	  a	  semantic	  debate	  which,	  as	  mentioned	  
above,	  I	  am	  not	  contesting	  here.	  	  	  
	  
One	  thing	  to	  note	  in	  both	  the	  phenomenology	  and	  the	  neuroscience	  is	  the	  
relationship	  between	  action	  and	  emotion.	  Both	  these	  disciplines	  suggest	  that	  
disambiguating	  what	  we	  are	  facing	  involves	  the	  experience	  of	  how	  one	  is	  poised	  to	  
engage	  with	  the	  world.	  Such	  poise	  is	  affectively	  construed,	  our	  bodies	  are	  
orientated,	  that	  is,	  meaningfully	  pointed	  towards,	  the	  world.	  	  	  
Similarly,	  Barrett	  &	  Bar	  mention	  that,	  	  
The	  medial	  OFC	  not	  only	  realises	  the	  affective	  significance	  of	  the	  apple,	  but	  
also	  prepares	  the	  perceiver	  to	  act	  –	  to	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  apple,	  to	  pick	  it	  
up	  and	  bite	  it,	  or	  to	  ignore	  it.	  (p.	  1330.)	  
	  
The	  wording	  Barrett	  &	  Bar	  use	  suggests	  that	  the	  affordance	  and	  the	  affect	  are	  
independent,	  but	  we	  can	  look	  at	  the	  same	  evidence	  another	  way.	  To	  see,	  to	  feel,	  to	  
act,	  are	  totally	  interdependent.	  The	  affective	  significance	  of	  an	  apple	  involves	  
action	  affordances.	  If	  Snow	  White	  were	  to	  have	  seen	  the	  green	  slime	  dripping	  off	  
the	  apple,	  the	  fear	  ignited	  would	  involve	  the	  affordance	  of	  avoidance,	  and	  this	  
bodily	  attitude	  would	  have	  been	  part	  of	  her	  seeing	  that	  she	  has	  been	  given	  a	  
poison	  apple.	  	  So	  we	  can	  see	  that	  action	  affordances	  contain	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  is	  we	  
are	  interacting	  with	  and	  vice	  versa.	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   This	  is	  beautifully	  consistent	  with	  Prinz’s	  observation	  that	  emotion	  
simultaneously	  is	  a	  perception	  of	  a	  situation	  and	  being	  poised	  to	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  
way.	  Evaluating	  what	  we	  are	  facing	  means	  intuiting	  how	  we	  could	  act.	  This	  will	  
become	  relevant	  when	  discussing	  the	  best	  way	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  
psychological	  disorders.	  	  
	   The	  account	  I	  have	  developed	  here	  also	  overlaps	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  affectivity	  
developed	  by	  Colombetti	  (2014).	  For	  her,	  affectivity	  is	  part	  of	  all	  sense	  making.	  
Sense	  making,	  for	  her,	  is	  an	  organism’s	  activity	  of	  inhabiting	  and	  bringing	  forth	  the	  
world	  around	  them,	  which	  includes	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  situation.	  Affectivity,	  as	  a	  
creature’s	  sense	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  their	  situation,	  is	  characteristic	  of	  all	  sense	  
making.	  By	  considering	  both	  empirical	  and	  phenomenological	  evidence,	  
Colombetti	  also	  concludes	  that	  the	  appraisals	  involved	  in	  affect	  are	  embodied	  and	  
action-­‐orientated,	  and	  may	  be	  tightly	  interlinked	  with	  sensory	  processes,	  where	  
these	  are	  different	  characteristics	  of	  the	  same	  process	  rather	  than	  different	  
component	  parts.	  That	  is,	  Colombetti	  argues	  that	  these	  are	  not	  sequential	  parts	  of	  
a	  process,	  where	  for	  example,	  we	  make	  an	  appraisal,	  and	  then	  we	  feel	  something,	  
or	  we	  feel	  something	  and	  then	  we	  prepare	  for	  action.	  	  
	  
3.3.	  The	  psychological	  perspective	  
3.3.1.	  Depression	  &	  psychosis	  as	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  disturbance	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  the	  neuroscience	  and	  the	  phenomenology	  are	  consistent	  with	  
each	  other,	  and	  the	  phenomenology	  is	  accurately	  described	  by	  my	  theory	  that	  
affective	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  interdependent.	  However,	  it	  may	  seem	  that	  
clinical	  psychology	  presents	  an	  alternative	  picture:	  one	  where	  emotional	  and	  
sensory	  experience	  are	  independent.	  	  
The	  theory	  that	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  are	  interdependent,	  
rather	  than	  independent,	  predicts	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  clear	  cases	  of	  changes	  to	  
affect	  without	  changes	  to	  sensory	  experience	  and	  vice	  versa.	  If	  sensory	  experience	  
and	  emotional	  experience	  are	  not	  intertwined,	  we	  would	  expect	  there	  to	  be	  
possible	  cases	  of	  extreme	  sensory	  distortion	  without	  emotional	  distortion.	  
On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  clinical	  psychology	  appears	  to	  support	  this	  reading.	  Mental	  
health	  problems	  where	  there	  is	  a	  huge	  disruption	  to	  our	  normal	  affective	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experience,	  such	  as	  major	  depression,	  are	  not	  obviously	  associated	  with	  sensory	  
disturbances.	  Similarly	  in	  psychosis	  and	  schizophrenia,	  which	  are	  generally	  
thought	  of	  as	  mainly	  disorders	  of	  cognition	  and	  sensory	  experience,	  this	  may	  not	  
be	  associated	  with	  a	  distortion	  of	  affective	  experience.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  
that	  these	  cases	  pose	  the	  challenge	  that	  they	  appear	  to:	  depression	  does	  co-­‐occur	  
with	  distortions	  to	  our	  sensory	  experience,	  and	  psychosis	  and	  schizophrenia	  co-­‐
occur	  with	  huge	  changes	  to	  our	  affective	  experience.	  Moreover,	  I	  think	  the	  claims	  I	  
made	  above,	  concerning	  a	  sense	  of	  perspective	  emerging	  out	  of	  the	  integration	  of	  
intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processes	  is	  borne	  out	  by	  this	  data.	  We	  see	  this	  because	  what	  
I	  am	  claiming	  is	  that	  a	  general	  disturbance	  in	  this	  process	  correlates	  with	  a	  
distortion	  in	  our	  sense	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world.	  I’ll	  look	  at	  depression	  and	  psychosis	  
in	  more	  detail	  in	  turn.	  	  
	  
While	  depression	  is	  often	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  distortion	  of	  affective	  and	  embodied	  
experience,	  many	  also	  report	  a	  change	  in	  how	  the	  world	  appears,	  although	  this	  is	  
quite	  a	  subtle	  change.	  People	  who	  have	  had	  experience	  of	  major	  depression	  often	  
talk	  of	  how	  the	  world	  seems	  both	  the	  same	  and	  different	  (Ratcliffe,	  2013).	  Further,	  
people	  with	  depression	  report	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  draw	  apart	  bodily	  complaints	  of	  
feeling	  clumsy,	  numb	  and	  un-­‐coordinated	  from	  changes	  in	  the	  world.	  This	  appears	  
to	  support	  the	  argument	  that	  our	  interoceptive	  experiences,	  our	  sense	  of	  what	  our	  
bodies	  can	  do,	  and	  our	  perception	  of	  the	  world	  are	  all	  integrated.	  Along	  with	  low	  
mood,	  lack	  of	  motivation,	  and	  anxiety,	  people	  experience	  the	  world	  as	  “bereft	  of	  
any	  positive	  enticement	  for	  action;	  it	  no	  longer	  draws	  one	  in	  and	  thus	  seems	  
distant,	  detached,	  not	  quite	  there”	  (Ratcliffe,	  2013,	  p.	  585).	  As	  the	  body	  changes	  its	  
relation	  to	  the	  world	  so	  does	  our	  perception	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
Although	  we	  could	  interpret	  the	  reports	  above	  as	  relating	  only	  the	  changes	  
in	  emotional	  response	  rather	  than	  a	  more	  general	  change	  to	  perception,	  given	  the	  
discussion	  of	  phenomenology	  above,	  I	  think	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  interpret	  this	  is	  as	  
a	  disturbance	  in	  perception	  due	  to	  a	  disturbance	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  interact	  with	  the	  
world.	  As	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  notes,	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  world	  before	  us	  requires	  a	  
capacity	  to	  find	  a	  bodily	  attitude	  that	  makes	  sense	  of	  a	  perturbation.	  If	  one’s	  
capacity	  for	  embodied	  appraisals	  is	  impaired,	  then	  the	  theory	  of	  interdependence	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predicts	  that	  one’s	  perception	  of	  the	  world	  will	  also	  change.	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  
analysis	  of	  how	  it	  is	  that	  we	  are	  normally	  able	  to	  feel	  present	  in	  the	  world	  makes	  it	  
possible	  to	  see	  reports	  such	  as	  the	  one	  above	  as	  trying	  to	  express	  something	  literal.	  	  
One	  particular	  expression	  of	  someone	  with	  depression	  highlights	  how	  their	  
affective	  state	  was	  constitutive	  of	  their	  experience	  of	  the	  world.	  He	  said,	  
“the	  shadows	  of	  nightfall	  seemed	  more	  sombre”	  (Styron,	  as	  cited	  by	  Ratcliffe,	  2013,	  
p.	  586).	  Rather	  than	  describing	  feeling	  sombre	  while	  looking	  at	  shadows,	  it	  is	  the	  
shadows	  themselves	  that	  seem	  sombre.	  This,	  along	  with	  Ratcliffe’s	  larger	  project	  
concerning	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  depression,	  indicates	  that	  how	  we	  feel	  and	  how	  
the	  world	  appears	  do	  not	  come	  apart.	  	  
Another	  reason	  to	  take	  these	  claims	  literally,	  that	  they	  are	  about	  one’s	  
experience	  of	  the	  world	  and	  not	  just	  one’s	  self,	  is	  the	  continuum	  between	  affective	  
disorders	  (such	  as	  depression	  and	  anxiety)	  and	  psychosis.	  Armando	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  
found	  depression	  and	  distress	  correlated	  with	  bizarre	  experiences	  and	  perceptual	  
abnormalities.	  Similarly,	  Wigman	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  found	  that	  people	  with	  anxiety	  and	  
major	  depression	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  display	  at	  least	  one	  psychotic	  symptom	  
compared	  to	  those	  without	  a	  mood	  disorder.	  Obvious	  disturbances	  in	  sensory	  
experience	  do	  seem	  to	  come	  in	  tandem	  with	  mood	  disorders.	  To	  frame	  these	  
findings	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  theory	  I’ve	  presented	  here,	  the	  descriptions	  of	  subtle	  
sensory	  changes	  are	  on	  a	  continuum	  with	  more	  obvious	  sensory	  disturbances.	  
Full-­‐blown	  hallucinations	  do	  not	  have	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  completely	  cut-­‐off	  from	  more	  
subtle	  changes	  in	  sensory	  experience.	  	  
On	  the	  flip	  side,	  psychotic	  episodes	  have	  generally	  been	  understood	  as	  
disorders	  of	  sensory	  experience	  and	  cognition.	  Delusions	  and	  hallucinations	  are	  
the	  typical	  characteristics	  associated	  with	  psychosis.	  For	  example,	  someone	  might	  
have	  the	  delusion	  that	  there	  is	  a	  government	  conspiracy	  against	  them,	  or	  might	  
hallucinate	  people	  talking	  to	  them.	  We	  should	  care	  about	  psychosis,	  because	  it	  
potentially	  shows	  that	  one	  can	  have	  a	  distorted	  sensory	  experience	  without	  a	  
change	  in	  emotion.	  In	  turn,	  this	  would	  show	  that	  sensory	  experience	  is	  
independent	  of	  emotions.	  	  
Yet,	  there	  is	  increasing	  awareness	  that	  psychosis	  is	  a	  thoroughly	  affective	  
experience	  too.	  Because	  of	  this,	  psychosis	  cannot	  be	  used	  as	  a	  counter-­‐example	  to	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a	  claim	  the	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  constitute	  each	  other81.	  Vodusek	  et	  
al.	  (2014)	  found	  that	  people	  in	  the	  prodromal	  stage	  of	  psychosis,	  full	  blown	  
psychosis	  and	  post-­‐psychosis	  all	  had	  unusual	  experiences	  of	  emotions.	  They	  
‘experienced	  more	  negative	  and	  disturbing	  emotions	  than	  controls’	  (p.	  254).	  
Similarly,	  people	  who	  do	  not	  currently	  have	  psychosis,	  but	  are	  members	  of	  groups	  
that	  are	  at	  high	  risk	  of	  having	  it	  in	  the	  future	  have	  altered	  affect,	  including	  
anhedonia,	  intense	  emotions,	  and	  emotional	  confusion	  (Phillips	  &	  Seidman,	  2008).	  
These	  groups	  were:	  people	  who	  were	  first-­‐degree	  biological	  relatives	  of	  someone	  
with	  psychosis,	  people	  who	  were	  in	  the	  prodromal	  phrase82,	  and	  people	  who	  
scored	  high	  on	  schizotypy83.	  	  
Yet	  this	  might	  seem	  suspicious:	  now	  the	  possibility	  arises	  that	  relatives	  of	  
people	  with	  psychosis,	  those	  in	  the	  prodromal	  phrase,	  and	  people	  with	  schizotypy	  
have	  altered	  affect	  without	  altered	  sensory	  experience.	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  so.	  	  
People	  who	  are	  prodromal	  often	  do	  report	  perceptual84	  disturbances	  (Yung	  et	  al	  
2003;	  Subotnick	  &	  Nuechterlein,	  1988).	  Similarly,	  a	  feature	  of	  schizotypy	  is	  that	  
one	  has	  unusual	  perceptual	  experiences	  (Claridge	  et	  al.	  1996;	  Mason,	  Claridge	  &	  
Jackson,	  1995).	  And	  it	  would	  not	  be	  implausible	  that	  family	  members	  of	  people	  
with	  schizophrenia	  have	  perceptual	  disturbances	  considering	  that	  they	  reported	  
unusual	  affect,	  and	  people	  who	  have	  mood	  disorders	  experience	  the	  world	  as	  
strange,	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  hallucinations	  than	  those	  who	  don’t.	  
So	  while	  psychosis	  is	  often	  characterised	  by	  changes	  to	  sensory	  experience,	  
this	  doesn’t	  seem	  to	  happen	  in	  isolation	  from	  changes	  to	  emotional	  experience.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81	  Yet,	  neither	  is	  it	  the	  case	  that	  evidence	  from	  co-­‐occurrence	  of	  psychosis	  and	  emotional	  
disturbance	  straightforwardly	  supports	  for	  the	  constitutive	  claim,	  for	  that	  I	  am	  relying	  on	  
the	  neurological	  and	  phenomenological	  evidence.	  
82	  The	  prodromal	  period	  of	  psychosis	  refers	  to	  changes	  in	  people’s	  experiences	  and	  
behavior	  that	  falls	  short	  of	  being	  understood	  as	  full-­‐blown	  psychosis	  (Yung	  &	  McGorry,	  
1996)	  and	  may	  or	  may	  not	  develop	  into	  psychosis	  (Yung	  et	  al.,	  2003).	  	  
83	  Schizotypy	  scores	  depend	  on	  the	  theory	  that	  everyone	  has	  aspects	  of	  their	  personality	  
that	  lie	  on	  a	  continuum	  between	  non-­‐psychotic	  tendencies	  and	  experience	  and	  psychotic	  
tendencies	  and	  experience.	  People	  who	  score	  high	  in	  schizotypy	  have	  tendencies	  that	  are	  
more	  like	  those	  of	  people	  with	  psychosis	  than	  average,	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
population.	  	  
84	  These	  studies	  tend	  to	  talk	  of	  ‘perceptual’	  rather	  than	  ‘sensory’	  disturbances.	  I	  retain	  
their	  original	  wording	  here,	  but	  note	  that	  many	  people	  take	  ‘perception’	  and	  ‘sensory’	  to	  
be	  analogous.	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While	  this	  fits	  neatly	  both	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  are	  
mutually	  forming	  and	  with	  a	  Prinzian	  view	  that	  emotional	  and	  sensory	  experience	  
are	  robustly	  causally	  connected,	  the	  evidence	  from	  neuroscience	  and	  
phenomenology	  gives	  weight	  to	  the	  former	  interpretation.	  Furthermore,	  unlike	  
Prinz’s	  theory,	  mine	  also	  explains	  why	  a	  disturbance	  in	  sensori-­‐affective	  
processing	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  a	  disturbance	  in	  our	  sense	  of	  being	  in	  the	  world,	  as	  we	  
shall	  see.	  	  
	  
	   3.3.2.	  Localised	  versus	  global	  disturbance	  
However,	  some	  clarification	  needs	  to	  be	  added.	  The	  theory	  that	  sensory	  and	  
emotional	  experiences	  are	  interdependent	  predicts	  that	  disturbances	  in	  one	  will	  
not	  be	  found	  without	  disturbances	  in	  another.	  But,	  understood	  simply,	  this	  is	  
clearly	  not	  the	  case.	  People	  who	  have	  very	  different	  sensory	  capabilities	  don’t	  
necessarily	  have	  emotional	  impairments:	  think	  of	  people	  who	  are	  blind,	  or	  deaf.	  
Similarly,	  large	  changes	  of	  mood	  that	  fall	  short	  of	  counting	  as	  pathological	  do	  not	  
appear	  to	  cause	  sensory	  disturbance.	  Strong	  anger	  because	  of	  your	  stressful	  
commute	  to	  work	  does	  not	  prevent	  one	  from	  seeing	  the	  computer	  in	  front	  of	  you	  
when	  you	  get	  to	  your	  desk.	  	  
To	  get	  a	  better	  hold	  on	  this,	  we	  need	  to	  return	  to	  the	  theory	  that	  Merleau-­‐
Ponty	  puts	  forward,	  and	  our	  neuroscience	  supports.	  Here,	  we	  are	  present	  in	  the	  
world	  if	  our	  capacities	  for	  interoception	  and	  exteroception	  can	  work	  smoothly	  
together	  as	  one	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process,	  such	  that	  our	  bodily	  feelings	  can	  find	  
a	  way	  to	  tune	  into	  the	  spectacle.	  But	  our	  bodily	  feelings	  are	  action-­‐orientated,	  they	  
are	  involved	  in	  understanding	  possibilities	  for	  actions.	  Similarly,	  our	  perception	  of	  
the	  world	  depends	  on	  us	  understanding	  what	  it	  means	  for	  us,	  including	  how	  we	  
can	  meaningfully	  act	  in	  it.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  integration	  of	  interoception	  and	  
exteroception	  that	  we	  feel	  present	  in	  a	  meaningful	  world.	  Affect,	  significance,	  
sensory	  perception,	  and	  action-­‐orientation	  come	  together	  on	  this	  account.	  Note	  
that	  the	  claim	  is	  not	  about	  specific	  intero-­‐	  or	  exteroceptive	  senses,	  that	  is,	  not	  
about	  sight	  or	  proprioception,	  but	  about	  interoception	  and	  exteroception	  in	  
general,	  how	  they	  come	  together,	  and	  how	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  
action	  affordances.	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Impairments	  in	  particular	  senses,	  then,	  should	  not	  be	  a	  problem,	  as	  long	  as	  
there	  is	  some	  interoceptive	  and	  some	  exteroceptive	  component	  to	  be	  integrated	  
such	  that	  one	  feels	  immersed	  in	  a	  world,	  which	  is	  experienced	  as	  an	  enticement	  for	  
meaningful	  action.	  Blindness	  and	  deafness	  are	  therefore	  not	  a	  problem;	  there	  is	  
still	  some	  exteroceptive	  input	  through	  other	  organs.	  Whatever	  exteroception	  is	  
available	  is	  enough	  to	  form	  an	  embodied	  appraisal	  of	  how	  we	  are	  related	  to	  the	  
world,	  which	  is	  also	  a	  signal	  of	  what	  actions	  are	  most	  suited	  to	  the	  situation.	  	  For	  
example,	  a	  blind	  person	  uses	  tactile	  and	  auditory	  processing,	  together	  with	  
interoception,	  to	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  they	  are	  positioned	  spatially	  and	  affectively	  in	  
relation	  to	  other	  things.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  they	  have	  some	  partial	  functional	  
counterpart	  to	  vision.	  	  
Similarly,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  particular	  changes	  in	  mood	  that	  are	  a	  problem	  in	  
sensory	  experience,	  but	  the	  general	  affective	  impairment.	  Major	  depression	  is	  
characterised	  as	  a	  mood	  disorder,	  and	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  of	  psychological	  literature	  
by	  Bylsma	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  found	  that	  people	  with	  major	  depression	  had	  a	  decreased	  
affective	  response	  to	  stimuli	  compared	  to	  controls.	  Although	  both	  negative	  and	  
positive	  affect	  was	  reduced,	  positive	  affect	  was	  reduced	  more.	  Heller	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  
found	  that	  neurological	  responses	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  theory	  that	  positive	  
affect	  is	  attenuated	  in	  major	  depression.	  The	  subtle	  changes	  in	  the	  way	  the	  world	  
seems	  in	  major	  depression	  can	  therefore	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  change	  in	  sensory	  
perception	  due	  to	  an	  impairment	  in	  relating	  to	  the	  world	  in	  a	  meaningful	  way.	  The	  
world	  is	  distant	  because	  our	  capacity	  for	  meaningful	  action	  orientation	  towards	  it	  
has	  decreased	  and	  so	  it	  isn’t	  as	  present	  to	  us.	  As	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  suggests,	  space	  is	  
lived:	  	  what	  surrounds	  us	  is	  not	  just	  geometrically	  arranged	  objects,	  but	  also	  an	  
arena	  of	  objects	  constituted	  by	  how	  graspable	  and	  interactable	  they	  are.	  That	  
positive	  affect	  is	  reduced	  more	  is	  telling:	  positive	  emotions	  often	  invite	  us	  to	  
interact,	  so	  a	  generalised	  reduction	  in	  positive	  affect	  comes	  with	  a	  decreased	  sense	  
that	  objects	  are	  calling	  to	  us.	  	  
Unlike	  extreme	  emotions	  outside	  of	  mood	  disorders,	  major	  depression	  is	  a	  
wide-­‐spread	  change	  in	  our	  capacity	  to	  form	  embodied	  appraisals	  at	  all,	  particularly	  
positive	  ones.	  However,	  one	  may	  note	  that	  even	  particular	  strong	  emotions	  can	  
change	  our	  perceptions	  of	  the	  world.	  For	  example,	  feeling	  extreme	  indignation	  and	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envy	  watching	  your	  current	  crush	  flirting	  with	  your	  best	  friend	  may	  increase	  the	  
resolution	  and	  intensity	  of	  every	  gesture,	  and	  shorten	  the	  apparent	  the	  distance	  
between	  you	  and	  them.	  Similarly,	  when	  feeling	  anxious	  in	  an	  everyday	  way,	  I	  
experience	  light	  as	  brighter	  and	  noises	  as	  louder	  and	  more	  sudden.	  	  
	   We	  can	  also	  understand	  psychosis	  as	  what	  occurs	  when	  there	  is	  a	  large	  and	  
global	  disruption	  of	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processing,	  resulting	  in	  a	  highly	  distorted	  
experience	  of	  body	  and	  world.	  Remember	  that	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  
distinction	  between	  some	  particular	  deficiency	  or	  disturbance	  to	  interoception	  or	  
exteroception,	  and	  a	  global	  disruption	  to	  one	  of	  these	  processes.	  A	  global	  
disruption,	  I	  am	  claiming,	  will	  impact	  both	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience,	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  a	  particular	  disturbance,	  such	  as	  a	  single	  strong	  emotion	  or	  loss	  of	  sight,	  
will	  not.	  Like	  depression,	  I	  think	  psychosis	  is	  another	  instance	  of	  this	  more	  global	  
disturbance.	  	  
De	  Haan	  &	  Fuchs	  (2010)	  analysed	  qualitative	  data	  from	  structured	  
interviews	  with	  two	  people	  who	  had	  experienced	  an	  episode	  of	  psychosis.	  What	  is	  
most	  striking	  is	  the	  metamorphosis	  to	  their	  prereflective	  experience	  of	  being	  in	  the	  
world.	  The	  first	  theme	  they	  identify	  is	  a	  loss	  of	  self.	  This	  includes	  a	  loss	  of	  self-­‐
coherence	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  meaning	  and	  motivation:	  “You	  cannot	  just	  get	  up	  and	  do	  
something.	  Nothing	  means	  anything	  to	  you.	  I	  simply	  cannot	  assign	  myself;	  I	  don’t	  
know	  what	  I	  want	  to	  do,	  what	  I	  am	  doing,	  who	  I	  am”	  (p.	  329).	  This	  also	  includes	  a	  
disturbance	  to	  the	  skin/world	  boundary:	  “my	  skin	  is	  extremely	  thin”	  “I	  am	  too	  
sensitive…I	  think	  I	  cannot	  defend	  myself”	  (ibid.).	  	  	  
The	  participants	  with	  psychosis	  also	  described	  their	  feelings	  of	  
estrangement	  and	  detachment	  from	  their	  bodies	  and	  the	  world.	  This	  came	  with	  
metaphors	  of	  being	  a	  machine,	  and	  expressions	  of	  disorientation	  that	  accompanied	  
it:	  “In	  general,	  I	  didn’t	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  my	  body…my	  face	  became	  increasingly	  
strange”,	  “the	  world	  is	  not	  tangible	  any	  more…if	  you	  cannot	  be	  part	  of	  it,	  the	  world	  
automatically	  feels	  different”,	  “I	  feel	  as	  if	  I	  am	  sitting	  on	  some	  distant	  planet	  and	  
there	  is	  somehow	  a	  camera	  in	  my	  head	  and	  those	  images	  are	  sent	  there”	  (De	  Haan	  
&	  Fuchs,	  2010,	  p.	  329),	  “I	  look	  around…	  and	  I’m	  dizzy,	  all	  is	  like	  a	  machine”	  (ibid.,	  p.	  
330,).	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   To	  understand	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  theory	  above,	  the	  feeling	  of	  inhabiting	  
the	  world	  requires	  the	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  interoceptive	  and	  exteroceptive	  processes,	  
such	  that	  we	  can	  perceive	  coherently	  and	  experience	  our	  bodies	  as	  our	  selves,	  and	  
our	  selves	  as	  embodied	  actors.	  Psychosis,	  as	  a	  global	  disruption	  of	  the	  intero-­‐
exteroceptive	  process	  disturbs	  the	  normal	  perspectival	  quality	  of	  experience	  
leading	  to	  disturbances	  in	  experiences	  of	  self	  and	  world.	  Co-­‐emergent	  with	  this	  
confused	  processing,	  one	  gets	  disturbed	  emotion,	  including	  intense	  emotion,	  
anhedonia	  and	  confused	  emotion85.	  The	  disruption	  to	  our	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  
processing	  disrupts	  emotion	  due	  to	  emotional	  experience	  being	  constituted	  
through	  this	  process.	  The	  strange	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  world	  experienced	  through	  
psychosis	  comes	  together	  with	  this	  disturbed	  emotional	  capacity.	  	  
	   As	  seen	  above,	  all	  these	  experiences	  of	  self,	  world,	  and	  emotion	  come	  
together	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  meaning	  and	  motivation.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  participants	  in	  
these	  interviews	  feel	  unmotivated,	  they	  also	  talked	  of	  their	  effort	  in	  acting,	  and	  
their	  clumsiness:	  “There	  were	  periods	  in	  which	  I	  felt	  extremely	  badly	  
coordinated…I	  found	  myself	  to	  be	  extremely	  clumsy,	  somehow,	  when	  walking”	  (De	  
Haan	  &	  Fuchs,	  2010,	  p.330).	  To	  act,	  participants	  either	  had	  to	  pay	  very	  close	  
attention	  to	  what	  they	  were	  doing	  or,	  as	  one	  participant	  explains,	  “switch	  off,	  my	  
mind	  was	  totally	  away	  from	  my	  body”86	  (ibid).	  That	  is,	  their	  capacity	  to	  engage	  
meaningfully,	  purposefully	  and	  fluidly	  in	  the	  world,	  to	  have	  a	  pre-­‐reflective	  sense	  
of	  themselves	  in	  action,	  has	  been	  undermined.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  one	  would	  
expect	  given	  the	  current	  framework	  because	  psychosis	  occurs	  not	  when	  one	  loses	  
a	  particular	  sense	  or	  has	  an	  angry	  outburst,	  but	  when	  there	  is	  an	  overarching	  
disintegration	  or	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processing,	  which	  co-­‐occurs	  with	  a	  
disordered	  capacity	  for	  emotion,	  sensory	  experience	  and	  action.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Vodusek	  et	  al.	  noted	  that	  people	  with	  psychosis	  were	  “less	  able	  to	  discriminate	  between	  
different	  emotions”(p.2).	  I	  think	  we	  should	  see	  this	  inability	  to	  discriminate	  as	  not	  an	  
epistemic	  failure,	  but	  as	  reflecting	  that	  emotion	  in	  psychosis	  can	  be	  more	  indeterminate	  
because	  of	  the	  dysregulation	  to	  the	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process.	  	  
86	  Note	  that	  such	  automatic	  behaviour	  may	  indicate	  very	  minimal,	  or	  absent,	  prereflective	  
awareness.	  That	  patients	  with	  psychosis	  operate	  more	  successfully	  when	  they	  switch	  off	  
(almost)	  completely,	  is	  congruent	  with	  the	  theory	  that	  disruptions	  to	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  
processing	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  disruptions	  to	  our	  sense	  of	  perspective.	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   It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Vodešek	  et	  al.	  (2014)	  found	  that	  what	  is	  described	  
above	  is	  more	  characteristic	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐psychotic	  experience.	  Full-­‐blown	  
psychosis	  came	  with	  “being	  at	  one	  with	  oneself”	  (p.	  5),	  feeling	  intense	  positive	  
emotion,	  being	  highly	  motivated,	  experiencing	  oneself	  as	  in	  control	  and	  
experiencing	  the	  world	  as	  deeply	  meaningful.	  This	  transformed	  eventually	  into	  a	  
threatening,	  alienating	  experience.	  Again	  we	  can	  see	  how	  disturbance	  of	  an	  intero-­‐
exteroceptive	  process	  can	  be	  seen	  enable	  such	  an	  experience:	  here	  an	  intense	  
increase	  in	  positive	  affect	  is	  co-­‐emergent	  with	  increased	  action-­‐orientation,	  and	  a	  
revitalised	  experience	  of	  self	  and	  world.	  	  
It	  is	  true	  that	  co-­‐occurrence	  does	  not	  prove	  the	  interconnectedness	  of	  
sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience.	  I	  take	  that	  to	  be	  shown	  by	  phenomenology	  and	  
the	  neuroscience,	  rather	  than	  the	  clinical	  psychology.	  Nonetheless,	  what	  I	  take	  the	  
clinical	  psychology	  to	  support	  is	  the	  phenomenological	  claim	  that	  our	  embodied	  
perspective	  on	  the	  world	  arises	  through	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processing.	  If	  one	  
buys	  the	  interdependence	  thesis	  then,	  one	  gets	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  
disturbances	  of	  self	  co-­‐emerge	  with	  distorted	  sensori-­‐affective	  processing	  for	  free,	  
because	  this	  process	  is,	  to	  some	  large	  degree,	  what	  constitutes	  our	  sense	  of	  being	  
in	  the	  world.	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  case	  of	  Ian	  Waterman	  may	  seem	  to	  disprove	  the	  theory	  that	  
interoception	  is	  necessary	  for	  sensory	  experience.	  Ian	  Waterman	  suffers	  from	  a	  
loss	  of	  proprioception	  (Cole,	  1995;	  Meijsing,	  2000),	  meaning	  he	  lacks	  the	  normal	  
immediate	  sense	  of	  how	  his	  body	  is	  organised	  that	  most	  of	  us	  have.	  Proprioception	  
depends	  on	  nerves	  that	  register	  our	  muscle,	  tendon	  and	  joint	  position.	  Yet,	  Ian	  
Waterman	  has	  no	  problem	  with	  feeling	  emotion	  or	  perceiving	  the	  world.	  He	  did,	  
however,	  have	  major	  problems	  moving	  initially,	  although	  he	  learned	  to	  do	  so	  
through	  paying	  close	  visual	  attention	  to	  where	  his	  body	  was	  situated.	  This	  initial	  
problem	  co-­‐occurred	  with	  a	  strange	  sense	  of	  self.	  	  
	   The	  first	  thing	  to	  note	  here	  is	  that	  proprioception,	  while	  an	  inner	  sense	  of	  
our	  body,	  is	  not	  all	  there	  is	  for	  interoception.	  These	  two	  senses	  are	  often	  seen	  as	  
distinct,	  although	  here	  they	  cannot	  be	  entirely	  –	  both	  are	  a	  sense	  of	  our	  body,	  and	  
so	  fall	  under	  what	  I	  am	  understanding	  as	  ‘interoception’.	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Because	  Ian	  Waterman	  still	  has	  other	  interoceptive	  capacities,	  he	  retained	  
his	  ability	  to	  sense	  the	  state	  of	  his	  organs,	  and	  he	  could	  feel	  deep	  pain,	  fatigue,	  hot	  
and	  cold.	  These	  remaining	  capacities	  are	  integral	  for	  understanding	  how	  one	  is	  
related	  to	  the	  world,	  because	  they	  are	  important	  for	  forming	  embodied	  appraisals.	  	  
If	  this,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  is	  part	  of	  sensing	  objects	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  then	  we	  can	  see	  
how	  loss	  of	  proprioception	  would	  not	  wipe	  out	  the	  capacity	  to	  sense	  the	  world.	  Ian	  
Waterman	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  form	  embodied	  appraisals.	  	  
This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  psychosis	  and	  depression.	  In	  these	  cases,	  while	  it	  
initially	  looks	  like	  there	  is	  a	  localised	  problem,	  what	  we	  found	  was	  that	  there	  were	  
pervasive	  perceptual	  problems.	  This,	  I	  was	  suggesting,	  could	  be	  explained	  through	  
the	  general	  attenuation	  of	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processing	  or	  an	  impairment	  in	  the	  
co-­‐ordination	  and	  integration	  of	  intero-­‐	  and	  exteroceptive	  processes.	  It	  is	  a	  general	  
disturbance	  that	  explains	  the	  disturbances	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  presence	  that	  
accompanies	  depression	  and	  psychosis.	  However,	  the	  claim	  is	  not	  that	  people	  with	  
depression	  and	  psychosis	  have	  no	  perceptual	  experience,	  and	  that	  they	  have	  no	  
sense	  of	  presence,	  just	  that	  these	  are	  both	  markedly	  altered.	  	  
With	  Waterman,	  his	  issue	  is	  confined	  to	  one	  type	  of	  experience:	  he	  does	  not	  
have	  a	  pervasive	  perceptual	  disturbance,	  but	  a	  problem	  localised	  to	  one	  modality.	  
Unlike	  Waterman,	  people	  with	  depression	  and	  psychosis	  cannot	  use	  other	  
modalities	  to	  compensate,	  because,	  I	  am	  have	  argued,	  the	  problem	  is	  not	  confined	  
to	  one	  of	  their	  modalities.	  Waterman	  is	  more	  similar	  to	  someone	  who	  lacks	  a	  
particular	  modality,	  like	  someone	  who	  is	  deaf	  or	  blind.	  	  
	   Still,	  some	  puzzles	  remain.	  Another	  function	  I	  have	  given	  to	  interoception	  is	  
to	  co-­‐ordinate	  with	  exteroception	  to	  give	  us	  a	  sense	  of	  our	  position	  in	  the	  world.	  
So,	  I’ve	  given	  interoception	  two	  (partially	  conceptually	  distinct)	  functions:	  being	  a	  
key	  part	  in	  our	  capacity	  for	  embodied	  appraisals,	  and	  being	  central	  to	  the	  
experience	  of	  being	  immersed	  in	  the	  world,	  both	  working	  through	  the	  interaction	  
with	  exteroception.	  A	  joint	  and	  co-­‐ordinated	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process	  is	  
needed	  to	  enable	  the	  experience	  of	  self	  and	  world	  to	  come	  together,	  since	  our	  
selves	  take	  a	  stance	  towards	  some	  situation,	  and	  the	  world	  is	  experienced	  through	  
our	  embodied	  appraisals.	  However,	  if	  someone	  cannot	  adopt	  this	  bodily	  stance,	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then	  my	  theory	  may	  make	  it	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  explain	  how	  they	  could	  feel	  present	  in	  
the	  world	  and	  act.	  	  
	   Crucially,	  embodied	  appraisal	  already	  contains	  a	  readiness	  for	  action,	  it	  is	  a	  
bodily	  stance	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  an	  attitude	  towards	  the	  world.	  Waterman	  feels	  present	  
because	  having	  an	  action	  orientation	  does	  not	  require	  currently	  having	  the	  motor	  
control	  needed	  to	  act.	  	  
One	  way	  to	  understand	  this	  is	  that	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  think	  that	  embodied	  
appraisals	  only	  rely	  on	  our	  feeling	  of	  our	  body	  as	  it	  is.	  Neuroscientist	  Damasio	  
(1999)	  also	  talks	  about	  feelings	  as	  partly	  based	  on	  our	  sense	  of	  how	  our	  body	  
could,	  or	  ought	  to,	  be	  given	  the	  situation	  we	  are	  in.	  Damasio	  calls	  this	  the	  ‘as	  if	  
body	  loop’.	  According	  to	  this	  theory,	  emotions	  rely	  partly	  of	  our	  sense	  of	  our	  body	  
as	  if	  it	  were	  in	  a	  particular	  state87.	  We	  may	  not	  actually	  be	  cowering	  when	  we	  face	  
an	  object	  that	  threatens	  us,	  but	  might	  nonetheless	  experience	  cowering	  as	  
appropriate	  for	  the	  situation.	  This	  works	  as	  another	  explanation	  of	  why	  Waterman	  
can	  sense	  the	  world	  prior	  to	  regaining	  his	  motor	  abilities:	  being	  able	  to	  experience	  
oneself	  as	  if	  one	  were	  in	  a	  posture	  is	  a	  partial	  substitute	  for	  being	  in	  that	  posture.	  
Just	  as	  we	  feel	  fear	  in	  dreams	  without	  cowering,	  so	  can	  someone	  who	  cannot	  move	  
easily.	  Because	  even	  without	  cowering,	  we	  can	  experience	  the	  situation	  as	  one	  that	  
calls	  us	  to	  cower.	  
	  However,	  there	  is	  more	  going	  on	  here	  than	  that.	  Ian	  Waterman’s	  visual	  
exteroception	  partially	  compensated	  for	  some	  of	  the	  functional	  roles	  normally	  
played	  by	  proprioception.	  He	  could	  move	  about	  only	  granted	  that	  he	  was	  
constantly	  looking	  at	  his	  body	  and	  making	  a	  conscious	  effortful	  attempt	  to	  move	  it	  
(Meijsing,	  2010).	  	  
We	  can	  say	  that	  Waterman	  has	  a	  kind	  of	  visual	  proprioception,	  and	  that	  his	  
experience	  of	  inhabiting	  the	  world	  still	  depends	  on	  a	  capacity	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87	  Colombetti	  (2014)	  raises	  some	  issues	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  neurological	  ‘as	  if	  body	  
loop’,	  since	  much	  of	  the	  biological	  realisers	  of	  emotions	  appear	  not	  to	  be	  brain-­‐based.	  
However,	  as	  long	  as	  some	  neural	  circuitry	  is	  involved,	  this	  may	  be	  part	  of	  our	  current	  
affective	  experience	  even	  while	  such	  an	  experience	  is	  possibly	  attenuated	  or	  altered	  by	  
not	  being	  accompanied	  by	  the	  normal	  non-­‐brain	  realisers.	  Further,	  some	  of	  the	  experience	  
of,	  for	  example,	  a	  situation	  calling	  us	  to	  cower,	  may	  not	  be	  based	  on	  an	  ‘as	  if	  body	  loop’	  
that	  is	  enabled	  by	  the	  brain,	  but	  actually	  occurring	  bodily	  changes,	  such	  as	  hormonal	  
changes,	  that	  we	  refrain	  from	  acting	  on.	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way	  he	  can	  move	  with	  information	  about	  his	  surroundings	  (Meijsing,	  2010).	  That	  
is,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  one	  of	  the	  functional	  roles	  normally	  played	  by	  proprioception	  
can	  be,	  to	  some	  extent,	  played	  by	  particular	  exteroceptive	  information.	  Since,	  to	  
move,	  Waterman	  has	  to	  engage	  in	  constant	  and	  conscious	  visual	  attention,	  we	  can	  
see	  that	  he	  cannot	  totally	  make	  up	  for	  the	  loss	  of	  proprioception.	  Yet,	  Ian	  
Waterman	  does	  not	  threaten	  my	  theory	  if	  we	  see	  the	  phenomenology	  as	  offering	  a	  
functional	  description	  of	  what	  is	  needed	  to	  feel	  present	  in	  the	  world,	  if	  we	  
remember	  that	  other	  interoceptive	  processes	  retained	  by	  Waterman	  play	  much	  of	  
that	  role,	  and	  if	  we	  have	  some	  flexibility	  concerning	  how	  people	  with	  impairments	  
use	  other	  capacities	  as	  partial	  replacements	  (similar	  points	  are	  made	  in	  sensory	  
substitution	  literature,	  see	  Noë	  &	  Hurley,	  2003).	  	  
It	  is	  through	  this	  capacity	  to	  act	  that	  Waterman	  regained	  a	  normal	  sense	  of	  
inhabiting	  the	  world	  through	  his	  body.	  Before	  he	  learned	  to	  move	  in	  this	  way,	  
Waterman	  says	  he	  felt	  dead.	  Similarly,	  other	  people	  who	  have	  lost	  proprioception	  
but	  did	  not	  learn	  to	  move	  have	  related	  to	  their	  body	  as	  a	  pilot	  in	  a	  ship	  they	  cannot	  
really	  control	  (Meijsing,	  2010).	  One	  thing	  we	  can	  take	  from	  this	  is	  that	  although	  
embodied	  appraisals	  involve	  action	  tendencies,	  and	  give	  us	  some	  sense	  of	  self,	  our	  
capacity	  to	  be	  the	  author	  of	  actions	  does	  change	  how	  we	  experience	  ourselves	  in	  
the	  world.	  Large	  impairments	  in	  our	  capacity	  to	  act	  change	  our	  experience	  of	  self,	  
although	  action	  affordances	  are	  enough	  for	  some	  (distorted)	  feeling	  of	  a	  self	  in	  the	  
world.	  Loss	  of	  proprioception	  did	  not	  remove	  the	  understanding	  Waterman	  
already	  had	  of	  affordances,	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  movement	  and	  
perception,	  so	  his	  perception	  was	  enabled	  by	  a	  working	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  
extero-­‐	  and	  interoception.	  	   	  	  
	  
We	  started	  this	  line	  of	  enquiry	  through	  the	  observation	  that	  exteroception	  appears	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  fail	  without	  harming	  our	  experience	  of	  affect,	  and	  we	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  knock	  out	  interoception	  without	  damaging	  our	  ability	  to	  sense	  the	  world.	  	  I	  have	  
argued	  that,	  in	  the	  cases	  where	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  so,	  only	  parts	  or	  aspects	  of	  
interoception	  or	  exteroception	  are	  missing.	  When	  there	  is	  a	  partial	  impairment	  
other	  processes	  can	  play	  a	  sufficiently	  similar	  functional	  role	  to	  the	  capacity	  that	  
has	  been	  lost.	  What	  is	  more	  of	  a	  problem	  for	  our	  sensing	  and	  affective	  capacities	  is	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when	  there	  is	  an	  impairment	  of	  our	  general	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processing.	  This	  
results	  in	  odd	  experiences	  of	  self,	  affect,	  and	  world.	  Evidence	  from	  clinical	  
psychology	  is	  therefore	  congruent	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  interdependence	  of	  sensory	  
and	  emotional	  experience.	  Furthermore,	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  theory	  of	  how	  we	  feel	  
present	  in	  the	  world	  can	  help	  explain	  the	  experience	  of	  people	  with	  psychosis,	  as	  
well	  as	  when,	  and	  why,	  loss	  of	  proprioception	  will	  disrupt	  of	  sense	  our	  being	  in	  the	  
world.	  	  
	  
3.4. A	  good	  theory?	  
We	  have	  now	  seen	  three	  different	  perspectives	  concerning	  whether	  emotional	  and	  
sensory	  experience	  are	  entangled:	  phenomenological,	  neurological,	  and	  
psychological.	  This	  matters	  because	  if	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  are	  
entangled	  then	  it	  cannot	  be	  only	  emotion	  that	  constitutes	  our	  moral	  sense,	  and	  it	  is	  
not	  right	  to	  argue	  that	  sensory	  experiences	  are	  part	  of	  moral	  judgement	  only	  
insofar	  as	  they	  provide	  the	  particular	  object	  of	  the	  judgement.	  On	  my	  theory,	  
sensory	  experience	  is	  a	  constituent	  to	  what	  is	  moral	  about	  our	  perspective,	  rather	  
than	  distinct	  from	  it.	  Further,	  this	  theory	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  feeling	  and	  
sensing	  will	  form	  a	  part	  of	  my	  explanation	  of	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  
possible.	  	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  now	  is	  summarise	  how	  the	  relationship	  between	  
phenomenology,	  neuroscience	  and	  psychology	  relates	  to	  the	  two	  different	  theories	  
being	  compared.	  The	  theories	  being	  compared	  here	  is	  the	  theory	  that	  emotions	  
and	  sensory	  experience	  co-­‐constitute	  each	  other	  (my	  theory),	  to	  the	  theory	  that	  
they	  are	  tightly	  causally	  coupled,	  but	  not	  constitutive	  of	  each	  other	  (Prinz’s	  
theory).	  I	  am	  not	  aiming	  to	  conclusively	  prove	  that	  my	  theory	  is	  stronger.	  Instead,	  I	  
aim	  to	  show	  that	  we	  have	  some	  good	  preliminary	  reasons	  to	  favour	  my	  theory	  
over	  his.	  	  
	  
Crucially,	  my	  theory	  is	  more	  accurate	  than	  its	  rival.	  My	  theory	  makes	  sense	  of	  our	  
daily	  experience,	  that	  sensory	  experience	  is	  affective	  and	  vice	  versa,	  while	  Prinz’s	  
theory	  doesn’t.	  In	  addition,	  if	  one	  follows	  Merleau-­‐Ponty’s	  transcendental	  
argument,	  then	  it	  looks	  like	  there	  is	  a	  conceptual	  reason	  to	  suppose	  that	  only	  a	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theory	  where	  interoception	  and	  exteroception	  are	  integrated	  could	  explain	  our	  
capacity	  to	  perceive	  (see	  section	  3.1.1.).	  	  
My	  view	  also	  enables	  greater	  consistency	  between	  disciplines.	  It	  allows	  
three	  domains	  of	  enquiry	  to	  fit	  together.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  view	  of	  
independence	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  accurate	  with	  regards	  to	  clinical	  
psychology.	  But	  on	  this	  theory,	  the	  three	  disciplines	  I	  have	  looked	  at	  become	  
inconsistent.	  That	  is,	  the	  clinical	  psychology	  is	  now	  inconsistent	  with	  the	  
neuroscience	  and	  the	  phenomenology.	  	  
The	  consistency	  of	  different	  disciplines	  can	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  theoretic	  virtue	  
once	  we	  share	  commitments	  similar	  to	  those	  that	  Wheeler	  (2013)	  proposes.	  On	  
this	  theory,	  the	  insights	  of	  one	  discipline	  can	  help	  us	  discern	  potential	  strengths	  
and	  weakness	  in	  another.	  When	  the	  focus	  of	  each	  discipline	  is	  on	  the	  same	  subject,	  
we	  might	  think	  of	  them	  as	  offering	  different	  perspectives	  on	  that	  subject.	  Where	  
perspectives	  converge	  on	  what	  characterises	  our	  subject	  matter,	  we	  have	  more	  
reason	  to	  be	  confident	  in	  our	  characterisation	  of	  that	  subject	  matter.	  Where	  there	  
is	  disagreement,	  each	  discipline	  has	  the	  task	  of	  re-­‐evaluating	  its	  methodology	  and	  
conclusions.	  	  
Therefore,	  we	  should	  see	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  situated	  in	  the	  world	  as	  
requiring	  the	  entanglement	  of	  motor	  intention,	  emotion	  and	  sensory	  experience.	  
Sensory	  experience	  is	  one	  way	  that	  we	  hook	  on	  to	  the	  world	  in	  the	  here	  and	  now,	  
including	  by	  it	  being	  involved	  in	  our	  emotional	  experience.	  And	  emotion	  as	  an	  
essential	  way	  that	  we	  are	  connected	  to	  the	  world	  and	  motivated	  to	  act,	  
incorporates	  both	  interoceptive	  and	  exteroceptive	  experience	  and	  is	  an	  expression	  
of	  how	  organism	  and	  world	  relate	  to	  each	  other.	  
However,	  while	  much	  of	  the	  clinical	  psychology	  could	  be	  made	  sense	  of	  
through	  either	  theory,	  only	  my	  account	  enables	  the	  novel	  insight	  from	  
phenomenology	  to	  elucidate	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  the	  examples	  from	  clinical	  
psychology.	  The	  phenomenological	  support	  for	  the	  theory	  of	  interdependence	  also	  
presents	  an	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process	  as	  being	  a	  major	  constituent	  in	  our	  sense	  
of	  inhabiting	  a	  world.	  Here,	  then,	  we	  have	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  disruption	  to	  the	  
integration	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  interoception	  and	  exteroception	  co-­‐emerges	  with	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disruptions	  to	  one	  sense	  of	  embodied	  self,	  like	  in	  psychosis88.	  Another	  way	  to	  say	  
this	  is	  that	  it	  looks	  like	  my	  theory	  has	  greater	  explanatory	  scope	  than	  Prinz’s.	  If	  
intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processing	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  perspective,	  then,	  my	  
theory,	  unlike	  Prinz’s,	  can	  explain	  cases	  of	  distorted	  perspective.	  	  
	  
So,	  there	  is	  good	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  co-­‐
constitute	  each	  other.	  They	  are	  not	  independent.	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  is	  fully	  
convinced	  by	  the	  transcendental	  argument,	  one	  can	  see	  this	  theory	  as	  fitting	  closer	  
with	  our	  daily	  experience,	  and	  as	  creating	  a	  framework	  that	  shows	  different	  
disciplines	  to	  be	  consistent.	  Additionally,	  the	  characterisation	  of	  experience	  that	  
this	  theory	  is	  consistent	  with	  offers	  novel	  insight	  into	  particular	  psychological	  
disruptions.	  That	  is,	  the	  package	  that	  my	  theory	  offers	  appears	  to	  have	  greater	  
explanatory	  scope	  than	  its	  rival.	  	  	  
The	  result	  is	  that	  sensory	  experience	  is	  given	  a	  different	  functional	  role	  in	  
our	  moral	  perspective	  than	  the	  one	  that	  Prinz	  gives.	  While	  on	  Prinz’s	  account	  
sensory	  experience	  may	  enable	  a	  moral	  judgement	  to	  have	  a	  particular	  object,	  it	  is	  
not	  part	  of	  the	  affective	  moral	  sense	  itself,	  but	  conjoined	  to	  it	  to	  constitute	  a	  
judgement.	  That	  is,	  on	  Prinz’s	  theory	  there	  is	  a	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  sensory	  
experience	  and	  emotional	  experience	  within	  a	  moral	  judgement.	  The	  emotion	  
provides	  the	  moral	  sense,	  and	  the	  sensory	  experience	  provides	  the	  particular	  
object.	  On	  my	  theory	  we	  see	  a	  subtle	  shift.	  Here,	  both	  are	  co-­‐constituents	  of	  each	  
other:	  sensory	  experience	  partly	  constitutes	  our	  moral	  sense	  itself,	  and	  emotions	  
partly	  constitute	  the	  particular	  object	  of	  that	  sense.	  	  
	  
	  
4. Sensory	  Experience	  and	  Narrative	  Understanding	  
	  
I	  started	  this	  chapter	  by	  mentioning	  that	  there	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  looking	  at	  the	  
relationship	  between	  emotion	  and	  sensory	  experience:	  to	  present	  reasons	  for	  
doubting	  the	  role	  Prinz	  gives	  sensory	  experience	  in	  moral	  judgements	  and	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  a	  correlation	  between	  depression	  and	  an	  altered	  sense	  of	  self	  has	  
also	  been	  found	  (Lambert	  et	  al.	  2001).	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present	  a	  reason	  why	  narrative	  understanding,	  like	  MTT,	  must	  require	  sensory	  
experience.	  This	  latter	  aim	  blocks	  a	  possible	  objection	  to	  my	  account	  of	  moral	  
agency.	  This	  objection	  would	  go	  as	  follows:	  MTT,	  but	  not	  narrative	  understanding,	  
requires	  sensory	  experience;	  sensory	  experience	  plays	  some	  crucial	  role	  in	  moral	  
agency;	  therefore	  MTT	  is	  important	  for	  moral	  agency	  in	  a	  way	  that	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  not.	  	  	  
Moreover,	  the	  above	  discussion	  contributes	  to	  my	  positive	  proposal	  for	  
moral	  agency	  by	  contributing	  to	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  
enables	  us	  to	  act.	  In	  the	  phenomenological	  analysis	  above,	  I	  have	  so	  far	  explained	  
why	  sensory	  experience	  must	  be	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  experience	  ourselves	  as	  
present	  in	  the	  present.	  What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  now	  is	  look	  at	  the	  implication	  of	  this	  in	  
regards	  to	  how	  we	  inhabit	  narratives,	  our	  past	  and	  future,	  and	  act	  in	  the	  present.	  
That	  is,	  what	  does	  the	  theory	  above,	  concerning	  how	  it	  is	  that	  we	  experience	  
ourselves	  in	  the	  world,	  have	  to	  do	  with	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  moral	  
agency?	  	  
	   	  	  
I	  have	  argued	  before	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  emerges	  when	  we	  have	  the	  
capacity	  to	  have	  a	  perspective	  on	  a	  sequence	  of	  events.	  What	  does	  this	  have	  to	  do	  
with	  moral	  agency?	  Well,	  narrative	  understanding	  constitutes	  our	  capacity	  to	  have	  
a	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  most	  valuable	  to	  us,	  because	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  form	  a	  coherent	  set	  
of	  interrelated	  affective	  reasons	  through	  which	  we	  understand	  the	  world.	  And,	  I	  
have	  claimed,	  these	  reasons	  motivate.	  	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  now,	  is	  that	  this	  narrative	  process,	  with	  its	  
perspectival	  character,	  depends	  on	  our	  sense	  of	  being	  a	  self	  within	  the	  world	  
presently.	  I	  gave	  a	  first	  approximation	  of	  how	  that	  is	  possible	  in	  chapter	  3.	  There	  I	  
argued	  that	  emotion,	  as	  an	  embodied	  appraisal,	  was	  important	  for	  having	  a	  
perspective	  at	  all.	  I	  noted	  that	  emotions	  have	  a	  bipolar	  structure,	  that	  they	  place	  us	  
on	  one	  end	  of	  a	  relation.	  Because	  emotions	  are	  embodied	  this	  placing	  is	  felt.	  And	  
emotions,	  as	  embodied	  appraisals,	  tell	  us	  how	  that	  thing	  we	  are	  related	  to	  matters	  
to	  us.	  Lastly,	  this	  involves	  an	  embodied	  stance,	  since	  having	  this	  sense	  of	  how	  an	  
object	  matters	  to	  us	  is	  also	  understanding	  a	  set	  of	  possibilities	  for	  action.	  Now	  we	  
are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  see	  that	  emotion	  alone	  doesn’t	  get	  us	  this.	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Importantly,	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  sensori-­‐affective	  experience	  co-­‐emerges	  
with	  the	  experience	  of	  finding	  ourselves	  amid	  the	  world,	  which	  is	  concurrently	  
experienced	  through	  the	  possibilities	  of	  action	  that	  are	  afforded.	  Exteroceptive	  
processes	  are	  a	  necessary	  part	  that	  enables	  all	  these	  characteristics	  of	  our	  
experiences.	  This	  is	  what	  is	  distinctive	  about	  the	  Merleau-­‐Pontian	  view	  I	  have	  
developed	  above:	  that	  self	  and	  world	  come	  into	  being	  together	  through	  the	  
contribution	  of	  interoception	  to	  sensing,	  and	  exteroception	  to	  affect	  and	  motor	  
intention.	  Intero-­‐	  and	  exteroception	  interact	  and	  co-­‐enable	  our	  experience	  that	  
stuff	  exists	  for	  us,	  and	  our	  experience	  of	  ourselves	  among	  that	  stuff.	  
Like	  the	  quote	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter	  suggests,	  an	  explication	  of	  
how	  we	  are	  situated	  in	  the	  present	  has	  consequences	  for	  how	  we	  understand	  
feeling	  situated	  in	  narratives,	  and	  in	  the	  past	  and	  future.	  All	  of	  these	  things,	  
inhabiting	  narratives	  that	  ostensible	  are	  not	  related	  to	  us	  and	  our	  lives,	  and	  MTT,	  
are	  what	  I	  am	  going	  to	  call	  ‘inhabiting	  counterfactuals’.	  That	  is,	  inhabiting	  times	  
and	  spaces	  other	  that	  the	  one	  we	  are	  currently	  situated	  in.	  
It	  makes	  sense	  to	  suggest	  that	  experiences	  of	  self	  in	  non-­‐occurent	  situations	  
are	  not	  based	  on	  totally	  different	  processes	  than	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  experiences	  
of	  self	  in	  the	  present.	  Rather,	  a	  simulation	  of	  sensori-­‐affective	  processes	  in	  memory	  
and	  imagination	  simulates	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  situated	  in	  the	  present.	  As	  Merleau-­‐
Ponty	  puts	  it,	  “the	  body,	  being	  our	  permanent	  means	  of	  “adopting	  attitudes”	  and	  
hence	  of	  creating	  pseudo-­‐presents,	  is	  the	  means	  of	  our	  communicating	  with	  both	  
time	  and	  space.”	  (2012,	  p.	  187).	  The	  experience	  of	  being	  situated	  in	  counter-­‐
factuals	  is	  an	  effect	  of	  the	  body	  conjuring	  up	  a	  spectacle	  through	  the	  motor	  
intentions	  and	  appraisals	  that	  come	  with	  it.	  That	  is,	  we	  enter	  the	  past	  and	  future	  
when	  we	  can	  adopt	  an	  orientation,	  attitude	  or	  poise	  towards	  something	  not	  
currently	  before	  us89.	  That	  scene	  not	  before	  us	  takes	  shape	  through	  these	  attitudes.	  
We	  project	  pseudo-­‐worlds	  around	  us	  as	  we	  project	  our	  selves.	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  
parsimonious,	  but	  it	  accurately	  reflects	  the	  evidence	  that	  simulations	  use	  
overlapping	  systems	  to	  online	  processes,	  as	  I	  discuss	  shortly.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89	  Kim	  Atkins	  (2008)	  discussion	  on	  the	  interdependence	  of	  psychological	  and	  bodily	  
continuity	  overlaps	  with	  my	  discussion	  here.	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   Because	  affect	  includes	  its	  object,	  and	  sensory	  experience	  includes	  our	  
sense	  of	  self	  as	  relating	  to	  the	  world,	  this	  interdependence	  means	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  
we	  adopt	  an	  attitude	  towards	  something	  beyond	  the	  present	  we	  summon	  a	  scene,	  
and	  when	  we	  imagine	  a	  scene,	  we	  transport	  ourselves.	  These	  things	  include	  each	  
other,	  so	  the	  triggering	  of	  one	  process	  necessarily	  implies	  the	  other.	  While	  a	  theory	  
of	  the	  independence	  of	  affect	  and	  sensing	  may	  explain	  the	  same	  phenomena	  
though	  claiming	  these	  two	  processes	  are	  always,	  or	  normally,	  connected,	  it	  has	  
some	  extra	  work	  to	  do	  to	  explain	  if,	  and	  why,	  this	  connection	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  
perspective.	  The	  conjunct	  of	  sensed	  object	  plus	  feeling	  does	  not	  obviously	  explain	  
our	  sense	  of	  perspective.	  Instead	  we	  inhabit	  counterfactuals	  through	  the	  capacity	  
to	  integrate	  intero-­‐	  and	  exteroceptive	  processes.	  	  
We	  have	  seen	  that	  there	  is	  always	  an	  embodied	  pre-­‐reflective	  self	  in	  
narrative	  understanding.	  But	  what	  does	  this	  mean	  for	  moral	  agency?	  Our	  capacity	  
to	  act	  on	  our	  deepest	  values?	  	  
Well,	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  our	  narrative	  understanding,	  constituted	  through	  an	  
emotional	  cadence,	  is	  the	  context	  through	  which	  we	  understand	  our	  current	  
situation.	  Such	  an	  emotional	  cadence,	  we	  now	  know,	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  a	  
perspective	  only	  through	  integration	  with	  sensory	  experience.	  	  
In	  particular,	  the	  integrated	  sensori-­‐affective	  character	  of	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  perspective,	  and	  the	  events	  it	  is	  directed	  
towards,	  existing	  through	  time.	  That	  is,	  we	  experience	  ourselves	  as	  present	  now,	  
but	  within	  a	  narrative	  context	  that	  frames	  our	  current	  experience	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  
led	  up	  to	  it,	  and	  the	  future	  likely	  trajectories.	  The	  backstory	  to	  our	  current	  
situation	  and	  the	  possible	  future	  plots	  are	  understood	  through	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  a	  
continuing	  perspective	  through	  time.	  This	  is	  regardless	  of	  whether	  that	  narrative	  
understanding	  contains	  us	  explicitly	  or	  not,	  because	  we	  are	  prereflectively	  present,	  
at	  least	  as	  an	  external	  perspective,	  in	  any	  act	  of	  narrative	  understanding.	  Not	  only	  
does	  the	  simulation	  of	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processes	  enable	  us	  to	  experience	  
counterfactuals,	  but	  that	  counterfactual	  experience	  is	  important	  to	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  present.	  There	  is	  a	  reciprocity	  between	  our	  imaginative	  
adventures	  and	  our	  capacity	  to	  understand	  the	  present.	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So,	  for	  example,	  if	  I	  find	  myself	  in	  a	  tense	  exchange	  with	  a	  police	  officer	  at	  a	  
protest,	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation,	  and	  my	  choice	  of	  action,	  may	  be	  
informed	  by	  several	  narratives.	  First,	  I	  probably	  got	  into	  a	  tense	  exchange	  through	  
narratives	  of	  the	  police	  as	  agents	  that	  maintain	  the	  state,	  including	  aspects	  of	  the	  
state	  that	  are	  violent	  and	  oppressive.	  I	  don’t	  just	  see	  a	  person	  in	  uniform,	  I	  see	  a	  
person	  who	  plays	  a	  certain	  role	  in	  a	  narrative	  about	  our	  current	  society,	  its	  
formation,	  how	  it	  is	  maintained,	  and	  how	  it	  will	  likely	  continue,	  and	  what	  all	  this	  
means	  for	  people’s	  lives.	  Second,	  my	  next	  choice	  of	  action	  will	  be	  narratively	  
informed.	  Through	  understanding	  narratives	  about	  prison,	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  people	  
with	  criminal	  records,	  and	  stories	  of	  people	  who	  have	  been	  assaulted	  by	  police	  and	  
then	  accused	  of	  assaulting	  the	  police,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  I	  will	  quickly	  restrain	  myself	  
from	  pursuing	  the	  matter	  further.	  	  
All	  these	  instances	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  need	  not	  involve	  mental	  time	  
travel,	  if	  we	  understand	  mental	  time	  travel	  to	  explicitly	  include	  the	  self.	  As	  we	  saw	  
before,	  my	  narrative	  understanding	  involves	  a	  bodily	  orientation	  towards	  the	  
world,	  the	  people	  that	  populate	  it,	  and	  the	  events	  that	  characterise	  it.	  And	  this	  can	  
be	  brought	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  a	  situation	  without	  that	  bodily	  orientation	  
explicitly	  being	  about	  our	  own	  lives.	  Neither	  is	  metarepresentation	  necessary	  for	  
this,	  as	  explained	  in	  chapter	  4.	  	  
Further,	  if	  embodiment	  in	  the	  present	  is	  tied	  up	  with	  our	  understanding	  of	  
counterfactuals,	  through	  situating	  our	  current	  context	  within	  narratives,	  then	  we	  
can	  explain	  how	  we	  can	  act	  on	  our	  narrative	  understanding.	  We	  have	  a	  
perspective,	  which	  is	  sensori-­‐affective,	  on	  what	  our	  current	  situation	  is	  through	  an	  
understanding	  of	  the	  past	  and	  possible	  future.	  When	  our	  understanding	  of	  
counterfactuals	  is	  narrative,	  it	  is	  always	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  our	  bodies.	  
Because	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  also	  action-­‐orientated,	  our	  narrative	  
understanding	  informs	  our	  actions	  in	  the	  present.	  Our	  narrative	  understanding	  of	  
events	  consists	  in	  a	  bodily	  orientation	  towards	  those	  events	  even	  while	  they	  are	  
not	  currently	  happening.	  	  
	   This	  discussion	  overlaps	  with	  Velleman’s	  Self	  to	  Self	  (1996).	  Like	  my	  
current	  discussion,	  Velleman’s	  interest	  is	  how	  our	  psychology	  allows	  us	  access	  to	  
perspectives	  other	  than	  the	  one	  we	  have	  right	  now.	  Velleman	  suggests	  that	  what	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matters	  here	  is	  that	  we	  are	  able	  to	  construct	  a	  scene	  that	  “converge[s]	  at	  a	  single	  
point;	  and	  it	  has	  a	  self-­‐centered	  scheme	  of	  reference	  because	  the	  point	  of	  
convergence	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  occupied	  by	  the	  image’s	  subject”	  (p.	  49-­‐50).	  For	  
Velleman	  we	  have	  to	  go	  further	  than	  this	  though,	  because	  here	  we	  are	  visualising,	  
but	  not	  yet	  involved	  in	  ‘imagined	  seeing’.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  	  
The	  viewer	  is	  [present]	  invisibly,	  insofar	  as	  it	  now	  depicts	  things	  as	  seen	  by	  
him	  [sic];	  and	  thereby	  presents	  him	  [sic]	  reflexively,	  as	  the	  subject,	  in	  the	  
way	  that	  a	  spoken	  first-­‐person	  pronoun	  presents	  its	  speaker.	  (p.	  51.)	  
	  
The	  difference	  is	  that,	  in	  this	  case,	  one	  does	  not	  have	  to	  explicitly	  think	  of	  oneself,	  
one	  is	  already	  present	  ‘invisibly’.	  I	  disagree	  with	  Velleman’s	  distinction	  here.	  For	  
me,	  any	  scene	  construction	  involves	  an	  invisible	  sense	  of	  self	  because	  sensory	  
experience	  requires	  a	  sense	  of	  one’s	  own	  body.	  Nonetheless,	  what	  I’ve	  presented	  
here	  allows	  us	  to	  understand	  how	  such	  a	  first-­‐person	  perspective	  is	  enabled:	  it	  is	  
through	  our	  embodied-­‐embeddedness,	  an	  experience	  that	  co-­‐emerges	  with	  our	  
sensory-­‐affective	  processing.	  	  Velleman’s	  description	  highlights	  the	  form	  of	  such	  a	  
perspective:	  like	  a	  first-­‐person	  pronoun,	  it	  is	  a	  reflexive	  pointing	  to	  self,	  where	  the	  
point	  and	  what	  is	  being	  pointed	  to	  converge,	  and	  where	  the	  pointing	  happens	  
without	  explicit	  thought90.	  	  
	   But	  this	  psychological	  connection	  between	  perspectives	  also	  means	  that	  we	  
can	  learn	  something	  new	  by	  understanding	  narratives.	  Particularly,	  we	  can	  learn	  
something	  new	  about	  what	  actions	  are	  available	  to	  us	  in	  the	  present,	  and	  what	  
they	  mean.	  Those	  actions	  available	  to	  me	  in	  narratives	  are	  mine	  in	  the	  present	  
because	  of	  the	  identity	  between	  the	  embodied	  self	  in	  the	  present	  and	  in	  the	  past	  
and	  future.	  This	  is	  how,	  when	  we	  imaginatively	  settle	  on	  a	  best	  course	  of	  action,	  
our	  reasons	  for	  action	  are	  reasons	  on	  which	  we	  can	  act.	  	  	  
	   Not	  only	  does	  narrative	  understanding	  allow	  us	  to	  imagine	  scenarios	  
similar	  to	  those	  we’ve	  come	  across	  before,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  creative:	  we	  can	  put	  
together	  new	  scenarios.	  So,	  the	  affordances	  we	  are	  faced	  with	  now	  do	  not	  just	  
depend	  on	  what	  we	  have	  experienced	  in	  the	  past,	  they	  also	  partially	  depend	  on	  the	  
imaginatively	  created	  scenarios	  that	  we	  have	  lived	  in	  our	  heads.	  And,	  by	  virtue	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  G&K	  similarly	  think	  that	  what	  is	  important	  about	  MTT	  is	  that	  it	  is	  an	  indexical	  mode	  of	  
thinking	  (p.	  601).	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my	  interdependence	  theory,	  all	  narrative	  understanding	  discloses	  to	  us	  what	  
matters	  to	  us,	  hence	  our	  affordances	  contain	  a	  sense	  of	  their	  consequence	  and	  
value	  to	  us.	  Sensory	  experience	  makes	  narrative	  understanding	  possible,	  and	  our	  
narrative	  understanding	  enhances	  our	  general	  ability	  to	  make	  and	  act	  on	  (moral)	  
decisions.	  	  
In	  sum,	  if	  sensory	  experience	  and	  emotional	  experience	  are	  interdependent,	  
then	  sensory	  experience	  in	  narrative	  understanding	  contributes	  to	  moral	  agency	  in	  
the	  same	  way	  emotions	  do.	  Because	  sensory	  experiences	  are	  involved	  in	  emotion,	  
and	  emotions	  are	  necessary	  for	  us	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  matters	  to	  us,	  then	  
sensory	  experience	  is	  involved	  in	  this	  too.	  Because	  emotional	  cadence	  is	  necessary	  
for	  narrative	  understanding,	  and	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  necessary	  for	  
understanding,	  and	  acting	  on,	  what	  we	  value	  most	  highly,	  sensory	  experience	  is	  
necessary	  for	  this	  too.	  	  	  	  
	   	  	  
There	  are	  some	  neuroscientific	  reasons	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  feeling	  of	  being	  
situated	  when	  inhabiting	  counterfactual	  possibilities	  is	  due	  to	  the	  involvement	  of	  
emotional,	  motor	  and	  sensory	  processing.	  	  
	   There	  is	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  when	  we	  MTT	  we	  use	  emotional,	  sensory	  and	  
motor	  parts	  of	  the	  brain	  (e.g.	  Piefke	  et	  al.	  2003;	  Markowitsch	  &	  Stanilou	  2011;	  
Szpunar,	  Watson	  &	  McDermott,	  2007).	  However,	  the	  claim	  here	  is	  broader	  than	  
that,	  and	  it	  is	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  in	  general	  involves	  sensorimotor	  and	  
affective	  processing.	  	  
	   We	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  that	  Kaplan	  et	  al.	  (2017)	  report	  that	  
the	  narrative	  network	  includes	  areas	  that	  appear	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  emotional	  and	  
sensorimotor	  regions.	  Further,	  they	  took	  this	  network	  to	  include	  the	  medial	  
prefrontal	  cortex	  (mPFC),	  which	  includes	  the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  
(vmPFC).	  	  	  
	   Sabatinelli	  et	  al.	  (2006)	  found	  that	  brain	  regions	  associated	  with	  spatial	  
navigation	  and	  motor	  areas	  were	  associated	  with	  narrative	  imagery.	  Xu	  et	  al.	  
(2005)	  in	  their	  discussion	  of	  narrative	  processing	  refer	  to	  neuroscientific	  studies	  
where	  areas	  associated	  with	  emotion,	  motor	  regions,	  multimodal	  areas	  that	  
process	  exteroceptive	  information,	  and	  areas	  that	  become	  active	  when	  asked	  to	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visualise	  a	  scene,	  become	  active.	  	  Similarly,	  Ferstl	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  in	  their	  meta-­‐
analysis	  found	  that	  language,	  including	  narrative	  language,	  activated	  the	  anterior	  
temporal	  lobes,	  thought	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  memory	  processing,	  particular	  emotional	  
memory,	  and	  multimodal	  processing.	  
This	  is	  evidence	  that	  sensory,	  emotional	  and	  motor	  activation	  are	  important	  
for	  narrative	  understanding.	  A	  good	  explanation	  of	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case	  is	  that	  they	  





This	  chapter	  has	  focused	  on	  answering	  a	  question	  about	  the	  role	  of	  sensory	  
experience	  in	  moral	  agency.	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  it	  must	  be	  central.	  Like	  Prinz,	  I	  
think	  that	  emotions	  must	  be	  pivotal	  to	  moral	  agency,	  but	  unlike	  him,	  I	  think	  
that	  sensory	  experience	  is	  a	  constituent	  of	  our	  affective	  sense	  of	  what	  
matters,	  rather	  than	  an	  independent	  object	  of	  that	  sense.	  I	  have	  presented	  
the	  view	  that	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  experience	  co-­‐constitute	  each	  other,	  and	  
it	  is	  through	  this	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  process	  that	  self	  and	  world	  come	  into	  
experience,	  and	  we	  can	  act.	  	  
	   This	  gives	  us	  some	  explanation	  of	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  
possible.	  When	  we	  engage	  in	  storytelling	  we	  engage	  a	  similar	  intero-­‐
exteroceptive	  process	  as	  when	  we	  are	  aware	  of	  our	  current	  situation.	  When	  
this	  sensori-­‐affective	  process	  is	  simulated,	  it	  places	  us	  in	  a	  virtual	  world.	  
Narrative	  understanding	  then	  becomes	  central	  to	  being	  able	  to	  act	  for	  
reasons,	  because	  it	  is	  an	  embodied	  process	  where	  the	  actions	  of	  our	  virtual	  
self	  are	  available	  to	  our	  present	  self.	  Furthermore,	  as	  narratively	  constructed,	  
the	  meaning	  of	  our	  actions	  and	  their	  consequences	  are	  available	  to	  us	  in	  the	  
present.	  Thus,	  like	  G&K,	  I	  take	  sensory	  experience	  to	  be	  central	  to	  agency.	  	  
Of	  writing	  a	  novel,	  the	  author	  Ursula	  le	  Guin	  has	  said:	  	  
There	  is	  a	  relationship,	  a	  reciprocity	  between	  the	  words	  and	  the	  images,	  
ideas,	  and	  emotions	  evoked	  by	  those	  words:	  the	  stronger	  the	  relationship,	  
the	  stronger	  the	  work.	  To	  believe	  that	  you	  can	  achieve	  meaning	  or	  feeling	  
without	  coherent,	  integrated	  patterning	  of	  the	  sounds,	  the	  rhythms,	  the	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sentence	  structure,	  the	  images,	  is	  like	  believing	  you	  can	  go	  for	  a	  walk	  
without	  bones.	  (1997,	  p.	  196.)	  
	  
And	  similarly	  I	  have	  argued	  imagery,	  or	  sensory	  experience	  more	  generally,	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Conclusion	  
	  
“In	  the	  beginning	  was	  the	  word.”	  Goethe	  answered	  this	  Biblical	  phrase	  through	  Faust:	  “In	  the	  
beginning	  was	  the	  deed.”	  Through	  this	  statement,	  Goethe	  wished	  to	  counteract	  the	  word’s	  
over-­‐valuation…	  We	  can	  agree	  with	  Goethe	  that	  the	  word	  as	  such	  should	  not	  be	  overvalued	  
and	  can	  concur	  in	  his	  transformation	  of	  the	  Biblical	  line	  to,	  “In	  the	  beginning	  was	  the	  deed.”	  
Nonetheless,	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  history	  of	  development,	  we	  can	  still	  read	  this	  line	  with	  a	  
different	  emphasis:	  “In	  the	  beginning	  was	  the	  deed.”	  	  
Vygostky,	  1987,	  Thinking	  and	  Speech,	  original	  emphasis.	  
	  
I	  have	  been	  focused,	  in	  this	  thesis,	  on	  the	  question:	  what	  constitutes	  our	  reasons	  
for	  action?	  Prinz’s	  answer	  has	  been:	  emotion,	  and	  only	  emotion.	  My	  response	  has	  
been	  similar	  to	  Vygotsky’s	  above:	  in	  the	  beginning	  was	  emotion.	  But	  then	  there	  
were	  concepts,	  and	  thus	  the	  capacity	  to	  deliberate.	  But	  concepts	  are	  affectively	  
constituted,	  and	  thus	  emotion	  falls	  within	  the	  space	  of	  reasons,	  and	  enables	  us	  to	  
act	  for	  reasons.	  	  
	   We	  started	  this	  journey	  with	  two	  theories	  of	  moral	  judgement	  both	  with	  
aspects	  that	  seemed	  importantly	  right.	  From	  Prinz,	  there	  was	  something	  
compelling	  about	  the	  idea	  that	  emotions	  are	  central	  to	  moral	  judgements,	  and	  that	  
emotions	  are	  embodied	  and	  action-­‐orientated.	  From	  G&K,	  we	  were	  also	  introduced	  
to	  the	  idea	  that	  self-­‐understanding	  might	  be	  crucial	  to	  agency,	  and	  that	  
subjectively-­‐experienced	  diachronic	  thinking,	  what	  they	  called	  MTT,	  may	  be	  
related	  to	  self-­‐understanding.	  	  
	   Each	  theory,	  however,	  had	  their	  pitfalls	  and	  limitations.	  Prinz	  is	  ambivalent	  
about	  whether	  moral	  emotions	  are	  conceptual.	  And,	  if	  we	  look	  closer	  at	  some	  of	  
the	  commitments	  that	  might	  underlie	  G&K’s	  criticism	  of	  Prinz,	  we	  find	  
McDowellian	  intuitions	  that	  emotions	  cannot	  constitute	  moral	  judgements	  unless	  
they	  are	  conceptual,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  deliberative	  
reasoning,	  something	  that	  Prinz	  appears	  to	  reject.	  Reasons	  for	  action	  must	  be	  the	  
type	  of	  things	  that	  can	  be	  articulated	  and	  defended.	  Yet	  G&K’s	  proposal	  left	  it	  
puzzling	  how	  to	  relate	  ideas	  of	  MTT	  and	  self-­‐understanding	  with	  emotions.	  	  
	   So	  this	  thesis	  has	  attempted	  to	  incorporate	  the	  insights	  from	  both	  these	  
theories	  and	  to	  resolve	  some	  of	  the	  issues.	  I	  have	  proposed	  that	  acting	  for	  reasons	  
is	  a	  narrative	  activity	  and	  that	  it	  is	  both	  rational	  and	  experiential.	  Further,	  these	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processes	  are	  mutually	  forming.	  Our	  sensori-­‐affective	  abilities	  are	  constitutive	  of	  
our	  capacity	  to	  tell	  and	  understand	  stories,	  but	  the	  stories	  we	  tell	  shape	  our	  
experiences.	  Specifically,	  we	  act	  for	  moral	  reasons	  when	  the	  language	  we	  use	  to	  tell	  
and	  understand	  stories	  enables	  us	  to	  form	  what	  Taylor	  calls	  strong	  evaluations.	  
	  Because	  it	  is	  narrative	  understanding	  that	  constitutes	  the	  moral	  sense	  that	  
we	  draw	  on	  to	  articulate	  judgements,	  moral	  judgements	  are	  not	  reducible	  to	  a	  
singular	  emotion.	  Instead	  they	  are	  formed	  through	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  
affective	  concepts	  that	  make	  up	  the	  narratives	  we	  understand.	  This	  theory	  of	  
moral	  judgements	  differs	  from	  Prinz’s	  by	  bringing	  them	  into	  the	  space	  of	  reasons,	  
because	  our	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  the	  type	  of	  thing	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  and	  
scrutinized	  for	  rational	  coherence.	  	  
	   In	  forming	  this	  theory,	  I’ve	  rejected	  some	  of	  the	  commitments	  of	  those	  I	  
have	  engaged	  with.	  I	  have	  rejected	  Prinz’s	  dichotomy	  between	  deliberative	  
reasoning	  and	  emotions,	  and	  the	  independence	  of	  emotion	  and	  sensory	  
experience,	  and	  argued	  that	  these	  processes	  are	  all	  interdependent.	  I	  have	  rejected	  
G&K’s	  commitment	  to	  metarepresentation	  being	  central	  to	  self-­‐understanding.	  I	  
have	  also	  rejected	  Velleman’s	  notion	  that	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  distinct	  from	  
metarepresentational	  understanding,	  and	  instead	  argued	  that	  the	  former	  is	  a	  
condition	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  
	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  do	  now	  is	  spell	  out	  in	  a	  bit	  more	  detail	  how	  I	  have	  managed	  to	  
respond	  to	  Prinz’s	  claim	  that	  emotion,	  and	  not	  deliberative	  reasoning,	  constitutes	  
moral	  judgements	  and	  arrived	  at	  a	  theory	  of	  embodied	  moral	  agency.	  Remember,	  
that	  this	  constitution	  claim	  is	  softened	  by	  Prinz’s	  more	  detailed	  claim	  that	  a	  moral	  
judgement	  is	  constituted	  by	  an	  emotion	  and	  a	  representation	  of	  the	  particular	  
object	  of	  that	  emotion.	  Note,	  however,	  that	  in	  this	  proposal	  it	  is	  still	  the	  emotion	  
that	  remains	  the	  moral	  part	  of	  the	  moral	  judgement,	  the	  particular	  object	  just	  
anchors	  the	  moral	  sense	  to	  its	  particular	  object,	  the	  particular	  object	  does	  not	  
participate	  in	  the	  moral	  sense.	  	  
	   How	  does	  Prinz	  manage	  to	  argue	  for	  this	  conclusion,	  that	  emotions	  
constitute	  our	  moral	  attitudes?	  One	  thing	  he	  has	  to	  do,	  to	  defend	  this,	  is	  also	  argue	  
for	  the	  independence	  of	  various	  psychological	  processes.	  Included	  in	  this	  project,	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is	  establishing	  that	  our	  explicit	  rational	  capacities	  can	  only	  be	  causally	  relevant	  to	  
our	  emotions,	  rather	  than	  constituents	  of	  them.	  If	  emotions	  and	  deliberative	  
reasoning	  are	  interconnected	  in	  some	  constitutive	  way,	  then	  the	  possibility	  of	  
Prinz’s	  moral	  emotions,	  distinct	  from	  deliberative	  capacities,	  constituting	  
judgements	  falls	  away.	  	  
In	  my	  first	  chapter,	  I	  argued	  that	  Prinz	  equivocated	  on	  whether	  moral	  
emotions	  constitute	  concepts	  or	  not.	  Although	  he	  stated	  that	  they	  do,	  he	  does	  not	  
appear	  to	  think	  the	  moral	  emotions	  are	  part	  of	  our	  deliberation,	  instead	  they	  are	  a	  
result	  of	  it.	  However,	  concepts,	  for	  Prinz,	  are	  normally	  things	  that	  can	  participate	  
in	  deliberation.	  It	  seems	  that	  he	  is	  ambiguous	  on	  this	  point	  because	  he	  is	  trying	  to	  
defend	  sentimentalism.	  As	  such,	  making	  deliberation	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  
judgements	  would	  by	  a	  synthesis	  of	  rationalism	  and	  sentimentalism,	  rather	  than	  a	  
clearly	  sentimentalist	  position.	  	  
	  In	  my	  second	  chapter,	  I	  introduced,	  using	  McDowell,	  an	  alternative	  way	  to	  
understand	  ‘judgement’.	  Here,	  for	  something	  to	  be	  a	  judgement,	  it	  is	  the	  
articulation	  of	  our	  conceptual,	  but	  implicit,	  reasons.	  Further,	  for	  it	  to	  count	  as	  a	  
judgement,	  it	  must	  be	  justified	  and	  not	  merely	  caused.	  Prinz,	  as	  understanding	  
moral	  judgements	  as	  merited	  because	  they	  are	  caused	  in	  the	  right	  way,	  rather	  than	  
justified,	  fails	  to	  give	  a	  theory	  of	  moral	  judgements.	  My	  argument,	  however,	  
requires	  that	  the	  language	  we	  use	  to	  characterise	  rational	  agents	  is	  distinct	  and	  
legitimate.	  Meanwhile	  causal	  explanation	  can	  only	  explain	  the	  enabling	  conditions	  
that	  make	  creatures	  like	  ourselves	  possible.	  In	  doing	  this,	  I	  make	  a	  fundamental	  
commitment	  to	  how	  to	  best	  understand	  questions	  of	  agency	  and	  knowledge.	  
In	  chapter	  3,	  I	  started	  developing	  my	  own	  theory	  of	  what	  type	  of	  things	  we	  
are	  as	  agents.	  Here,	  I	  looked	  at	  G&K	  claim	  that	  MTT	  is	  essential	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
make	  and	  act	  on	  responsible	  decisions.	  I	  argued	  that	  G&K	  are	  right	  that	  being	  able	  
to	  inhabit	  a	  sequence	  of	  events	  makes	  a	  special	  contribution	  to	  making	  and	  acting	  
on	  decisions,	  but	  that	  they	  are	  wrong	  that	  this	  is	  specific	  to	  MTT.	  Instead,	  I	  argued	  
that	  the	  general	  capacity	  to	  inhabit	  counterfactuals,	  called	  narrative	  understanding	  
–	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  particular	  capacity	  to	  inhabit	  the	  past	  and	  future	  of	  what	  is	  
explicitly	  depicted	  as	  our	  own	  life	  –	  is	  important	  for	  decision-­‐making.	  Further,	  I	  
proposed	  that	  if	  we	  understand	  emotions	  as	  embodied	  appraisals,	  as	  Prinz	  does,	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then	  we	  can	  explain	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  MTT,	  and	  
why	  that	  phenomenology	  co-­‐occurs	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  action.	  As	  Velleman	  
explains,	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  characterised	  by	  an	  emotional	  cadence.	  So,	  
emotions,	  as	  providing	  us	  with	  a	  felt	  understanding	  of	  how	  we	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  
a	  situation,	  co-­‐emerge	  with	  a	  sense	  that	  we	  are	  inhabiting	  a	  situation.	  	  
	   In	  chapter	  4,	  I	  related	  narrative	  understanding	  to	  the	  theory	  that	  we	  are	  
agents	  when	  we	  can	  act	  in	  light	  of	  our	  own	  self-­‐understanding.	  I	  argued	  that	  
narrative	  understanding	  is	  always	  implicitly	  self-­‐understanding	  because	  
understanding	  a	  narrative	  always	  contains	  a	  pre-­‐reflective	  experience	  of	  our	  
selves	  and	  how	  we	  relate	  to	  a	  situation.	  Because	  of	  this,	  the	  ability	  for	  narrative	  
understanding	  to	  unify	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  is	  also	  the	  potential	  to	  
unify	  our	  implicit	  understanding	  of	  our	  selves.	  If	  reasons	  for	  actions	  consist	  of	  
acting	  in	  light	  of	  what	  would	  make	  sense	  for	  us	  to	  do,	  given	  our	  commitments,	  then	  
narrative	  understanding	  enables	  us	  to	  act	  on	  reason.	  Unlike	  Velleman,	  I	  argued	  
that	  narrative	  understanding	  and	  metarepresentational	  understanding	  are	  on	  a	  
continuum	  –	  our	  ability	  for	  narrative	  understanding	  emerges	  with	  a	  diachronic,	  
teleological,	  perspective.	  The	  implicit	  understanding	  of	  such	  a	  perspective	  is	  
necessary	  to	  explicitly	  think	  about	  our	  selves	  and	  others	  as	  thinking	  things	  that	  
pursue	  goals	  over	  time.	  	  	  	  
	   In	  my	  fifth	  chapter,	  I	  considered	  how	  narrative	  understanding	  is	  involved	  in	  
moral	  agency.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  I	  returned	  to	  Prinz	  and	  the	  relationship	  
between	  emotions	  and	  concepts,	  and	  I	  gave	  further	  reasons	  that	  supported	  the	  
alternative	  understanding	  of	  ‘judgement’	  that	  I	  had	  started	  in	  chapter	  2.	  
Judgements	  are	  the	  act	  of	  a	  language-­‐using	  creature	  because,	  by	  enabling	  us	  to	  
stand	  back	  and	  reflect	  on	  our	  attitudes,	  language	  enables	  us	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  
our	  own	  perspective.	  Looking	  at	  Taylor’s	  theory	  of	  strong	  evaluations,	  I	  explained	  
how	  the	  moral	  sense	  through	  which	  we	  make	  moral	  judgements	  emerges	  with	  
narrative	  understanding	  that	  involves	  moral	  language.	  Moral	  narrative	  
understanding	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  moral	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  of	  qualitatively	  higher	  
and	  lower	  worth	  through	  providing	  us	  with	  a	  coherent	  network	  of	  affective	  
reasons.	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This	  theory	  of	  moral	  agency	  is	  supported	  by	  a	  phenomenological	  
description	  of	  our	  moral	  thinking	  as	  one	  that	  is	  continually	  both	  affective	  and	  
conceptual,	  and	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  shows	  concepts,	  particularly	  abstract	  
ones,	  are	  affective.	  Both	  these	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  fit	  with	  the	  theory	  that	  emotions,	  
through	  being	  constitutive	  of	  concepts,	  can	  be	  part	  of	  the	  space	  of	  reasons.	  Since	  
Prinz	  understands	  emotions	  as	  nonconceptual	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  not	  
involved	  in	  deliberation,	  this	  also	  departs	  from	  Prinz	  by	  arguing	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  
singular	  emotion	  joined	  to	  representation	  of	  their	  particular	  object	  that	  constitutes	  
a	  judgement,	  but	  articulation	  of	  the	  interrelation	  of	  various	  affective	  concepts.	  As	  
an	  alternative	  to	  Prinz,	  therefore,	  the	  theory	  of	  embodied	  narrative	  moral	  agency	  
gives	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  what	  psychological	  processes	  enable	  us	  to	  act	  for	  moral	  
reasons,	  and	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  phenomenological	  and	  empirical	  
considerations.	  While	  it	  does	  not	  disprove	  Prinz’s	  theory,	  it	  does	  provide	  a	  
competing	  explanation	  that	  doesn’t	  result	  in	  the	  highly	  counter-­‐intuitive	  claim	  that	  
only	  emotions,	  and	  not	  deliberative	  processes,	  are	  constitutive	  of	  moral	  
judgements.	  	  	  	  
In	  my	  final	  chapter,	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  theory	  that	  emotions	  and	  sensory	  
experience	  are	  interdependent	  also	  provides	  us	  with	  an	  account	  of	  how	  narrative	  
understanding	  is	  possible,	  and	  how	  we	  can	  act	  on	  it,	  and	  has	  theoretic	  virtues	  that	  
Prinz’s	  theory	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  lacks.	  I	  
draw	  on	  the	  phenomenology	  of	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  to	  explain	  how	  our	  sense	  of	  being	  
present	  in	  the	  present	  consists	  of	  the	  world	  being	  experienced	  affectively,	  and	  our	  
bodies	  being	  experienced	  as	  engaged	  with	  the	  situation	  we	  are	  in.	  This	  can	  be	  
explained	  neurologically,	  through	  the	  intertwining	  of	  intero-­‐	  and	  exteroceptive	  
processes	  in	  perception.	  Unsurprisingly,	  then,	  when	  there	  is	  an	  intense	  and	  global	  
break	  down	  in	  the	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  intero-­‐exteroceptive	  processing,	  such	  as	  in	  
psychosis,	  people	  experience	  an	  altered	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  world.	  That	  is,	  the	  
interdependence	  of	  sensory	  and	  emotional	  experience	  can	  explain	  cases	  in	  clinical	  
psychology.	  Finally,	  this	  contributes	  to	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  we	  can	  act	  on	  our	  
narrative	  understanding	  through	  explaining	  how	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  have	  a	  
perspective	  on	  our	  current	  situation.	  My	  proposal	  is	  that	  our	  pre-­‐reflective	  sense	  
of	  embodiment	  in	  our	  narrative	  imaginings	  is	  a	  simulation	  of	  the	  same	  intero-­‐
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exteroceptive	  processes	  that	  provide	  us	  with	  our	  current	  sense	  of	  embodiment.	  
This	  makes	  narrative	  understanding	  an	  indexical	  type	  of	  understanding.	  Both	  our	  
actual	  and	  virtual	  embodiment	  prereflectively	  point	  back	  to	  the	  same	  body.	  
Because	  our	  embodiment	  is	  also	  thoroughly	  action-­‐orientated,	  narrative	  
understanding	  discloses	  possible	  actions	  to	  us,	  and	  so	  the	  possibilities	  for	  action	  
we	  encounter	  through	  narrative	  understanding	  are	  available	  to	  us	  now.	  	  
	  
In	  the	  end,	  this	  thesis	  expands	  on	  a	  truism	  about	  what	  type	  of	  things	  we	  are	  as	  
humans,	  as	  agents.	  So	  we’ve	  gone	  on	  this	  journey	  to	  arrive	  near	  the	  beginning	  of	  
the	  western	  philosophical	  tradition.	  Aristotle	  expressed	  it	  long	  ago:	  we	  are	  rational	  
animals.	  Here,	  I	  have	  suggested	  that	  our	  rationality	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  
embodiedness	  and	  our	  emotionality,	  in	  virtue	  of	  us	  having	  a	  world	  that	  matters	  to	  
us.	  Prinz	  is	  right	  to	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  emotion	  to	  being	  agents,	  he	  is	  right	  
that	  because	  we	  have	  affect,	  we	  can	  act,	  and	  we	  can	  act	  on	  what	  matters	  to	  us.	  	  He	  
is	  right	  that	  this	  relation	  is	  one	  of	  constitution.	  But	  G&K	  are	  right	  too	  to	  stress	  the	  
importance	  of	  self-­‐understanding,	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  rational	  thought	  to	  moral	  
agency.	  	  	  
This	  led	  us	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  narrative	  understanding	  for	  moral	  agency.	  
Narrative	  understanding	  is	  the	  capacity	  to	  inhabit	  a	  sequence	  of	  events;	  it	  allows	  
us	  to	  be	  present	  in	  virtual	  situations	  and	  for	  virtual	  situations	  to	  contextualise	  our	  
current	  predicament.	  When	  we	  can	  produce	  narratives,	  we	  have	  agency,	  we	  have	  
the	  capacity	  to	  act	  on	  what	  makes	  experiential	  and	  logical	  sense	  to	  us.	  A	  capacity	  
that	  is	  conceptual-­‐affective-­‐sensory.	  Because	  these	  processes	  cannot	  be	  pulled	  
apart	  fully	  it	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  say	  that	  emotion	  alone	  constitutes	  agency	  
because	  it	  is	  mutually	  formed	  with	  our	  capacity	  for	  concepts	  and	  sensory	  
experience.	  I’ve	  suggested	  that	  this	  is	  the	  best	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  evidence	  from	  
our	  experiences	  and	  from	  science,	  a	  way	  that	  fits	  with	  a	  philosophical	  account	  of	  
agency,	  where	  we	  are	  agents	  because	  we	  act	  for	  reasons.	  Reasons,	  now,	  are	  
constituted	  through	  an	  emotional	  cadence,	  but	  this	  is	  part	  of,	  and	  not	  counter	  to,	  
our	  deliberative	  capacities.	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